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Abstract 
This thesis examines the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus in war torn zones. 
With a case study of the Kivus in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has 
experienced one of the world’s worst blood-shedding over the last two decades, the study 
uses a constructivist Grounded Theory approach to research in terms of both data collection 
and analysis. It focuses on the existing body of knowledge on conflict analyses with a 
particular reference to the absurdity of abundance theory, which singles out the endowment 
of natural resources and weak governance as the main fuelling-factors of the conflict in the 
DRC. Data collection was carried out using diverse methods including literature reviews, 
interviews and focus groups. In particular, the study aims to explore how the 
demilitarisation of the mining zones could contribute to enhancement of the Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants and promote social cohesion, 
sustainable peace and security in the eastern DRC. 
The analysis of the conflicts in the DRC and the acquaintance of belligerents with artisanal 
mining revealed the convoluted multi-layered nature of the conflicts in the country and their 
intricate causalities. The examination of the demilitarisation of the mining zones pertinent 
to the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment 
of combatants in the Kivus identified a few prerequisites in order to sever the artisanal 
mining-combatant-recruitment relationship that largely swivel around “bottom-up 
solutions”. 
The research contributes to knowledge in three broad areas; firstly, it contributes to ongoing 
academic debates on conflict analyses, the political economy of armed conflicts vis-à-vis 
mining sector as well as the mining sector and DDR of combatants in the DRC. Secondly, it 
offers empirical analysis and data on the combatants’ recruitment and DDR process and the 
artisanal mining sector with regards to state failure and protracted armed conflict in the 
DRC. Finally, it underlines the need to re-evaluate “the concept of community-based 
approach”, a key approach to improving peacebuilding and post-conflict recovery in the 
eastern DRC. 
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Chapter One: Researching on the Nexus between Artisanal Mining and Reintegration 
of Ex- combatants in the Context of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
 
 (IPIS 2013). 
1.1 Introduction 
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a widespread optimism that the Cold War is 
over and consequently, African countries were expected to enter an era of peace and 
development. This optimism nonetheless ushered in recurrent local conflicts. Some 
fundamental factors, including identity and land access associated with economic 
exacerbations have been singled out as conflict triggering-factors. Most Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries, particularly the DRC, have been experiencing a turbulent period mainly caused 
by the presence of natural resources. These resources occur to be feeding local and regional 
insecurity, therefore keeping the region prone to protracted armed conflict.  
Indeed a fairly cursory knowledge of the DRC’s history proves that Congolese authorities’ 
perspective of state – the DRC being a sovereign state, is far different from great powers 
and multinational corporations’ – which view the DRC as an international space for trade 
purposes,1 where economic and lucrative issues have priority over security and stability. It 
is an indisputable fact that from the reign of King Léopold II over the International 
Association of the Congo to the present Congo, the DRC has been a reservoir of natural 
resources destined for illegal exploitation.  
The thesis’ main argument that the conflict in the DRC is hybrid and multifaceted2 sheds 
light on how the country is a ‘text-book-state’3 or a ‘terra nullius’,4 with a stateless 
                                                 
1 See Chapters 4 and 5 for further details. 
2 See chapter 4 for more details. 
3A text-book-state is a country which is totally evanescent on the issue of human security and social 
development of citizens at all social levels. In the context of this research, it refers to as an organised political 
community – territory, population and government, under one government, with the latter being powerless 
and careless in delivering basic needs for its people.  
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the 
thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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situation over its territory-mineral endowment. Possible interpretation includes that first 
and foremost, the country will need a proactive security system drawn from the thought that 
‘whosoever wants peace should prepare for war’.5 In such a context, a problem-solving 
approach toward analysing and resolving conflict will need to primarily incorporate local 
vision.  
Over the last 20 years or more, some individuals have been involved in the cycle of 
Demobilisation, Disarmament, Reintegration (DDR) and Re-recruitment of ex-combatants 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s war-torn territories.  The last 20 years have also 
seen those who were recruited becoming recruiters themselves, because they have 
knowledge of who to liaise with – on issues regarding recruitment, where to find 
combatants and how to convince or compel individuals to join such armed movements. 
Meanwhile, the presence of natural resources should not necessarily instigate militarisation, 
be it legal or illegal, such as those have happened or re-occurring in the eastern DRC. This 
process should be seen under a wider environment; national, local, regional or beyond the 
borders to vividly understand and explain the problem. Ndaywel (1998) and Elikia 
M’bokolo (2005) put forward that this is not the first time a category of individuals have 
been involved in the recruitment enterprise in the DRC. Between 1860 and 1870, they 
reiterate, the hunting of elephants proceeded roughly in the same manner. To them, 
probable interpretation could be that youth who were recruited in Namwezi around Tabora 
had to cross Tanganyika Lake either to the north or south to hunt for elephants. With time, 
these individuals began to recruit other young people to work with them. After about 35 
years, these individuals resorted to infantile, young or adult workforce that involved 
socialisation procedure and the creation of new elite as well as new identity.  
In the context of state failure and long-drawn-out armed movements, as the case in the 
DRC, the ex-combatants’ DDR would barely succeed, due to a “top-down understanding” 
of the problem and the “top-down solutions” to the same issues that led to the conflict. In 
                                                                                                                                                     
4 The concept ‘terra nullius’ is a Latin term which means free man’s land, land opened for all. In the context 
of this study it designates free land for exploitation. 
5 This is the translation of a Latin adage; Si vis pacemen para bellum adapted from a statement found in Book 
three of Latin author Publius Flavius; Vegetius Renatus’s tract De Re Militari – 4th or 5th century. 
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this case, arguably the ex-combatants will generally be in the prey of conflict entrepreneurs 
and likely to be re-recruited by armed movements. Probable interpretation could be that the 
ex-combatants’ re-recruitment hence will happen either because there is a local, national or 
international conflict’s network which enables recruiters and conflict entrepreneurs to 
perpetuate the cycle of recruitment or due to ineffectiveness of the institutional framework 
to sustain and promote peace, social, political and economic stability. 
1.2 Setting the Context: the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Leopold’s colonial rule and the very first Congolese civil war some weeks after 
independence resulted in the breaking-up of two mining provinces thus, Katanga and Kasai 
in September 1960. These are the two main watersheds that could help understand the long 
way from colonial period to the current DRC as well as different rebellions that the country 
has still been experiencing. Located in the African Great Lakes Region, the DR Congo6 is 
the 2nd largest country in Africa by area and the 11th in the world. With a population of 
about 75 million (UNDP 2014), it is also the 4th most populous African country, the 19th in 
the world and formally the most populous Francophone country. As seen in Figure 1, the 
country has nine neighbours including the Central African Republic and South Sudan to the 
north; Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and Tanzania to the east; Zambia and Angola to the south 
and the Republic of Congo, the Angolan enclave of Cabinda and the Atlantic Ocean to the 
west. Although the 2006 Constitution has provided a Unitarian state with 26 decentralised 
entities, up to date however it is still administratively split into 11 provinces including 
Bandundu, Bas-Congo, Equateur, Kasai Oriental, Kasai Occidental, Katanga, Kinshasa, 
Maniema, the north Kivu and the south Kivu (Van Reybrouck 2014).  
With a surface area of 2,345,000 km2, the DRC is a country brimming with natural resource 
potentials. According to the National Statistic estimates, as quoted by CIA World Fact-
book (2010), the DRC’s population is scattered across the country, with only 40% living in 
                                                 
6 Belgium-Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Congo-Leopoldville, Congo-Zaire and Congo-
Kinshasa will be used interchangeably.   
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urban areas. The country is endowed with extraordinary agricultural and mineral resources 
that potentially make it one of the richest countries in Africa and a driver for African 
growth. Since 2003, DRC is still improving from a cycle of crisis – which erupted in the 
1990s, and from the upshots of a protracted economic and social morass – in which the 
country has been mired since the late 1970s. Although a slow recovery, the Congo still 
remains a fragile post-conflict state, characterised by little tax headroom and weak 
institutions that require enormous needs in terms of state-rebuilding and economic growth 
(World Bank 2010; UNDP 2012).   
Over the past five years, the country has made some improvements through political and 
economic reforms. In contrast, per capita income and human development is ranked near 
the bottom of the world, at 176 out of 182, and one of the lowest in Africa, with many 
communities living from hand to mouth (UNDP 2012). From 2003 to 2010, the government 
in close cooperation with the World Bank embarked on a systematic restructuring process 
to enhance economic governance, particularly decentralisation, public finance management, 
public administration and transparency, and three other sectors; namely public enterprises, 
the mining sector and the security sector, with the latter including ex-combatants’ DDR 
(World Bank 2010). Although considerable improvement in the implementation of these 
measures have been accomplished over the past two years, further efforts are still needed to 
entrench the principle of competitive awarding of mining, oil and forestry contracts.
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The country’s mining activities are closely linked to conflicts and instability rather than 
contributing to the country’s development or to the improvement of peoples’ living 
standards (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Van Reybrouck 2014). There is a striking contrast 
between those in poverty and immense wealth, in terms of natural resources and other 
valuable commodities, in the DRC. The country’s wealth is also believed to be one of the 
causes of the endless armed conflicts, riots and poverty (UNDP 2012). Transforming the 
‘absurdity of abundance’ into a blessing is one of the main challenges facing the state 
following the second democratic elections held over decades ago.  
 
Compared to other countries in the world, the DRC is characterised by the abundance and 
diversity of its natural resources. The particularity of Congo’s minerals is that several 
minerals are concentrated in one place, for instance when digging for gold, two or three 
other kinds of minerals such as diamond, tin or coltan can also be found. Different natural 
resources are mainly concentrated in the following areas; 
Katanga: large deposits of cobalt and copper along the Central African copper belt in the 
south. In this region, it is not uncommon to find other related-metals to copper and cobalt, 
such as zinc, silver, germanium, and even uranium in some fields. 
Eastern Regions: in the provinces of the north Kivu, the south Kivu and Maniema, 
bordering Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi, there are deposits of gold, coltan (columbite 
tantalite), tin and tungsten. 
Kasai Regions: in the eastern and western Kasai there are enormous diamond deposits. 
Littoral Zone: there are oil and natural gas (offshore) but also in a narrow strip along the 
coast (onshore). However, compared to its neighbouring countries – Congo-Brazzaville and 
Angola that are already oil producers, the probability of finding the most important inland 
oil reservoirs is very limited.  
Judged by its share of world reserves, suggest Berke et al. (2007), the main mineral 
resources of the DRC, in its current state are as follows; cobalt (36% of world reserves), 
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tantalum (25 - 65%), tin (7%), copper (6%) and diamond (25%), including explored and 
exploited economically as well as additional reserves estimated on the basis of available 
knowledge fields. The country is also covered by tropical rain forest (Congo basin), and is 
the 2nd largest forest reserve in the world after Brazil. 
The present state or condition of the DRC is the result of a series of socio-political 
metamorphoses that hampered the country’s economic development potentials. From the 
establishment of the International Association of the Congo by King Léopold II in 1879 to 
the current DRC, the country’s government has been unstable. To date, it has had eight 
name changes (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Van Reybrouck 2014) reflecting its fragility and 
instability. The Table 1.1 summarises some of the different general changes the DRC 
underwent in its history. 
Table1.1: The DRC’s history of important governance changes 





Association of the 
Congo (IAC) 
Royal Discretion Private property of 
King Léopold II 
1885-1908 Congo Free State 
(CFS) 
Berlin General Act Terra Nullius 
International Property 






Law on the 
Government of the 
Belgian Congo 
Monarchy/ Personal 
Union with Belgium 
1st  Republic 
1960-1964 

















                                                 
7 This was arguably the longest – albeit coerced, period of tranquillity the country has experienced. 
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Source: Own composition 
The history of natural resources exploitation and conflicts in the DRC goes side by side 
with the creation of the current DRC. The DRC’s colonial history shows that resources 
exploitation began in the 1700s while armed conflicts started in the 1900s. In his research 
on memories of Africa, Elikia M’bokolo (2005) provides that during Leopold’s colonial 
rule the King of Belgium amassed an immense individual wealth from ivory and rubber 
through Congolese slave labour, while about 10 million people died from forced labour and 
famine. This outright extermination and the inhuman9 exploitation of the Congo have been 
                                                 
8 The executive of the transitional period (2003-06) was made of one president and four vice-presidents. 
9According to Genocide scholar Adam Jones (2006:42), “the result of rubber exploitation in the Congo Free 
State by Léopold II was one of the most brutal and all-encompassing corvée [forced labour] institutions the 
world has known… Male rubber tappers and porters were mercilessly exploited and driven to death”.  From 
Hochschild (1998) and Ewans’ (2002) account on Belgian colonial atrocities in the Congo, it has been 
unveiled that Leopold’s agents held the wives and children of these men hostage until they returned with their 
rubber quota. Those who refused or failed to supply enough rubber often had their villages burned down, 
children murdered, and their hands cut off. 
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believed to be the ultimate cause which prompted Belgium to take over administration of 
the Congo in 1908, which remained a colony until June 30, 1960. However, five days after 
independence – July 5, a military mutiny by Congolese soldiers against their European 
officers broke out in the capital and rampant looting began. On July 11, 1960 the mining 
province of Katanga seceded from the new republic while the diamond-rich province of 
Kasai broke away on August 8, 1960. Hence, newly independent Congo plunged into its 
first civil war in 1960 (Elikia M’bokolo 2005).  
The overview of macro-level mining in the DRC suggests that mining generates a bigger 
share of economic activity than in other countries with remarkable direct economic impacts, 
especially in terms of producing foreign direct investment and export. The indirect impacts 
are potentially much greater (see Figure 1.2), but difficulty lies in impacts’ measurement 
because of data constraints within the DRC (Oxford Institute of Management 2013).  
 
Figure1.2: Overview of macro-level contributions of mining in DRC (Oxford Policy 
Management 2013:9) 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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Endowed with resources of vast potential wealth, the DRC’s economy dropped 
considerably since the mid-1980s.10 The United Nations Development Programme – 
UNDP, recently advised that the country’s untapped mineral deposits are believed to be 
worth in excess of US$ 24 trillion, with an economy relying heavily on mining. However, 
despite being one of the world’s richest countries in terms of natural resources, it has the 
world’s 2nd lowest nominal Gross Domestic Profit – GDP, per capita (UNDP 2012). 
1.3 Political Economy of Armed Groups vis-à-vis Mining Sector in the Kivus11 
Following the end of the Cold War, arguably the outbreak of most of the conflicts in Africa 
had been linked to economic incentives, exacerbated by either ethnic identity or land 
dispute. For instance, suggestions from Gebrewold (2009) indicate that informal and 
unlawful high-profit economic activities such as arms sales, drug trafficking, illegal mining 
and trade of minerals including diamonds, gold, coltan etc., are believed to have developed 
and increased in territories under rebel control, as over time those involved in, or reliant on 
these activities lose all interests in peace. The history of rebellions in the DRC started 
immediately after the colonial period (Dean Pavlakis 2010; Onana 2013; Nashi 2013). 
From 1960 to 2013, Congo has experienced at least nine rebellions and an endless 
occurrence of local and external armed groups12 (Onana 2013; Nashi 2013). With the 
exception of the 1960s rebellions which started in the south – Katanga, west – Bandundu 
and Kasai, and a part of the north – Kisangani,13 the rest of rebellions erupted in the 
mining-rich territory of the country in the east – Kivus. The figures 1.3 and 1.4 below show 
the abundance of mineral deposits in the north and south Kivus that led to the rebellions’ 
outbreak. 
                                                 
10 Chapter 5 casts more lights on the DRC’s conflict analysis. 
11 The DRC has two provinces of Kivu – north and south. In this study Kivus will be used when it refers to 
both provinces. 
12 See annex 1 and 2 for more details on different rebellions and armed conflicts that occurred in the DRC 
from 1960 to 2013. 
13 The Katanga and Kasai secessions were led respectively by Moise Tshombe and Albert Kalondji two 
months following the independence 1960. The Bandundu rebellion was headed by Pierre Mulele from 1966 to 
1969. See Appendixes one and two for more details.  
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Figure1.3: Mineral deposits in the North Kivu (Source: www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php) 
 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can 
be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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Figure1.4: Mineral deposits in the South Kivu (Source: www.ipisresearch.be/mapping.php) 
 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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The two Congolese wars – 1996-1997 and 1998-2003, the proliferation of armed groups in 
the eastern DRC, the ambiguous phenomenon of combatants’ recruitment cycle and the 
failed or unfolded nature of the reintegration process illustrate the intricate relationships 
between conflict and mineral resources, as well as the convergence of domestic and 
international financial interests in perpetuating conflict (Nest 2011; Kourra Owana 2012; 
Hilgert 2013). A set of papers on the cycle of crises in the DRC have found that natural 
resources offer incentives to conflicts in order to capture the resources and reduce the 
constraints in financing the war from outside (Kourra Owana 2012; Hilgert 2013; Nashi 
2013; Onana 2013). From the first Congo war in 1998 to the outbreak of the M23 rebellion 
in 2012, the various players involved in rebellions derive profits from the conflict through 
“resource mining or war economies” (Bucyalimwe 2013:12). Illegal mining in East-Congo 
encourages and sustains the furtherance of conflict. For instance, Hilgert (2013) asserts that 
mining of mineral resources, be it legal or illegal, has blurred the discrepancies between 
economic and politico-military interests as politically unlikely but economically rational 
agreements are formed for money-spinning purposes. Subsequently, ending the war 
becomes less of a priority. 
The course of the conflict from 1996 to 2012 depicts that natural resources were, and are 
still, fuelling conflicts in the eastern DRC. Since 2001 to the recent past, several reports 
from the United Nations – UN, have focused on the issue of the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources in the East DRC, and a committee of experts on this particular issue has 
been created since 2002 (Onana 2013). Recently these experts have found that armed 
groups and members of the Congolese national army control the exploitation of gold, 
cassiterite, coltan, wolfram, timber and diamonds in a number of areas in the north and 
south Kivus (Enough Projects 2013). Global Witness (2013) released a report which 
supports the Enough Projects’ evidence. According to this report, armed groups and 
members of the Congolese national army have become “informal owners” of mining 
concessions and are levying taxes on minerals trade. On the other side however, some will 
argue that in the absence of a strong response to the state of unemployment, the majority of 
youth and demobilised ex-combatants turn to artisanal mining as an alternative and 
lucrative activity. A set of papers on putting a stop to illegal logging and on conflict 
minerals in DRC suggest that in some territories in the eastern Congo, artisanal mining is 
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an alternative response to the jobless state for young people and ex-combatants because it 
yields hundreds of thousands of informal jobs and tens of millions of dollars per year 
(Jeroen 2010; EITI 2011). 
The state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC has shown that the level and 
growth rate of revenue decrease the cost of organising rebellions and, to a limited extent, 
the government’s ability to neutralise the rebellions (World Bank 2011). However, 
although local ethnic dominance in the eastern DRC is a basis for recruitment of civil wars, 
ethnic rivalry is also a stumbling block to extend these wars beyond the province of origin 
(Bucyalimwe Maroro 2013). The reliance of Congolese economy on natural resources14 and 
on informal sector, to some extent, is a noteworthy determinant of the cycle of combatants’ 
recruitment and the failure of the reintegration process in the Kivus. However, it is not 
reliance per se which motivates combatants’ recruitment and the failure of the reintegration 
process, but rather the topographical concentration of natural resources and their 
imbalanced sharing. In such a context, the government’s capability to thwart or eliminate 
unauthorised armed groups and demilitarise mining zones depends more on external 
support, rather than on the national army and government’s economic ability.  
With this context of mineral-based conflict as the background, this study examines the 
nexus between artisanal mining and combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and re-
recruitment cycle in the Kivus, DRC. The idea of this research broadly locates the impact of 
ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas15 on combatants’ recruitment 
and reintegration rather than looking at armed group dynamics and their political economy 
vis-à-vis the mining sector.  
Combatants are linked to mineral deals in many ways. They could be involved in mining 
exploitation through a direct taxation whereby they mine natural resources using forced 
labour (GW 2013). For example, between January and December 2013, gold exports 
through accounts controlled by the rebels of the March 23 Movement (M23) totalled $500 
                                                 
14 The elaboration of resource curse in Chapter 3 gives more details on the mineral-based conflict. 
15
According to the DRC’s mining code, the army elements are prohibited from mining activities and all 
mining zones should be clear from armed elements. 
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million (The Enough Projects 2013). Combatants are also linked to minerals through 
looting, expropriation and the seizure of mineral resources or other forms of wealth 
(Kabemba 2012). From 1996 up to 2013, Rwandan and Ugandan contingents or troops 
have set a monopoly over the exploitation and commercialisation of mineral resources by 
forcing local entrepreneurs out of business while inundating the region with products 
imported from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi (Nashi 2013; Onana 2013). 
The 1998 and 2000 rebellions brought out another combatants’ profile in terms of the 
artisanal mining-combatant relationship. This is based on the combatants levying tax in the 
mining territories administrated by rebels; this levy is both in-kind and direct taxation (The 
Enough Projects 2013; GW 2013). From 1996 to 2013, Rwanda and Uganda earn sizeable 
profits from the mining of natural resources in the DRC. Evidence from some reports 
depicts that the M23 combatants levied a tax of about 8 percent of total mineral exports by 
the comptoirs [mineral selling-point] in addition to a $ 15,000 annual license fee per 
comptoir. A portion of the taxes levied by the M23 were paid to Kigali and Kampala as 
payments for military support (De Koning 2011; 2012; The Enough Projects 2013; GW 
2013, Onana 2013). The control of most artisanal mining by armed groups has connected 
combatants to some international financial institutions that have been accused of buying 
mineral from conflict zones. There is a claim that the two Congo wars and rebellions have 
also been financed by a network of financial institutions mainly established in Rwanda, 
Uganda and in Western countries (Bucyalimwe Maroro 2013; Onana 2013). It has been 
said that Rwandan banks were the principal suppliers of the funding expended to buy 
minerals from the Congolese territory controlled by rebels (GW 2013). Western banks are 
also believed to be involved in the trade of DRC’s natural resources. The 2001 UN Panel 
report, quoted by Bucyalimwe Maroro (2013), for instance, found that Banque Bruxelles 
Lambert of Belgium has handled the financial operations of Aziza Kulsum – alias Madame 
Gulamali, a notorious arms and minerals trader and one-time general manager of the 
Société Minière des Grands Lacs [Mining Company of Great Lakes; SOMIGL], a mining 
company owned by pro-Rwanda rebels in the Kivus. Citibank of New York also has been 
found to have significant indirect financial networks and mining dealings with senior rebel 
leaders in the Kivus via their suppliers (De Koning 2012).  
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The 2001 UN Panel report, quoted by Onana (2013) found that Uganda’s decision to enter 
the war in the DRC was motivated by three individuals who were keen to gain from the 
occupation of the mineral-rich eastern region of the DRC. In Rwanda however, the 
government’s decision to support an incursion was motivated by the conviction – which 
still holds true, that resource looting would help offset the cost to the government of the 
invasion, which might have otherwise been prohibited. Once inside the Congolese territory, 
the Rwandan army adopted and showed well-disciplined procedures for mining the DRC’s 
resources and utilising them to finance the military effort (Ibid.). 
In the DRC, combatants are acquainted with mining exploitation through various schemes 
and techniques depending on the circumstances and the rank of the commander or senior 
officer involved in a specific business. In the mineral-rich eastern region of the DRC, 
weapons could be acquired through direct payments or exchange with a product; however 
prevalent in the DRC is a barter type of business between ores and weapons. The 2001 UN 
report on the DRC, quoted by Bucyalimwe Maroro (2013) for instance found that arms are 
offered to a party in return for mining concessions. Overall, the DRC’s reliance on informal 
economy based on artisanal mining and mineral exports make the country prone to conflict 
because of resource appropriation and the struggle for the control of resources. However, 
the regional distribution of mineral resources could also be taken as one of mechanisms 
through which mineral resources cause conflict. Hence, the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment nexus is particularly prone to the recurrence due to the regional concentration 
of mineral resources than its reliance on mineral resources. As discussed in the following 
sections, artisanal mining is one way which drives this link. 
1.3.1 Artisanal Mining 
This section explores how artisanal mining upholds the cycle of combatants’ recruitment, 
reintegration and re-recruitment in the mining-rich zones in the Kivus. This relationship is 
also part of greed or the economic functions of war hypotheses in the prevailing conflict 
analyses discussed in Chapter Two. However Chapter Four in respect of state failure and 
protracted armed conflict in the DRC has substantiated the complex environment which 
gave rise to conflicts at multiple stages and which still upholds some of them. By 
contextualising the system of artisanal mining in the eastern DRC and how it has changed 
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over time, this review seeks to identify the ways in which artisanal mining links to the 
recruitment of combatants and the failed or unfolded nature of the reintegration process in 
the eastern DRC.  
 There is a range of studies being conducted on the nexus between mineral resources and 
conflict in the Kivus. Since the establishment of a Panel of Experts by the UN in 2000,16 
research on the illegal exploitation of resources in the DRC has prompted many other 
studies. The Panel research on the illegal exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC 
revealed the pervasive linkage between the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the 
second Congo War17 (UNSC 2001a), the role played by private companies, their home 
countries and international financial institutions (Khan 2008). These reports prompted 
diplomatic pressure from some Western governments (Lasker 2008). It emerged from the 
panel reports that the primary reason which led to invasion of Congo by Rwanda and 
Uganda was not security reasons but the exploitation of natural resources (UNSC 2001b). 
During the second Congo War, the countries above established elite networks towards 
exploiting natural resource (Autesserre 2010; 2012; Onana 2012). While the reports point 
out 85 companies being in infringement of the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development – OECD, Guidelines for Multinational Corporations and underscore the 
liability of the home governments (UNSC 2002b), the nexus between natural resources and 
conflict has been backed by the influential rational choice theory and the economic 
purposes of the war reviewed in Chapter Two.  
From the International Peace Information Service – IPIS research (Raeymaekers 2002), it 
might be thought that there was a shift in the incentive for conflict from political to 
economic. The research employs the concept ‘network war’ to portray the privatised 
networks of army officers, armed groups and international companies, connecting local war 
economy and global economic networks in looting resources for personal enrichment and to 
fund the conflict. The political economy emerging from this network war indicates that 
                                                 
16 The Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
17 UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b; 2003b) 
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state borders, state sovereignty or the difference between lawful and unlawful economy are 
irrelevant. For Duffield (2001) this is an emerging complexes situation.  
“Artisanal mining refers to the manual excavation of alluvial mineral deposits that requires 
minimal technology input” (De Koning 2009:1). According to the World Bank (Taka2011), 
90 percent of the mineral production in the DRC comes from artisanal miners, who are 
estimated to number between 500,000 and 2,000,000. In thinking about the relationship 
between artisanal mining and livelihood in the DRC, it is unarguable that the artisanal 
mining sector caters for the livelihood for 14-16 percent of the total population (ibid.). 
Thus, drawing on the understanding of the World Bank’s perspective, as contended by 
Taka (2011:158), artisanal mining sector in the DRC can be viewed as: 
“The largest segment of the DRC mining sector and the one that has the highest 
impact in terms of production, as well as persons involved in. This informal sector 
is dominated by a number of problem areas, including relations between artisans 
and large-scale miners; exploitation of vulnerable populations; extortion by 
government officials and criminal elements; lack of health, safety, and environment 
protection; and inadequate legal protection and government assistance for the 
miners”. 
The view that artisanal mining motivates combatants’ recruitment and de-motivates their 
disbandment has been supported in particular by Non-Governmental Organisations – 
NGOs, which suggest action by private companies.18 The business partnership between 
combatants and private companies – that facilitate the exploit, transport and market of 
coltan, gold and cassiterite from the DRC, is coined and described as ‘combatant 
commercialism’ in some studies.19 Within this ‘combatant commercialism’, “upholding 
insecurity has been a primary source and strategy of enrichment” (Raeymaekers 2002: 9). 
Other researches, although concurring with the above view, underline issues that have been 
overlooked by the combatant commercialism paradigm, with the exclusive emphasis on the 
                                                 
18 For example, Hayes and Burge (2003); Global Witness (2004); Enough (2009a). 
19 They include Dietrich (2000); Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002a); Raeymaekers (2002); Amnesty 
International (2003). 
 
Chapter One: Researching on the Nexus between Artisanal Mining and Reintegration of Ex- combatants in the Context of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)   
Coventry University 19 
 
nexus between coltan, gold and cassiterite exploitation and combatants’ (re-) recruitment or 
the delay of the reintegration process.  
Stearns et al.’s (2013) ethnographic approach to analysing the Obama Law shows that 
artisanal mining, particularly coltan, gold and cassiterite has become the most important 
means for local people to survive since the collapse of the formal economy in the 1980s. A 
Congolese NGO in Goma, the Pole Institute, has underlined the contribution of the above 
mentioned ores in the change of the livelihood of the people within the context of the state 
collapse and successive wars (Tegera et al. 2002; Autesserre 2010). Furthermore, by 
exploring the mining policy of the transitional government, the Pole Institute’s analysis 
brought out two major concerns in line with the collapse of the DRC’s economy. To this 
end, it highlights that the general structural problem of the DRC lies in the collapse of the 
state institutions and formal economy and the failure of the transitional government to 
tackle the struggles over mining ownership that emerged from conflicting legislation 
(Johnson and Tegera 2005). A more recent report from the Enough Project (2013) gives 
detailed analysis of the informal cross-border trade in the north Kivu. Like Pole Institute, 
the Enough Project has shed light on the existing commercial competition between different 
communities for survival (Tegera et al. 2002; Tegera and Johnson 2007; Enough Project 
2013). While there is a set of papers focusing on the informal cross-border trade in the 
region,20 in-depth studies on the linkages between artisanal mining and combatants’ 
recruitment and reintegration are limited.21 As explained in Chapters Two and Four, a few 
studies look at governance and government, known as the nature of the state, including the 
‘predatory governance’ (Rackley 2006) and warlord politics (Reno 1998; 2000).  
More recently, studies on the conflict in the Kivus find that all belligerents and 
protagonists, including the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda [Democratic 
Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda; FDLR], the Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple [National Congress for the Defence of the People; CNDP], the March 23 Movement 
                                                 
20 See DFID (2007); INICA (2007a; 2007b); Garrett and Mitchell (2009a; 2009b). 
21 See MacGaffey et al. (1991); Kisangani (1998); Raeymaekers (2009a; 2009b). 
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– M23, the Mai-Mai or Mayi-Mayi22 and the Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo; FARDC], 
secure funding from mineral exploitation and taxations (Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b; 
Global Witness 2013; UN Panel 2014). While the ongoing militarisation of mining zones 
and the involvement of combatants in natural resource exploitation in the eastern DRC 
could be regarded as a symptom of insecurity and governance failure and the complexities 
of war economies (de Koning 2009; Garrett and Mitchell 2009a; 2009b; Garrett et al. 
2009), an analysis of the conflict motivation applying qualitative geographical 
methodology revealed grievances and security as main motivations behind the conflict 
(Spittaels and Hilgert 2008; 2009b). Visibly, the above review illustrates really little 
analysis of the incentive for the conflicts. There is also a limited attempt to piece together 
the various issues regarding natural resource exploitation in order to attain more 
comprehensive understanding of the nature of the link between artisanal mining and 
combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle. 
1.3.2 Security Provisions in Artisanal Mining in the Eastern DRC 
As the fieldwork indicates, Congolese law acknowledges artisanal mining while at the same 
time prohibits security systems around its periphery.23 The mining zones have been affected 
and militarised in different ways during the civil wars in the DRC.  In the eastern DRC, 
particularly in the Kivus, many of the mining territories invaded by armed groups have 
been reverted to the control of the national army, the FARDC, since most armed 
movements that were part of the 2003 Sun City Agreement accepted the rehabilitation of 
their combatants into the FARDC thus through a rehabilitation process called 
‘intermingling’ process (De Koning 2009; 2011).24 Based on this process, combatants from 
different armed factions and those of the former national army had to be trained and 
redeployed away from their former positions. However, De Koning (2009) suggests that 
                                                 
22 The term Mai-Mai or Mayi-Mayi refers to the local self-defence force in the Kivus. It will be used 
interchangeably in this research. 
23
 Interviews conducted with a member of Congolese civil society and an academic in Kinshasa, September 
2013. 
24 The Final Act of the Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations was signed on 2 April 2003 at Sun City, South 
Africa provided the DDR programme for ex-combatants. 
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most combatants who opted for integration into the FARDC rebuffed or delayed full 
integration in order to avoid the collapse of their units and the loss of the territories 
controlled during the conflict period. This is what was referred to as non-integrated 
FARDC soldiers.25 Meanwhile, considerable number of ex-combatants had refused 
integration altogether. The CNDP and the Patriotes Résistants Congolais [Congolese 
Patriotic Resistance; PARECO] accepted the integration process of their combatants only in 
March 2009.26 As a sideline to this, the FDLR was singled out and labelled as the most 
important ‘unauthorised armed group’ which operates in the country (Autesseree 2008).27 
De Koning (2009:6) suggests: 
“whether completely rehabilitated or not, or whether previously belonging to an 
armed movement, ethnic militia or national army, soldiers in the DRC are often 
poorly paid and under limited command of the military leadership in Kinshasa and 
the provincial capitals”. 
To some extent, military leaders tolerate soldiers’ involvement in artisanal mining since it 
helps soldiers to earn payment and provisions that they could not get from the government. 
The military justice system only detains periodically military leaders accused of regular 
plunder and extortion of local communities (Autesserre 2010). Although wartime 
combatants might have been dislodged from mining zones as an upshot of the intermingling 
process (de Koning 2011), newly rehabilitated military repeatedly replace them. 
Meanwhile, a number of state security services, including the National Police, the Mining 
Police, the Agence Nationale de Renseignements [National Intelligence Agency; ANR] and 
the Direction Générale des Migrations [Directorate-General for Migration; DGM] are 
involved in the provision of security inside and around mining sites (De Koning 2009; 
2011, Autesserre 2012).  
                                                 
25 Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo: priorities for children 
associated with armed forces and group’gives more details on this issue. 
26 International Crisis Group – ICG, Congo: Five Priorities for a Peacebuilding Strategy, ICG Africa Report 
no. 150 (IGC: Brussels, 11 May 2009). 
27 While the UN does not define the term ‘illegal armed groups’, UN reports use this term to refer to foreign-
armed groups operating in the DRC as well as Congolese rebel groups that have not accepted army 
integration. 
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Beyond the official security system cited above, private and semi-private security 
companies protect mining concessions on behalf of mining companies. Finally, in remote 
mining areas where the state and companies cannot provide security, customary authorities 
could set control systems involving lightly armed recruits (De Koning 2009). In whole, it 
might be considered that the artisanal mining security issue is diverse and typically brings 
in an amalgamation of the aforementioned state and non-state security players. Although it 
has been said that these security actors could perform positive – in terms of regulatory 
functions, it should be however acknowledged that they more often threaten and do 
violence against civilians (Autesserre 2010). Moreover, considering the view that mining 
revenues could uphold fighting capacities and enrich belligerents menaces long-term 
stability, therefore, protagonists may be willing to resume war, dismiss proper reintegration 
or collude directly over control of resource deposits. The implication of combatants could 
also exacerbate non-violent local conflicts over rights and access to resources. The 
following subsections provide a brief overview of the current security issues associated 
with artisanal mining in the Kivus where combatants are directly linked to cassiterite, 
coltan and gold. 
1.3.3 Cassiterite, Coltan and Gold in the Eastern DRC 
Most of the productive artisanal mining sites for cassiterite, coltan, gold and a number of 
other valuable ores in the Kivus have been extremely militarised. Most commonly, the 
army elements and rebel factions control physically mining zones and access routes where 
they take taxes – due in money and in kind, on minerals and trade that go through the zone. 
However, the belligerents’ involvement could also be more elaborated. Evidence from De 
Koning (2009) supported by a more recent report of the UN Panel of Experts (2014) shows 
that individual soldiers, combatants as well as their hierarchical leaders, ‘own’ mining pits 
and mining concessions, where to some extent they offer supplies to and secure artisanal 
miners, in return for part, generally half, of their production. In the analysis of the context 
of the Kalehe territory (ibid.), it has been acknowledged that the FDLR has set a credit 
system to help individual members take loan from the group’s central treasury to put in all 
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sorts of economic activity.28 It is worth noting that combatants network with independent 
traders and private trading companies to whom they usually sell ores. This is not to say that 
this bond is only limited to the mining zones controlled by belligerents. But the nexus 
between traders and combatants could be more intimate. For instance, it has been argued 
that combatants secure traders, whilst traders could get ores past official controls on behalf 
of combatants (UN Experts 2014).  
While different belligerents earn revenues from artisanal mining, it would be unfair to 
assert that the protracted violent conflicts in the Kivus are a fight over resources. In lieu of 
prompting conflict, resource access protracts the violent conflict in two ways. Firstly, 
belligerents are able to avoid military defeat partially as a result of their access to mineral 
resources. Probable interpretation could be that the 2009 military operations by the FARDC 
against the FDLR, for instance, showed that mineral resources remain increasingly 
significant for the FDLR’s military survival. Consequently, the FDLR was driven off the 
eastern borders of the DRC into remote forest regions inside the country, where the easy 
access to various relatively small resource deposits enables its combatants to hide out. 
Secondly, resources access postpones combatants’ reintegration, due to combatants 
refusing to abandon profitable positions acquired unduly during the conflict period (De 
Koning 2009; 2011). The non-integrated 85th FARDC brigade, made up of ex-Mayi-Mayi 
combatants that had occupied Bisie in Walikale – the most significant cassiterite mine of 
the East, is the best picture of this case (Autesserre 2010; Enough Project 2009).  
Possible explanations include that in early 2009, the 85th Brigade reached eventually an 
agreement on its full rehabilitation, allegedly due to the progression of a newly formed 
FARDC brigade towards the area, under the command of an ex-CNDP officer. The risk was 
that military takeover of the mining areas by this brigade would postpone the fragmentation 
of the CNDP combatants involved. Artisanal mining at Bisie and smaller FDLR-controlled 
mining sites in the Kivus are a perfect example of the complex linkages between 
combatants, resources and violent conflict in the eastern DRC. But parallel situations could 
                                                 
28 See Action pour la Paix et la Concorde and Life and Peace Institute, Analysis of the context of the Kalehe 
territory Apr. 2009, http://www.life-peace.org/ p. 26. 
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be mentioned from all over the region where artisanal mining is set. In the town of Kongolo 
in the north Katanga, for instance, the FARDC elements rejected the full integration 
process because they do not want to lose the control of the many coltan and gold mines in 
the area (Enough Project 2009). It was the same case in Orientale province with the Mayi-
Mayi combatants. They were supposed to integrate the FARDC in Kisangani but have 
instead been disbanded. In response, combatants that stayed behind opened hostilities 
against the FARDC from their resource-rich strongholds on the fringes of Maiko National 
Park (De Koning 2009; 2010). These cases illustrate how mineral resources pave the way 
for the recurrence of combatants’ recruitment and impede the demobilisation and 
reintegration process. 
1.4 Gaps in the Literature 
The literature on the linkages between arms groups, access to mineral resources and 
prolongation of armed conflict has grown exponentially in the last several years. As 
discussed in this research, there have been some innovations, especially in the area of post-
Cold War conflicts or civil war causes. For example, Collier and Hoeffler’s civil war 
datasets concerning the political economy understanding of civil war has shifted from the 
sole economic consideration to others such as identity and land access. Despite innovations, 
less attention has been devoted to exploring the impact of ongoing illegal exploitation of 
minerals in demilitarised areas on combatants’ recruitment and unfolded DDR dynamics. 
Hence, what constitutes the link between combatant and artisanal mining and in what ways 
it could be severed continue to be a challenge for both academics and practitioners, because 
there is no universal formula which could be employed to each and every one of these post-
conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding dilemmas. The nature and process of involvement 
of combatants in artisanal mining is context-specific, as understanding the relationship 
between artisanal mining and the combatants’ (re-) recruitment and the failed nature of 
DDR is one of the most critical aspects towards breaking the link between armed groups 
and minerals in a post-conflict country. Furthermore how authorities envisage and see the 
impact of artisanal mining on the recurrence of combatants’ recruitment and the unfolded 
nature of the DDR process might be different from community’s perceptions towards the 
proliferation of combatants in the mining zones and the failure of the DDR process. While 
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some of these complexities are explored in the context of the implication of armed groups 
and the FARDC in the illegal exploitation of mineral resources, the nexus between artisanal 
mining and combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment, and how to break 
down such a link, as is the case in the Kivus, are still under-theorised largely. 
Consequently, there is limited empirical evidence from these kinds of involvement of 
combatants in illegal mining business during and after wartime, as in the context of the 
Kivus, where the militarisation of many of mining sites jeopardised post-conflict 
reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. This phenomenon constitutes a research gap, and 
it is in this area where the research will aim to contribute to the field of peacebuilding and 
knowledge.  
1.5 Research Design and Field Research Methodology 
From the first Congo war in 1996, through the second in 1998, to the ongoing armed 
conflict in the Kivus, belligerents had created military wings and recruited combatants and 
members of various militias from within and outside of the DRC (Onana 2012). Once the 
peace agreements had been reached in 2003, management of ex-combatants was one of the 
front challenges, yet not clearly defined during the signing of the peace agreement. 
Management of former combatants seemed imperative for some reasons. Firstly, the 
eradication of armed movements from the eastern DRC would be crucial for the purpose of 
post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Secondly, the ongoing conflict in the Kivus had 
involved many local and foreigner combatants for the purpose of accessing natural 
resources, therefore demilitarisation of the mining areas and the ex-combatants’ 
rehabilitation and reintegration would augur the future of peacebuilding in the Kivus. 
According to the peace agreement, recognising the need to demilitarise the mining zones 
and to deal with ex-combatants as a peacebuilding approach suggest that the government 
and the international community would develop a ‘demilitarisation of mining areas’ and a 
‘rehabilitation of ex-combatants’ plan, with some ex-combatants integrating the national 
army and others reintegrating civilian life (De Koning 2009; 2011).  
Chapter One: Researching on the Nexus between Artisanal Mining and Reintegration of Ex- combatants in the Context of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)   
Coventry University 26 
 
Given political ambitions and economic agendas of rebel leaders, many of the contentions 
and policy in respect to the management of ex-combatants focused on the combatant-army 
integration than reintegration into the community (De Koning 2011). However, over time, 
the government set various ranges of policies and processes for former combatants who 
were set to integrate into the national army. For instance, after the Pretoria agreement in 
2003, the rehabilitation of ex-rebels into the national army was under an ‘intermingling 
process’, while the same rehabilitation was a ‘mixing process’ for the combatants of the 
CNDP in 2006 (De Koning 2009). 
The ex-combatants’ DDR in the Kivus consisted of several and confusing structures 
including a national programme – which incorporated another specific DDR programme for 
Ituri, programmes to disarm and repatriate non-national combatants and their dependants, 
processes for special needy groups, such as women, disabled ex-combatants and children 
and projects in line with the DDR of militia groups’ members (World Bank 2010). There 
was not a standard policy to run all these different structures as each of them was 
implemented independently. According to the 2003 agreement and the national programme 
for DDR, a group of combatants had to be joining the national army while the others were 
meant to be disbanded (Marriage 2007). Combatants who integrated into the national army 
were largely underpaid and those who joined civilian lives were also disenchanted. 
Although they have been given some money as reintegration package, they did not go 
through a proper reintegration process, whereas at same time local economic and social 
grievances never changed on the ground (Baaz and Stern 2008). Owing to these various 
reintegration process disparities, the DDR of ex-combatants was a failed and unfolded 
process in the Kivus.  
However, it should be acknowledged that the DDR programme in the Kivus was part of the 
peace agreement and was organised according to the United Nations DDR standards. The 
process nevertheless was neither viable nor safe, lacked development agendas and was not 
planned to keep ex-combatants from re-recruitment or away from the mining zones. It did 
not either assist them to address their grievances and build a livelihood without using 
violence (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008). This is one of the complex situations, which makes 
our efforts to appreciate the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, 
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reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in the Kivus complicated. Demilitarising mining 
zones, delinking combatants from artisanal mining as well as a successful DDR of ex-
combatants are pivotal for a successful peacebuilding in the Kivus. Although linkages 
between the above mentioned, the post-conflict recovery and peacebuilding are clearly 
established in a number of post-conflict countries (Knight and Özerdem 2004; McEvoy and 
Shirlow 2009). In the context of the Kivus, the nexus between artisanal mining, 
combatants’ recruitment and unfolded or failed nature of DDR has been proved to be true 
but the demilitarisation of the mining zones is largely understudied. It is this gap that 
stimulated this research.   
To live up to the expectations of this research, the aim is to establish and examine the nexus 
between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of 
combatants, as well as investigate the likely impact of such a link on the armed conflict in 
the Kivus in the eastern DRC. In order to achieve this aim, the overall objectives of this 
study are to: 
 Understand how countries are trapped into resource-based conflicts with specific 
reference to the mining sector. 
 Explore the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants in 
relation to artisanal mining through a cross-cultural perspective. 
 Investigate the political economy of the mining sector in the context of conflict 
reoccurrence in the DRC. 
 Analyse the artisanal mining-combatant relationship based on the field research in 
the DRC.   
 Develop an approach for the demilitarisation of mining sector in the DRC. 
Against this backdrop, the demilitarisation of the mining sites in the Kivus constitutes the 
core theme of this research. On this note, the overarching research question that this 
research aims to address is; 
How and in what ways could demilitarisation of mining zones consolidate peace in the 
Kivus? 
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Moreover, I aim to find responses to the following specific research questions: 
1. To what extent can natural resources be characterising the trajectory of the unfolded 
nature of the combatants’ DDR process in the Kivus, the state failure and protracted 
armed conflicts in the DRC? 
2. How does the nexus between artisanal mining and the cycle of combatants’ 
recruitment and the reintegration impede the achievements of the DDR process and 
feed the cycle of the (ex-) combatants’ (re-) recruitment in the Kivus?   
3. How can the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage be broken down? 
What would the relevance of the new DDR process be to the demilitarisation 
process and the security of the demilitarised mining zones?  
4. How can the process of severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link be 
strengthened in order to prevent and stop violence in the Kivus? What are the 
opportunities and challenges of breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment nexus? 
Demilitarising the mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment 
linkage relate directly to the DDR process. Drawing on the reviews and based on the 
analysis of the fieldwork’s findings, dimensions of severing the artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment linkage, the need for a new DDR process, the traceability of arms 
and finances and the development of internal and external geopolitics have been used to 
frame this thesis. Peacebuilding is based on the process of change and transformation 
happening at individual levels as well as at collective and relational levels (Luckham 2007). 
To understand the link between the demilitarisation of mining zones and peacebuilding, an 
exploration of how the above mentioned dimensions could or could not induce in the lives 
of ex-combatants, at individual levels as well as at collective/relational levels have been 
undertaken. Economically, the resource-based conflict with a focus on the ‘absurdity of 
abundance’ theory is examined. By analysing recruitment, reintegration and re-
recruitments, the combatants’ push and pull factors have been reviewed to link the 
combatants’ recruitment to greed and grievance theories reviewed in resource curse theory. 
Similarly, this study has also explored the trajectory of state failure and protracted armed 
conflict in the DRC in order to piece together economic aspects with the social and political 
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ones that have crystallised around the current resource-based conflict. By looking into the 
nexus between artisanal mining and the combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and re-
recruitment, the way combatants are recruited and the implementation of their DDR process 
have been explored. At this point, it has been indicated that the way in which the unfolded 
nature of the DDR programme turned into the combatants’ re-recruitment is driven by the 
assumption that delinking ex-combatant from mineral exploitation is essential for a 
successful peacebuilding and post-conflict efforts following decades of armed conflict in 
the Kivus. Finally this thesis seeks to explore the mechanisms for demilitarising the mining 
sites as an upshot of not only combatants but also all belligerents’ involvement in illegal 
exploitation and trade of minerals, which results in the failure of peacebuilding efforts.  
1.5.1 Qualitative Research Paradigm and Social Constructivism 
Since the overarching objective of this thesis is to explore the nexus between artisanal 
mining and the ex-combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in the 
Kivus, the findings and analysis of this research are rooted in the experiences, narratives 
and opinions of participants and respondents – including army officers, ex-combatants, 
Kivus’ notables, diplomats, Members of Parliament, government officials, political party 
leaders, Academics and analysts as well as civil society, international and local Non-
Governmental Organisations representatives. Possible explanation of this could include the 
need for comparing information from different social clusters in order to have a 
cosmopolitan view of the case being studied. Mair (2008:171), for instance, suggests: 
“All social science research is invariably some form of comparison, whether it is 
between countries or cases information or cross-cultural perspectives, and 
knowledge is gained from the comparison of units”.  
Bechhofer and Patterson’s (2000:2) statement concurs with Mair’s. To them, a good 
research design should be able to manage the different problems of comparison and control. 
It is therefore important to ensure that the cross-cultural perspectives of the case are 
measured so that it allows generalisation from information gathered to similar cases. Mair 
(2008:179) underlines that a good cross-cultural perspective requires an understanding of 
what has been occurring to other cases against what is being looked at, what are the 
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‘concepts’ that are being looked at, and how will this be conducted. Concepts might be 
subject of disparity in their meaning. Research terms must be accurately defined so as to 
avoid misinterpretation of concepts in the peacebuilding and conflict settlements field.  
Acknowledged as a concept, the term ‘Peacebuilding’ itself illustrates this contrast in that, 
it is one such term which also encompasses various interpretations and comprehension by 
diverse actors within this field. As a sideline to this, in deciding on the case study, it is 
important to delineate the concepts which are being studied in an explicit way. Exploring 
the nexus between artisanal mining and combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and re-
recruitment cycle is a subject that embraces a range of fields and disciplines. I am analysing 
issues of international relations, conflict theory, peacebuilding theory, political sociology, 
management theory, polemology, political economy of natural resources and sociology of 
organisations to name a few.  
It would seem appropriate, in such circumstances, to build up a multi-lens approach to the 
research study (Druckman 2009:119), due to the intricate nature of the subjects being 
studied and the overlap between the various arenas. The multi-lens analysis likens to 
“triangulation” when an eclectic analytical approach is used to make possible verification 
and comparison between them (Della-Porta and Keating 2008a:34). This portends that there 
is more than one way of looking at a situation and possible plural explanations. Using more 
than one method of gathering data guarantees that results are not skewed from coming from 
a single data source (McCandless 2007:140). It might be assumed that the validity of the 
data and any consequential extrapolations can be cross-referenced. 
Owing to the subjective nature of the research topic, the study is methodologically situated 
in the qualitative research paradigm. A paradigm is a sociological phenomenon which 
involves a set of thoughts, beliefs, methods and goals around common tools that guide our 
action, and is made of ontological, epistemological and methodological premises (Guba 
1990; McCandless 2007; Della-Porta and Keating 2008b). Being subjective and interpretive 
in nature, qualitative research implies a rigorous process of interpretation as a method of 
analysis for the words rather than the numerical variables constitute these findings (Flick 
2007; Della-Porta and Keating 2008b). In Merriam’s (2009:5) words, with qualitative 
research:   
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“Rather than determining cause and effects, predicting or describing the distribution 
of some attribute among a population, [qualitative researchers] might be interested 
in uncovering the meaning of a phenomenon of those involved [by] understanding 
how people interpret their experience, how they construct their worlds, and what 
meaning they attribute to their experiences”.  
People’s interpretation of peace is largely subjective, for what is regarded peaceful in one 
context might be different in other cases. Additionally, as the focus of this study is also on 
people’s experiences and perceptions about the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment 
linkage and how to delink this relationship, qualitative analysis would be a relevant 
technique to use in processing and interpreting the information provided by the informants 
and participants of this study. 
The methodological philosophy of this research lies in social constructivism. In practice, 
Social Constructivism as the underpinning of qualitative methodology puts forward that: 
“there is neither objective reality nor objective truth…reality is constructed” (Sarantakos 
2005:37). Social Constructivism is therefore a process through which a knower and the 
knowledge interact in order to understand a social reality (Gergen 1994). In peacebuilding 
as well as in post-conflict reconstruction field, practice is reflective. This entails that the 
significance of peace and the making of peace or the building of peace in these areas are 
developed from individuals’ views, tales, knowledge and stories in line with how 
individuals intermingle with the construction of social phenomena (Lederach et al. 2007). 
Therefore, social constructivism as a philosophy is relevant to conduct research on 
peacebuilding-related activities such as the nexus between artisanal mining and 
combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle, which involves several 
players including ex-combatants, community, government, corporate world and other 
stakeholders and agents of change. 
Furthermore, any social research departs from clarifying its ontological and epistemological 
locations. Noonan (2008) suggests that in the social sciences, ontology provides a 
theoretical study and a description of the nature of social reality. In order words, it studies 
the most general properties to be, such as the existence, possibility, time and fate. From a 
constructivist opinion, researcher refutes objective reality and its existence; rather such 
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realities are constructed in the social minds. Therefore, ontologically, we have to recognise 
that there is a balanced conclusion as to the fundamental nature of reality which is being 
investigated (Noonan 2008; Bakker 2010). Social reality is dynamic and subject to change 
across time and space. Understanding the dynamic nature of social reality would require 
getting familiar with how the reality is questioned and what processes are applied to 
appreciate it (Noonan 2008). The ontological stance in this research is that social reality 
under investigation – which is the nexus between artisanal mining and the combatants’ 
recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in this study, is a dynamic phenomenon 
and it is possible to understand the phenomenon based on the interpretation of experiences 
of participants and respondents. 
Epistemology guides methodologies about the nature of information under study, or “what 
counts as a fact and where knowledge is to be sought” (Sarantakos 2005:30). Miller and 
Brewer (2003) and Sarantakos (2005) indicate that an interpretive approach remains at the 
centre of constructivist epistemology which goes hand in gloves with constructivist 
ontology, as both are interested in the need for social construction of reality and 
interpretations of meanings underlying the reality. 
1.5.2 Constructivist Grounded Theory Approach to Qualitative-Interpretative 
Research 
According to Neuman (2003), methodologies are made up of a range of approaches to 
research that pursue particular ontological and epistemological practices. The qualitative 
research paradigm and details of the methodological processes and instruments used in this 
study are explained in the upcoming section. The Constructivist Grounded Theory – GT, 
approach is relevant to research in the collection and analysis of findings. The GT approach 
to research is an inductive procedure aimed to enable the development of a theory from 
findings or gathered information rather than hypothesis testing or forecasting approaches, 
as it occurs in many deductive methods of social research (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 
and Corbin 1990). 
The use of reviews in research which applies the GT approach remains controversial. As 
mentioned by Bryant and Charmaz (2007:19): 
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“Ever since the publication of the Discovery of Grounded Theory by Glazer and 
Strauss (1967), there have been concerns in respect to how students and researchers 
should approach and use the existing literature pertinent to their research topic”.  
Although a review of the related literature previous to data collection is enviable in most 
research, suggestion from Glazer and Strauss (1967) and Glaser (1998) informs that the 
literature review needs to be avoided in substantive area in the early stage of the research 
process. For them, without a review of literature in substantive area prior to the fieldwork 
would permit the researcher to start their fieldwork without predetermined problem 
statements, so that the categories stem logically from the fieldwork without the researcher’s 
testing being influenced by the existing assumptions and frameworks gleaned from the 
literature (Glaser 1998; Holton 2007). Contrarily, Kools et al. (1996) are of the view that 
researchers rarely give up any previous substantive or methodological knowledge entirely 
in the search of the comprehension of a complex social phenomenon. 
Various advantages of writing literature reviews prior to fieldwork are discussed in the 
literature.  Coyne and Cowley (2006), for example, indicate that the literature could help to 
come up with a clear rationale and justification for an explicit research approach. An early 
review of literature could shed light on the existing gaps in knowledge (Hutchison 1993; 
Creswell 1998); on the other hand, it could guide when contextualising the investigation 
(MacCann and Clark 2003). An early review of literature could spare the researcher from 
conceptual and methodological pitfalls (MacGhee et al. 2007). Pragmatically, a review of 
literature is unavoidable, particularly for research students, since it is one of the 
prerequisites for students to plan on conducting the fieldwork. With acknowledgement of 
the arguments and counter-arguments discussed above, a few reasons however led me to 
review literature in the substantive area of the study prior to the fieldwork as it was 
important to ensure familiarisation with the key concepts of the area of investigation. It was 
also imperative to contextualise the research in the area of peacebuilding and post-conflict 
recovery in the Kivus. Following data gathering and analysis, literature reviewing was 
conducted further whereas writing the thesis; and these reviews were guided by the 
information gathered during the fieldwork. While the previous literature reviews done prior 
to the fieldwork were regarded as secondary data, the more recent reviews conducted 
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following the fieldwork serve to evaluate and contrast the empirical findings from the field 
with the existing published papers.  
Meanwhile, the research setting of the study initially ought to be in the mining zones in the 
Kivus where ex-combatants and other artisanal miners are settled. However, due to the 
persistence of insecurity in the eastern DRC, particularly in the Kivus, the University 
prohibited me to travel to the eastern DRC. I had to mitigate this challenge by starting the 
fieldwork in Kinshasa. The choice of Kinshasa was due to the fact that it is the capital city, 
safe and home to several national and international institutions and representations. It was 
also easy to liaise with potential respondents and participants, including some ex-
combatants rehabilitated into the army and those who chose Kinshasa as their new 
settlement. But most importantly was that conducting interviews from Kinshasa helped also 
to locate some Kivus’ notables who assisted me in conducting remote interviews through 
email, telephone and skype with the Kivus’ community leaders. With the initial round of 
interviews in Kinshasa, it was possible to locate and get hold of potential participants and 
respondents inside and outside of the country. Therefore, the first round of fieldwork 
started between July and September 2013. In this round, the field research was conducted in 
Kinshasa and by remote in Beni, Butembo, Goma and Masisi in the north Kivu, and 
Bukavu and Uvira in the south Kivu. It bears mentioning at this point that in the Kivus, 
interviews were mainly through email, telephone and Skype. However, a second round of 
the fieldwork was conducted between November and December 2013 in Brussels, London 
and Paris.  
The socio-political landscape of the DRC is very dynamic and unpredictable. In the last few 
years, the context of conflict has drastically shifted. When the idea of this research was 
conceived in 2012, the government suspended the exploitation of mineral resources in the 
Kivus and was planning military operations against any illegal occupation of mining zones. 
At the same time, a Tutsi-led uprising M23 erupted in the Kivus and the Obama’s Law in 
regard to the certification of minerals from war zones was in force. With regards to the 
context of ex-combatants, it was decided to explore the cycle of combatants recruitment in 
the mining zones. However, after the completion of the first round of the fieldwork in late 
September 2013, the context has completely changed. In November 2013, the government 
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defeated the M23 supported by Rwanda and Uganda and decided the rehabilitation and 
integration of the M23 ex-combatants into the national army and civilian life through a new 
DDR process. As a consequence, most ex-combatants have fled into Rwanda and Uganda 
and seem to be uncomfortable with joining civilian life in the Kivus.  In these shifting 
contexts, whereas keeping the overall aims and objectives of the study the same, it was 
further considered to incorporate the experience of combatants without borders and the 
regulation of mining sector in the DRC. For the research process, the new context has 
provided a number of new opportunities particularly for not only the artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment relationship, but also the nexus between the demilitarisation of 
mining zones and peacebuilding in the Kivus. Subsequently, a second fieldwork was 
conducted in Brussels, London and Paris in order to be informed about the dynamics of the 
situation from some international stakeholders and individuals based in Europe but directly 
involved in the peacebuilding process in the DRC. 
Recruiting Participants 
As this research applied Grounded Theory approach for data collection and analysis, 
research participants were recruited primarily based on the sampling techniques employed 
in the Grounded Theory methodology. However, further respondents were recruited 
through a partial use of purposive sampling, due to the findings in the field being not 
incompatible with GT. As opposed to determining participants before data collection, 
sampling in Grounded Theory is carried through in tandem with data collection and 
analysis. It is a flexible strategy aiming to determine respondents on the basis of the 
emerging analysis (Bryant and Charmaz 2007). It is also known as “theoretical sampling” 
process (Glaser and Strauss 1967:45). This method gives opportunity to the researcher to 
decide who to interview and what to incorporate as interview questions on the basis of the 
rising concepts from the ongoing interviews and analysis. 
 
Drawing on this method, the field research started with interviews conducted with some 
government officials and political party leaders in Kinshasa. At this stage of the study, 
selection of participants was pre-arranged as this was set as a starting and entry point for 
the fieldwork. Information collected from a literature review conducted previous to my 
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fieldwork was helpful in identifying potential respondents during this early stage of the 
field research project. The interviews further supported the process in assembling 
preliminary information on the whereabouts of participants and respondents in different 
areas. Hence, when the fieldwork was initiated the recruitment of research participants 
encompassed a component of purposing sampling. Purposing sampling is a selection 
method whereby the choice of respondents suits the needs of the researcher and the 
particular subject being studied. It is appropriate to research where the researcher 
previously has some clues and understanding on the population being studied (Brewer and 
Hunter 1990).  
 
In the first round of the fieldwork, interviews with 30 individuals were conducted. Most of 
them were based in Kinshasa (18) and in the Kivus (12). In the second round of the 
fieldwork, interviews with 10 respondents based in Brussels (4), Coventry (1), London (1) 
and Paris (4) were undertaken. Apart from 4 ex-combatants and 3 military officers, most of 
interviews were conducted with civil society members, government officials, political party 
leaders, academics and national and international organisation representatives. Not only 
were they easily accessible, but have also been working in tandem with one another during 
the conflict period and had much information with regards to peace process in the Kivus. It 
is similarly important to compare and contrast the testimonies of the respondents above 
with additional information gathered from ex-combatants and even other opposing groups 
(Barrett 2011). To this effect, further in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted 
with ex-combatants and some notables of the Kivus. In doing so, I was of the view that in 
order to have a plausible analysis of peace and conflict dynamics, it is important to listen to 
what the war participants themselves have to say (Graham 2007). The field research 
process received assistance from local, national and international facilitators in building a 
network of contacts and taking notes in the field as well as gathering information through 
the interviews. 
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Table1.2: Statistics of respondents for interviews29 
 Category of 
respondents 
First round of 
fieldwork 
Second round of 
fieldwork 
Total % 
1 Political parties 8 2 10 25 
2 Academia and civil 
society 
10 2 12 30 
3 Mining and Private 
Sector 
8 3 11 27.5 
4 Ex-combatants and 
military officers  
4 3 7 17.5 
5 Total number 30 10 40 100 
Source: Fieldwork 2013 
 
In-depth Semi-Structure Interview 
The in-depth interview or the key informant interview is a way of social and interpersonal 
interaction. It is a main data collection tool employed in this study. Semi-structured 
questions were employed in the in-depth interviews. Semi-structured interviewing involves 
questions that prompt discussion with the opportunity for the interviewer to investigate 
particular topics or answers and follow-up questions. It does not limit interviewees to a set 
of prearranged responses. Semi-structured questions are employed to understand how 
participation works and how it could be enhanced. In semi-structured questions, 
participants and respondents are allowed to discuss and raise issues that the researcher 
might not have considered in the beginning of the fieldwork (Neuman 2003). Furthermore, 
in-depth semi-structured interviews could be a suitable tool in different levels of data 
collection. In the beginning, the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee 
could help expand the researcher’s knowledge and comprehension in order to categorise 
relevant issues about the theme being studied, whereas at the later level a semi-structured 
interview with selective participants might be applied either to analyse more issues raised 
during the interviews or to cross-verify data gathered during the preceding interview 
(Miller and Brewer 2003).  
                                                 
29 See Appendix three for details on the categories of respondents and interviewees used in this study.  
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To inform the initial stage during the interview, open questions were prepared under three 
different themes. These open questions, however, were kept to a minimum in order to 
prevent the effect of predetermined evidence that would influence the interviews. Rather, 
semi-structured questions were posed in a way that would be in harmony with the situation 
so as to collect further information. The same questions were used for all respondents based 
on their knowledge on the theme.30 For instance, at the beginning of the interviews with the 
respondents, there were open questions on their opinion about the involvement of 
belligerents in illegal exploitation of mining. Once the respondent answers this question, 
further related questions were posed such as; could you tell a bit about what happened in 
the mining zones controlled by armed groups as far as the recruitment of combatants are 
concerned? Can you explain how and why this relationship is recurrent after ex-combatants 
have been demobilised, disarmed and reintegrated? What is their opinion on the corollaries 
of this relationship, how could such a relationship be broken, and so on. The in-depth 
interviews with some ex-combatants were mainly used to glean information and cross-
verify the answers collected from official institution representatives. Interviews were 
conducted in French and barely in vernacular language, and were later transcribed into 
English. The English translation is used when quoting. In some cases, terminologies in 
local language have been employed to emphasize the original understanding, though their 
translation in English was provided. The interviews ended when it was realised that no 
further new information and theoretical ideas were emerging from further interviews. 
Focus Group Discussion 
Focus group discussion – FGD, is another tool of data collection which was applied to this 
research. As opposed to the in-depth interview which involves a one-to-one exchange, a 
FGD is, according to Kamberelis and Dimitriadis (2008:375), a ‘collective conversation’. 
Although focus group method is often mistaken for a group interview or a focus group 
interviews (Liamputtong 2011), Fontana and Frey’s (2000) suggestion, however, indicates 
that it is more formal than the group interviews. The formality criteria however could be a 
problematic concept since it is not often possible to establish distinction between formal 
                                                 
30 See Appendix four for the open questions used in the fieldwork. 
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and informal interaction in FGDs (Morgan 1997). Certainly, it might be within the 
discretion of the researcher and the setting of an FGD. When an FGD is associated with in-
depth interview, a dilemma as to which one has to go first arises. Drawing on Morgan’s 
(1997:22-23) framework, the fieldwork began with in-depth interviews, which assisted to 
extend information and understanding about the research phenomena, which, in turn, gives 
more ideas in terms of choosing population group, setting, venue and time for the FDGs. 
Three FGDs have been conducted during the first round of the fieldwork – see the list of 
FGD in table 4. 
Table1.3: Details of FGDs31 
Source: Fieldwork 2013. 
There is an ongoing debate (Morgan 1997; Liamputtong 2011) on whether FGD 
participants have to be homogenous or heterogeneous. In this research, homogenous groups 
of participants were selected. In doing so, the research concurred with Morgan’s (1997) 
view that homogeneity could guarantee open and flowing discussions among participants. 
Furthermore, from in-depth interviews, it has been learned that respondents that are outside 
                                                 
31 See Appendix three for details on the categories of Focus Groups’ participants in this study. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be 
viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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the country and the representatives of international institutions were more open and free to 
interact with the researcher than other respondents from inside the DRC. The following 
points further detailed operation of the FGDs: 
 Each FGD took one and half hours. 
 The local facilitator backed organising the FGDs and the researcher was leading the 
discussion. 
 Prior to the start of each FGD, participants were clearly briefed about the objectives 
of the discussion and the expectations by them. 
 The FGDs were conducted in French. 
Snowballing Technique 
Snowballing technique is a process of finding research respondents or participants. It is 
about one participant providing the researcher the name of another respondent, who in turn 
provides the name of a third, and so on (Vogt 1999). This approach is often considered as 
an alternative to solving issues associated with sampling concealed people, including 
criminal and isolated individuals (Faugier and Sargeant 1997). Often located within a 
broader set of link-tracing methodologies (Spreen 1992), snowballing technique aims to 
capitalise the social networks of identified participants who can give an ever-expanding set 
of potential contacts to a researcher (Thomson 1997). Based on the postulation that ties 
exist between the original sample and others in the same target people, it authorises a series 
of recommendations to be formulated within a circle of acquaintance (Berg 1988). Two 
primary purposes require the application of snowballing technique. Firstly, it is used very 
often to carry out qualitative research, mainly through interviews (Hendricks et al. 1992), as 
was this thesis. Secondly, snowballing technique could be used as a more formal 
methodology to infer about a group of individuals who have been difficult to enumerate 
through the use of descending methods such as household surveys (Snijders 1992; Faugier 
and Sergeant 1997). The technique involves some advantages, such as setting contact with 
formerly hidden populations, developing trust due to referrals being created by 
acquaintances and not by identification. This technique is also economical, efficient and 
effective in various studies. However, it has a number of limitations, including problems of 
Chapter One: Researching on the Nexus between Artisanal Mining and Reintegration of Ex- combatants in the Context of 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)   
Coventry University 41 
 
representativeness and sampling principles, discovering participants and setting chain 
referral off and engaging participants as informal research assistants. 
In the first round of fieldwork, I visited two professional training centres in Kinshasa. 
These centres allegedly received some ex-combatants’ instructors previously and the 
government was planning to send some more for the upcoming DDR programme. It was 
during those visits that I came across two ex-combatants and an ex-training instructor. The 
opportunity of conducting interviews with them arose and following the interviews, they 
were able to put me in touch with other potential individuals who have been of support in 
terms of remote interviews with the leaders of the Kivus’ community. I equally, visited the 
Department of Peacebuilding of the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in 
the DR Congo – MONUSCO. During this visit I met the Head of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations, Hervé Ladsous, who I later interviewed. Similarly there were 
visits to the office of the Southern Africa Resource Watch – SARW, and to the Department 
of Natural Resources of the National Episcopal Conference of Congo – CENCO, in 
Kinshasa. Finally a think-tank or research institutes at the University of Kinshasa was 
visited. I had the opportunity of conducting FGDs with policymakers, academics and 
analysts. Due to the sensitivity of the subject being studied and the current socio-political 
landscape of the DRC characterised by tensions between different political actors, 
snowballing technique helped me to develop trust with participants and respondents since 
referrals had been made by acquaintances. Through it, I was able to reach more research 
subjects particularly those that are living in the remote mining zones of the Kivus, but who 
were not known to me. 
Data Analysis 
The analysis of data in this research is based on the Grounded Theory method. More 
recently, the Grounded Theory approach has shifted into conflicting trajectory (Guba and 
Lincoln 1994). The fundamental dissimilarity between lots of versions of GT is their 
parallel approaches used in data analysis. This research has drawn from the constructivist 
Grounded Theory approach and its data analysis techniques (Charmaz 2000; 2006). 
Constructivist grounded theory research basically relies on the constructivist paradigm for 
the analysis of data (Charmaz 2000). This approach of analysis entails the understanding of 
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the meaning of the issue by the participants and is contextualised based on the sensitivities 
of a particular time, context, place and culture (Ghezeljeh and Emami 2009). 
Contrary to most qualitative research methods, data analysis in Grounded theory is handled 
concomitantly with data gathering (Strauss and Crbin 1990; Ezzy 2002). Suggestions from 
Lofland (1971) and Ezzy (2002) indicate that blending data gathering with initial analysis, 
also known as an integrated research method, facilitates the researcher to shape emerging 
theoretical implication through regular exchanges with participants.  
In the GT method, data coding is the first step toward analysis. Coding is a two-part 
component; line-by-line coding or open coding and focused coding (Charmaz 2006). Open 
coding is concerned with naming words as they facilitate the researcher to reflect about the 
meaning which could be associated to the data (Charmaz 2000). Focused coding comes 
after the researcher has identified selective codes and categorised them to identify more 
repeated concepts from the data (Charmaz 2006). Selective focused coding helps the 
researcher to pick out themes that are the groundwork of the analysis and theory which 
emerges directly from the analysis of the data.  
Data gathering and analysis were conducted simultaneously following this coding 
approach. First, the data classifying the respondents were transcribed into three themes: 
Theme I – the relationship between mining and the recruitment of combatants, Theme II – 
demilitarisation of the mining zones, and Theme III – political economy of the DRC’s 
mining sector. Then a special code number was given to each respondent in order to have a 
reference number for each interview. For instance, interview question numbers 1, 4, 6 and 8 
conducted with theme I were coded or referenced as TI1, TI4, TI6 and TI8 respectively. A 
similar method was also applied to interview theme II and III. The transcriptions of data 
were carefully kept for each theme. Interview notes, comments, records and transcripts 
were read closely several times to single out key ideas; thus, ‘open codes’, from the 
interviews. Singling out open codes constitutes the first stage of analysis. Table 4 shows a 
specimen of how open codes were drawn from interviews. Similar processes were reiterated 
for all answers to different open questions from interviews and FGDs. 
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Table1.4: Example of Opening Code: 
Guiding questions: recruitment of combatants and their involvement in artisanal mining   
Ref Interviews Open coding 
TI1 I was in Mwenga territory in the south Kivu, where I have visited 
the site of gold mining controlled by the FDLR armed group. 
The FDLR taxes and its members were going physically in the 
mining site, while others sent to the village to take money from 
the members of the community. At the same time, some FARDC 
soldiers are coming three times a week on a motorbike to collect 
the money from the miners. They are sent by their commanders 
and I saw them with my own eyes going into the mining sites 
and taxing people. 
 
Link between 
artisanal mining and 
combatants 
Armed group 
operating in mining 
areas and techniques 
used to mine 
Security provision of 
mining site  
TI2  I am fed up! My family’s members have been raped. My field 
and crops were taken away. The government does not do 
anything to protect us, I am going to join armed group.  
My commander is always drunk and does not know exactly what 
to do while our position is always assaulted by the rebels. I’m 
going to the bush with other military mates and there we will 
organise ourselves against invaders. 
I was jobless and depended on mine’s activities, but we were not 
safe in the mining sites. There were many taxes levied by 
combatants and the FARDC. I was not earning anything; it was 
looking like I was working for them. To be on a safe side, I 








armed groups and 
militia in illegal 
exploitation of 
minerals 
TII2 One of the things we campaign for is when a company is buying 
minerals from the Congo, it needs to do due diligence or supply 
chain of minerals in order to check whether minerals do not 
come from armed groups.  
The Congolese government has introduced a decree which 
requires all mining companies to use the due diligence process 
which helps to create a clean supply chain of minerals in the 
Congo. To my understanding, to demilitarise really mining 
zones, it will require a conjunction of several efforts and things 
at the same time. For instance, the reform of security sector, the 
application of Dodd Frank Law. It should be provided more than 
demilitarisation. For instance, people will need care, school… 
 
Demilitarisation of 







Traceability of arms 
and minerals 
 
Source: Fieldwork 2013 
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Following the selection of open codes, the most recurrent ideas/codes emerging from 
interviews were compared and contrasted. In Constructivist Grounded Theory, such codes 
are known as focused codes (Charmaz 2006). In this thesis, they are called ‘concepts’. 
Concepts are broader prototypes drawn from the open codes. Concepts gave rise to some 
large subjects that have been labelled as ‘themes’ in this thesis. The analytical chapters of 
the thesis are built on the themes that fit together. Given the fact that themes are part of the 
bedrock of findings and analysis of this research, the analytical chapters are presented with 
the interpretation of main themes and concepts woven together. I also had a memo writing 
as a technique in the field. Memo writing is a tool that provides a researcher an opportunity 
to think and keep in mind question and analyses, and produces implication from the 





Kinshasa,10 July 2013 
Today I visited…in Kinshasa, in the…borough. This institution deals with….With 
regard to my research, the information that I have collected will help me in…, 
and I have been welcomed by…who met me at…. While I was waiting to 
encounter the respondent, I was given a tour in the Building and I observed work 
environment which gave me the first idea of the institution. People were.... 
During my tour I had a chat with…who updated me about....After a brief 
exchange with…; I have been offered opportunity to ask questions on the 
organisation of the institution. I observed that people…. Following the interview 
with the participant, I was given some technical reports on…in order to have 
more knowledge about what the institution is doing. Many of the technical 
reports that I was offered deal with… and helped me to have much more light on 
certain issues that I could not cover during the 30 or 45 minutes-interview. 
 
Figure1.5: An example of a Memo from the Fieldwork. (Fieldwork 2013) 
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Memo writing helped me to identify the gaps or areas where the research needed more 
information so that other potential participants who could provide such information may be 
identified. It was also useful at the thesis writing stage as I was referring on it to cross-
verify data with the observations. 
Managing source of information 
This research hinges around information gleaned from the literature as well as from 
interviews and focus groups conducted with different socio-political clusters, including the 
Kivus’ national and provincial Members of Parliament; government officials; political party 
leaders; international organisation representatives; local and international Non-
Governmental Organisations; academics and analysts; civil society representatives; the 
army officers and ex-combatants. The list of interviewees’ names as referred to Appendix 
Three, with some of which being withheld and or given a pseudonym, illustrates the source 
of information which underpins the research being studied.  
With reference to the source of information management, it might be pointed out that 
respondents or interviewees mostly with civil society and political backgrounds showed the 
vital significance of analysing peacebuilding process in the Kivus from the ground up, with 
upheld attention to the local community dynamic. The breadth of supporting evidence and 
the range of arresting insights are among their contributions. Academics mainly offered 
new perspective on how and why the DRC’s post-conflict rebuilding and peacebuilding 
process, particularly the demilitarisation of mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-
combatant-nexus, should evolve a thorough understanding of the local history, culture and 
customs of population. During the focus groups however, I found interesting that 
participants were well-reasoned reminders for all would-be the relevance of the processes 
of demilitarisation of mining zones, delinking (ex-) combatants from artisanal mining and 
from the organisations that stand behind them. Focus group discussions also put forward 
that such peacebuilding and post-conflict processes need to be undertaken with prudence 
and patience in both their prescription for peace and the way they go about trying to 
achieve processes, such as the combatants’ Demobilisation, Disarmament and 
Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), for which good intentions are not 
enough to be achieved.   
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Furthermore the management of source of information also elucidated that, talking to 
journalists gave the researcher a further insight in terms of understanding the current 
situation in the DRC. In the context of the research being studied, interviewing journalists 
was important as they work with a diverse array of international and non-governmental 
organisations involved in peacebuilding efforts in the Kivus. From journalists’ information, 
I have been able to trace back to the routine practices, habits and narratives of the Kivus’ 
peacebuilding process within the subculture of communities. However, to get into bottom 
of these key issues of artisanal mining, my interviews with mining sector’s analysts and 
practitioners expertly showed how the artisanal mining-combatant links continue to be the 
case. Hence, how this relationship contributes to failure of peacebuilding efforts as well as 
socio-economic development, and why belligerents that should and do know better, seem to 
be gripping to illegal exploitation of minerals were a major contribution of mining sector 
and private actors. In showing how the artisanal mining-combatant-nexus is embedded into 
the culture of belligerents, acts and constructs on the local scale, a few ex-combatants, army 
officers and security experts lent a path-breaking contribution to understanding this 
relationship. 
Ethical Considerations 
Ethical approval for this research was endorsed by the Research Ethic Committee at 
Coventry University following the processing of proposed research.32 For ethical reasons 
and on participants’ request, respondent’s names and, to some extent, direct quotations of 
what they may have said have been kept anonymous. Prior to each interview, each 
respondent was provided a briefing sheet33 before obtaining interviewee’s consent.34 The 
researcher explained to each respondent and participant about the raison d’être of the 
research and what he expected from them though they were offered a briefing sheet. 
Interviewees were free to end an interview at any time they wished to do so for whatsoever 
reasons. Two respondents actually did so; one on health reasons, could not carry on with 
the interview, while the other for security reasons and the sensitivity of the issue felt 
                                                 
32 See Appendix five for the approval of ethics process by Coventry University. 
33 See Appendix six for the interview briefing sheet used in the fieldwork for this study. 
34 See Appendix seven for the consent form used in the fieldwork for this study. 
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uncomfortable and had to cease responding. Following the end of an interview, each 
interviewee was granted opportunity to ask questions about the researcher and the research, 
or to ask for an elucidation of any issue/concern which might have occurred. The researcher 
ensured that all respondents were older than 18 years and any kind of discrimination was 
strictly avoided. 
Reflections on the Fieldwork 
In these lines, I would like to give a succinct account of my own experience and reflections 
as a researcher. Being a Congolese and having worked and lived in the DRC for some 
years, at the beginning I felt myself as an ‘insider’ in my research setting. However, when I 
went into the fieldwork, I came to understand that my identity was moving between 
‘insider’ and ‘outsider’. As a Congolese researcher, it is legitimate to consider myself as 
insider; however within the Congolese community the respondents regarded me as an 
outsider – somebody who has severed his roots with the Congolese Community. This 
entails that the insider versus outsider dilemma still exists even though I and the 
respondents share the same identity in terms of language and citizenship, especially in 
peace and conflict study like the one being studied. Such a dilemma is directly connected 
with power dynamics and relationships in the field. For example, in my case, I found barely 
respondents and participants who could easily agree that the purpose of the research was 
purely academic. It is worth noting at this point that many of the DRC’s partners and the 
government’s foes are not in agreement with the ruling party in its attempt of modifying the 
constitution in order to allow the current President to stand for the third term. There is a 
perceptible tension between those who are against any constitutional review – backed by 
the United States and the United Kingdom, and those who are determined to modify it. In 
this context, my position as a researcher – insider or outsider, became uncomfortable. 
Most participants interviewed seemed to have considered me as a spy from the British 
NGOs who was pretending to conduct an academic research. They were demure and 
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reluctant toward me until I had to exhibit the official letter from the University35 for some 
of them to believe that I have an academic purpose, though others still remained 
unconvinced. I came to understand that most Congolese officials and some representatives 
of international and national organisations were annoyed by some researchers who visited 
them previously and used information to criticise the government and other institutions 
instead of academic purposes. Moreover, government officials were also upset with 
researchers coming from the United Kingdom or the United States, since these countries 
laid several blames on the DRC’s management of natural resources. Due to political 
sensitivity and security issues involved in dealing with the implication of belligerents in the 
illegal exploitation of mining and the reintegration of ex-combatants, I was mistaken for a 
Western agent who aimed at collecting information about the government mining-related 
activities in order to report to Western chancelleries in Kinshasa.  
On the other side, I was considered as a government agent by the members of the Mission 
de l’ Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation de la République Démocratique 
du Congo [the United Nations Organisation Mission for the stabilisation of the DRC; 
MONUSCO], since there was an ongoing argument between the latter and the government 
on the management of the DDR programmes and the involvement of the army in the human 
rights abuse. In such a situation, locating participants, winning their trust and sticking 
interview’s schedule in time were an enormously challenging job. With my previous 
research backdrop in the field of peace and conflict in the DRC, I had some previous 
networks in Kinshasa, which was useful to identify respondents at the outset of the research 
and assisted in setting ball rolling. While conducting interviews, I spent some time with 
respondents, having an informal chat with them for a while prior to the formal interview. 
With this rapport-building, I was able to create an environment of trust whereby I could 
shed more light on the academic purpose behind the study. 
Moreover, the management of participants’ expectations and neutrality are two important 
things worth discussing. Following quite a few hours of discussions and interviews with the 
                                                 
35 See appendix eight for the University letter used to convince participants about the academic purpose of the 
research.  
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respondents, rapport building was boosted. However, participants, particularly academics 
and civil society members had some expectations from me. For example, some suggested a 
decolonisation of my research methodology which implies a traditional mechanism that is 
acceptable to the people and not in compliance with Western lens. However, at the same 
time, there might be a danger of adhering emotionally to the participants’ request, which in 
turn, would influence the neutrality of my analysis and interpretation. As a researcher, I 
have been continually attentive of my limitations and the academic rationale on the back of 
the fieldwork, which kept me from any emotional influences. The involvement of 
belligerents in the mining activities is a politically charged issue in the DRC. Even 
politicians and army seniors are highly involved in this issue. From my experience, unless a 
researcher shows a substantial level of political neutrality during their fieldwork, it would 
be difficult to collect authentic information from the interviews. Therefore, environmental 
sensitivity is at stake. In effect, I have learned several lessons from conducting the 
fieldwork for this thesis. Firstly, apolitical attitude and humility discipline by the researcher 
could be a means towards maintaining neutrality, which could further be helpful in 
reinforcing bonds between participants from different social and political backdrops and the 
researcher. During FGDs, I found that the facilitator or assistant identified had some 
implications to the discussions, mostly when the debate opposed the ruling party members 
and the opposition. In such context, participants had the tendency to be more open to the 
interviewer than to the facilitator. Therefore, I had to handle this issue with utmost care by 
selecting an assistant from the civil society. Although the Congolese civil society has been 
criticised for allying with the ruling party, this political inclination cannot be generalised 
for all its members. It was decided that a research assistant from a civil society background 
not only could be acceptable than any other individual from different background, but also 
could spare the researcher from favouring one party over the other during FGDs.  
Lessons learned from the fieldwork also taught me that when conducting a fieldwork in 
politically and socially torn societies like the Kivus, there is a need for recruiting some 
participants from across diving lines. However, it is important to bear in mind that the 
recruitment of participants relies on the nature and objectives of a research topic. So, I am 
of the view that if participants are recruited, especially in peace and conflict study like 
being studied, from different socio-political organisations, tribal and religious associations, 
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it would be possible to glean suggestions and perspectives from across diving lines in a torn 
society. Although security concerns explained above did not allow me to enter the divided 
communities and mining zones in the Kivus, I used a sample diversification strategy to 
maintain challenges of biased answers and to be sensitive to the existing conflict dynamics 
in the field. 
Limitations of the Study 
Challenges concerning methodology have been discussed above. This section will shed 
light on other limitations. One such challenge relates to the accessibility of literature in 
connection with the issue being studied. This research focuses on a case which emerges 
from the dynamics of armed groups in ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in alleged 
demilitarised areas. As such, it should be pointed out that the research has also faced a 
certain limitation due to the nature of the phenomenon investigated. As the research topic is 
an ongoing occurrence, it is not possible to evaluate the results of the demilitarisation of 
mining zones as yet. Therefore, some of the research results are only as possible 
trajectories. Consequently, this means that firstly, the topic epitomises seriously the upshots 
of the new geography of resources and the principle of resource globalisation in weak or 
fragile states. Secondly, it requires an urgent response and solution for sustainable peace in 
the Kivus. Its findings might not be generalised for application in other contexts where 
peacebuilding processes arise from a military victory or international involvement. 
However, there are lessons to be learnt from each case.  
The study has drawn from the resource curse review to elaborate and demonstrate how 
natural resources directly or indirectly link to armed conflicts. This approach also showed 
some limitations to establish whether greed hypothesis and grievances can link and trigger 
violence. Although the absurdity of abundance analysis touches slightly on factors that 
motivate rebels to fight, nevertheless it overlooked the fundamental issue in line with how 
rebel groups and combatants are linked to the exploitation of natural resources and the war 
economy. Furthermore, it focused more on economic agendas of the conflict and 
overlooked others such as ethnic identity and land access which have always been regarded 
as the apparent causes of armed conflicts – mostly in the Kivus, even though the latent 
causes remain economic. Although the trajectory and nature of the conflict in the DRC, 
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particularly in the Kivus depicts that the conflict is a multi-layered and hybrid conflict36 
which had officially turned into a mineral-based conflict in the 1998 Congo war, its 
resolution however involves a total and comprehensive approach. One of the 
recommendations to this regard was delinking armed groups from mineral resources. It is 
therefore the research’s limitation to exclude this aspect from the study because the focus in 
this research is on the nexus between artisanal mining – cassiterite, coltan and gold, and the 
rising phenomenon of combatants (re-) recruitment cycle on the one hand; and how to 
break down such a relationship on the other. Therefore, it would make sense to focus only 
on artisanal mining, the (re-) recruitment, reintegration and recruitment of (ex-) combatants 
in the Kivus and on how to sever this nexus rather than including the DRC’s mineral-based 
conflict in its all aspects. It bears stressing, at this point, that all mineral resources in the 
DRC’s mining-rich provinces do not fall under mineral-based conflict, which also justifies 
the limitations of the study to artisanal mining in the Kivus.  
1.6 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seven Chapters. Chapter One contextualised the framework of the 
study by undertaking a general literature review on the foundational concepts and processes 
in the context of artisanal mining and the ex-combatant reintegration nexus as well as 
presenting the research design and fieldwork methodology used in this study.  
In Chapter Two, the study is contextualised in the dynamics of absurdity of abundance, 
providing an account of the economic motivations and opportunity created by abundance of 
natural resources and weak governance in fuelling armed conflict. It throws more light on 
the nexus between mineral resources and conflicts. It also discusses the occurrence of 
resource-related conflict, which is supported by two schools of thoughts, including greed 
and grievance hypotheses. 
In Chapter Three, the research browses through the dynamics of the recruitment, 
reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants. Exploring push and pull factors of 
                                                 
36 See Chapter 4 for more details. 
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recruitment, reintegration and the re-recruitment cycle of combatants emerged as an 
integral element of peacebuilding. The mechanisms and processes involve the 
understanding of this phenomenon as consequential to a compendium of mixed 
motivations. 
Chapter Four focuses exclusively on the processes and nature of the protracted armed 
conflict and state failure in the DRC from the two Congo Wars up to 2012. It contextualises 
the all multi-layered conflict motivations that underline the protracted armed conflict in the 
eastern DRC. It also sets that the state failure and long-drawn-out armed conflict in DRC is 
the repercussion of an intersection of local, national and regional conflicts worsened by 
their interaction and by the presence of natural resources. 
The nexus between artisanal mining and combatants’ recruitment is investigated in Chapter 
Five. In particular, this chapter presents and analyses the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment linkages, which is presented as a consequence to informal economy, and which 
draws its roots from the 1980s economic meltdown. It also underlines the lack of an 
efficient legal system option to resolve litigations and contestations over mining 
ownerships, which gave rise to violence as an approach appeared to be an important 
mechanism of conflict resolution within an environment where the DDR process did not 
address properly the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. 
Chapter Six examines some perspectives towards demilitarising the mining zones. 
Discussing the political economy of armed groups – including all belligerents, vis-à-vis 
mining sector, it is showed that the control of mining zones by belligerents gives the 
opportunity to conflict’s entrepreneurs and their supporters to access minerals at a cheaper 
price. Demilitarising mining zones and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment 
nexus associated with socio-political solutions such as the participation of local 
communities, arms and finance traceability and an internal and the need of an external 
mining-development geopolitics that consolidate the mining sector have also been 
discussed.  
A summary and conclusion of the key findings of this study are presented in Chapter 
Seven. This is done in light of the research questions posed at the onset of this thesis. The 
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analytical framework applied in this study is also revisited. It expounds and gives ideas for 
future research routes in line with conflict resolution and peacebuilding in the Kivus.   
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Chapter Two: Resource-based Conflicts in the Post-cold War Context 
2.1 Introduction 
Resource concerns have been construed to be subordinated to the political and ideological 
dimensions of the United States-Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. With the end of the 
bipolar world, planning for securing access to vital economic assets or rather rare natural 
resources has reappeared to be at the central position of major powers in the world. Since 
1999, the Global geo-economics strategy shifted significantly to the strategy of relocating 
conflict into states with resource endowment. Some strategic regions, comprising Sub-
Saharan and Central Africa, Near and Middle East among others caught the most attention 
and became a major strategic prize owing to their huge reserves of natural resources; oil, 
natural gas, diamonds, gold, timber, copper, coltan – to name a few, thought to be in these 
regions.  
The assumption of control over states with resource endowment would portend that these 
areas shall now on receive close attention from the people whose primary task is to watch 
and protect the flow of vital resources to major powers (Reyntjens 2009). This chapter 
reviews resource-related aspects of contemporary armed conflict and responds to the first 
research objective. This literature sheds light on the relationship between mineral resources 
and conflicts, repeatedly referred to as the paradox of plenty or resource curse hypothesis. 
The review highlights the occurrence of resource-related conflict, which is supported by 
two schools of thoughts, including ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ hypotheses. The three sections 
deal with armed conflicts, ‘absurdity of abundance’ and war economy to reassess the 
relevance of the studies to the analysis of resource-conflict links. 
2.2 New Geography of Conflicts 
The new prominence of Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly Great Lakes Region and its rich 
mineral resource reserves is but one sign of larger transformation of Western strategic 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed 
in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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thinking. Contrary to the Cold War period where the areas of greatest concern to military 
planners focused on the collision between the United States – US, and the Soviet Blocs 
(Klare 2002; Kaldor 2007), since the end of Cold War though, these areas have been left 
behind and are of less strategic significance for the US, while other regions, as earlier 
noted, are receiving close attention from the Pentagon (Klare 2001). Behind this switch in 
strategic geography of conflicts lies the new geo-economics thought to be based on the 
protection of supplies of vital natural resources. The new geo-economics thought has 
become a crucial national concern for importing countries. In the same vein, Reyntjens 
(2009) contends that economic competition, having taken over Cold War ideological lines, 
drives current international relations. It is likely, therefore, that new geography of conflicts 
thinking draws from economic competition over natural resources, and links to the inability 
of unstable and resource-rich states to manage their territory whereby competition over 
access to vital economic assets is still soaring. It is to say that the complexities of the 
swiftly focus on ideological lines changed to soaring demand of natural resources and 
energy since the end of the Second World War. Accordingly, the concentration of some 
strategic natural resources in unstable developing states and the ascension of industrialised 
world triggered up competing claims over ownership of resources by bordering countries 
(Soeters 2005; Reyntjens 2009). All these support the idea that new geography conflicts 
represent a significant shift in strategic thinking over access to critical resources in post-
Cold War era (Strange 1996; Cramer 2006b), also known as contemporary conflicts, post-
modern wars, new or civil wars. 
Post-Cold War conflicts embody war economy. Fighting over access to vital natural 
resources has become a national concern both to countries with resource endowment and 
those without resources, for economic competition and natural resources protection are 
increasing greater. In a similar vein, we might be tempted to believe that the recent collapse 
of the global economy, including the scarcity of petroleum, natural gas and strategic 
mineral resources prove that the world is unable to keep up both the demands of continued 
population growth and economic expansion (Reyntjens 2009). Probable explanation could 
be that beyond this doctrine, a major strategic thinking describes the new geography of 
conflict as the revival of scarce resources competition which fuels armed conflicts within 
unstable states. This doctrine suggests that a focus on the acquisition and protection of 
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natural resources is evident in the strategic and hegemonic thinking of powers as the 
competition for natural resources is getting greater. Therefore, it is worth bearing in mind 
that with more than half of the world’s natural resource reserves laying in politically 
unstable regions (Reyntjens 2009), and with coltan, cassiterite, gold, diamond, timber wars 
already spanning throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, resource competition has easily and 
overtly turned into open war economy and competing interest. So far, fighting over 
resources has become a geo-economic requirement for governments. Hence, governments’ 
new security requirement and policies seem to be concentrated on the acquisition and 
protection of natural resources, and they are ready to go into battle in order to protect the 
future of their natural resources. However, how do natural resources come to enticing war 
economy or modern armed conflicts? This query raises the need for understanding what 
civil war is, which the following lines try to deal with.  
2.2.1 Defining Civil War 
There is not always a clear-cut agreement on the definitions of civil war, neither is there 
any agreement on the number of civil wars (King 1997; Human Security Centre 2005; 
Hanlon and Yanacopulos 2006). Although there are still stumbling-blocks to identify armed 
conflicts, a few developments based on operational definitions could help gather statistical 
datasets. It follows from these statistical datasets that civil war is a conflict over 
government or territory that has reached the threshold of at least 1,000 battle-related deaths 
per year, and 25 battle-related deaths per year for low-intensity internal armed conflict 
(Salehyan 2008). However, according to scholars (Cranner 2006a; Kaldor 2007; Salehyan 
2008; Beswick and Jackson 2011), contemporary conflicts are viewed as internal conflicts 
that involve a myriad of transnational connections where the line between internal and 
external, between aggression – attacks from abroad, and repression (attacks from inside the 
country), or even between local and global, is difficult to draw. The new wars, therefore, 
involve “a blurring of the distinctions between war, organised crime and large-scale 
violation of human rights” (Kaldor 2007: 2). This is a real and evident fact within many 
current armed conflicts. However, this is not to say that all wars will fall under Cramer 
(2006a), Kaldor (2007) and Salehyan’s (2008) patterns. 
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From a holistic perspective, some will argue that the discourse on civil wars encapsulates a 
destructive force which works for the failure and collapse of modern states, and fed into the 
opinion that a Western-model state is the standard of state being (Beswick and Jackson 
2011). This could entail possible interpretations such as defining a civil war possibly 
“becomes more an issue of political perceptions than objective realities” (1997:18). 
Nevertheless, Hanlon and Yanacopulos (2006) identify around 200 wars which have 
occurred since the end of the Second World War, and a spiralling number of violent 
conflicts occurred during the Cold War period. But the lack of appropriate definitions of 
civil war has given rise to a number of terms such as internal conflict, intrastate conflict, 
insurgencies, coups, revolutions, terrorism, small wars, limited wars and low-intensity 
conflicts. These terms are interchangeably used to describe armed conflicts, but no clear 
criteria are made available to draw the line between these terms or to help establish the 
start-point and concluding-points of unfolding conflicts (King 1997; Alley 2004). The 
reality is that most scholars encounter stumbling-blocks to confirm whether or not wars 
have a clear-cut starting or concluding point (King 1997; Alley 2004).  
A better conflicts analyst and a better predictor of new wars in the new international system 
would define armed conflicts through the lens of long-drawn-out troubled period running 
through an average period of four years and five months (Alley 2004; Sambanis 2004). As 
for their end, it frequently happens depending on negotiated settlements, thereby tending to 
a failure, and often encouraging military victory to put a more conclusive end to these 
disruptive and unpredictable events (King 1997; Beswck and Jackson 2011). Cramer 
(2006a) and Salehyan (2008) suggest two key aspects in defining a civil war; firstly, the 
boundaries around the set of civil wars might be artificial, porous, or fuzzy. Secondly, there 
is a common ground between many civil wars and intrastate conflicts that have occurred 
after the post-Cold War period; these wars have global or regional networks (King 1997; 
Alley 2004; Salehyan 2008) and are based primarily on domestic origins. They are largely 
shaped by domestic elements in pursuit of political goals and usually have international 
dimensions (Alley 2004). This contrast is due to many negative externalities caused by such 
conflicts in terms of migratory flows, economic disturbances in bordering states and 
interventions by these neighbouring states, with the aim of influencing the outcome of civil 
wars according to their preferences (Salehyan 2008). As we can note, there is no overall 
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agreement on the definition of civil wars, but it would be much more informative to have a 
good understanding of what causes such conflicts. 
Understanding contemporary wars entails a need for twigging both the end of the Cold War 
and the rising of globalisation. The end of the Cold War, according to Strange (1996), has 
been considered as the dawn of the new wars because of the collapse of the bipolar World 
order and totalitarian empires. At the same vein of thinking, the rising of the globalisation 
process in the late 1980s and early 1990s has accelerated global network in terms of 
political, economic, military and cultural links and also gnaw the state sovereignty, also 
known as the ‘retreat of the state’ (Strange 1996). The global interconnectedness and the 
rise of capitalism have significantly contributed to the decline of state revenues, the 
sprawling of organised crime, the emerging force of paramilitary groups and the decrease 
of political legitimacy (Kaldor 2007). New wars’ supports emerge from a decentralised 
system, largely from a wide range of external resources, including looting, hostage-taking, 
the black market, remittances from the Diaspora, taxation, support from neighbouring 
countries and informal trade (Kaldor 2007; Beswick and Jackson 2011). 
The mobilisation of combatants and their involvement in hostilities legitimise and sustain 
such a war economy. Combatants’ enlistment sustains the linkage between new wars and 
the global economy (Keen 1998; 2000; 2008; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 2000; 
2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ballentine 2004; Salehyan 2008) and perpetuates the 
recurrence of new wars (Keen 1998; 2000; Dietrich 2000; Duffield 2000; 2001; Alley 
2004; Studdard 2004) through fighting over potential vital resources’ zones (Alley 2004). 
Klare (2001; 2002) highlights resources as roots of civil wars in contemporary conflicts in 
particular and points out the fears that the US made use to deter the ex-Soviet Union over 
its access to Middle Eastern oil and Africa’s mineral resources.  
New wars’ concept is not a new form of conflict, neither has it been specifically coined to 
describe contemporary warfare (Le Billon 2004; Beswick and Jackson 2011). The concept 
shaped fairly ideological rivalry during the Cold War period, finally turned into becoming 
an economic competition over vital economic assets between areas and states that possess 
the world’s known natural resource reserves and those without these assets (Klare 2001; 
2002). Resource wars arise from the concerns to control and protect supplies of natural 
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resources, since the demand for these resources is recently getting greater than before in 
considerable proportions. For instance, Klare (2002) argues that the scarcity of critical 
natural resources is the root-cause of the conflicts and localised fighting over access to 
scarce natural resources will surely increase in the future. Renner’s (2002: 6) research 
concurs with Klare’s and indicates: 
“more or less a quarter of the nearly 50 wars and armed conflicts active in 2001 
have a strong resource dimension – in the sense that legal or illegal resource 
exploitation helped trigger or exacerbated violent conflict or financed its ongoing”.  
However, Renner’s resource scale over-emphasis encountered several criticisms because 
the study neglects other significant factors such as the geography of resources, which also 
has a crucial role in determining conflicts (Le Billon 2004; 2005; 2008; Sambanis 2004). 
Beyond these different considerations, three different frameworks and outcomes are drawn 
from different analysis of civil wars since the mid-1990s (Kalyvas 2007; 2009; Salehyan 
2008; 2009). The most helpful work and approaches seem to be econometric methods from 
development economists, which aim to identify crucial factors that civil wars face, and 
came up with the impact and role of natural resources. Meanwhile international relations 
scholars agreed on ethnic antagonism, while comparative politics and sociology academics 
have pointed out the role of the state capacity in civil wars. However, how do natural 
resources link to a conflict? The upcoming section referring to the absurdity of abundance 
theory will try to address it. 
2.3 Absurdity of Abundance Theory: Root Causes of Conflicts 
Competing over valuable economic assets in contested resource zones has become a crucial 
feature in delineating root-causes of armed conflicts in countries with natural resources 
endowment. Possible elucidations include that as the global populations grow up and 
economic activity spreads out in many parts of the Globe (Reyntjens 2009), the hunger for 
critical resources swells more quickly than nature could accommodate. I would argue that a 
map of contested resource zones would locate concentrations of vital economic assets in the 
developing and unstable World. This map, surely, would also delineate areas where armed 
conflicts are devastating and, of course, those where they are most likely to break out in the 
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years after. In other words, the mere presence of valuable economic assets or natural 
resources in a particular area is a strong evidence of conflict eruption and would therefore 
portend that conflict outbreak links to valuable resource endowment. Of course this goes 
alongside other factors, including colonial history, countries stability, region geo-
economics and geopolitics, and the history of relationships between states among others. 
However, does resource endowment imply conflict flare-up and poverty in natural resource 
producing countries? If so, how do valuable economic assets have adverse effects to 
resource-rich countries? And do all resource-rich countries crumble into armed conflicts? 
These enquiries shed more light on the absurdity of abundance theory regarded as being 
root-causes of conflicts in natural resource producing countries, and are developed in the 
following lines. The concept of ‘absurdity of abundance theory’ used in this research 
implies that ‘amidst vast natural resource-endowment, there is starvation of nothing but 
hunger in the mist of plenty’. This is what most scholars refer to as the paradox of plenty, 
resource curse or the adverse effects of resource abundance. 
It has been claimed that African countries that rely highly on oil and mineral exports are 
also exposed to a stagnant economic growth, lower living standards, and face more 
prevalent corruption and violence than countries without rich natural resources (Pegg 
2003). Over the last two decades the World Bank support for liberalisation, privatisation 
and capacity building to develop a favourable environment for investment in resource-rich 
countries proved that all efforts undertaken in these countries failed to mitigate poverty in 
sub-Saharan Africa as expected (ibid.).37 Possible interpretation could be that policy 
formulation towards poverty alleviation in these countries was not tailored to their 
economic, political and social settings. It bears stressing that the assessment of the 
absurdity of abundance theory in this section tries to test its validity and implications for 
policy formulation as it is used as a means of responding to conflict, even if the outcome in 
terms of resulting policy is still weak. Therefore, the review is helpful to us in grasping the 
assumptions made upon the nexus between artisanal mining and combatants’ recruitment in 
the Kivus – Chapter Five, and various plans envisioned to attend to the long-drawn-out 
conflicts in the eastern DRC – Chapter Six. 
                                                 
37 Recent findings from Pegg’s (2006) research shows that the World Bank Programme on the mining-led 
poverty alleviation failed to produce the expected objectives. 
Chapter Two: Resource-based Conflicts in the Post-cold War Context   
Coventry University 61 
 
The absurdity of abundance has been considered to be a highly influential thesis of armed 
conflicts (Stevens 2003; Rosser 2006; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007). Resource-rich 
countries are likely to experience poor economic performance which Karl (1997) calls ‘the 
paradox of plenty’ and other scholars (Stevens 2003; Rosser 2006) address as ‘resource 
curse’ or ‘the adverse effects of natural resource abundance’. The concept of paradox of 
plenty, referred to as the ‘absurdity of abundance’ in this research, was coined by Richard 
Auty in 1993 (Stevens 2003) and its significance is getting a widespread meaning. The 
hypothesis also implies that states get also liable to face low levels of democracy and 
governance and consequently civil war. The absurdity of abundance was seen to be rather 
radical until late 1980s. Before that, natural resource endowment was generally regarded as 
being advantageous to developing countries for economic growth and development (Rosser 
2006). However, nowadays, natural resource abundance is widely considered as a curse for 
a country’s economic, social and political development. 
There are three broad sub-literatures on the resource curse hypothesis, dealing with: (1) the 
link between natural resource abundance and economic performance, (2) the link between 
natural resource abundance and political development and (3) the link between natural 
resource abundance and civil wars (Pegg 2003). But all of them have paid less regard to the 
social impact of natural resource abundance and the relationship between social and 
economic processes (Ross 2007); even if the sub-literature with regard to civil wars has 
recently emerged after the establishment of the hypothesis about the resource curse had 
been developed in the late 1990s (Rosser 2006). 
The significant set of empirical analysis entails three crucial issues regarding natural 
resource curse, which are:  
1. The approach used in theses empirical analyses is too reductionist, barely focusing 
on the task of establishing the link in question (Rosser 2006). This type of approach 
opens a leeway toward debate on some of the conceptual and technical issues raised 
by the empirical studies, and therefore failed to address sufficiently issues of 
causality and the various processes involved. Researches on natural resource and 
conflicts from Lederman and Maloney (2006) and Rosser (2006) show that 
measurement of resource abundance is source of major disagreement; for instance, 
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on the basis of the ratio of countries’ natural resource exports to GDP, the ratio of 
countries’ natural resource exports to total exports or resource rents. Again, these 
studies reveal that the databases related to different variables including civil war 
and types of natural resources are still issues of contention. 
 
2.  Some natural resource-rich countries have avoided the trap of resource curse, thus 
these findings cannot be conclusive enough. Stevens (2003) and Rosser (2006) 
dismiss this theory in the sense that it is limited and does not give clear explanation 
on the disparity in question. The results merely substantiate the presence of a 
recurring tendency rather than that of an iron law, failing therefore to describe any 
causal relationships between natural resources and negative outcomes or pathways 
(Stevens 2003; Lederman and Maloney 2006; Rosser 2006; Arellano-Yanguas 
2008). Hence, there is no clear-cut consensus as to whether there is indeed such a 
thing as a resource curse (Lederman and Maloney 2006). 
 
3. Arellano-Yanguas (2008) observes a serious lack of analysis of the detailed 
contexts that affect how natural resource abundance produces adverse results in 
each country in the first two crucial issues. From this point, a need for a more 
analytical engagement along with the broad range of social and political variables, 
as well as some of the external political economic environments that help shape 
development outcomes are crucial (Rosser 2006). Moreover, cross-cultural studies 
available to date, based on national statistical data, did not either succeed to 
consider critical social, economic and political contexts at a sub-national level as 
they comprise more and more important factors in the ongoing decentralisation 
processes occurring within developing countries (Arellano-Yanguas 2008). In 
addition, the extent to which informal economy in many African countries 
functions outside the visible official mechanisms (Heller 2006) would also help 
discredit some of the analyses that are more heavily reliant on official figures about 
GDP and exports, and would thus impede and obscure any real development 
outcomes.  
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Beyond this literature, a few key aspects characterise these econometric studies such as 
resource reliance, types of resource and civil war emergence and protraction. It can also be 
noted that a few critiques of those studies have looked at technical issues and, to a lesser 
extent, at their analytical limitations and weaknesses in explaining causation. The question 
then is that how has the prominent absurdity of abundance hypothesis impacted on the 
policy responses for resource-related conflicts and the implications of such policy 
instruments? The upcoming greed and grievance hypothesis subsections address this issue. 
However, considering our topic which focuses on the link between artisanal mining and 
combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle in the Kivus, there will be 
more emphasis on the greed aspect as this has been believed to be strongly linked to armed 
conflicts within countries with natural resources endowment. 
2.3.1  Greed Hypothesis 
The increasing commitment on the close correlation between natural resources and armed 
conflict prompted some interesting research and investigations in social sciences. Statistical 
study presented by Collier and Hoeffler (1998) has been used as a referral key which 
inspired numerous studies carried out with the aim of analysing any link between natural 
resources and civil war. Probable interpretations include the following main trends 
observed in conflict emerged from these studies: (1) civil wars depend on natural resource 
export rather than abundance of natural resources itself which is a factor connected to civil 
war, (2) natural resource wealth has an impact on the extent of civil war rather than its 
inception, (3) natural resources are geographically located and easily controllable and aim 
at prolonging civil war interval.  
Researches on greed hypothesis have used several variables to analyse different linkages 
that exist between civil war onset, its length and its intensity, types of conflict such as 
secessionist or rebellion and types of commodity, as well as locations and productions of 
commodities (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Lederman and Maloney 2006). However, this 
could be taken as being mainly statistical in scope; hence these studies raised debates about 
some of the more technical questions as well as their analytical weaknesses in explaining 
issues of causality (Collier and Hoeffler 1998).   
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Civil War Incidence 
Nowadays, Collier and Hoeffler’s research on the link between natural resource abundance 
and civil war is still used as a referral pillar for analysis in developing better datasets. A 
measurement of natural resource abundance as the share of primary commodity exports in 
GDP in 98 selected countries, and a range of 27 civil war cases as subjects of analysis 
showed that increased natural resources intensify the propensity for civil war (Collier and 
Hoeffler 1998; Collier 2000). These findings were acknowledged by additional analyses 
carried out with improved datasets, confirming a significant correlation between natural 
resource wealth and civil war flare-up (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; 2004). Another study on 
resource-rich countries covering the period between 1960 and 1995 shows that reliance on 
primary commodity exports increases the probability of civil war by four times at least by 
comparison with the situation of countries with no primary commodity exports in GDP 
(Collier 2000). This is to say that an amalgamation of factors considerably boosts the 
propensity for civil war; these factors are: (1) the omnipresence of great primary goods 
exports, (2) a general low level of education among the population, (3) a society with larger 
proportions of younger men and (4) a situation of economic decline. Therefore, the factor 
of opportunity seems to have some explanatory power with regard to the occurrence of civil 
war (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
Some researches argue that civil war onset depends on natural resource rather than natural 
resource wealth fuelling the outburst of civil war. However, there is no accurate literature 
on the link existing between the civil war flare-up and natural resource wealth in cases 
where natural resource abundance is measured as the piece of natural resource stock per 
capita (De Soysa 2000). Some other studies, that used modified and/or different measures 
to explore the relationship between natural resource abundance and civil wars, did not find 
a definite relationship between resource wealth and civil war. Again the correlation test on 
a rent-based measure of natural resource abundance was presented with a curvilinear 
relationship and concluded that the correlation in question was insignificant (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2005). Likewise, it is still tricky to establish accurate links between a situation of 
natural resource reliance and the onset of civil war, even after running through a minor 
sampling frame (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005). However, this link may be 
validated by the high proportion of oil products among primary commodity exports, since 
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oil has a high influence on the possibility of civil war (Fearon 2005), even if it does not 
support the idea of a correlation between civil war and natural resources as generally 
categorised (Ross 2004a). Nevertheless, it concurs with the conclusion of a more recent 
study based on new data and concluding that the usage of a broad classification of natural 
resources does not explain strong evidence for any particular relation between those 
resources and the outbreak of civil war (De Soysa and Neumayer 2007).  
Civil War Scope  
Contrary to the weak relationship between natural resource wealth and the onset of civil 
war, various papers on statistical research depict a curvilinear correlation between natural 
resource wealth and civil wars inception (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Le Billon 2001b; 
2005; Ross 2004a). Ross (2003b) links this rapport to lootable resource and puts forward 
that lootable resources are more likely to extend non-separatist conflicts while non-lootable 
resources are likely to reduce the incidence of non-separatist conflicts. This frequently 
happens with contraband resources such as opium, diamonds or coca that are generally and 
largely utilised to finance rebel groups and thereby protracting civil wars (Fearon 2004; 
Ross 2006). With regards to minerals such as diamonds, it has been ascertained that there 
are strong correlations between civil wars and diamonds (Ross 2004a); in particular, 
secondary diamonds or alluvial diamonds that are lootable as opposed to primary diamonds 
such as Kimberlite diamonds (Lujala et al. 2005). Nevertheless, civil war protraction is a 
field of contradictory view among scholars.  
Overall, it emerges from the above that a group of natural resources are strongly linked to 
the lengthening of civil war. These natural resources are more lootable and contraband kind 
of resources, because they are easier for rebel groups to capture, appropriate and use to fuel 
and fund violence. This latter view, however, could still be questionable (Le Billon 2008). 
Interpretation that natural resource wealth serves to sustain civil war has triggered the idea 
that the accessibility of natural resource wealth enables the weaker side in a conflict to 
finance violence and sustain itself either through looting (Ballentine 2003; Ross 2004b; Le 
Billon 2005), or through selling future exploitation rights, called ‘booty futures’, that they 
want to capture and control (Ross 2004a; 2004b) whereas receiving “advance payments 
for” (Le Billon 2005: 44). In the case of separatist conflicts, according to the same thought, 
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governments are likely to forget about peace agreements that are meant to offer fiscal 
autonomy (Fearon 2004; Ross 2004b). Besides, combatants may not be motivated enough 
to adhere to peace agreements (Ballentine 2003; Fearon 2004), even if one study realised 
mixed results as evidence for such a view (Ross 2004b). Succinctly, it follows from the 
above that more than a few commentators highlight that a protracted conflict may have the 
aftereffect of changing initial motives, with financial rewards becoming gradually more 
important than political objectives (Le Billon 2005), thereby fuelling the development of 
‘war economies’ (Keen 1998; 2000; 2008; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 2000; 2001; 
Ballentine and Sherman 2003; 2004; Studdard 2004), an issue to be discussed in a later 
section. 
Fuelling Civil War 
The relationship between natural resource abundance and civil war intensity caught less 
attention of most scholars. Although the established availability of natural resources to 
augment the number of blood shedding battles during civil wars – due to hostility over 
resource-rich territories amongst belligerents and cruel countermeasures by governments 
against any challenges, just slight evidence tries to support this claim (Ross 2004b). Study 
from Ballentine (2003) even depicted that natural resource wealth decreased the number of 
losses during civil war, at least in some cases. Ballentine’s (2003) statement could be 
interpreted as followed; during battle-related deaths, collusion between combatants for 
resource exploitation could result in the low intensity of civil war (Keen 1998; Ballentine 
2003; Ross 2004b), or a “comfortable settlement in which opposing parties might secure 
mutually beneficial deals to produce and market resources” (Le Billon 2005: 48). This often 
occurs especially when there is “the impossibility of any one side securing a full monopoly 
over lootable resources” (Ballentine 2003: 269).  
Category of Armed Conflicts  
There still exist various types of civil wars. Despite the statistical and codified 1,000 battle-
related deaths per year, some studies have tried to draw a close relationship between types 
of civil war and secessionist or rebellion. There are two prominent data sets regarding 
categories of conflict. Firstly, separatist conflict is linked to non-lootable natural resources, 
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while rebellion is connected to lootable natural resources. The concept of lootability in this 
case is identified by “whether it can be easily appropriated by individuals or small groups 
of unskilled workers” (Ross 2003b: 47). Ross (2003b; 2008) finds negative implications in 
non-lootable resources for separatist conflicts. According to him, non-lootable resources 
last longer and they could be a source of grievance or a source of finance if they are 
obstructable (Ross 2003b). Again, there is a claim that resource-related separatist conflict 
has common aspects: (1) there exists a distinct identity prior to conflict, (2) a widespread 
awareness that the central government misuses the wealth and (3) the bearing by the local 
population of costs incurred by the extraction process (Ross 2003a). Lootable resources 
however, says Ross, do not impact on separatist conflicts as they generate fewer grievances, 
they rather pave the way for the incidence of non-separatist conflicts that are complex, and 
thus last longer because they carry “greater fragmentation and shifting alliances among the 
armies that control the resource” (Ross 2003b:67). Lootable resources, in the case of new 
wars, could be a financial source for non-separatist conflicts by using different mechanisms 
including direct looting and sale of resources, the sale of booty futures as well as extortion 
and abduction (Ross 2003a).  
Secondly, ‘point’ resources and ‘diffuse’ resources, geographically located in remote areas 
from the central government or the capital, could be a disturbing factor, with the aim of 
triggering different types of conflicts (Le Billion 2001a; 2001b; 2005; Ross 2003a). The 
difference between point resources and diffuse resources is that point resources are 
extracted in concentrated areas by a small number of capital-intensive operators. Point 
resources are oil and deep-shaft mineral exploitation, and they generally benefit 
governments. Diffuse resources however are exploited over open geographical areas by 
many small-scale operators without using industrial modes of production. Diffuse resources 
are alluvial gems and minerals, timber and agricultural products, and they are accessed by 
various actors, which enables informal operations (Le Billion 2005). At the same time, in 
the words of Le billion (2005:35): 
 “Distant resources are more difficult than proximate resources for the government 
to control, in part owing to their location in remote territories along porous borders, 
or within the territory of a political opposition group”.  
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For that reason, it is worth noting a few contrasting features marking the geography of 
resources. This would mean that point resources, closely located to the capital, easily fall 
under the state control, while those that are geographically in remote from the capital, 
escape from the government control and are more likely to trigger separatist conflicts. 
Diffuse resources located in remote from the capital are generally linked to conflicts, and 
they are characterised by warlordism. However, those that are near to the capital are 
associated with rebellions and rioting (Le Billon 2001a; 2001b; 2005; Ross 2003a).  
Landscape of Resources  
Findings over how lootable resources happen to be associated with civil wars expand 
beyond studies that focus on the effect of resources on different types of conflict. However, 
Ross’s (2003b) investigation on a set of 12 cases of civil wars and three cases of minor 
conflicts during the period between 1990 and 2000 could not find any major variations in 
the occurrence of civil war in connection with four main categories of natural resources 
after improving the data on income per capita; oil and gas, minerals, food crops and non-
food crops. However, he found a noteworthy positive correlation between drugs and 
diamonds. This latter findings, hence, confirms the theory that lootable resources increase 
the likelihood of civil war rather than point resources do. On the contrary and while 
explaining the relationship between mineral resource abundance and civil war De Soysa 
(2000) and Le Billon (2001a; 2005) advise that point resources, as being opposed to diffuse 
resources, are easier to capture and appropriate due to their geographical concentration. 
This logic equally appears to hint at the lootability of these resources. In their research over 
mineral resource abundance and state’s stability, Snyder and Bhavnani (2005) contend that 
beyond the simple accessibility to lootable resources, other factors do play a role in the 
occurrence of civil war through influencing the capability of rulers to maintain political 
stability in lootable mineral resource-rich countries; they include the accessibility of non-
lootable resources, the taxability of resources and prototypes or patterns of state spending. 
Available lootable or point resources are important but their mere presence is not sufficient 
enough for inferring directly an immediate link between their accessibility and the 
occurrence of civil war. There is a need for considering other factors, including the 
economic structure and its impact on social relations; such as a high degree of dependency 
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on agricultural production which may also be related to the incidence of civil war (Smith 
2004; Humphreys 2005).  
Conversely, numerous studies have robustly supported the correlation between oil and 
diamond abundance and civil war occurrence owing to diamond and oil attractiveness. 
However there is still many contrasting opinions about their role in civil wars (De Soysa 
2002; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Fearon 2005; Ross 2006; 2007; 2008; De Soysa and 
Neumayer 2007). It has been observed, for instance, that the probability of civil war in oil-
exporting countries seems to be double than other countries (De Soysa 2002). De Soysa and 
Neumayer (2007), however, warn about the relevance of the existing relationship and 
advise that the connection between oil wealth and civil war is relevant only for low-
intensity conflicts that have 25 or fewer battle-related deaths per year rather than the 
common figure of 1,000 deaths per year. Some other studies, however, pointed out that oil 
abundance lessens the occurrence of civil war (Smith 2004) and that the parallelism 
between oil wealth and civil war tends to be fairly weak (Humphreys 2005). 
Similarly, minor statistical studies revealed that diamond-producing countries are more 
likely to experience civil war than countries without (Humphreys 2005; Lujala et al. 2005). 
Lujala et al. (2005), for instance, contend that alluvial diamonds – whose extraction is easy 
and without using much skill or technology, are likely to trigger civil war, while Kimberlite 
diamonds – whose extraction involves considerable capital-intensive processes, are not. 
This point of view lacks evidence as other statistical studies did not find relationships 
between diamonds particularly and civil war outbreak (Ross 2006). Snyder and Bhavnani 
(2005) and Ross (2006), for example, contradict the view by Lujala et al. (2005). As for 
them alluvial diamonds are said to induce peace rather than conflict, and are poorly linked 
to civil war occurrence than Kimberlite diamonds.  
Other studies suggest that the link between armed conflicts and diamonds cannot be 
established and the issue is still questionable (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005; Ross 2006; Le 
Billon 2008). It has been said that diamonds cannot be a conflict-fuelling factor; therefore 
the above mentioned findings reject any link between diamonds and conflicts. These 
contrasting views might result from the lack of reliable figures on the production and 
location of diamonds (Gilmore et al. 2005), the time change, the correlation’s strength 
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today than that of the past (Lujala et al. 2005; Ross 2006) and the variety of diamond types 
considered. So far, the overall assessment on the issue depicts that a fairly narrow number 
of violent conflicts have occurred in diamonds-rich countries, a detail that should also 
render the statistical studies weak as it occurs to the oil’s case (Ross 2006; Le Billon 2008). 
These contrasting thoughts seem to emerge from different methods and data used in the 
studies in question (Ross 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). In the same vein, it appears 
that the measures used for oil resources were rejected, being weak and incomplete (Lujala 
et al. 2007). This brings out the importance of other elements that could influence the link. 
Ross (2006) and De Soysa and Neumayer (2007) are of the view that the time period is also 
an important factor which should be taken into account since the link would be more 
significant today than it would have been at earlier junctures. Some scholars, however, 
remain reluctant on the capacity of the state to avert conflict (Fearon 2005; Humphreys 
2005), as the abundance of some mineral such as cassiterite, coltan, diamond, gold and oil 
destabilises the capacity of states and leads to armed conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Fearon 2005; Ross 2006; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). This brings into light political 
results, also seen through the lens of grievance as part of the resource curse theory to be 
discussed further.  
Cogency of the Link 
Drawn from the above statistical studies, it might be postulated that some natural resources 
influence the incidence and lengthening of civil war occurrence. Empirical analysis has 
established a strong significant greed hypothesis, even if this has been utterly questioned 
for being both subjective and weak. The subjectivity and weaknesses can be attributed to 
contrasting views over the link between mineral resources and civil wars, and the lack of a 
robust analytical contribution over certain scientific issues raised by the theory – weakness 
which challenges the validity of the alleged correlation between mineral resources and 
conflicts, and which ends up flawing causations. Having said so, both data and proxies 
were dealt with adequately although technical issues were problematic. 
Firstly, Ross (2006) notes that a rare number of civil war cases that raise the need of 
analytical concern over the validity of statistical analysis as it turns to be more sensitive to 
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the minor changes within the data. This issue raised a crucial concern about the 
development of statistical studies that aim at analysing the impacts of natural resources on 
civil wars from the post-Cold War period, on the one hand, and on the other, the impact that 
the availability of point resources, such as oil (Ross 2006) and diamonds (Lujala et al. 
2005), tends to have on the expected possibility of a conflict inception seems to be evident 
in the post-Cold War by comparison with earlier periods. This view undermines the validity 
of the civil wars statistical studies and is not shared by the new wars paradigm which links 
resources to civil wars. 
Secondly, some scholars have largely rejected the quality of the data used by these 
econometrical studies. Humphreys (2005) is of the view that the data on natural resource 
abundance are of low quality. This has resulted in further works with the aim of finding 
reliant data. Snyder (2006) has tried to frame more carefully designed qualitative and 
comparative studies, while Gilmore et al. (2005) have started  improving datasets, more 
specifically on diamonds, and others on oil  and on natural resource rents (De Soysa and 
Neumayer 2007; Lujala et al. 2007). 
Several findings on civil wars are still problematic. The major concerns occur when it 
comes to codifying civil wars and identifying their beginning and ending. This major 
crucial issue is the result of the absence of an agreed definition of civil war as mentioned 
earlier. Collier and Hoeffler’s civil war datasets were discarded for being “biased in a way 
that overstates the impact of primary commodities” (Ross 2004a:342), this criticism was 
supported by other findings that used different coding rules. Ross (2004a) and Sambanis 
(2004) did not find any necessary linkage between natural resource dependence and the 
onset of civil wars. Moreover, the agreed operational definition of civil war as a conflict 
over government or territory, which is based on the use of a threshold of 1,000 battle-
related deaths per year, cannot apply to a well-defined concept of a civil war, neither does it 
represent it at all. Narrowing down civil war in a fenced definition, such as that above, fails 
to incorporate different forms and dynamics that fighting takes and which involves the 
exploitation and regulation of resources as well as the relationship with the broader context, 
including the mining sector role, the global trade chain and the peripheralisation of the 
extraction site (Le Billon 2008; Beswick and Jackson 2011). More importantly, the 
credibility of findings on the correlation between civil wars and mineral resource wealth is 
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severely dented owing to the fact that researchers rely on state’s official statistics or 
datasets, generally available but barely accessible by researchers. Furthermore, due to their 
status of being post-conflict countries, the accessibility and availability of the database are 
serious drawbacks, something that undermines official statistics (Cramer 2002; MacGinty 
2004). With regard to the extensive informal economy, generally developed within 
affected-conflict countries, the reliability of statistical issue has definitely to be addressed 
(Mwanasali 2000). 
Finally, the use of proxies in carrying out this empirical testing raised some concerns not 
only about these proxies, but also on their efficiency of what they should be measuring. 
Cramer’s (2002:1850) study, for instance, criticises these proxies and brings into light that 
the proxies used do not seem to be “conceptually or substantially equivalent to the thing 
they are meant to represent”. Therefore, the use of proxies is inconsistent and they are 
conceptually and empirically fuzzy. Cramer indents this situation as: 
“An instance of the more general problem of the empirical weakness, arbitrary 
prioritisation of particular variables, and manipulation of technique over and above 
the search for truth in econometrics” (ibid: 1854). 
Causality  
Despite macro-quantitative studies’ weaknesses picked out across different datasets, 
however, they are still helpful in identifying some general trends (Salehyan 2008), even if 
their resulting theories are problematic in many cases of exception. Mack (2002) believes 
them to have some value too. Salehyan (2008), though, warns that macro-quantitative does 
not aim at describing any causal relationships as part of the findings, which is a task 
requiring more detailed explanations that should be provided by empirical studies in order 
to complement the more probabilistic arguments. Statistical studies are still a set of 
causalities wooing to sustain the idea that civil wars are linked to resource, although these 
causalities were criticised for being not only essentially inconsistent and unconvincing 
(Cramer 2002; Cater 2003), but also overly reductionist (Cramer 2002; 2006b). The 
prominent fundamental theory that natural resources involve conflict was consistently 
opposed. Drawing on the same idea, Ross (2004b; 2006) puts forward one opposition and 
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argues as followed; the occurrence of civil wars flare-up in a country does not necessarily 
require the relocation of its non-extractive industries, such as manufacturing and services, 
into safer areas while the extractive industries remain owing to their specific nature. In this 
case, the proportion of primary commodity exports to GDP and a commonly used measure 
of resource wealth augment significantly. Accordingly, it might be concluded that the 
correlation in question was as a ramification of the reality of the conflict that forces the 
factor of resource reliance. 
Although critics of existing work on causality have been formulated, the greed hypothesis –
which supports the impact of availability of natural resources on the incidence of civil war 
with armed groups gaining from economic motivations and opportunity provided by the 
lootability of resources in question, remains the backbone of the prevalent causality thesis. 
However, bearing in mind the potential correlation between lootability and realistic actor 
perspectives (Rosser 2006), the motivation behind looting is alleged to be purely economic 
even if scholars do not explicitly mention it when they set to examine different factors 
explaining the complex dynamics at play in conflict situations and the various rationales for 
looting. MacGinty (2004:866-868) draws the line between economic looting and symbolic 
looting; economic looting is set to gain profit while symbolic looting is set to get non-
material advantages. MacGinty further distinguishes strategic looting – which is part of a 
wider politico-military project, from selective looting for target selection. Other than 
MacGinty’s looting specification, several scholars tend to rely heavily on the concept of 
lootability as narrowly defined in economic understanding without adequately investigating 
or clearly conceptualising it; thereby weakening the hypothesis put forward (ibid.). 
Some scholars recommended a few other explanations to strengthen the weak argument of 
linear correlation between natural resources and conflict onset. On the front line is Ross 
(2004b) who rejects any correlation between resource wealth and incidence of civil war by 
a simple mechanism of coexistence, as another unpredictable factor may play the role of a 
third variable at stake (Ross 2004a) or even a diversity of mechanisms (Ross 2004b). 
Although Ross’ (2004a; 2004b) argument sheds light on the new route to understanding the 
link between resources and civil war onset, the most important argument however has 
pointed out the role of governance as the most crucial variable in explaining the causal link 
between conflict and natural resource abundance (De Soysa 2000; Cater 2003; Fearon and 
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Laitin 2003; Ross 2003a; Fearon 2005; Humphreys 2005; De Soysa and Neumayer 2007). 
This leading argument derives from a ‘state-centric theory’. The state-centric theory argues 
that natural resource reliance paves the way for a weak and unaccountable government 
which, in turn, culminates in a set-up of particular conditions conducive for the incidence of 
civil war (De Soysa 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2003a; Fearon 2005; De Soysa and 
Neumayer 2007).38 One of these conditions includes the tendency for corruption to be 
found in patrimonial regimes (Le Billon 2003a), a stance previously approved by some 
studies. A political order could enable high-value lootable resources through ruling the 
institutions of extraction and exercising the degree of control over the resource revenues 
created by these institutions (Snyder 2006). Herbst (2000) tried to illustrate this view when 
he looked at how rebel leaders in sub-Saharan Africa recruit combatants by persuading 
them to join armed groups. He contends that most rebel leaders use economic incentives 
and political indoctrination, ethnic mobilisation and coercion as a recruitment method. 
Furthermore, Herbst (2000) links the viability, continuation and form of a rebel movement 
to the capacity of the state to respond to internal challenges that it may face.  
                                                 
38 State-centric views contend that institutions of a fragile state, based on resource rents, have adverse impacts 
on economic development and democracy. Whilst how resource rents weaken state capacity can be explained 
by a combination of cognitive, historic-structuralist and institutional theories, the most predominant approach 
has been theories of rentier state (Ross 1999). Cognitive theories advise that in countries with natural resource 
endowment, the behaviour of political elites becomes altered in both rational and irrational ways, influencing 
the type of governance practiced in these regions, and the best known national behaviour feature of political 
elites is rent-seeking. It is to say that given resource rents being relatively easy to capture, they result in 
bribes, distortions in public policies and a shift of labour to public favour seeking (Leite and Weidmann 1999; 
Torvik 2002). Contrarily, a historic-structuralist perspective suggests that natural resource wealth adversely 
impacts on the level of democracy of a country because it hinders the social and cultural changes that help to 
cement democratisation, and focuses analytically on the role of social forces in shaping developmental 
outcomes. A number of scholars making use of the historic-structuralist perspective assume that natural 
resource wealth drives to a formation of the powerful business class and /or middle class with the aim of 
exercising power to influence government policies for its own interests (Ross 1999), and hampers a 
modernisation effect, whereby ‘the failure of the population to move into industrial and service sector jobs 
renders them less likely to push for democracy (Ross 2001:357). As to rentier state theories, a rentier state is 
‘characterised by a high reliance on external rents produced by a few economic actors’, and rents are 
‘typically generated from the exploitation of natural resources, not from production – labour, investment – 
interest, or management risk – profit. Rentier states culminate in becoming autonomous, because states with 
large natural resources endowment are ‘more detached and less accountable thus they do not levy taxes’ 
(Jensen and Wantchekon 2004:3). There are a number of scholars who support the rentier theories and explain 
the low levels of democracy or authoritarian regimes with the theories (Karl 1997; 2007; Ross 2001; Luong 
2004; Alayli 2005). More details on rentier states are available in Mahdavy 1970; Garaibeh 1987; Luciani 
1987; Caudhry 1994. 
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Another research on the causal mechanisms behind 13 recent civil war cases highlighted 
that more than one key mechanism seems to associate resource wealth with a subsequent 
outbreak of conflict; resource abundance may be a way-in or better a danger that a foreign 
country would use as reason to intervene on behalf of a nascent rebel movement (Ross 
2004b). Ross (2008) also brings out a significant contrasting view on the correlation 
between mineral resources and civil wars. For him, the trap of mineral-based inequality as 
it is represented by armed conflict, primarily stems from the problem of mineral-based 
inequality and hampers investment to increase mineral resource dependence. Ross further 
pointed out poverty, mountainous terrains, peripheries, prior regional identities, political 
institutions and types of minerals in terms of their lootability as some of tractable structural 
factors that are supplementary issues and therefore lead to war. As for the effect of mineral 
abundance on vertical and horizontal disparity, Ross (2007) contended that it is difficult to 
specify the correlation between vertical disparity and mineral abundance owing to the 
dearth of data on income disparity within mineral-rich countries, although the effect of 
horizontal disparity on armed conflict, particularly on secessionist conflict, has been set. 
Ross’ findings raise the need for filling in the gap between vertical mineral wealth disparity 
and horizontal disparity on armed conflict. Therefore, there is a need for a micro-level 
analysis of conflict and violence,39 which should look at the role played by various social 
forces broadly over ethnic and religious terms (Rosser 2006) and for the use of fine-grained 
information which goes behind the structural determinants of conflict alone. This opens a 
breach towards a more methodical approach to looking at a variety of other factors such as 
“the geographic spread of civil war, the variation in the incidence of civil war over time, 
and the characteristics of civil war violence” (Weinstein 2007:366). Lesson learned from 
this approach is that the nature and the availability of the resource endowments impact 
considerably on behavioural patterns showed by both individuals and movements. It is to 
say that armed groups that exploit natural resources with external support seem to use 
indiscriminate violence, while those that rely on social rather than economic endowments 
choose a more selective usage of violence and refer to civilians for their support. However, 
                                                 
39Justino (2007) postulates that whilst there is a new emerging body of work on micro-level analyses of rough 
violence, ‘micro-level empirical evidence on the correlation between violent conflict and poverty has been 
scarce and at times contradictory’, largely because of the absence of sufficient data. 
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would socio-economic and political disparities or discontents be a fuelling-conflict factor in 
a natural resource producing country? So, how are they connected to the armed conflicts? 
The upcoming grievance hypothesis’ lines shed light on these issues. 
2.3.2  Grievance Hypothesis 
A set of papers from several researchers who have looked at this issue have tried to 
establish the correlation between civil war onset and grievance in terms of vertical disparity 
(Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 2004). The most eminent pattern proxied 
grievance on the basis of a series of measurements, along with economic stagnation through 
a calculation of GDP growth before civil war, of repression through a measurement of 
political rights indices, of inequality through the use of the Gini coefficient and, last but not 
least, of ethnic tension measured by the ethno-linguistic fractionalisation index. And the 
outcomes of the measure of grievance produced by proxies are not enough at all to increase 
the risk of civil war (Collier 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002). However, some scholars 
criticised these objective proxies of not being adequate tools (Mack 2002), while some 
other proxies, including the average levels of schooling for individual fighters as well as the 
general ratio of young men within the total population, utilised in the statistical studies to 
set the greed hypothesis have been claimed to be closer to grievance sources (Ballentine 
and Sherman 2003; Cramer 2006a). 
Some other authors reject any link between civil war and social disparity. Collier (2007), 
for instance, advises that grievance cannot be a source of civil war; neither can it lead to 
violence since it is a common feature shared by all societies. Collier’s (2007) stance has 
been robustly criticised for being a long colonial tradition of ‘dismissing rebellion as 
criminal’ and illegitimate violent protest (Duffield 2001; Keen 2008). Ross (2007) 
however, draws away from Collier’s view and contends that the lack of reliable data on 
income disparity undermines the assessment on the correlation between vertical disparity 
and mineral resource. For Ross, the lack of data on income disparity within mineral-rich 
countries constitutes stumbling-blocks to assess with any accuracy the linkages between 
vertical disparity and mineral wealth.  Conversely, Luckham et al. (2001) are of the view 
that poverty and disparity bear the root of civil wars. This view is supported by Ross’ 
(2004b; 2008) research on the disparity observed between mineral-rich and mineral-poor 
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areas, something that could lead to secessionist. Rosser (2006: 17) also endorses the view 
above by demonstrating:  
“Natural resource exploitation triggers various types of grievance such as 
insufficiently compensated land expropriation, environmental degradation, 
inadequate job opportunities and labour migration”. 
These economic studies were criticised and the selection of proxies for grievance was found 
dubious (Keen 2008). Likewise, while some of the statistical studies strived to assess 
grievance by the means of objective proxies, they did not directly measure “the emotions … 
that may affect the propensity of people to resort to violence” (Mack 2002:522). Research 
on factors pushing individuals to join militia and fight (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008) 
reveals that issues related to the belligerents’ various experiences and emotions may 
constitute a crucial source of violence through the critical impact they have on them, as 
they develop a “sense of having been humiliated ” (Keen 2008:50). The concept of ‘having 
been humiliated’ spells the “important dynamics which deepens violence during civil war 
and the patterns of violence that emerge in the aftermath of a war” (ibid: 69). 
Having authored the greed hypothesis, economists have criticised and rejected the 
grievance hypothesis for being politicised and lacking systematic analysis (Collier 2007). 
Nevertheless, the grievance hypothesis is still supported by a long-standing body of 
knowledge in political science, and its active role derived from relative deprivation fuels 
internal conflicts, whereby identity contributes to help group formulation to assume 
collective action (Cater 2003; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007). While Cater (2003) links the 
civil war to state failure owing to failing legitimacy and weak capacity of governments or a 
weakening of social contract40 (Addison and Murshed 2006; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 
2007), grievance literature however is largely influenced by Stewart’s (2000; 2003) concept 
                                                 
40 Addison and Murshed (2006:137) define a social contract as “the set of rules, formal and informal that 
guide the behaviour of citizens, entrepreneurs and governments and allow conflict to be expressed and 
resolved peacefully rather than violently, and is not purely internal affairs, but can have strong international 
dimensions, both in cause and effect”. In this argument, greed or grievance is limited to initiate such large-
scale violence but a failure of social contract; which is “similar to the weak or fragile state capacity and by 
implication poor institutional quality” should be considered (Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2007:25). 
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of horizontal disparity developed during the last decade41 (Cater 2003; Murshed and 
Tadjoeddin 2007).  
As stated by Stewart (2003:3), horizontal disparity means: “the existence of severe 
inequalities between culturally defined groups, which includes multidimensional effects; 
political, economic and social”. By contrast, vertical inequality “lines individuals or 
households up vertically and measures inequality over the range of individuals”, he said 
(ibid.). Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007) support this view and advise that despite rather 
scarce data, horizontal disparity is linked to the civil war onset in a cross-section of 
countries. However, these contrasting views impel to understand a couple of theoretical 
views on grievance with regard to concerns over ‘deprivation’ and ‘polarisation’ (Murshed 
and Tadjoeddin 2007). In Murshed and Tadjoeddin’s (ibid: 16-17) words: 
“Relative deprivation’s view deals with perceptions based on “the disparity between 
aspirations and achievements suggested to constitute the micro-foundation for 
conflict, while polarisation emerges when two groups exhibit great inter-group 
heterogeneity combined with intra-group homogeneity, overlapping with the 
concept of horizontal inequality”.  
So, what would motivate an armed movement to fight? The following section will look at 
this issue. 
Following the above literature concerning resource curse, it might be postulated that the 
paradox of plenty is a conflict mineral based analysis, established to explain root-causes of 
new war economy. Bearing in mind that one of the key things that the research has set is to 
look at the bond between artisanal mining and combatants’ (re-) recruitment and 
reintegration, after various approaches and following extensive analysis of current civil 
wars, it might be identified that policies based on adverse effects of resources are complex 
and weak to accurately address issues of mineral resource conflict-related. Even if they are 
important in showing why armed conflicts erupt over mineral resources, however, they did 
                                                 
41 From an approach developed at the United Nations University WIDER, Helsinki, civil war outbreak 
correlates to horizontal disparity and a breakdown of social contract (Hanlon and Yanacopulos 2006). 
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not live up to elaborate on how the process of civil war-mineral resources’ link comes to 
taking place, and the gap is still in the literature. Therefore, there is still a lack of a clear 
and elaborated explanation on how greed and grievance link to conflict over mineral 
resources. This gap further suggests that the absurdity of abundance theory has narrowly 
focused on the grievance aspect while strongly relied on greed’s, thereby overlooking to 
elaborate on how both aspects are interconnected to an armed conflict. Further to this and in 
the same perspective of thinking, it bears stressing that although horizontal disparity has 
been pointed out as main conflict-fuelling factor, vertical’s, however, seems to catch less 
attention. Conversely, a very few studies have rooted their analysis over the motivation of 
rebels, and the literature on civil war-mineral resources has strayed from other factors such 
as colonial history and social, economic and politic aspect in which an armed conflict 
explodes.  
2.4  Economic Dynamics of Armed Conflicts: War Economy 
The analysis of the adverse effects of natural resource abundance in the previous sections 
brought into light one basic dichotomy based on greed and grievance, and founded the 
importance of these two hypotheses in the debate on armed conflict occurrence and its 
origins and causes. There is a claim that both hypotheses carry analytical weaknesses and 
are subject to much criticism. Again, their explanation about the motivation for war was 
oversimplified and has been widely contested (Cater 2003). In the same way, Cramer 
(2006a:166) clearly points out the problem of using grouping in scientific analysis and 
contends: “most classification systems impose artificial discontinuities onto a reality that is 
more of a continuum”. The coding rules of civil wars, as detailed previously, epitomises 
this. Besides, most economic analysis pretends “to assume selfish behaviour” to be rational 
without examining what selfishness entails (Keen 2008:30). Concomitantly Keen (2008) 
believes that social issues and external factors were neglected. 
Keen’s (1998; 2000; 2008) studies recommend to start from such an oversimplified 
dichotomy on the role of greed and grievance in order to observe how they both work 
alongside or interact, and to understand how and why a civil war happens and how and why 
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it protracts. The economic purpose of violence42 being fundamental in sustaining wars, as 
there is “more to war than winning”, its “grievance in contemporary conflicts is a 
continually important factor” (Keen 2000:26). Therefore, grievance and political objectives 
of civil war, contends Keen (2008), cannot be cleaned out even after they are transformed 
or compromised to an extent as a war proceeds. Hence, clarifying both the meanings of war 
support and war causes becomes crucial. Cramer (2006b:195) draws the line between both 
meanings and argues: “[t]he means of paying for war should not be conflated with the 
causes of war as ‘where there’s a will there’s a way”. Capra (1997) also recommends 
considering the relationship between the roles that individual parts play as a whole and as 
systems thinking. 
A set of papers on war economies and various debates over resource curse (Keen 1998; 
2000; 2008; Berdal and Malone 2000; Duffield 2000; 2001; Ballentine and Sherman 2003; 
Nitzschke 2003; Ballentine 2004; Le Billon 2004; Studdard 2004) have revealed that the 
flawed and insular greed and grievance hypotheses have also influenced a number of other 
findings made influence beyond greed and grievance, leading to the emphasis on the 
economic agendas or economic functions in civil war, or on war economies, generally 
viewed as new systems emerging from the process of civil war and that often persist even 
after formal settlements of conflict, and have a huge impact on post-conflict societies. 
Conventional war economies, according to Kaldor (2007:95), are “a system which is 
centralised, totalising and autarchic’ with ‘[t]he main aim of the war effort’ being ‘to 
maximise the use of force so as to engage and overcome the enemy in battle”. Contrary to 
Kaldor’s (2007) definition, Duffield (2000) and Kaldor (2007) define new war economies 
as a globalised system which tends to rely deeply on local assets control and external 
support rather than domestic production. From an eclectic view, war economy should 
include all economic activities happening during a violent conflict (Keen 2008). These 
profits can originate from different sources including looting, embezzlement, protection of 
money and ransoms as well as from attempts at controlling trade, exploiting labour market 
and gaining access to land or appropriating aid. From this perspective, it is acknowledged 
                                                 
42According to Keen (2000; 2008), Violence has three immediate functions: economic, security and 
psychology. 
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that the eclectic view has obscured the  meaning of war economies, since wages, bribery 
and corrupt benefits happening to military personnel, as well as remittances received from 
allied Diaspora communities render new war economies a crucial feature to be understood 
(Duffield 2000; Keen 2000; 2008). New war economies are adaptive networked structures 
linked to global markets (Duffield 2000) and, as such, could switch over time (Duffield 
2000; Cater 2003); they exercise violence that produces “different functions at different 
points throughout the duration of the conflict” said Cater (2003:28), thereby obscuring all 
analysis of these processes through the use of static models (Keen 1998). 
New wars have emerged after the Cold War and they are characterised by an accelerating 
globalisation (Keen 2008), given the fact that the post-Cold War ended external support and 
sponsorships provided to armed groups. Warriors were compelled to seek their own 
financial resourcing (Dietrich 2000; Cramer 2006b) and they have set it through wider 
economic networks provided by globalisation (Duffield 2000). Duffield (2000) and 
Ballentine and Sherman (2003) contend that market liberalisation in the globalised world 
has paved the way for all forms of trans-border activity, including informal and illicit 
activities; which is part of most of these war economies, with the realisation of local assets 
and of all forms of basic supplies relying on external markets. Consequently, war 
economies have become one of the international trade pillars, so well incorporated into the 
existing social networks, to an extent that their relationship and structures interact with 
those of more conventional global economies and of peace economies within the region 
concerned. However, are new wars or war economies different from ‘old wars’ – Cold-
war’s conflicts? To this question, Beswick and Jackson (2011:25) argue:  
“Old wars drew closely from the process of European state-building from the 
seventieth to the twentieth century, while new wars are seen as state-destruction, 
coined [by Jackson 2012] as ‘state-unbuilding’ or ‘state-breaking’”. 
Based on a Programme on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars – EACW,43 run between 2000 
and 2004, Ballentine (2004:1) reports that motivations for civil war in resource-wealth 
                                                 
43 The programme was chaired at the then International Peace Academy and is now based at the International 
Peace Institute. For more details, see www.ipinst.org/topic/1/14.html. 
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countries tend to include to varying degrees a combination of greed and grievance rather 
than any single set of causes.44 The same study however dismissed the notion of resource 
wars and asserted that economic views are not associated with the primary cause behind 
most armed conflicts, even if it is not an easy task in research to draw the line between 
economic reasons and other factors. Possible understanding of this mainly includes 
methodological difficulties faced within the studies themselves, but also the nature of the 
subject itself, due to the “fluid nature of conflict dynamics over time” (Ballentine 2004:4). 
However, it might be suggested that a well-connected economic motivation with a range of 
other factors (Ross 2008), spanning from “socioeconomic and political grievances, on the 
one hand, interethnic disputes and security dilemmas on the other” (Ballentine 2003:260) 
seems to enable war outbreak. In practice however, it is worth noting that accessing and 
controlling economic wealth would constitute a source of an opportunity structure which 
financially sustains warfare and enables the lengthening, intensity and character of conflict 
(Le Billon 2004). It is, therefore, likely that economic aspects are “consequential to the 
character and protraction of civil war and complicate efforts at conflict resolution” 
(Ballentine 2004:4). 
The role of resources on the dynamics of civil war has also been clearly shown by the 
study. Overall, it might be presumed that more lootable resources are likely to be linked to 
rebellions, most they contribute to encouraging violence and profit wider actors, thereby 
increasing the number of peace spoilers and the risk of secondary conflicts over wealth 
(Ballentine 2003; 2004; Kaldor 2007). However, they do not greatly alter the political 
objectives of the combatants, notwithstanding the fact that accessing and controlling 
lucrative lootable resources tend to culminate in resource predation and the concomitant 
risk of continuing more systematic forms of criminality (Ballentine 2003; Keen 2008; Ross 
2008). Conversely, non-lootable resources are associated with conflicts of the separatist 
kind (Ballentine 2003). The EACW has also further underlined the bond between relying 
on primary commodity exports and the incidence of civil war. As most civil wars have their 
ground of predilection in developing countries, it follows from the study above that there is 
a number of variables that are conducive for prompting civil wars, including weak 
                                                 
44 Balletine and Sherman (2003) The political Economy of Armed Conflict: beyond Greed and Grievance, 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
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governance, military, economic and political weakness in states, corruption, prevalent 
informal and shadow economies, undeveloped manufacturing sectors, the nature of existing 
social and kinship bonds and the existence of regional allies (Ballentine 2003). 
Concomitantly, the EACW’s research has also suggested the location of war economies 
within the internal opportunity structure as aforementioned, as well as within the broader 
political economy, which also counts for “insufficient global regulation of commodity and 
fiscal markets” in liberalised international trade and commerce (Ballentine 2004:3). 
Following previous discussion on new geography of conflicts, it might be noted that due to 
war economies being overlapped by regional and global networks, drawing the line 
between intra-state and internal or civil war becomes challenging (King 1997; Alley 2004; 
Ballentine 2004; Salehyan 2008). It goes the same that war economies are also associated 
with numerous actors, including various war profiteers and peace spoilers, who contribute 
to transforming strife into protracted conflicts by multiplying the points of conflict 
(Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003). Therefore, a few regional economic dimensions have 
several linkages with negative externalities and interventions by neighbouring states 
(Salehyan 2008). 
At this point, the development of conflict within regional settings becomes very crucial as it 
involves the availability of sanctuaries for the use of rebels, a view acknowledged by 
Salehyan (2008).45 The state-centric theories have explained how the existence of internal 
opportunity structures induces civil war and war economies and how they extend. It 
emerged from these theories that internal opportunity structures are largely influenced by 
the effect of weak governance and state weakness (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003; 
Ballentine 2004) or state failure, defined as “a declining state capacity or desire to provide 
public goods and an increasing erosion of legitimacy” (Cater 2003:41). A systematic 
dilapidation of state’s economic resources enables patronage networks and ends up creating 
‘shadow state’ (Reno 1998; 2000; Ballentine 2004), whereby rulers bound “potential rivals 
to them, in exchange for largesse, without the need for creating strong bureaucracies that 
they feared would heighten independent tendencies among elites” (Reno 1998:2), a much 
                                                 
45 See the section on post-Cold War conflicts. 
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feared ramification. However, the end of financial supports after the Cold War and the 
dawn of liberalisation reform have curtailed the amount of resources available to rulers, 
something which gave rise to a new theory of fragmentation of shadow states and the 
emergence of warlords, clearly known as a favourable opportunity structure to the rising of 
armed conflict. 
On the other hand, being presented as a reliable and strong approach by most scholars, the 
great emphasis laid on natural resource wealth within a given state at the expense of a more 
thorough examination of the effects left by both globalisation and market liberalisation has 
revealed the weak side of the state-centric approaches (Reno 1998; Keen 2000; Duffield 
2000; Cater 2003), also known as ‘the erosion of authority or retreat of the state’ theory 
(Strange 1996). The state-centric approaches have provided some limitations in the 
systematic analysis of the role and effects of foreign states in a civil war (Reno 1998; Keen 
2000; 2008; Duffield 2000).   
2.5 Conclusions 
This chapter investigated the literature on three key points that are relevant to the research 
subject, namely new geography of conflicts, the absurdity of abundance and war economy. 
The new geography of conflicts that shaped the post-Cold War period portrays different 
characteristics in terms of environment, scale, actors, methods of civil wars and finance. 
The end of superpowers’ support following the halt of the Cold War as well as the rising of 
globalisation and market deregulation have weakened the state’s monopoly of organised 
violence, dismissed the autonomy of state, and extended the regional and global networks 
that enhanced self-financing of the conflicts. 
Amongst various perspectives on the contemporary conflicts, the adverse effects of 
resource abundance thesis has been highly influential in the analysis of resource-related 
conflicts despite being criticised for a number of analytical limitations including coding 
issues, an overly reductionist approach, cross-country analysis without micro- and regional-
level analysis, and a lack of causal explanation. The greed hypothesis explains that 
economic motivations and opportunity created by abundance of natural resources – 
valuable, lootable, diffuse and distant resources in particular, and weak governance trigger 
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and uphold armed conflict, while dismissing grievance as the motivation of armed conflict. 
A more recent set of papers on the economic agendas of war economy explain the nature of 
the contemporary war economy as adaptive networked structures connected to the global 
market. The contemporary war economy is hence decentralised, situated in the internal 
opportunity structure and broader political economy, and well integrated into the existing 
economies. However, the resource curse theory showed its limitations when it came to 
clearly elaborating the process through which natural resources are directly or indirectly 
linked to armed conflicts. Neither did it demonstrate whether greed and grievance 
hypothesises could link each other and trigger violence. Therefore, the analysis over 
resource-related conflict has eluded to clearly explain motivations that entice combatants to 
fighting; neither did it hint at how rebel groups and combatants become involved in the 
exploitation of minerals and in war economy. 
Having a controversial meaning, combatants play a central role in the composition of the 
armed forces though, even if their components seem to respond to different functions. 
However, it has been proved that in war-affected countries, the end of conflict releases a 
large number of returnees; most of them being unable to afford their livelihood. 
Accordingly, the resumption of armed conflict in a particular area seems to be the result of 
the paucity of an accurate understanding of ex-combatants’ enlistment and the context in 
which the conflict came to erupt, which finally tends to culminate in the failure of the DDR 
of fighters. Conversely, failure to piece combatants’ recruitment and the DDR programmes 
together, in order to tackle ex-combatants’ social concerns, generally turns into jeopardising 
post-conflict security, at worst a continuation of armed groups. Therefore, the upcoming 
chapter brings into light how combatants’ recruitment and management provide a unique 
benchmark of responding to the effectiveness of DDR in action. 
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 (Beswick and Jackson 2011:122). 
3.1 Introduction 
A clearer understanding of the dynamics of the recruitment, reintegration and re-
recruitment cycle of combatants is necessary for sustainable peacebuilding interventions 
and post-conflict reconstruction programmes. Reintegration, security sector reform and 
peacebuilding programmes need to refer back to recruitment and specifically to the 
structural conditions that feed individuals into recruitment pools. The (re-) recruitment of 
combatants, considered as products to be plundered along with natural resources and public 
funds, are an integral part of the conflict entrepreneurs.  
The dynamics of combatants’ enlistment and their participation in armed conflicts falls 
under the micro-level empirical approach to civil war (Humphreys and Weinstein 2004; 
2006; 2007). By responding to the second research objective, this chapter examines the 
factors that are believed to be the root-causes – push and pull factors, of recruitment, 
reintegration and the re-recruitment cycle of combatants. It considers this phenomenon as 
consequential to a compendium of mixed motivations, such as environment, structural 
violence, coercion, poverty, education and employment, family and friends, politics and 
ideology, culture and tradition (Kalyvas and Arjona 2007). These reasons, also known as 
‘push and pull’ factors associated with the failure of reintegration enable the re-recruitment 
cycle, and need to be looked into both at the macro and micro level in order to ensure that 
the process of post-conflict reconstruction and security sector reform follows the best 
possible course (Taylor, et al. 2006; Özerdem and Podder 2011). The chapter then suggests 
some paths towards a successful reintegration programme in its concluding part. 
3.2 Resource-Conflict Nexus through Armed Groups Dynamic 
The political economy approach to the ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ debate (Collier 2000a; 
Collier 2000b; Collier and Hoeffler 2002) posits that the exportation of natural resources as 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the 
thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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primary commodities entices the creation of armed organisations and, as a corollary, violent 
behaviour. In this context, it is assumed that mineral resources are also easily captured and 
that resources are often referred to as a ‘honey pot’ that provides incentives for profit-
seeking groups to engage in violent actions (De Soysa 2000; Collier 2000b). 
However, all resources do not result in the same conflict effect; lootable resources, for 
example, are thought to impact more on the behaviour of armed groups than non-lootable 
or obstructable resources do. It is important to segregate lootable resources – such as 
diamond, drug, timber etc. from ‘obstructable’ resources – oil and non-fuel minerals (Ross 
2003). Collier (2000b) is of the view that the carriage of non-lootable resources might be 
easily prevented, while lootable resources could be captured and handled without problems. 
Collier’s view simply implies that the exports of primary commodities are less complex and 
delicate. These commodities do not require complicated networks of information and 
transactions, as with non-lootable resources. Additionally, for an organised armed group or 
military force, it is easier to capture and tax lootable resources, by tracing closely these 
trade routes and market networks.  
There is a spectacular proliferation and increasing trade of commodities like drugs, 
gemstones, agricultural products and timber by military organisations in most unstable 
resource-rich regions, such as Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. From this 
perspective, the likelihood of war is unavoidable. Collier (2002), for instance, claims that in 
capturing these lootable goods, fighters often socialise in a destructive way whereby 
violence and atrocity are committed against their own communities. Collier’s (2002) view 
corroborates with the reality according to which trading these lootable goods turn into a 
source of conflict and predatory behaviour (Collier 2000b). Although trading in looted 
goods perpetuates and sustains military organisations, it is also believed to be one of the 
root-causes of broader socially destructive processes, having negative impacts on the wider 
population (Collier 2000a). Extant literature’s view of civil wars in Africa is not 
significantly different. For example, the 1991-2002 war in Sierra Leone revealed that the 
control of diamond-mining sectors as well as the diamond trade by both government and 
rebel forces determined strategies in the conflict (McCue and Haahr 2008; Keen 2005; 
Reno 2009).  
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As a starting point, the nature of the resources is not sufficient enough in explaining 
violence. The nexus between mining and violence might also be expounded by analysing 
the armed organisations and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of 
combatants. In this context, it has been believed that steady accessibility of resources 
impacts negatively on the behaviour of combatants and rebel movements (Weinstein 2007; 
Reno 2009). Weinstein and Reno’s stance draws the line between ‘opportunistic’ and 
‘activist’ combatants and rebellions. Opportunistic combatants and rebellions arise from 
resource-rich environs, generally with support of external patrons, as is the case in the 
Kivus in the DRC, where conflict’s entrepreneurs or patrons take advantage. These patrons 
hold all the profits and are prone to committing any violence against the local population. 
In contrast, activist rebellions occur in resource-poor environments where combatants’ 
abuses are likely to be lesser while also violence is selectively and strategically used (Yusuf 
2008). Chapter Four explains how both contexts occurred in the DRC and vice versa. It 
could be deduced from this view that the accessibility of resources would end up as 
‘absurdity of abundance’, whereby the armed group is submerged with opportunistic actors 
and combatants, having harmful results for the affected population.  
Weinstein’s (2007) view on the recruitment of combatants points out that resource-rich 
rebel organisations recruit combatants by offering short-term rewards or payoffs as 
motivation. Conversely, resource-constrained rebel organisations recruit combatants based 
on promises about the selective benefits that combatants would obtain in the future. From 
Weinstein’s view, one can infer that due to the presence of economic endowments or 
benefits, rebel groups attract and recruit opportunistic individuals or combatants who have 
a particularly temporary perception and whose main interest is their own enrichment. This 
is the starting point of mistrust between armed groups and community members. These 
opportunistic armed groups become detrimental to local communities and civilian 
populations, as combatants reconfigure the rebellion into destructive, violent and state-
destroying rebel organizations (Weinstein 2007). 
Weinstein attempts to elucidate how the recruitment of combatant and how their personal 
actions have a strong and direct link with the character of an armed group as a whole. So, 
the combatants’ recruitment and the rest of their military life or civilian status – if they 
come to revert back home, rely on their individual incentives. In the same context, Keen 
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(2000) describes how violence in this situation could result from ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-
up’ activities. In a top-down approach, violence could be triggered by political leaders and 
entrepreneurs for both political and economic motives; while from a bottom-up fashion, it 
is seen as the result of those bottom-up ingenuities that combine military and civilian 
factors to use violence as a solution to their problems (Özerdem and Podder 2011). These 
might be both psychological and economic – whereby case violence turns into violent 
private accumulation (Özerdem and Podder 2012), with the latter potentially being a 
particularly striking incentive for joining a particular rebel group. 
Based on their research carried out along the Congolese-Ugandan border between 2004 and 
2009, Titeca and De Herdt (2010) establish the relationship between artisanal mining and 
the behaviour of armed groups. Their research concurs with Weinstein’s (2007) view that 
armed movements operating in resource-rich areas – a ‘honey pot’, are opportunistic due to 
their easy access to resources and external support, and the use of violence against the 
population. However, as for the use of violence, it is not significantly the same as their 
views do not corroborate. The case of the Forces Armées du Peuple Congolais [the Armed 
Forces of the Congolese People; FAPC], for example, has shown a fairly different attitude 
towards the population. Weinstein’s opinion diverges from Titeca’s due to the fact the 
FAPC rebel group decided to cooperate with the local trading community and it engaged in 
disciplined behaviour within its centres of control (Titeca 2009; Titeca and De Herdt 2010). 
This behaviour is different from that of opportunistic armed groups, whose violent 
activities are expected in the area endowed with natural resources. 
Increasingly, there have been efforts at disbanding ex-combatants after the period following 
an armed conflict. This process, also known as Disarmament, Demobilisation and 
Reintegration (DDR), aims to demobilise, disarm and reintegrate ex-combatants into 
civilian life to generate a new social hope. However, owing to military knowhow that they 
acquire in armed movements and the security sector, the ex-combatants still have skills 
which pave the way for further re-recruitment and make them important recruits for rebel 
groups. There is a need for DDR policy to tackle this weakness, if regional insecurity and 
the interconnectedness of modern conflicts are to be addressed (Özerdem and Podder 
2011). The phenomenon of the combatant’s re-recruitment cycle is well-documented in the 
Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa regions, and may hold true for the region of West 
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Africa – Mali and Niger, and African Great Lakes, particularly in the Kivus, the eastern 
DRC’s mining-rich zones in its current protracted civil unrest.  
The current greediness of states in response to the new geopolitics of the scarcity of 
strategic natural or mineral resources has unleashed a new mode of war economies, which 
have significant repercussions for DDR practice. There is no moral or ethics in the 
competition over resources, but interests’ survival. In war economies, said a former 
Congolese diplomat: 
“The fundamental discourse is summarised through the following statement; 
economics matters more than society and ethics, even if armed groups are accused 
of brutalising communities”.46  
For this respondent, the prime objective of war economies is to demolish and reconfigure 
the existing structures of a state, a view which concurs with Beswick and Jackson’s 
(2011:26) for whom new wars are “a threat to modernity and to the existence of the state 
itself”. As mentioned earlier, this chapter attempts to understand a conceptual scoping of 
the nexus between artisanal mining and recruitment-reintegration and re-recruitment of 
(ex)-combatants in a war-torn territory. In this regard, the chapter provides that current 
DDR approaches are oblivious to the bond between reintegration results and re-recruitment 
into rebel groups or national military forces.  
There have been some positive strides towards disbanding rebel groups and breaking their 
chains of command in most African, Asian and Latin American post-conflict countries, 
while regional security architecture still remains complex and volatile (Özerdem and 
Podder 2012). However, considered to pay mere lip service to the overwhelming challenge 
of security (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; 2007; Kalyvas and Arjona 2007), DDR is 
often taken as a set of good intentions rather than actions. The programme is impeded by 
several issues among others; the porosity of borders and the dearth of a reliable security 
system (Özerdem and Podder 2012) as well as the presence of certain mineral resources in 
                                                 
46Interview conducted with a Congolese former diplomat, Brussels, November 2013. 
Chapter Three: From Recruitment to Re-recruitment of Combatants: The Failure of Reintegration Process?   
Coventry University 91 
 
zones where war has raged for decades. The following section looks at some motivations 
that may prompt combatants’ recruitments, reintegration and re-recruitment. 
3.3 Skimming the Root-Causes of Recruitment, Reintegration and Re-recruitment 
Becoming a combatant can be full of symbolic meaning, something which is often 
controversial. What motivates individuals to enlist for military service depends on both 
environmental circumstance and personal objectives. Individuals could join armed groups 
as volunteers to retaliate against some grievance they believe to have been a victim of in 
their community. They may also avenge on some grievance on the basis of someone whom 
they believe to have a family connection with. Likewise they might decide to join armed 
groups in order to secure their community against injustice, exclusion and any other kind of 
social inequality. Accordingly, individuals could also become combatants just because they 
want to support and feed their families, while some others unfortunately become so by 
force or coercion.  
As their family’s breadwinners and community’s protectors, to some extent, combatants 
possess the symbolic power of the gun which legitimises them to use violence and  to 
despise authority and the respect that have been built over the generations into the youth to 
perpetuate a gerontocratic hierarchy (Özerdem and Podder 2012). However, this social 
reconfiguration is very sweeping and easily challengeable to stand for a reason behind 
combatant’s re/recruitment, especially in the case of a resource-based conflict or war 
economy (Verhey 2005; Knight 2008). In recent years, little academic and policy attention 
has been at the centre of long-drawn-out armed conflicts, and less attention has been paid 
on the potent relationship of the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of 
combatants in a resource-based conflict country. This might be because of the changing 
economic interests in resource-based conflict zones due to a steady flow of mining interests 
(Mckay 2012).  
3.3.1 Combatants’ Recruitment 
While a number of researches have looked at resource-conflict, very little systematic cross-
national data on combatants have been collected. These data sets lightly show combatants’ 
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status in armed groups. Combatants are members of the armed forces taking directly or 
indirectly part to the conflict (Gates and Nordås 2010). The concept “taking a direct part in 
hostilities” definitely encompasses attacking enemy combatants or military objectives. It 
may extend to some support activities but the clear-cut understanding of the concept 
remains controversial. An armed force consists of all organised armed forces, groups and 
units that are under a command responsible for the conduct of its subordinates to a party to 
the conflict (Knight and Özerdem 2004; Gates 2011; Özerdem and Podder 2011). Each 
armed organisation is subject to an inner disciplinary system which enforces compliance 
with the law of armed conflict (Gates and Nordås 2010), and whose members, at least when 
deployed on military operations, wear uniform or combat gear which distinguishes them 
from the civilian population (Beber and Blattman 2010).  
The composition of the armed forces is a matter for the State or faction concerned. Its 
components may be regular units, reservists, territorial defence units, citizens called up for 
part-time service or full-time soldiers as long as the conditions set out above are fulfilled 
(Achvarina and Reich 2006). Combatants have ranks in an armed organisation. The more 
senior ranks have power to give orders and exercise discipline over their subordinates. 
Violation of the law of armed conflict is dealt with the criterion of an internal disciplinary 
system, called punishment or penalty. In unusual circumstances where it is impossible to 
wear uniform or combat gear all the time, such as when operating in areas under adverse 
occupation, behind enemy lines or, in liberation conflicts, in areas controlled by 
government forces, combatants must, at the very least, carry their arms openly during 
military engagements or when visible to the enemy in military deployments preceding the 
launch of any attack (ibid.). When they surrender or are captured, combatants are entitled to 
be treated as prisoners of war, though this could mean their internment until the close of 
active hostilities (Achvarina and Reich 2006). 
The recruitment of combatants has become a key subject in discourse on armed conflict and 
is well documented in recent literature on resource-based conflicts (Mandel 2009; Sageman 
2010). The recruitment phenomenon is a psycho-socio-political process which leads to 
violence or military action. Therefore, there is a need for understanding the root-causes 
leading to combatant’s recruitment and re-recruitment by looking at the micro – individual 
and macro – societal/cultural, specific context (Veldhuis et al. 2009). Recruitment and re-
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recruitment concepts sound conflated. The word ‘recruitment’ refers to the process through 
which an individual becomes a member of an armed group – combatant, be it voluntarily or 
forcibly. The recruitment root-causes or push-and-pull factors result from political, social or 
economic contexts with deep-seated thought that lead to militancy or military actions 
(Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012). 
There is a significant set of papers on the recruitment of combatants; however the case of 
child soldiers serving rebel groups as an act of agency and volition has been neglected. 
Nonetheless, in some war-torn zones, serving either the rebel organisation or the 
government forces is the only possibility to survive, to escape torture, abuse and other 
politically instigated assassinations (Özerdem and Podder 2011). In some circumstances, 
community or family plays a significant role in encouraging its members to join military 
service as a cultural or social duty. In this context, as Özerdem and Podder (2012) highlight 
it, joining military activities is perceived as part of communal defence, and young people 
who fight for their community comply with their social and cultural duty, which in turn is 
an essential and natural part of their transition into adulthood. But the extent to which the 
latter is true for an abduction or forced recruitment remains questionable. 
In some military strongholds over dominated by roaming and raiding soldiers, joining an 
armed faction might also help unify a disintegrated family (Blattman 2008). When I 
interviewed one of the Kivus’ notables in Kinshasa, it was revealed that in some war-torn 
villages, such as in the Kivus in the DRC, carrying a weapon or wearing a military uniform 
in some circumstances has assisted in locating and rescuing family members, defending 
ethnic group and assuring access to the land and resources.47 Therefore monitoring violence 
deployment is a fruitful asset in armed organisation for it is a means to having access to 
public resources and services when official facilities are on hold (Özerdem and Podder 
2012), and to confirming one’s citizenship therefore access to land as is the case in the 
Kivus.48 Dealing with adolescent recruitment through the lens of a community approach 
brings about triggers. It is important to shed light on the fact that these factors are 
                                                 
47 Interview conducted with a member of the Kivus’ notability, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
48 Telephone interview conducted with a Mwami [Mwami is a Swahili term to name customary chief in the 
Kivus], Bukavu, August 2013. 
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crystallised around the nature of conflicts. Hence, in order to escape recruitment’s 
phenomenon, adolescents need to learn the resilience and coping mechanisms while they 
have the development capacity (Maclay and Özerdem 2010). 
Family and community have a determining role, to some extent, in the involvement of 
youth with armed groups. Recruitment into armed group may be voluntary or forced. 
However, some debate exists among contemporary scholars (Sageman 2004; Roy 2008; 
2010; Blattman 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010) about the nature and extent of 
combatant’s recruitment. Voluntary recruitment could be facilitated by a family member or 
a relative. Mediation or agency is the key mode of participation for combatants in 
communities with a Muslim back ground (Roy 2008; 2010). Looking at the traditional 
recruitment patterns, such as conscription or dedicated military service, there is no clear cut 
as to the organisational norms. For instance, Islamist militants explore new supporters, 
activists and members that they employ in active efforts; this pattern influences others to 
adopt their point of view (Sageman 2004). 
Being involved with an armed group can be the result of being exposed to conflict, and 
lacking a strong family or community. The occurrence of this case often arises when 
combatants are directly or indirectly victims of violence, or they have witnessed the killing 
of family members in a lengthened war. All these greed and grievance amalgamated could 
trigger and fuel the likelihood on behalf of youth to join a military organisation. Chronic 
poverty and social marginality could lead individuals to militancy actions and culminates in 
getting involved in violence. In certain resource-rich countries where people live in chronic 
poverty and social marginality, recruiters could use ideology to entice young people by 
capitalising on perceptions and experiences of injustice (Crossett and Spitaletta 2010; 
Mazer and Lambert 2010); as is the case in armed conflicts occurring in the region of 
Africa of Great Lakes, particularly in the Kivus. 
In fighting zones where the main characteristic of conflict is looting, greed and clientelism, 
the recruitment of combatants is directly and indirectly linked to benefits deriving from 
participating in an armed group. Many of the literature on the recruitment of combatants are 
both conceptual and empirical (Mazer and Lambert 2010). It bears stressing that the 
recruitment process per se is still a debatable issue and its pathways and mechanisms have a 
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different mode of operation. Further understanding of how armed groups interconnect and 
how the recruitment process works both around and within groups, would pave the way for 
developing sustainable and informed policies and practices that could curtail the spread of 
armed conflict. Several prominent theoretical and analytical frameworks drawn from social-
movement theory, social psychology and conversion theory among others have been 
proposed to understand the recruitment process. These theories attempt to explain the root-
causes leading to the recruitment into armed groups (Crossett and Spitaletta 2010), and 
operate at both the macro and micro levels (Özerdem and Podder 2012). From this point of 
view, it might be postulated that there is no voluntary enlistment. It seems to be that the 
difference between voluntary and forced recruitment is a meaningless discourse. In fact, 
although some individuals – adults, are recruited on a voluntary basis, it is a desperate 
attempt to survive which underlies the so-called voluntary recruitment. Ultimately it is up 
to the adult commanders to decide whether they would recruit children, and therefore they 
are liable to be held accountable for their acts. However, be it voluntary or forcible, 
recruitment would impact on the reintegration outcomes for former combatants if root-
causes are not addressed. 
3.3.2 Pull-and-Push Factors for Child Soldiering 
Two types of individuals interest war entrepreneurs; individual children and adults. Rebel 
movements consider children as an economically efficient alternative to adult combatants 
(Özerdem and Podder 2011), while some studies on child soldiering have indicated that 
child recruitment is a straightforward process as children are easily brainwashed (Özerdem 
and Podder 2012). Children are also believed to be efficient combatants for they are 
assumed to be ignorant of the concept of death (Roos et al. 2011). However, both adults 
and children may forcibly or voluntarily become members of armed group. Forced 
recruitment occurs when an individual is compelled or abducted or even beaten into 
submitting to authority. Since the 1990s, this was well-known as the child soldiering 
archetype (Özerdem and Podder 2011; Roos et al. 2011). Nevertheless, abduction and 
coercion are not the sole methods that many armed groups use to compel combatants to join 
their movements. We can find other push and pull factors that result in individuals 
becoming engaged with armed movement.  
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There is a need for more in depth research, in order not to only respond to the phenomenon 
of recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle, but also for understanding the gaps 
and root-causes underlying incentives of combatants to join armed groups. It is claimed that 
poverty is an important conflict-fuelling factor, which motivates combatants to join armed 
forces and groups. Joining armed groups for some youngsters can be a way towards 
ensuring that they are fed and housed. Yet, discrimination also does not have anything short 
in motivating conflict. This attitude leads to marginalisation and engenders grievance.    
The notion of discrimination associated with ethnic and religious identity is a potent 
conflict-motivating factor, which might mobilise whole communities and ignite conflict. 
This is the case in the Kivus with the Banyarwanda communities.49 Watching the killing, 
humiliation of their parents and observing their sisters being raped might be a motivating-
factor for youngsters to join armed groups in retaliation. Many other individuals become 
fighters to defend their communities against perceived injustices. The feeling of being 
aggrieved together with the religious or traditional belief can bring up the idea of 
martyrdom and heroic death, which often attracts boys and girls in Muslim community’s 
background (Roy 2009; 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2012). Rebel leaders, on their side, 
have some recruitment methods, based on incentives, rewards, money and ideology to 
name a few, which they use to entice individuals to join the movement. However, from a 
micro-economic view, material recruitment incentives that rebel leaders give or intend to 
offer to combatants are very weak as motivating factors (Brett et al. 2004; Rosen 2005). By 
way of comparison between youth and adult combatants, it might be put forward that young 
combatants request fewer incentives than adults. While adult combatants are concerned 
about their involvement in armed groups and the rewards of their engagement, child 
soldiers, however, do not care for getting a big share of the looted goods as they depend on 
senior officials for protection, patronage and support (Gates and Andvig 2006; Roos et al. 
2011). Youngsters who belong to armed groups quickly and easily build their affiliation 
attachment with the movement. In return, the movement leadership flows essentially from 
the fact that the group brings the hope of protection feelings, security and non-pecuniary 
rewards. Contrary to the experience of child soldiers, adult combatants are concerned about 
                                                 
49 See chapter 4 for more details on the Benyarwanda ethnic conflict in the Kivus. 
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issues related to honour and responsibility, vengeance and a sense of purpose (Brett et al. 
2004; Honwana 2006; Olson 2008). This confirms the view that rebel groups with scarce or 
limited means forcibly enlist young adolescents or children, as they provide the ideal 
combination of efficient and ease retention (Blattman 2007; Roos et al. 2011).  
Against the backdrop of what is believed to be the underlying variables of the recruitment 
of the combatant lies the understanding of the degree and scope of the nature of conflicts 
(high or low intensity, cross-border or internal), the enlistment patterns (voluntary or forced 
enlistment, family or community encouragement, abduction) and motivations(food seeking, 
security, job or seeking vengeance). It also gives meaning to individual experiences – being 
engaged in fighting activities, sexual slavery, having been valorised, or being shaped by 
experiences featuring abuse (Verhey 2005; Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012). Adolescents 
working for armed forces are also considered as a new pool of military labour. Therefore, 
their engagement to military service has thrown up concerns within the domain of labour 
economics as to how child abduction impacts on the labour market (Blattman 2007; Roos et 
al. 2011; Özerdem and Podder 2012). To what extent armed conflict zones attract recruits 
by drawing the line between direct experiences of military involvement and the over-
arching risks needs to be looked at more closely. This combination of discrete risks 
encompasses attack and dislocation, and protracted risks, such as poverty and dearth of 
access to regular schooling and health care (Alastair et al. 2005). Kostelny (2006) suggests 
a risk accumulation model as a path towards mitigating these impacts linked to challenges 
facing combatants, particularly children in conflict and post-conflict situations. The 
paradigm comprises conflict’s side-effects – emotional, social, spiritual and physical, that 
affect combatants. It also links to the levels of both risk and the side-effects of conflict at 
three noteworthy points, including the family, community and society.  
From the family’s side, combatants watch the killing of their siblings; they are sequestrated 
and isolated from family units. There are also issues related to the paucity of security on 
account of the exigencies of war-torn societies. From the community’s side, forced 
recruitment – abduction and coercive, in countries such as Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Uganda, among other cases, has illustrated the extent to which abducted combatants have 
been compelled to attack and terrify their fellow citizens; perpetuating atrocities against 
their own relatives and kin, disturbing social peace, breeding mistrust (Özerdem and Podder 
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2011; 2012), and in doing so, creating vast stumbling-blocks for them to reintegrate the 
community. From the societal side, lobbying through agency factors is crucial. The civil 
wars in Sierra Leone and Liberia, among other cases, resulted partially from aggrieved and 
marginalised youth, patrimonialism and the plutocracy – power domination in the hands of 
a few important men. Social disparity, discrimination or inequality and lack of social 
flexibility stemmed from this exclusionism brought out dissension (Maclay and Özerdem 
2010), which often has impacts on post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding process. 
3.4 DDR as Peacebuilding Process 
It can be argued that Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – DDR, programmes 
are the main backbone for post-conflict peacebuilding efforts. The United Nations – UN, 
has been at the forefront of DDR programmes across the World and draws the line between 
different components of the DDR as follows (UN 2006a:8): 
“Disarmament is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, 
ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons used by combatants and often 
also the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of 
responsible arms management programmes. Demobilisation is the formal and 
controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. 
The first stage of demobilisation may extend from processing of individual 
combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for 
this purpose – cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks. The 
second stage of demobilisation involves insertion, which is the support package 
provided to the demobilised. Reintegration is the process through which ex-
combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. 
Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open timeframe, 
primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general 
development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-
term external assistance”. 
DDR happens in different post-conflict environments and its outcome is often different 
from a post-conflict society to another, owing to context-specific factors that contributed to 
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the eruption of the conflict. Generally there are two kinds of DDR; those that occur after a 
significant military success and whose focus is on demilitarisation, and those happening in 
war to peace transitions (Colletta et al. 1996a; Hazen 2010). The former arrangement 
emerges from a context where a conflict ended in a military win and focuses on 
demilitarisation, encompassing decreasing the number of military personnel as well as 
military expenses, and eradicating the belligerence culture, as was the case in Angola and 
Nigeria. The latter practice of DDR however occurs in an environment of hostility where 
there is no winner. In this context, DDR pans out as a negotiated and agreed plan, often 
clearly set in the documents of a negotiated peace process, as was the case in Mozambique, 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and the DRC. 
DDR stems from a political negotiation of peace process and is generally reflected in an 
agreement (Muggah 2010; Willemijn Verkoren et al. 2010). This implies that DDR is not 
only politically complex processes, though being a component of the agreement (Ball and 
Van de Goor 2006), but also runs the risk of being politicised during the implementation of 
the agreement (Pouligny 2004). In such a context, there is a high risk that policy makers 
would employ DDR either as a way to bargain peace agreement or as a yardstick to map out 
and gauge the implementation and achievement of the peace agreement, rather than 
regarding it as a component of peacebuilding. In a peace process which is the result of a 
political concession, as it did in the DRC, the involvement of transitional politics in the 
DDR process is evident. However, understanding the intricacies of the politics-DDR 
linkage and how this nexus may impact on further processes of peacebuilding is still an 
under-theorised aspect in peace research (Berdal and Ucko 2009).  The nature and character 
of DDR is context specific depending on the environment of the peace process and the 
foregoing armed conflict. There is a give-and-take relationship between DDR and 
peacebuilding (Knight and Özerdem 2004). This implies that there is no DDR without a 
peacebuilding process for the latter lends an institutional framework, and viable and 
bureaucratic structures for DDR implementation. Reversely, DDR sustains structural 
change and reduces direct and basic violence through changing configurations of armed 
conflict such as military organisations of armed movements.  
Since the first UN Security Council’s endorsement of the Namibian DDR programme in 
1989, 60 acknowledged programmes have been initiated by 2010 (Muggah 2009a; Beswick 
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and Jackson 2011). From all of these programmes, be it successful or unsuccessful, a 
number of insights have been drawn. In Beswick and Jackson’s (2011) account on conflict, 
security and development for instance, it has been claimed that disarmament as a DDR 
component involves military effort and technical know-how, whereas reintegration, which 
is regarded as a key component of a DDR programme (UN 2010b), calls for the 
involvement from non-military development experts. Hence, DDR, in practice is believed 
to be a post-conflict social engineering process resulting from the blend of a rigorous 
coordination of military and development skills, involving a proliferation of numerous new 
and non-traditional players in its landscape, partially perhaps because of this complexity. 
Porto et al (2007), for example, suggest that such new players take in bi-lateral donor 
governments, non-governmental organisations – NGOs, civil society organisations and the 
private sector, and had to play a fairly limited role in earlier DDR programmes in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Likewise, there have been a number of noteworthy institutional programmes at 
the international level, including the Stockholm Initiatives in DDR (SIDDR 2006), the UN 
Integrated DDR Standards – IDDRS (UN 2006) and the Multi-Donor Reintegration 
Programme (MDRP 2003).50 DDR’s scholars (SIDDR 2006; Porto et al. 2007) are of the 
consensus that these initiatives came out with further insights that have helped expand the 
understanding mainly in line with improving the ‘supply aspect’ of DDR by proposing 
recommendations, such as the choice of apposite target groups for reintegration, better and 
effective coordination, and implementation mechanisms amongst players leading or 
supporting the process. Successful DDR relies on how its process acknowledges the task of 
different players at different programmatic levels. However, how some non-state players, 
such as civil society and the private sector, partake in the management of ex-combatants 
may be linked to the type of political and institutional framework of like-minded DDR to 
their roles and participation.   
In second generation DDR however, UN representatives have sought to ensure that DDR 
programme is a national ownership whereby the government takes the front line 
responsibilities (UN 2010b). Such tasks comprise, but are not restricted to, deciding the 
time scale and extent of DDR, as well as setting selection standards and implementation 
                                                 
50 See Muggah (2010) for further details on innovation in the DDR research and policy. 
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modalities for fighters (Harpviken 2008). This innovation responds to the main concern 
raised that dearth of national and local ownership in a DDR process renders it a ‘supply-
driven’ initiative. Ownership should be understood at two dimensions; local and national. 
At the local level, contends Pouligny (2004:11), community participation is indispensable, 
not only to become familiar with local contexts, but also to boost local ownership. 
Analysing local and national ownership from countries like El Salvador, Sierra Leone, 
Kosovo and Afghanistan, Özerdem (2009:214) suggests that there is a need for drawing the 
line between “local ownership” and “local participation”; the former is broader concept 
than the latter. However, in practice, ownership in DDR programme is narrowed down to 
the national government and some rebel leaders, while other key stakeholders are often kept 
away (CICS 2006). 
Apart from DDR, post-conflict peacebuilding includes broader agendas, ranging from 
security sector reform (SSR), and the rule of law to transitional justice. In this regard, 
researchers who have hand on this subject are of the consensus that DDR goes hand in 
glove with SSR (Bryden 2007; Lamb and Dye 2009; McFate 2010). At this point, DDR in 
fact is regarded as part of the wider SSR process if the peace negotiation in question has 
considered SSR as an agenda in the peace process. Integrating ex-combatants into the 
national security force, as what happened in Philippines (Hall, 2009), Timor Leste (ICG 
2008), Burundi (Samii 2010), Nepal (Nayak 2009) and the DRC (Boshoff et al. 2008; 
Stearns et al. 2013), exemplify how SSR goes along with the management of ex-
combatants in the post-conflict period. In the case of the DRC, it was the SSR rather than 
DDR that caught more attention in the discussions surrounding the management of all 
RCD’s [Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie; Rally for Congolese Democracy] 
factions, MLC [Mouvement de Libération Congolais; Congolese Liberation Movement], 
CNDP [Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple; National Congress for the Defence of 
the People], M23 [Mouvement du 23 Mars; the March 23 Movement] and Mai-Mai 
combatants (Boshoff 2008; Boshoff et al. 2010; Stearns et al. 2013).  
Finally, drawn from some African countries’ experiences, it bears noting that there is the 
need for mapping out and effectively reorienting programmatic focus towards reintegration 
(Colletta et al. 1996b). Disarmament draws much attention both internally and externally, 
to the extent that when it happens to widen support to actually reintegrating ex-combatants, 
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the resources are either scarce or there is restricted long-term commitment by governments 
as well as external players who back up the peace process (Muggah 2010; Kilroy 2012). 
Following the collection of weapons, points out Özerdem (2009:208), the mission is often 
considered “accomplished”. Therefore, when the real time to reintegrate ex-combatants 
emerges, the resources and commitments become scarce or unavailable. 
3.4.1 Reintegration as a DDR Component 
As a peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction process, reintegration of ex-combatants 
is one of the core components of DDR. Seen in the context of unfolded or failed 
reintegration processes as is the case in the Kivus, in this sub-section the study of 
reintegration will be situated within the field of political economy. From a political 
economy approach, the reintegration could best be understood as a process in which ex-
combatants transform their identity from belligerent to civilian, and revise their conduct by 
stopping the use of violent means and escalating actions that are not authorised by the 
mainstream community (Torjesen 2013). Shifting in behaviour is perceptible in three 
stages; social, political and economic (de Vries and Wiegink 2011; Munive and Jakobsen 
2012; Nussio 2012; Özerdem 2012; Podder 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Torjesen 
2013). In social level, combatants break down their contact and dependence from the militia 
networks, rebuild and reinforce their relations with mainstream communities and family 
(Özerdem 2012; 2013). The political dimension is concerned with ending violence as 
means to attain political goals. As a substitute, combatants integrate normal politics at the 
local, regional or national level whether as individual voters or as political supporters or 
members of a larger group (Podder 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Torjesen 2013). In 
economic terms, reintegration means that the combatant should move away from the 
livelihood support mechanism related to the militia networks. In return, as element of 
economic reintegration, demobilised individuals should receive long-term productive 
employment – formal or informal, or they should be able to set off other genuine income-
generating activities, such as agriculture, which permits them to support their household (de 
Vries and Wiegink 2011; Munive and Jakobsen 2012).  
Reintegration process could repeatedly be one-sided, unfinished or reversible. However, its 
social, political and economic aspects illustrate the experiences that combatants come 
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across as they end their violent identity and activities, where challenges generally 
associated with experiences in social, political and economic spheres would need to be 
given prominence. Reintegration is a component and package of armed conflict that extend 
beyond the conflict aftermath. In reality, the social environment wherein reintegration 
process occurs is profoundly shaped by the trajectory of the conflict and developments 
afterwards (Torjesen 2013; 2014). The meaning of trajectory in this context refers to 
different movements that combatants go through as they leave an armed group (Munive and 
Jakobsen 2012). In so saying, the gap time between leaving and a full return to civilian life 
could change considerably and might be associated with complex patterns of movements. 
Each every combatant has a trajectory, despite whether or not the individual has opted for a 
formal reintegration process initiated by the government and international organisations. In 
the research setting of the study, it would be appropriate to look at the ‘self-integrated’ 
combatants since it is to explore those who embark on government- or internationally-run 
programmes (Nussio 2012; Torjesen 2014). 
From a political reintegration perspective, it is believed that political reintegration is about 
achieving political goals through non-violent means. As such, combatants partake of the 
mainstream politics at all state’s levels either as individual voters or as political advocates 
or representatives of a larger group. This change would not be an easy process (Berdal and 
Zaum 2013). Torjesen (2014:4), for instance, believes: “the breaking up of militia units has 
profound political implications, since many of the major war and post war power wielders 
are likely to be associated with these networks”. Possible interpretation of Torjesen’s 
statement could be that combatants as individuals might seek to bring to an end war while 
group possessions would need to be driven to a complex ground where a few players may 
hearten such a transition, whereas others would discourage it. In such a context, senior 
military leaders in armed groups or top/mid-level decision makers related to militia would 
have to step in a powerful game for position and prestige following the wartime, whereas 
facilitation of, or alternatively, the thwarting of low-level combatants’ reintegration, is one 
important political bargaining chip (Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Özerdem 2013; Torjesen 
2014). This strongly adumbrates the reintegration projection facing low-level combatants 
that needs to be factored in when researching on political reintegration. 
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Economic reintegration is the segregation between combatant and the livelihood support 
mechanisms associated with militia networks. As part of economic reintegration, 
combatants are entitled to long-term lucrative employment (formal or informal) or they 
have to be part of other legal income-generating activities, such as agriculture, which 
enables them to sustain their household. From a political economy view, however, it has 
been underlined that many of economic activities are acutely interweaved with politics and 
power, and vice versa, following the wartime situation (Berdal and Zaum 2013). The war 
entrepreneurs are likely keen to control, participate or enjoy the paybacks deriving from the 
war economy (Torjesen 2014). They are also likely to change and keep on controlling a 
range of economic sectors, particularly those with high return margins, in the years 
following conflict (Torjesen 2013). The growing models of domination, monopolisation or 
overt rivalry in the economy will affect low-level combatants as they desire to join 
mainstream economic activity (Berdal and Zaum 2013). There will be the need for 
factoring in these considerations altogether with formal economic assessments of growth, 
employment prospects and livelihood options when exploring economic reintegration.  
The private sector is a significant partner in peacebuilding which can support reintegration 
through providing job opportunities to ex-combatants (International Alert 2006).  In the 
SIDDR account on ex-combatants’ reintegration, it is suggested that reintegration 
programmes could benefit from efforts to encourage home private sector and civil society, 
by such means as the diminution of obstructions to doing business, access to credit, 
technology and technical support (SIDDR 2006:29). However, following the war, the 
private sector has often been sceptic about offering jobs to ex-combatants with an appalling 
past. Dearth of trust between employer (the private sector) and employees – ex-combatants, 
could not only lead to apparent insecurity on behalf of the employers, but also might create 
friction in their professional relationship. To this regard, policy initiatives, wisely advises 
Specht (2010), need to be geared toward stimulating a trustworthy business environment 
and associating the private sector in planning and execution of reintegration, so as to build 
ownership and develop confidence in the process. Additionally, economic reintegration of 
ex-combatants relies on quite a few non-economic factors and conditions both at 
combatants and social levels. Therefore, it is significant to examine non-economic social 
factors from a social reintegration perspective. 
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Finally, social reintegration pulls combatants from armed group networks, in terms of 
reliance and contact, and interconnects them with mainstream communities and family. At 
this level, the political economy view is irrelevant. However, it could be that concepts 
drawn from other theoretical perceptions may prove useful (Torjesen 2014).  
In peacebuilding jargon, social reintegration refers to finding ex-combatants’ family or 
social roots so as to recondition bonds between them and their family and community 
(Knight and Özerdem 2004). Having switched from less attention to much focus of DDR 
programmes, social reintegration is regarded as an interactive and constructive role of 
social entities, including family, community kinship and social network. Social 
reintegration has evolved in the course of time and the concept is getting currency, to the 
extent that scholars and policy makers are in agreement with it being now a value in DDR 
and peacebuilding (Leff 2008; Özerdem 2012). However, although social reintegration’s 
meaning has got broadened and includes what is needed to recondition post-conflict society 
– including building social support, upholding community participation and re-knitting the 
social fabric of often divided societies, to name a few (Annan and Cutter 2009:2), there is 
still not yet a clear-cut consensus as to how it can be achieved in a post-war complex social 
and political environment. Such complexities have sometimes proved to be deeper due to 
social reintegration being all about relationships that sustain both formal and informal 
processes, often not easy to study. Nevertheless, in DDR account on ex-combatants’ 
reintegration, social reintegration is conceptualised with key entities such as family, 
community, social capital and reconciliation. 
There is a range of theories that acknowledge the importance of family as a primary 
constituency in social reintegration. Although this role cannot be denied for a successful 
reintegration (Özerdem 2012), several issues however need to be considered. First, it is 
often difficult to trace the family link for anybody who became combatant for a significant 
part of their life, especially if this started during childhood. Furthermore, combatants who 
left their family at an early age become unenthusiastic to go back home (Dolan and Schafer 
1997). It is also worth noting that the extra burden related to ex-combatants’ return may 
drive some families to turn their backs to members who have been away for ages. Herein 
lays the idea that insertion as an economic safety-net for ex-combatants and their families 
would play a useful role as means of supporting social reintegration (Kostner 2001). Family 
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acceptance finally can also be embarrassed by a degree of disgrace stemming from how an 
ex-combatant is regarded by society at large. This partially applies to female-combatants 
(Sideris 2003:722) who, in the most of African communities, are meant for the traditional 
roles in the household economy. During the war, society may get metamorphosed, while 
female-fighters are often intended to return to their traditional roles following the wartime 
(Knight and Özerdem 2004). Therefore, this disparity between community hopes and 
women’s new feature could upset the process of social reintegration. Eritrea presents a 
noteworthy example, at this effect, where owing to the status quo in women’s gender roles 
after the wartime, a positive alternative was found to halt negative community hopes and 
high divorce rates (Kingma 2002).       
The extent to which ex-combatants are welcomed in or are eager to join a family will also 
forecast how ex-combatants will be accepted in the community. As it is substantiated in 
Chapters Four and Five, in the Kivus, for instance, each community has its tribal militia51 
and traditional chiefs urge families to persuade their children to join armed movements in 
order to defend their lands against invaders, said an ex-combatant. Defending one’s land 
against squatters is a bravery action in the eyes of the Kivus’ communities. When members 
of family leave their community to join endogenous armed groups in the eastern DRC, in 
reality they are still in touch with their community, to the extent that their coming back 
home is not an issue for the rest of the community.52 The Kivus’ case could be likened to 
Ethiopia’s, where the more ex-combatants partook of the community’s activities the better 
the acceptance of the spouse and family (Colletta et al. 1996b). In Mozambique and 
Uganda, however, ex-combatants had to go through traditional ritual process in order to 
cleanse the war atrocities they committed (Kingma 2002). Overall, it might be suggested 
that the role of family in social reintegration is partially contingent upon the role of 
community which is another key constituency of social reintegration. Drawing on Bernard 
et al. (2003) and Stark’s (2006) view on community reintegration, it could be asserted that 
community acceptance has a major significance in social reintegration. In the context of 
DDR and peacebuilding, as is the case in this thesis, community means a geographically-
bounded physical and social location, as well as symbolically built space which enables 
                                                 
51 Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
52 Chapters 4 and 5 provide further details on armed groups and combatants’ recruitment in the Kivus. 
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social activities and exchanges, and comprises official and non-official social organisations 
and institutions (Cohen 1985; Block 2009). Therefore, community in this case refers to 
people who do not belong to any group of former combatants – villagers, city dwellers…, 
rather includes conflict victims, security personnel retired from the government, business 
people, civil society and non-combatant members of the general public.  
A host of factors can delineate community acceptance. Armed conflict, asserts Özerdem 
(2012:63), segments social structures by splitting people into an “us” versus “them” 
polarisation. Such polarisation had impacted negatively on ex-combatants’ acceptance in 
the community in Liberia and Sierra Leone (ibid.). In a research on the process of ex-
combatants’ reintegration in Khmer Rouge, Veroren (2005) has demonstrated how a degree 
of suspicion and resentment between Khmer Rouge ex-combatants and people in the 
community affected negatively the acceptance of ex-combatants in Khmer Rouge society. 
The conception and perception of community about ex-combatants’ identity has further 
implication on the acceptance of ex-fighters into community. Ex-combatants who return 
home as heroes of war, as ascertained by Özerdem (2012), would have a much easier social 
acceptance in a post-conflict environment than those who are regarded as troublemakers. 
However, it bears emphasising that the determination of social reintegration relies on the 
overall political context of war to peace evolution and the extent to which post-conflict 
society handles issues related to fear, vengeance and hatred (Duthie 2005). 
Although literature has underscored social reintegration as a collective process at the 
community level, the issue of ex-combatants’ agency during reintegration process and the 
roles they can play in their personal experience with social acceptance seem to be given less 
attention. There is a growing literature in peacebuilding on the linkages between social 
reintegration and social capital, but the concept still lacks a clear-cut definition. It is 
however worth noting that scholars are in agreement with social capital being built on 
social ties, relationships and networks (Granovetter 1973; Portes 1998; Narayan and 
Cassidy 2001). Social capital is a quality of social life (network, norms and trust) which 
facilitates participants to work together more efficiently in order to achieve shared 
objectives (Putnam 1995). In social capital, trust is the key measuring element as it is based 
on models of reciprocity and cooperation in network of civic engagement (Fukuyama 
1995). Taken from the above definitions and for the purpose of this study, the concept of 
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social capital is used to refer to networks, relationships and trust between ex-fighters and 
members of community. Social capital can play both a positive and negative role. Its 
positive role gives information and resource access to members of a group, while its 
negative role can further marginalise individuals who are disqualified from group 
membership (Gilbert 2009; Micolta 2009). The negative role of social capital comes in 
when the line between ‘bonding’ (exclusive) and ‘bridging’ (inclusive) social capital is 
drawn (Putnam 2000). Bonding social capital, in Putnam’s (ibid: 2000) words, is: 
“Inward looking [networks] that tend to reinforce exclusive identities and 
homogeneous groups, whereas bridging social capital consists of outward looking 
[networks] that encompass people across diverse social cleavages”.  
In light of Putnam’s paradigm, it might be argued that social division is strengthened by 
bonding social capital whilst social cohesion is enabled by bridging social capital. Some 
scholars, which include; Colletta and Cullen (2000), Varshney (2003), Paffenholz and Purk 
(2006) and Cox (2009) are of the view that while a society with a high degree of social 
capital is more integrated, peacebuilding however aspires to encourage social capital in 
segmented and segregated post-conflict societies. The way that a community accepts ex-
combatants and the degree of confidence, reciprocated relationships and networks that 
connect ex-fighters to the rest of community, contend Leff (2008) and Annam and Cutter 
(2009), relate to social capital. Armed conflict incited ex-combatants’ networks, that Hazan 
(2007:1) coins as a “war family”. War family can underpin connected social capital 
between ex-combatants, which in turn, can keep alive networks of the war-time and their 
structures in either way. In Gilbert’s (2009) account on community acceptance of ex-
combatants, it is indicated that bonded social capital carries the power to produce violence 
for violence and crime entrepreneurs tend to create close bonded relationships within their 
formal and informal networks. As a component of post-war peacebuilding, one of the aim 
of ex-combatants’ reintegration is to bridge the nexuses that exist between ex-combatants, 
their families and communities in order to sustain bridging social capital for the 
improvement of social harmony.  
How ex-combatants manage to earn their livelihoods and build social capital relies on their 
psychological health and the mechanisms of assistance that they are provided to recover 
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from war-related mental and physical health problems. In Autesserre’s (2012) dangerous 
tales, it is disclosed that child soldiers and ex-combatants enlisted by warlords in the 
eastern DRC suffered from depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder and general 
psychological difficulties. As a sideline to this, ex-combatants encountered several snags in 
reconnecting and rebuilding nexuses with their families and communities.   
More recently, reconciliation has emerged as an element of reintegration process in post-
war society. Broadly, it aims to thwart, once and for all, the use of the past to refuel the 
conflict. Seen under the lens of peacebuilding, Bloomfield et al. (2003:19) put forward that 
reconciliation is a process towards consolidating peace, severing the cycle of violence and 
cementing nexuses between victims and perpetrators of the preceding conflict. On the other 
hand, Ngoma (2004) claims that it has been proved undeniable that ex-combatants’ 
reintegration is one of the several approaches that keep states and societies from falling 
back into volatility and war. From the above, it might be postulated that reintegration and 
reconciliation share the same objective, as both initiatives aim to prevent post-conflict 
societies to relapse into renewed conflict and instead they reinforce and restore new ties. 
Based on the 1999 Lusaka ceasefire agreements, that are the pedigree of the DRC’s 
peacebuilding process, DDR and reconciliation have been mentioned as integral 
components of peace process which is underway. In Central Africa Republic, however, 
reconciliation and DDR were clearly mentioned in the 2003 Bangui Agreements, and 
efforts were made to bring both processes together by drawing connecting lines between 
them (ecp 2008). It also stands true for Colombia and the post-Apartheid South Africa 
where reconciliation was cross-fertilised with reintegration in the peace process. There is a 
greater reciprocal nexus between reconciliation and reintegration when they are run 
simultaneously. Thus, scholars, such as Porto et al (2007), Annam and cutter (2009), and 
Kingma and Muggah (2009) advise that post-conflict reconciliation and transitional justice 
activities need to be handled alongside DDR. In other words, if reconciliation is undertaken 
in tandem with reintegration, its effects may have a great influence on the acceptance of 
combatants in communities. Yet this is barely the case in practice, and hence due to 
reintegration being often secluded and disengaged from the much needed reconciliation 
processes, contend Kingma and Muggah (2009).  
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In terms of social, economic and political capacities, post-conflict societies seem to be 
fragile to run and hold reconciliation processes. Reconciliation attempts in haste, which 
often culminates in transitional justice, may even drive protagonists with atrocious pasts off 
from the peace process. It goes the same that in the immediate repercussion of conflict, 
communities could be in a disagreement and thus, a number of war-affected social clusters 
might have opposing views of a peace process. Such contradictions could perceptibly 
hinder an individual’s and community’s ability to bear with someone who carries a brutal 
history. There is the need for transforming relationships, suggest Ramsbotham and Miall 
(2005), if the transformative levels of bridging differences and if restoring trust between 
hostile groups are envisioned. Nonetheless, in the immediate aftermath of heinous fighting, 
lots of post-conflict societies lack means to accommodate reconciliation, which often leads 
to a shared future between the erstwhile victim(s) and perpetrator(s), due to the dearth of 
such capacity. In such a context, a substantial time may be considered before they can 
embark on this idea under these hard conditions.    
3.4.2 Reintegration: From Minimalist to Maximalist Perspective 
Ex-combatants’ reintegration into society is a dynamic process. Its ultimate purpose is to 
convert an ex-combatant into civilian life (Kingma 1997; Ginifer 2003; Hazan 2007). Such 
a conversion, however, is a continuing process, with transformations taking place both in 
the lives of individual ex-combatants and at the relational level between them and people in 
their society. As an element of peacebuilding, the objective of reintegration is to produce 
constructive transformation in the relationships between ex-combatants and individuals in 
the community (Kilroy 2012). Reintegration’s main objective is identity change and the 
creation of a healthy civil society. Conversely, on the ground, reintegration processes are 
securitised, implying that ex-fighters are regarded simply as spoilers of peace processes set 
on the ground to terminate violent conflict. As a result, there is less interest in creating 
citizenry and in forming and factoring in the citizen-state interactions that would deal with 
ex-combatants in post-conflict period in a democratic structure (Muggah 2010). 
In spite of a number of praiseworthy improvements in the field of DDR, results are still 
varied and the level-headedness of a successful reintegration experiences the dormant 
tensions between policy recommendations allocated and the desirable outcomes from below 
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(Muggah et al. 2009). Equally, reintegration’s efficiency hinges upon significant issues 
ranging from challenges of setting pragmatic and realisable objectives, choosing suitable 
beneficiaries (UNDP 2005; Annan and Cutter 2009), to preventing the process from turning 
out to be a prisoner of political manipulation (Ojeleye 2010). In between time, interim and 
hasty arrangements, context-insensitive policy responses marred by scarce funding 
permanence and obstructed by the political surroundings are still producing exasperating 
outcomes in the field. 
Emerging as part of the peacebuilding doctrine in the 1980s and 1990s, DDR programmes 
were highly securitised. Such securitisation was hinged on the idea that non-state rebel 
movements and their elements constitute security menaces both to the post-conflict state 
and to the whole region. Consequently, in terms of formal peace support operations, 
contend Colletta and Muggah (2009), DDR and SSR go along with post-conflict security 
promotion. In Muggah’s (2005) provision on DDR, it is of note that the success of DDR 
was often measured according to the number of weapons gathered and disposed off, the 
number of ex-combatants processed, the number of vocational training courses afforded, 
the decreased reappearance of violence in which the ex-combatants were drawn in and so 
on. However over time, reintegration processes have evolved gradually from the narrow 
security-focused ‘minimalist’ agenda to a ‘maximalist’s’, with the latter integrating socio-
economic development agendas into the reintegration phase of DDR (Bryden 2007; Buxton 
2008; Jennings 2008; Muggah 2010). Subsequently, in the second generation of DDR 
programmes, reintegration has tried bringing together security and development agendas, 
with community development agendas being included into DDR (Baare 2005; Jackson and 
Alberecht 2011). This switch from minimalist to maximalist agenda is outstanding in that, 
it positions combatants’ reintegration within the discourse of post-conflict reconstruction 
and development (SIDDR 2006). Post-conflict reconstruction idea implies recreating and 
restoring the capacity of national institutions and community following a conflict (UNDP 
2007). This idea has been often associated with the concept of transition from war to peace 
and is being thrived as a way of including relief and development in post-conflict 
peacebuilding (Bocco and Oesch 2009; Beswick and Jackson 2011). 
In the discourse of post-conflict recovery, DDR programmes, particularly ex-combatants’ 
reintegration, has been regarded as an instrument to stimulate human and socio-economic 
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development. This change results from a set of convergent views that human security53 has 
a strong development dimension. In the aftermath of the Cold War, debate on human 
security has switched its attention from ‘state-centric’ approach to a ‘community-centred’ 
approach (MacLean et al. 2006; UNDP 1994). From the latter approach, it emerges that 
security is regarded as a dynamic product through a balance between ‘freedom from want’ 
and ‘freedom from fear’ (ibid.). Therefore, DDR partakes not only in post-conflict 
economic recovery, but also in human security by speaking for both security and 
development. Here lies the necessity to recognise reintegration limitations in that it can 
only complement some complex which upholds both post-conflict recovery and 
development however cannot and should not substitute development (Ball and van de Goor 
2006). 
The controversy around identifying appropriate target group(s) has been another critical 
issue associated with reintegration process. Currently, post-conflict recovery’s provision on 
DDR establishes at least two approaches; individual ex-combatant focused, and individual 
and community focused. Being minimalist in nature, individual ex-combatant focused 
reintegration caters economic opportunities solely for ex-fighters. The UNDP (2005) 
describes this support as including, but not limited to, encouraging employment in existing 
enterprises, encouraging micro and small business start-ups, the delivery of micro-grants or 
credit, the use of training as a reintegration tool, provision of technical advice, monitoring 
and supervision, public sector job creation and education and scholarships. A key critique 
of ex-combatant focused approach advises that if ex-combatants are given exceptional 
treatment and material inducements whereas other conflict victims, including unemployed 
youth, inside displaced individuals, war-widows, and war-victims – the families of those 
who were killed particularly if they were innocents, get markedly less attention, it may give 
                                                 
53 Human Security emerged in the post-Cold War era and has been regarded as a way of bringing together 
various humanitarian, economic and social issues so as to improve human conditions and assure security. The 
concept was first popularised by the UNDP in the early 1990s and aims to address issues comprising, but not 
limited to, the following; organised crime and criminal violence, human rights and good governance, armed 
conflict and intervention, genocide and mass crimes, health and development, resources and environment. It 
focuses primarily on protecting people while promoting peace and ensuring sustainable continuous 
development. Human security also emphasises on supporting individuals by using a people-centred approach 
as a way to resolving inequalities that affect security. One of the major failings of Human Security, according 
to its critics, is that it is too all encompassing and that it often fails to achieve its ambitious goals to improving 
human condition (Ball 2010; Sedra 2010; Autesserre 2010; 2014). 
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rise to tensions between ex-combatants and host communities (Annan and Cutter 2009). 
However, a preferential system, opines Last (1999), can symbolise political objectives and 
meaning as settled during a peace process. Contrarily, in the instantaneous stabilisation 
phase, reply Kingma and Muggah (2009), targeting ex-combatants and their families for a 
direct support is valuable; however, reintegration should be planned as an element of a 
post-conflict recovery programme in order to speak for grievances of the wider community.  
A maximalist approach to reintegration consists of extending the focus of reintegration 
programmes to both ex-combatants and communities. Individual and community focus 
approach is at the heart of reintegration process as it is proved that balancing the support 
between ex-combatants’ specific need and the needs of the wider community will spare 
returnees from community resentment (UNDP 2005; UN 2010b). The main advantage of 
this approach is that it intends to empower and equip communities with the capacity to 
support the reintegration of ex-combatants. As such, reintegration is seen as part of greater 
recovery programmes, comprising the reintegration of refugees and internally displaced 
peoples (Gleichmann et al. 2004; Alden et al. 2007; Beswick and Jackson 2011). 
Moreover, when reintegration support is balanced between ex-combatants and the 
community, social cohesion in post-conflict societies will easily be promoted (Fearon et al. 
2009).   
Some challenges, however, need to be considered. It has been actually proved that 
combining reintegration with community development is not an easy task as the process 
requires a greater deal of coordination between several players, including DDR 
implementers, development actors and national and local governments. It entails 
incorporating reintegration into post-conflict development initiatives, something that may 
prove to be difficult for some reasons among others; dearth of continuity of funding and 
resources in the long-term, limited political will and paucity of an appropriate environment 
in which to embark on such long-term ambitious programmes. At this particular point, the 
key issue is no longer about the programme targeting a particular social group, rather when, 
to what extent and how to balance resources between particular and general needs of 
populations (CIDDR 2009). However, it should be warned that resources allocated for ex-
combatants’ reintegration should not serve as enticements to spoilers and rebel leaders; 
neither should the programme be misappropriated by strongmen – the local elites and 
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warlords, so as to handle the resources in ways that could jeopardise the future of the peace 
process. 
3.5 Reintegration Outcomes and the Problem of Re-recruitment 
Apart from the recruitment’s root-causes or motivations, the successes and failures of 
combatant’s reintegration would also have a serious brunt on their eventual re-recruitment 
into armed groups. Living in a group can be a powerful weapon to indoctrinate young 
people and get them to become fighters. Group socialisation has some bearing such as the 
challenges of regaining lost childhoods, family, loved ones, and norms of social behaviour, 
on returnees during their post-conflict civilian life. This case happened to the protracted 
Liberian and Sierra-Leonean conflicts where combatants who embarked on military service 
as children and demobilised as adults suffer from long-term in-group socialisation 
(Özerdem 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010). Özerdem and Podder (2012) are of the view 
that socialisation is crucial for post-war reintegration outcomes as it interferes with some 
key post-war behavioural indicators with regard to mental-health-related disorders, such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder – PTSD, disability and infertility. The same goes for the loss 
of education, a dearth of employable skills and the destruction of a stable family. It is 
evident that former fighters are severely challenged with several fallouts as the result of the 
time spent in an armed organisation. 
Transition from civilian life to that of military is a breach between the normal and accepted 
life, as is reintegration a significant challenge for ex-combatants. In societies with rooted 
communal visions of death, there is a set of mechanisms that aim to deal with ritualistic 
cleansing and sacrifice, illness and healing and enable the environment of socially 
acceptable reintegration (Özerdem 2008; Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Özerdem and Podder 
2011; Özerdem and Podder 2012). Traditional cleansing rituals, as those applied in 
Mozambique under the organic interventions, have proved to be dangerous for the start of 
reintegration programmes. By their nature, traditional cleansing rituals are set to 
psychologically reconcile well-being with the social world and wipe out killing or 
combatant bearings imbibed in the rebels’ world (Utas 2003; Özerdem and Podder 2012). 
Approaches to re-socialising combatants from their combatant’s identity have been 
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criticised for being incomplete, as they fail to incorporate into the operational system and 
the importance of the reintegration process, neither do they underline its social aspect 
(Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012). It is challenging to re-familiarise with norms and values 
of the period preceding conflict in a society. This could end up jeopardising social 
reconciliation and mutual acceptance between community’s members and those who are 
regarded as socially undesirable for their forfeit during war. Reintegration involves 
meticulous and sensitive work whereby combatants are held accountable for their 
belligerent offences – killing, amputation and other forms of horrific violence against their 
host community.  
Lessons learned from the inversion theory of reintegration illustrate the proverb that ‘what 
goes around comes around’. During reintegration, combatants may be treated in the same 
way that they behaved towards their community, given that the accepted behaviour of war 
time becomes reprehensible in peace time. Therefore, combatants are stripped off their 
combatant identity. Like good and bad civilians, the same applies to rebels, in some 
respects. An African proverb says ‘mind asking the age of an individual who carries a 
weapon’. It is common to all communities to fear and distrust anyone who has handled fire 
arms, be it during or after war. Discarding rebel-like behaviour and changing one’s mind to 
the reality, poverty, or incapacity of civilian living, cannot be achieved overnight. In the 
course of the socialisation period within armed organisation and during fighting life, 
violence becomes entrenched and second nature for combatants’ lives while in reality they 
become victims of their past. Relying on violence to reinstate law and order remains a 
significant challenge in the identity transformation process. Although traditional cleansing 
ceremonies have limitations regarding reintegration process, they have played a 
considerable role in bringing together returnees and their families or communities. At the 
same time they can align returnees’ well-being with spiritual beliefs of death and rebirth. 
Such a process could facilitate reintegration and hence increases community confidence in 
its own children, formerly regarded as spiritually contaminated by the exposure to the war 
behaviour – violence and death (Özerdem 2008; Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012). It is of 
note that particular attention should be paid to the component of successful social 
reintegration and re-acceptance by their families and communities in order to preclude 
further attempts to re-recruitment.  
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From more technical DDR efforts, it has been proved that child soldiers have traditionally 
been marginalised from DDR programmes and reintegration support in particular (Taylor et 
al. 2006; Özerdem 2008; Özerdem and Podder 2011). However, in the efforts at stopgap 
programmes, those excluded have been prioritised in family reintegration, counselling, 
basic economic support – which includes short vocational training programmes, provision 
for shelter, food and tools. In the context of child soldier reintegration, it is suggested that 
community-based reintegration – BR, strategies attempted would be appropriate to deal 
with the need for equilibrium in targeting and downsizing antagonisms generated from 
exclusive focus on any particular caseload (Keen 2000; Themner 2008; Özerdem and 
Podder 2012). The re-recruitment of combatants would be curbed and discouraged if the 
preventive capacity of communities lies in ensuring community-located follow-up 
mechanisms and more effective use of donor and local resources (Themner 2008). This 
would deflect criticism formulated to CBR approaches as relegating responsibility for 
reintegration to impoverished and incapacitated communities (Özerdem and Podder 2012).   
It is established that when the state and the central government support the communities 
through providing sufficient resources, and if communities are sufficiently empowered to 
categorise, gauge and prioritise needs locally, then the re-recruitment of combatants would 
be deterred, thus communities will be strong enough to deal with those needs more 
successfully (Themner 2008). In contrast, Beswick and Jackson (2011) are of the view that 
in conflicts with regional character, combatants receive assistance from more than one 
country, as is the case in Uganda, Rwanda and the DRC, and tend to spoil the process. In 
both contexts, capacity building through credence is very important. Community members 
need to encourage returnees to restart their new life normally without any impediment, 
including going back to school or training and partaking in social stability. Community can 
positively maximise combatant reintegration by considering it as a rich pool of human 
resources for development. Failing to do so may lead to an increase of combatants’ re-
recruitment, as occurred in the eastern DRC. Well-reintegrated ex-combatants would be 
powerful agents of local economic development – LED. The participation of former 
combatants in the LED, the reintegration strategies plan, its impacts on individual action 
and trajectories of empowerment would be a very strong fence to the youth re-recruitment 
cycle.  
Chapter Three: From Recruitment to Re-recruitment of Combatants: The Failure of Reintegration Process?   
Coventry University 117 
 
As a bottom-up approach toward empowering local-based communities, local government, 
the private and non-profit sectors to work together to develop the local economy (Blakely 
and Leigh 2010), LED would work appropriately in post-conflict environment if combined 
with the social navigation approach. In essence, social navigation is defined as motion 
within a fluid space which requires individual agency in deciding on how to navigate the 
dangers and the possibilities, as well as an ability to locate and creatively traverse a difficult 
social space (Gates and Andvig 2006; Özerdem and Podder 2012). It might be argued that 
LED, social navigation and post-conflict control would be a significant yet little considered 
aspect in the reintegration routes of former fighters. In the same vein of thinking it would 
be desirable to seriously consider how the DDR’s repercussions and reintegration outcomes 
would impact on the re-recruitment of former soldiers and on their involvement in armed 
groups. 
Challenges facing ex-combatants in post-conflict societies range from lack of work or 
usable skills, disempowerment to marginalisation. However, what they are likely to 
encounter the most in their new life is the embarrassment of accepting past structures of 
traditional leadership, control and domination (Utas 2003; McMullin 2004). This raises the 
concern of how do former combatants handle the loss of education, a lack of employment, 
and the pejorative brand of killers that might challenge perspectives for a successful 
reintegration. In this regard, it is also reasonable to figure out the way reintegration process 
trickles down support in order to have a broad view on how the process can enable 
combatant’s return to their wounded, destroyed and traumatised communities. 
Reintegration support can be directly given to ex-combatants, or the funding might be used 
to build educational infrastructures that will train returnees in the short-term and benefit the 
whole community in the long-term. In Sudan, for example, the reintegration process 
provided support to family and community so as to create and sustain a conducive and 
empowered environment for the reintegration of returnees (Özerdem 2008; Özerdem and 
Podder 2012). From what has been discussed above, it might be argued that the successful 
reintegration of ex-combatants into society is not impossible but complex. Re-involvement 
of former combatants with armed groups in post-conflict war period is a result of a 
combination of factors, ranging from a certain loss of agency, discriminations and 
retaliation attacks to issues of physical and economic insecurity (Crossett and Spitaletta 
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2010). The feelings of being aggrieved and excluded or marginalised are thought to trigger 
motivations behind recruitment and may be extended to the re-recruitment cycle if not dealt 
with. Ex-combatants who do not rely on the local security system use their combatant skills 
to ensure their security. This would also be true for ex-combatants who are secluded and 
non-integrated. They generally tend to resolve their problems by using violence (Spear 
2006).  
Experiences from post-conflict countries such as Algeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone advise 
that although gerontocratic and corrupt societies can undermine social advancement in post-
conflict contexts, post-war period can bring out opportunities to empower not only 
returnees but also all other marginalised groups (Abdullah 1998; Özerdem 2008; Maclay 
and Özerdem 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2012). After the conflict, demilitarised youth who 
are reintegrated into communities, whereby their political, economic and social rights are 
denied, become frustrated and are likely to face the same conditions that led them into 
joining armed groups. Many ex-fighters have found themselves as mercenaries in regional 
conflicts because of their reintegration into poverty and their exclusion from social, 
economic and politic activities (Mats Utas 2003; McMullin 2004). In this case, re-recruited 
combatants become more dangerous than they were before. Lessons learned from Sierra 
Leone, Liberia and Uganda show that on the order of their superiors, child soldiers 
assaulted their own homes, with the intention of breaking their bonds with family and the 
home environments, while others stormed their own villages, committing atrocities like 
looting food, mutilating people and even shooting their own siblings (Özerdem and Podder 
2012).  
Re-engagement of combatants into violence is a result of the instrumental and technical 
DDR which has limited the DDR process on numbers, caseloads, targets, partners, trauma, 
protection and rehabilitation (Sageman 2004; Mandel 2009). The instrumental and 
technical DDR would approach merely the question ‘why’ – cause of conflicts and not 
‘how’ – root of conflicts. This means that DDR approaches will superficially tackle the 
fundamental causes of conflicts, resulting in a delay of successful reintegration. In Özerdem 
and Podder’s (2011:73) words: 
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“DDR approaches remain mired in instrumentalism; the means and end results are 
instrumental and are geared towards keeping a certain caseload perceived as a 
“security threat” busy and engaged to prevent conflict relapse. Besides, there are 
significant negative impacts of DDR programmes for child soldiers. They can result 
in labelling, stigma, distrust and animosity at an intergroup level within rural 
communities”. 
During the period of peace, ex-combatants need to be taught values based on how they 
should get involved with leadership structure. This allows on-going involvement of young 
people in socio-political projects and yields positive results in terms of peace building 
processes (Sageman 2004; Mandel 2009). This critical emphasis of DDR policy would 
restrain possible remobilisation or re-recruitment. A DDR programme based on a 
successful economic, political and social reintegration would undermine command and 
structure of armed groups; impeding recruiters and re-recruits reengaging in violence. It has 
been established that the success of DDR programmes leads to new social relationships, 
whereby training and schooling stimulate returnees to give up arms and embark 
strategically on civilian livelihoods (Mandel 2009). Economic, political and social 
reintegration aspects bring out the necessity of addressing the root-causes (push and pull 
factors) that lie behind combatants’ recruitment in the first place. In contrast, former 
fighters who are reintegrated into poverty and still face the same grievances they fought for 
are at risk of deciding to break the peace transition and reengage into violence. 
Lessons learned from the relationship between combatants’ recruitment, reintegration and 
re-recruitment suggest that combatants’ mobilisation – recruitment, is the result of social, 
political and economic grievances and greed, while the remobilisation – re-recruitment, 
stems from the instrumental and technical DDR which culminates in the failure of the 
reintegration programmes. However, it is attested that re-recruitment cycle is avoidable, if 
only there is a clear-cut policy on preventing remobilisation based on strengthening 
community-based support structures, operative border monitoring and the participation of 
youth to the political, economic and social leadership opportunities. The main policy on 
preventing re-recruitment should avoid the trap of excluding and re-marginalising even 
frustrating young people. It is common for post-conflict states to have locations for ex-
combatants and their dependants. These camps are generally over populated and are a 
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potent re-recruitment target for warlords. Hence, such sites require a closely monitored 
system. In the context of a post-conflict country wherein there is a proliferation of armed 
groups, good governance associated with political and development actors would 
discourage any attempt towards the remobilisation of combatants. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Against the backdrop of the literature on combatant’s push-and-pull factors, the specific 
question which can be raised is who needs to be reintegrated into what? After a thorough 
review of the DDR provisions, reintegration seems to be a straightforward task in theory, as 
it is directly linked to the existence of home and community. However, it sounds like these 
two latter components are relevant to undertake the DDR programmes but not enough for a 
successful reintegration. In practice though, reintegration has proved to be the most 
complex component of DDR (Beswick and Jackson 2011), due to difficulties to develop 
alternatives to “violence-based livelihoods” for ex-combatants (ibid: 124). This may partly 
justify why it often fails on the ground. Most reintegrated individuals – child soldiers and 
young people, have lost their formative years, having spent these years living in armed 
groups. Frequently, reverting back home is not an aspiration for somebody who spent 
his/her life into violence; it confirms a future of uncertainty. Unfortunately combatants’ 
margin of manoeuvre to manage their life during the war aftermath is very limited. They 
have to go through difficult transitions from fighters to civilian status in a post-conflict 
environment mired with socio-economic and civilian challenges. As a consequence, the 
reintegration process becomes a token gesture or meaningless process welcoming home 
returnees with violent pasts, without rehabilitation to enable them to build their new life 
next to those they have aggrieved. Some reintegrated combatants have succeeded in 
building their lives while others have failed. It is however of note that ex-combatants’ DDR 
occurs within a war-torn society, disabled by weak and unstable socio-economic and 
political structures. It is hardly surprising that combatants who failed to accommodate 
themselves with the new style of life will commit themselves to armed groups and criminal 
networks for re-recruitment. 
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Former combatants have been regarded as a legacy of conflict, one which threatens the 
security of a post-conflict society. From micro/macro-insecurity perspectives, it might be 
advised that remobilisation is one of the results of the failure of the reintegration process. 
As elaborated through push and pull factors throughout this chapter, combatants’ 
recruitment-reintegration-(re-) recruitment – mobilisation-reintegration-remobilisation, 
cycle remains a cause and effect relationship. This portends that the same root-causes that 
motivated recruitment would apply for the re-recruitment as well. However, particular 
attention needs to be paid to the re-recruitment level, as at this stage, it is to deal with an 
‘ex-combatant’ whom not only already possesses military skills, but also is a valuable 
instigator of violence. Owing to their skills and experience in battle and torture, former 
combatants become valuable commodities for conflict entrepreneurs and agency. This latter 
can jeopardise security through recruiting combatants for armed groups, fuelling conflict 
and organising violence.    
The mobilisation-reintegration-remobilisation relationship is a cumulative interaction. This 
means that it would be important to consider not only what motivates re-recruitment – the 
failure of reintegration programmes, but also to seriously think about how reintegration 
failure can fuel the existing root-causes – push and pull factors that have led to recruitment 
in a particular society. The failure of reintegration outcomes and existing push and pull 
factors interact and lead to the re-recruitment cycle. This happens in post-conflict in the 
Kivus (DRC), Liberia, Ivory Coast, Uganda, and Central Africa among others where failed 
former combatants turn back on peace and reengage in violence. However, this is still 
questionable for the north and west Africa regions in relation to the impact of Al-Qaeda in 
the Islamic Maghreb – Libya, Algeria, Boko Haram – Nigeria, Cameroon, and Jihad in the 
west Africa – Mali, Niger, to name a few. Besides, believing that the success of 
reintegration will utterly thwart erstwhile combatants from reengaging in violent activities 
in the future would be simplistic.   
In post-conflict society, grievance and greed would linger for a while if not dealt with and 
could be a fuelling-factor for individuals joining armed groups. Therefore, there is the need 
for reducing rebel groups’ capacities to re-recruit former combatants. In this case, 
reintegration programmes should need to concentrate on the following aspects:  
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- Supporting community and families so as to speak to the major push and pull factors 
that motivate youth recruitment.  
- Bearing in mind that reintegration should be more a political process which should 
be thought and materialised beyond employment and education opportunities.  
- Reintegration needs to focus on the development of local economy so the post-
conflict society is better able to address to the problem of poverty and 
unemployment which is a major concern for both ex-combatants and other 
unemployed community members.  
- Ex-combatants need to be considered as potential political and social actors for the 
future of post-conflict environments. 
- Re-recruitment is a structural issue and its root-causes need to be addressed from the 
broad picture of macro-level economics, politics and international relations.  
Not only the review of literature in Chapters Two and Three delved into the broad scope of 
violent conflicts emerging from the Post-Cold War settings and the process of mobilisation, 
demobilisation, reintegration and remobilisation of combatants, but it allowed us to 
understand the political economy of the conflict vis-à-vis natural resources, as well as the 
link between natural resources and recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of 
combatants. However, this review has merely touched upon how the interconnection of the 
abovementioned would trigger violence. Hence, an in-depth analysis of the conflict in the 
DRC would reveal a wealth of information as to how this nexus fuels the destabilisation of 
a weak resource-rich state. Therefore, it is important to approach the issue with two 
questions: ‘How and why’. This helps address the problem from the micro/macro-level 
structural dynamics, as is the case illustrated in the upcoming chapter. 
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(Robin Geib 2009:128). 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the processes and nature of the protracted armed conflict and state 
failure in the DRC from the two Congo Wars (1996-97 and 1998-2003) to the continuation 
of conflicts up to 2012. The focus of this chapter is on the multi-level of conflict players 
due to their key position in supporting armed groups and illegal exploitation of minerals. In 
so doing, it expects to contextualise all multi-layered conflict motivations that underpin the 
unfolded nature of conflict in the eastern DRC. Broadly, the analysis indicates that the state 
failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC is the upshot of an intersection of local, 
national and regional security concerns – that involve several actors worsened by their 
interaction, and by the  presence of natural resources (Cramer 2006a; Grignon 2006; Wake 
2008). This ‘intricate crossbreed conflict’ (Carayannis 2003; Prunier 2009) occurred in a 
significant socio-economic environment decline – particularly since the early 1990s, and 
was characterised by the evanescence of state’s authority and a loss of political legitimacy. 
The chapter also explores the embedded historical, social, economic, political and cultural 
bonds prior to the occurrence of the conflict that have significant meaning in the 
understanding of conflict before elaborating on the current artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment in the DRC. 
Several researchers, with hand on this subject, are of the consensus that the two Congo 
wars have been a business enterprise, since the exploitation of natural resources and control 
over trade involve all belligerents. A set of papers on the conflict in the DRC (UN Experts 
2011; 2012; 2013; 2014) indicated that the involvement of belligerents in the exploitation 
of minerals in this country means that the conflict is the low-intensity nature conflict, and 
involves a fragmentation of belligerent groups and criminal elements concerned with the 
cross-border networks of illegal trade. Although there is an ongoing debate on the armed 
conflict in the DRC, there is still a major challenge in explaining the complexity of violence 
nature of the conflict, due to the existing theoretical divide (Carayannis 2003; Hawkins 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the 
thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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2008). This suggests that considering the DRC conflict under the lens of intrastate conflicts, 
the absurdity of abundance theory and post-Cold War conflicts (King 1997; Kaldor 2007; 
Klare 2001; 2002), as illustrated in the literature review, would be irrelevant if the analysis 
of the conflict focuses only on the state and the state actors as established by most of the 
international relations theories.  
Along similar lines, the DRC conflict could not be understood as a rational choice approach 
based on resource abundance and weak governance, owing to the statistical analysis54 
limitations that do not adequately allow for causation. However, it should be acknowledged 
that both academia and policymakers have significantly increased research on violence in 
the DRC, with focus exclusively being on the political economies of armed groups vis-à-vis 
mineral resources and the economy of war. A few institutions such as the International 
Peace Academy,55 the Overseas Development Institute – ODI,56 the UN,57 and the 
International Peace Information Service – IPIS,58 have largely released publications in this 
regard. From these studies, it might be suggested that emphasising on the political economy 
of war or the functions of the war paradigm may hamper to mention belligerents’ political 
grievances and local circumstances in which those grievances happened and turned into 
violence. A wide range of papers on the collapse and evanescence of the DRC state more 
recently emerged within the political science literature that the DRC state is a furtherance 
of greedy governance during Mobutu’ s regime (Rackley 2006), or a failed state with 
prevalence of warlords (Young and Turner 1985; Lemarchand 1997; 2003; Reno 1998; 
McNulty 1999; 2000; Zeilig 2009). However, Sangmpam (1994) is in disagreement with 
these perspectives developed from weak governance paradigm as they are insufficient to 
explain the nature of governance in the DRC.  
More recently a group of historians have come out with comprehensive analyses on the 
DRC conflict, emphasising both on the role of Rwanda (Prunier 2009) and the criticism of 
                                                 
54 The most influential work has been provided by Collier (2000) and Collier and Hoeffler (2004). 
55 Berdal, M. and Malone, D. M. (eds.) (2000) Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Nest, M. W. with Grignon, F. and Kisangani, E. F. (2006) The Democratic Republic 
of Congo: economic dimensions of war and peace, Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
56 Jackson (2003). 
57 UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b). 
58 Cuvelier and Raeymaekers (2002a; 2002b); Raeymaekers (2002). 
Chapter Four: State failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC   
Coventry University 125 
 
the rational choice approach (Turner 2007). One of these analyses suggests that a critical 
understanding of political grievances and context in the DRC requires considering local 
level, context-specific analyses and the view from the bottom (Mwanasali 2000). In the 
sight of Mwanasali’s perception lays the importance of bringing into the analysis the 
crucial issue of ethnicity, citizenship and the informal cross-border trade, even if his 
analysis basically disregarded the DRC’s economic analysis over the past decade (Mamdani 
1998; 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 2007; Turner 2007; MacGaffey et al. 1991; 
Raeymaekers 2009).59 It could be stressed that this chapter explores state failure and 
protracted armed conflict in the DRC since 1996, with the focus on the eastern-DRC. The 
particularity of the1990s armed conflicts in the DRC is that these conflicts are ‘multifaceted 
hybrid wars involving intrastate and interstate war, as well as cross-border insurgencies 
deriving from external repercussions, particularly from the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
(Carayannis 2003).  
There are ramifications of a violent regional socio-political history – particularly Burundian 
and Rwandan civil wars and genocides which arose as a repercussion of the extension of 
neighbouring countries’ internal conflicts into the DRC. This chapter offers a succinct 
chronology of events between 1996 and 2012 as it occurred in the Kivus and Oriental 
provinces, with the interference of Rwanda and Uganda. The chapter also introduces a 
concise conflict analysis of the DRC before the two wars and presents various fundamental 
issues in this region; ethnicity, identity, migration and citizenship. This demonstrates how 
the above mentioned elements have tied in with other existing issues – such as access to 
local resources, land rights and security for the people in the region, to cause conflicts and 
how they have set a complex environment which could explain war in the DRC. 
Subsequently, the chapter looks at the 1996-1997 conflict – War of Liberation, the 1998-
2003 conflict – Mineral-Based Conflict, and the ongoing conflict afterwards in the eastern 
DRC deriving from the failure of the peace process. From the pre-colonial period, through 
the colonial epoch to its independence, accounts on the DRC’s history and events are rich 
                                                 
59 There is a substantial study of the economy of the colonial period by Hochschild (1998) and of the Mobutu 
era by Young and Turner (1985). Some economic analyses are available from the policy community such as 
the international financial institutions, the UN and NGOs, as national statistics from the DRC state have been 
largely unavailable for more than a decade (Putzel et al. 2008). 
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in conflicts and litigations. This is the result of strong vested interests and various actors’ 
dissimilar world views. The analysis of conflict in the eastern DRC as set out in this chapter 
sheds light on the overriding context at the local level, embedded in historical, social, 
economic, political and cultural relations in the region. Overall, the analysis in this chapter 
is based on interpreting events and viewpoints that underline the conflict rather than 
reconciling different stances.  
4.2 From the Congo Free State to the Independence 
The history of the DRC reveals that the country has been a colony of exploitation shaped by 
foreign interests and intrusion. Hochschild (1998) and Bate’s (2004) researches on the 
DRC60 provide that King Léopold II of Belgium applied a brutal rule in the Congo Free 
State. Some other studies (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014) have 
ascertained that after 1885, the exploitation of the Congo’s natural resources particularly 
that of rubber, was made possible through forced labour on the indigenous population. In 
1908, the Congo Free State or the King’s personal property became Belgian colony after 
international pressure intensified against the King Léopold II unfolding atrocities 
(Hochschild 1998). Ten million people or half of the population in the colony were 
believed to have died as an upshot of the King Léopold’s brutal administration (ibid.).  
After King Léopold II, the administration of Belgian state in the Congo was characterised 
by an extremely discriminative system, based on race. The political administration of 
Belgium in the then Congo was based on the notorious Trinité Coloniale [Colonial Trinity] 
of the State, the Catholic Church – missionary, and private company interests or large 
corporations – predominantly the mining companies (Martelli 1962; Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2002). Scholars (Ewans 2002; Jones Adam 2006; Ergo 2008; Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; 
Van Reybrouck 2014) have referred to as ‘paternalistic61 domination’. From 1916 to 1921 
                                                 
60 The Kingdom of Kongo (1400 - 1914), which at its peak was the largest state in western Central Africa, 
covered what are now northern Angola, part of the DRC and part of the Republic of Congo (BBC n.d.). See 
www.bbc.co.uk/worldservice/africa/features/storyofafrica/10Chapter2.shtml. 
61 Paternalism is a socio-political system under which an authority undertakes to supply needs or regulate 
conduct of those under its control in matters affecting them as individuals as well as in their relations to 
authority and to each other. 
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after Germany’s defeat in the First World War, Belgium respectively and progressively 
occupied Ruanda-Urundi – present Rwanda and Burundi, and then took over the 
administration of both countries of German East Africa via a League of Nations mandate 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). From then on, the Belgian administration ruled the Belgian 
Congo and Ruanda-Urundi together – known as Le Congo Belge et le Ruanda-Urundi 
[Belgian Congo and Rwanda-Urundi], with a single army and a single governor-general 
based in Kinshasa. The above mentioned ‘colonial trinity’ was applied to colonial entities 
to seek  and inflict colonial master’s domination through paternalism, white supremacy and 
administratively enforced ethnic divisions among Africans, and thereby built the basis of 
ethnic identity politics in Rwanda and Burundi (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 217). Throughout 
the colonial period, indigenous people were subjected to ‘peasantisation and 
peripheralisation’ as lifestyle. To Sosne (1979), this process was meant to develop 
plantations in fertile areas without building infrastructures to connect the region to the rest 
of the country. There was a framework for exploitation of the peasants, with local 
traditional authorities as intermediaries for the colonial administration, profiting and 
becoming powerful (ibid.).  
4.2.1 The Independent Congo 
Following the rise of continent-wide anti-colonial movements, the DRC got its 
independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960. Few months before the independence, the 
country held its first parliamentary elections under Belgian supervision. However, it should 
be noted that during the colonial period, the colonial-master-power had mainly kept 
Congolese from administrative responsibilities; neither was it willing to develop a 
competent political class amongst the Congolese.62 Additionally, based on the extremely 
discriminative system applied during the colonial epoch, Belgians did not prepare 
Congolese politicians to take over the country after independence. There were only nine 
Congolese individuals with University degrees at the time of independence. Contrarily to 
the ten years granted to Nigeria to prepare for its independence (Davidson 1984), the DRC 
                                                 
62 For more details, see BBC (2010b) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/10449507.stm 
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was given six months.63 Allegedly the DRC’s independence was intentionally granted 
hurriedly to ensure the collapse of the recently self-governing country (Pare 2000). Out of 
32 government members – Heads of different government Departments, of the newly 
formed government, with Joseph Kasavubu as the first President and Patrice Lumumba as 
the first Prime Minister, only three had University degrees (Pare 2000). 
Following five days of independence, the country experienced the army revolt nationwide 
and the breakaway of Katanga and Kasai provinces. In July-August 1960, the Katangan and 
Kasaian secessions, respectively led by the secessionists Moise Tshombe and Albert 
Kalondji, constituted the first roots of the Congo Crisis. The new Congolese government 
immediately sought for the UN assistance to fight secessionists and re-establish the 
sovereign state. The UN intervened in the new state with a number of 20,000 deployed 
troops by the time of its removal in 1964 (ICG n.d.). It is important to mention that this 
situation happened in the context of the Cold War and within a mineral-rich country whose 
wealth and geopolitical importance was at the centre of bipolarity system. The fear of the 
Western block was that Lumumba would seek military support from the East (Young and 
Turner 1985; Pare 2000; Peck 2000; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; ISS c2008; ICG n.d.), as he 
was thought to be communist although this has not been proved (Pare 2000; Peck 2000). As 
a result, Patrice Lumumba and some of his comrades were detained and slain by the army 
in 1961, purportedly with the implication of the CIA, Belgian soldiers and Moise Tshombe 
(Pare 2000; Peck 2000; ISSc2008). It was also during this crisis that the then UN Secretary 
General, Dag Hammarskjöld, died in a plane crash while he was on his way to the DRC for 
peace negotiation.  
                                                 
63 In Africa, the United Kingdom launched the process of decolonization in the early 1950s. French 
independence in Africa was introduced in phases. Most of the French colonies in Black Africa became 
independent in 1960.The immense Belgian Congo was one of the richest colonies in Africa. After bloody riots 
in 1959, the Belgian Government quickly yielded to demands for independence in 1960. Portuguese colonies 
in Africa gained their independence only after the “Carnation Revolution” which took place in Lisbon in April 
1974.Spanish Guinea and Western Sahara gained their independence from Spain during the period 1956 to 
1975. 
For more details, seehttp://www.the-map-as-history.com/maps/11-decolonization_independence.php 
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4.2.2  Rise and Fall of Mobutu 
Mobutu’s role in the history of the Congo is quite controversial. He is believed to be a 
political creation of the United States. In McNulty’s (1999: 58) word: “he was seen as a 
reliable client in a state which was key to Western Cold War strategy in Africa”. Colonel 
Joseph Mobutu was the rare Congolese elite who enjoyed the USA, France and Belgium 
support during the 1960 crisis period. This proved to be true in November 1965 when he 
took advantage of the extreme instability in the country to initiate a successful coup, with 
the support of the same CIA agent involved in Lumumba’s assassination (Young and 
Turner 1985; Pare 2000; Peck 2000; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). In view of the above, it is 
important to underline that Mobutu’s first coup d’état happened in 1960 – 14 September, 
when he overthrew the government and arrested Lumumba with U.S. and CIA support. 
With the entry of Mobutu into power, the country was ruled by a centralised administration 
system underpinned by horizontal elite networks. Mobutu’s reign decreased the power of 
local networks and traditional authorities which was strengthened during the colonial rule 
(Young and Turner 1985; Putzel et al. 2008). Throughout his own networks, he set 
representatives of ethnic groups and took advantage of those that were vulnerable due to 
their political and social status as minorities (Jackson 2007). In the case of the eastern 
DRC, the minority of the Congolese Tutsi had been chosen owing to its elite networks 
(ibid.). However, how Rwandan Tutsi became Congolese Tutsi? To what extent are they 
important in terms of ethnic minority group at the heart of the conflict in the DRC? 
According to skype interviews I conducted in Beni, Butembo and Goma with some Kivus’ 
local leaders and those conducted in Kinshasa with two Kivus’ traditional authorities, 
Nande and Unde64 Mwamis, it has been said: 
“In 1965, Mobutu rose into power in a context of two ideology-divided-country; 
Marxism-Communism – spearheaded by the defeated Lumumba government’s 
                                                 
64 Nande and Hunde are two ethnic groups from the Kivus. According to these Mwamis, in the DRC, 
particularly in the Kivus, there is no minority in terms of ethnic group, since the country is made up of more 
than 400 ethnic groups. To them, all ethnic groups are minority. The concept of minority or vulnerable ethnic 
group has been purposely coined by certain elites from within and without the country for geopolitical and 
politician ends. 
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members, exiled in Stanleyville, and capitalism – represented by Kasavubu, Mobutu 
and his allies, based in Kinshasa. Theoretically, the new independent Congo was 
torn into two; the Republic of Congo with Léopoldville – Kinshasa, as the capital 
and the Popular Republic of Congo with Stanleyville – Kisangani, as the capital. 
Christophe Gbenye – the first Home Office Minister of Lumumba’s government in 
1960, was the President of the Popular Republic of Congo, with Antoine Gizenga – 
the former Vice-Prime Minister of the Congolese first elected government, as Prime 
Minister. Mulele Pière – the first National Education Minister following the 
independence, allied with Gizenga’s government to fight what they called ‘capitalist 
government’ of Kinshasa. In 1964, following his military training in China, Mulele 
Pière, Gaston Soumialot and other nationalist-Lumumbists launched a vast 
nationalist uprising against Kinshasa’s government. Marxist-Lumumbist leaders 
found favourable response from some local leaders in Bukavu – South Kivu, and 
Kwilu – Bandundu. The country plunged into a total and generalised instability 
along with the already Katanga and Kasai secessions. It was within this context that 
Mobutu deposed Kasavubu and took over the state’s office. However, Mobutu 
encountered a vehement resistance of Marxist-Lumumbist rebellion with Bukavu 
and Kwilu as their strongholds.65 Keen to stifle the upheaval, Mobutu allied with an 
influent Kivus’ local leader from Furute village, near to Lemera and appealed to 
colonel Mulamba, also known as ‘man of Bukavu’66 to lead the troops. In his 
strategy of dividing local communities in order to smother Marxist-Lumumbist 
rebellion, Mobutu had to network with Banyarwanda living in the Kivus. The 
Furute’s local leader liaised with Murita Kigongo, a Rwandan-Tutsi leader from 
Mulenge hills to fight against Marxist-Lumumbist rebellion. Following the Marxist-
Lumumbist insurgence’s defeat, Mobutu suggested Tutsi leaders to be called 
“Benamulenge” – a misspelling immediately corrected to Banyamulenge by 
Mobutu’s collaborator with Swahili origins, in exchange for victory. It can be 
stressed that the first attempt to identifying Tutsi from Mulenge hills as 
                                                 
65 See Appendix Three for more details on the Marxist-Lumumbist rebellion. 
66 During the 1994 Marxist-Mulelist uprising, Colonel Mulamba was coined as ‘man of Bukavu’ due to 
victory over the rebellion. It has also been said that being aware of the influence of colonel Mulamba’s tactics 
of battle, Mobutu saw in him a potential foe, therefore was afraid of him and murdered him, it was said. 
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Banyamulenge came from Mobutu. Tutsi leaders rather requested Mobutu to hire 
Tutsi children into the government as a reward. This was the entry-point to the 
public administration of Zaïre by Rwandan-Tutsi, with individuals such as 
Bisengimana Rema, Pay-Pay to name a few.67 These Tutsi elites have held high 
rank positions in Zairian public institutions. This could be a possible interpretation 
of how and why Tutsis are part of influential policy-makers in the country”.68 
Another essential detail which marked Mobutu’s reign was the implementation of certain 
major reforms among which the ‘Bakajika Law’ passed in 1966, the authenticity campaign 
in 1971 and the ‘Zairianisation’ in 1973. The Bakajika Law transferred the land ownership 
– including mineral rights, to the state and was supposed to come up with a solution on 
inherent conflicts between the colonial individual land ownership or colonial land law 
system, and the customary system of land tenure (Meditz and Merrill 1993). Authenticité 
[Authenticity] campaign was seen as the African nationalism. Through this ideology, the 
country was renamed Zaïre and his name changed into Mobutu Sese Seko Koko Ngbendu 
wa Za Banga, which in his mother tongue ‘Nbgwandi’ means “the all-powerful warrior 
who, because of his endurance and inflexible will to win, will go from conquest to 
conquest, leaving fire in his wake” (History.com n.d.). The aforementioned 1966 Bakajika 
law was also reinforced through nationalisation of land. It affected significantly customary 
law and decreased traditional influences over rural lands (Putzel et al. 2008: v).  
The Zairianisation campaign was based on radicalisation [nationalisation] of all foreign-
owned businesses. From this campaign, Mobutu and his political elite patrons unduly took 
control of the nationalised enterprises for their own benefit (Young and Turner 1985) given 
that the process personalised both private and public funds, resulting in a notorious 
kleptocracy (ISS c2008). A new land law – the General Property Law, was also enacted and 
                                                 
67 According to a former Mobutu’s collaborator living in London, Mobutu had personal connivance with 
Rwandan-Tutsis which he did not disclose to the Congolese. It is still believed that he was still indebted to 
Tutsi who helped him overcome the 1964 rebellion.   
68
 Interviews conducted with Nande and Hunde Mwamis, Kinshasa, Augut 2013. 
   Skype interviews conducted with members of civil society, Beni, Butembo and Goma, July; September 
2013. 
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allowed the state to have an absolute control over all lands (Meditz and Merrill 1993).69 
The 1971 and 1973 laws, nevertheless, remained evasive on the abolishment of the 
indigenous customary law. In the case of the individual land rights, land ownership was 
acquired from the state or through the customary land rights, but the future status of the 
land ownership remained uncertain (ibid.). Mobutu used the 1973 Zairianisation and the 
land law as tools towards reinforcing his patronage system as they were a means through 
which he constantly converted economic resources into a reserve of political resources for 
distribution against political loyalty (Van Acker 2005: 88). In doing so, Mobutu made 
significant realisation in terms of public goods delivery, education and primary health care 
provision.  
4.2.3  From Economic Reforms to Economic Breakdown 
After the 1970s’ reforms, Zaïre experienced an economic meltdown and went through a 
constant decline particularly after 1974, when the copper price which was the state’s 
economic backbone, fell drastically (Young and Turner 1985; Putzel et al. 2008). 
Following the collapse of copper price, state income was affected directly through 
nationalised mining companies, which thereafter had severe impacts on socio-economic 
activities of the country (Nest 2006b). Zaïre defaulted on debt payments to the international 
financial institutions, something which left room to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
to publish a report in 1981 in which widespread corruption was critically pointed out, with 
Mobutu being unable to draw the line between personal property and state’s (Young and 
Turner 1985). As an upshot, foreign investors left the country. Since then, the country kept 
defaulting on debt payments therefore resulting in the decline of the economy (ISS c2008). 
As in other developing countries, Zaïre embarked on reforms using Structural Adjustment 
Programmes recommended by the IMF (Zeilig 2009) in order to overcome the budgets 
shortfalls. These reforms were partially implemented by cutting expenditure on non-
productive sectors such as health and education (ibid.).  
                                                 
69 Van Acker (2005) gives a detailed analysis on the impact of the 1973 Land Law in the eastern DRC, see 
also the section in line with Ethnicity, citizenship and land in this thesis, which shows how this law is 
associated with the issue of ethnicity and citizenship. 
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The effect of the economic meltdown was momentous (Zeilig 2009) to the point that it 
almost disintegrated the country’s infrastructure and affected agricultural production 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). The public servants and army were miserably and erratically 
paid. The country lost a large number of professionals and skilled workforces. Most of the 
qualified labourers immigrated into South Africa in search of better conditions of life. 
Concomitantly, inflation drastically decreased the value of the already insufficient wages of 
the population. Life conditions became extremely difficult for the population and hence 
forced them to live at subsistence level. As the economy declined, the informal sector 
expanded countrywide. Another upshot of the shrinking national budgets was that Mobutu 
could no longer keep his horizontal elite networks, but instead created ‘vertical networks 
based on ethnic and regional affiliation’ for his power survival (Putzel et al. 2008: vi). Here 
is the importance of highlighting the rise of regional ‘strongmen’ or ‘warlords’ resulting 
from Mobutu’s shift in strategy. Seen under the lens of a growing informal economy, it 
might be argued that using their connection with Mobutu, strongmen took control of the 
national economy and made use of coercive forces for their personal interests (Reno 1998; 
Nest 2006b).  
4.2.4  DRC after the End of the Cold War 
From independence to the dusk of the Cold War, Mobutu gained support from France, 
Belgium and the USA as he was seen as a guarantor of stability within a region in prey of 
ideological conflict (McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). For more than two decades 
since the 1970s, French troops for instance strongly supported Zaïre against inner Marxist 
rebellions – the case of Moba I and II in 1977 and 1978 respectively.70 Mobutu also 
received military support from the West when there was competition between the 
superpowers over the decolonisation of Angola, Mozambique, and when white-ruled 
Rhodesia and South Africa reached its paroxysm (McNulty 1999). Mobutu became 
indispensable for his supporters as he was strategically using this backdrop (Young and 
Turner 1985; McNulty 1999). In the early 1990s, with major changes resulting from the end 
of the Cold War, the geopolitics of Africa changed and Mobutu started facing the 
                                                 
70 See appendix two for further details on Moba I and II. 
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withdrawal of financial and diplomatic support of the superpowers. In this context, while 
France and Belgium switched their position and advised Mobutu to leave power, the USA 
however still believed in him as an indispensable pillar for national unity in Zaïre (McNulty 
1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002).  
The sudden and significant shift brought by the end of the Cold War in the world 
geopolitics, associated with growing demand for multi-party democracy from inside and 
outside the country via insurrections and remonstrations were enough for Mobutu to accept 
multi-party democracy in 1990 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). After a series of national 
consultations that resulted in the populations’ blunt calls for the end of the Mobutu regime, 
a transitional period announcing the end of the second Republic and the beginning of a 
third one started on 24th April 1990. For this transitional period, Mobutu promised to 
restore a multi-party system with three parties including his own party, a separation of his 
party from the state, a transitional government for one year, the drafting of a new 
constitution and the renewal of the three-tiered custom laws – traditional authorities.71 All 
these pledges were auguring forthcoming democratic elections at all levels.  
However, democratic transition failed owing to the dispute of leadership in the opposition, 
political turmoil and crisis as well as the ability of Mobutu to manipulate and weaken the 
opposition (Zeilig 2009; Lanotte 2010). Based on Mobutu’s manipulations, the USA urged 
the opposition to agree on power sharing with Mobutu and to facilitate the process for 
democratic elections through the Conférence Nationale Souveraine [Sovereign National 
Conference; CNS] due to a belief by the Americans that Mobutu would be able to maintain 
national unity (McNulty 1999). Mobutu rationally used American support to sabotage the 
transition by further manipulating the existing divisions in the opposition united in the CNS 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Jackson 2007). Through his usual strategies of ‘divide-and-rule’, 
he was able to maintain significant powers, including control of the security systems and 
key Departments (Wrong 2001; Zeilig 2009). In doing so, he was able to suppress 
                                                 
71 The structure of traditional authorities is explained in the section in line with Ethnicity, citizenship and 
land. 
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democratic protests with violent means, including the Lubumbashi and Christians’ 
massacres respectively in 199072 and 1992.73 
After some upheavals in August 1992, Étienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the cartel of 
opposition parties – kwon as Union Sacrée [Sacred Union], was elected the transitional 
Prime Minister and mandated to form and lead a transitional Government of National Unity 
(Zeilig 2009). After a few days Mobutu ejected the Tshisekedi government and appointed 
Kengo-wa-Dondo as the transitional Prime Minister (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). This decision 
was supported by the USA and France whereas Belgium attitudinally remained 
unenthusiastic (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). The international community overlooked the CNS 
outcomes as sovereign and binding on all parties particularly when it came to appointing 
and evicting the transitional government (ibid: 1). The country went through a deeper crisis 
due to the loss of the momentum for democratic transition, the crisis of leadership, and the 
disorientation of the political class and social forces (Zeilig 2009). As a consequence, the 
eastern DRC’s territories have been embroiled with an endless inter-community rivalries 
and poverty, as well as insecurity for the population ascended by 1996 (ibid.). It is within 
this context that the 1996-1997 military rebellion of Laurent Désiré Kabila – who was 
politically supported by Rwanda, Uganda and Angola, came to pass (Lemarchand 1997). 
From this point, it should be noted that the beginning of ethnic conflict in the north Kivu 
was in 1993. This situation was worsened by the repercussion of the 1994 Rwanda 
genocide. The review of this local conflict is essential as it depicts the context and events 
that have been the underlying factors behind the state failure and protracted armed conflict 
in the DRC. Before exploring the two Congo Wars, the upcoming section analyses the 
critical correlation between ethnicity, citizenship and land. This resulted in marginalisation, 
inequality and insecurity from which is drawn the unfolding conflict with its corollaries in 
the eastern DRC.  
                                                 
72 On 11 May 1990, a few students at the University of Lubumbashi, who were against the continuing 
dictatorship by Mobutu, were killed by security forces, and their bodies disappeared (Zeilig 2009). This 
triggered economic sanctions internationally and facilitated the economic decline of the Mobutu reign 
(Takeuchi 1997). 
73 On 16 February 1992, several hundred thousand of Christians in Kinshasa assembled and marched to 
demonstrate peacefully for the reopening of the National Conference. The manifestation was harshly 
repressed by the army, causing between 16 and 49 deaths depending on the source (de Dorlodot 1994; de 
Villers 1995: 230; de Villers and Omasombo 1997: 71-72; Kabamba and Kasusula 1992b: 147-149 bis; 
Malenge 1992: 109-125; Oyatambwe 1997: 127-133). 
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4.2.5  Divide to Reign Strategy: Ethnicity, Citizenship and Land 
 As noted previously, ethnicity has been one of Mobutu’s ruling strategies. In the DRC, the 
concept of ethnicity closely related to citizenship. It was a civic terms and an aftermath of 
membership of the central state. However, in ethnic terms, it is a result of membership in 
the Native Authority (Mamdani 1998: 2-4).74 Although there have been growth in literature 
on ethnicity as a root-cause of the conflict in the eastern DRC, it is crucial to understand 
how the Banyarwanda,75 thus the Congolese with Rwandan origins, played a central role in 
the conflict owing to the deprivation of both their civic and ethnic citizenship (Mamdani 
1998; Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Armstrong and Rubin 2005; Jackson 2007; Clark 
2008).76 Furthermore, the understanding of the aforementioned concepts also implies to 
have a clear understanding of issues regarding access to land and citizenship. To this end, it 
is important to bear in mind that in the DRC, access to land is strongly attached to ethnicity 
and citizenship. It is a fact that in the densely populated areas in the eastern DRC, Land is 
still a fundamental source of livelihood (Sosne 1979; Van Acker 2005; Turner 2007). In 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers’ (2005: 9) words: it is “the single most important local 
economic resource”. The 1973 land law commoditised land and provoked a changing 
pattern of inequality and distortion of the existing patrimonial systems (Van Acker 2005). 
In the DRC, particularly, in the Kivus, ethnicity is strongly entrenched with issues such as 
migration, access to land, resources, entitlements and security, whereas ethnic citizenship 
has been intricately linked to shifting relationships under the Native Authority system, 
which deeply characterises the local socio-political environment (Mamdani 1998; 2001).  
                                                 
74 Mamdani (1998) has elaborated these parallel citizenships stemmed from the two legal regimes of the 
colonial period; racialised civic authority and ethnicised customary Native Authority. While the civic 
authority was de-racialised at independence, the Native Authority became further embedded within the ethnic 
context and remained as a means to control the majority of the rural population, even when the state was 
perceived to have collapsed. See also Mamdani (2001). 
75 The prefix, ‘banya’means literally ‘people from’ (Clark 2008). 
76 Turner (2007) provides detailed accounts on local politics and identity in the eastern DRC. Clark (2008) 
illustrates a similar fate of refugees and migrants from Rwanda in Uganda. Their citizenship status was 
precarious and vulnerable, and influenced by political developments in Uganda. The attack on Rwanda by the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front – RPF, which resulted in the Rwandan civil war in 1990, was initially formed by the 
Rwandan refugees in Uganda and is considered to have been triggered by the passage of the 1990 land bill 
that prohibited land ownership by non-citizens, specifically by Rwandan refugees and their children. 
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According to Mamdani (1998: 9), the three-tiered Native Authority in the Kivus is based on 
“a chief of the locality at the lowest level, the Chef de Groupement [Chief of the local pool] 
and the Mwami of the Collectivité [collectivity] at the highest level”. ‘Non-indigenous’ 
ethnic groups usually have only the chief of the locality from amongst their own ranks, but 
‘indigenous’ ethnic groups are entitled to a Chef de Groupement and a Mwami of the 
Collectivité from their own ranks. This difference in the right to the Native Authority has 
been critical since only the Chef de Groupement and the Mwami of the Collectivité possess 
the customary authority in administration, therefore the only ones entitled to check ethnic 
belonging, issue identity cards, distribute customary land for livelihood and deliver 
customary justice. Likewise, in Rwanda and Burundi ethnicity has been an ideological 
discourse exploited intentionally to manipulate fear and support, as it always leads to 
violent conflict and refugee flows to neighbouring countries (Evans 1997; Mamdani 
2001).77 The political history of Rwanda and Burundi suggests that violent events are 
always associated with political development in these very small poor countries with some 
of the uppermost population densities in Africa. Different conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi 
have had side-effects in neighbouring countries, spanning from refugee flows through 
influencing political developments in host countries to causing a series of violent conflicts, 
associated with impunity (Evans 1997; Takeuchi 2006). The ‘social revolution’ of the Hutu, 
led by Grégoire Kayibanda in Rwanda between 1959 and 1962, the murder of Prince 
Rwagasore in Burundi in 1961, the genocide of the Hutu middle class in 1972 and the 
domination of Tutsi in Burundi, the purge of Tutsi following Juvénal Habyarimana’s coup 
in Rwanda in 1973, and the brutal crushing of a Hutu revolt in Burundi in 1988 illustrate 
some turning points in this region (Evans 1997; Lemarchand 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2002). These events resulted in some 480,000 Rwandan Tutsi becoming refugees in 
neighbouring countries by the 1980s, and 240,000 Hutu having fled Burundi (Evans 1997). 
The settlement of these refugees in the host countries fuelled rumour, violence and reprisals 
(ibid.).  
                                                 
77 Conventional wisdom in Goma and Bukavu [the provincial capital of North Kivu and South Kivu 
respectively] suggested that Kivu Provinces in the eastern DRC is where losers in Rwanda traditionally end 
up, and it is from the Kivus that they prepare to return to power in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001: 234). 
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The focus in this section is primarily on ethnic groups of Rwandan origin – Congolese 
nationals with Rwandan origins, owing to their role in the development of conflicts in the 
eastern DRC. Broadly, two groups of population compose the eastern DRC. These groups 
are the ‘indigenous’ or those who derive from groups which lie totally within the territorial 
domain of the current DRC and the Banyarwanda or Congolese nationals with Rwandan 
origins (Reed 1998: 143). According to Mamdani (2002: 494),78 the Banyarwanda are “first 
and foremost a cultural identity, speakers of a common language, Kinyarwanda”. In the 
DRC, the concept of nationality is taken as a sensitive issue. “Since independence, 
citizenship law, although theoretically ‘national’ and ‘objective’, was, in fact, completely 
political and driven by the need to deal with the Rwandophone population of the East”, 
suggests Prunier (2009: 457). Owing to the sensitive nature of citizenship for the 
Banyarwanda and different identities that are socially created, accounts of the 
Banyarwanda’s origins diverge depending on the source (Clark 2008). Although there have 
been consecutive flows of migrants in the region throughout history, there are not reliable 
statistic data on different migrant groups that remember, interpret and re-imagine their 
collective history in different ways (Vlassenroot 2002; Clark 2008).  
In the DRC, the Banyarwanda are Rwandan migrants who settled into the DRC long before 
the independence period (Lemarchand 1997), those who belong to the DRC after colonial 
division (Mamdani 1998; 2001),79 as work forces in the agricultural plantations and mining 
companies through colonial promotion (Lemarchand 1997; Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins 
et al. 2005),80 and those who fled Rwanda to the DRC after the political violence in the 
early 1960s (Lemarchand 1997). The first Rwandophone settlers who arrived in the south 
Kivu in the end of the 19th century are believed to be some Rwandan pastoralists. Their 
arrival has been widely debated and controversially interpreted (Mamdani 2001; 
                                                 
78 Kinyarwanda is the national language spoken in Rwanda and by the Banyarwanda tribe, and exactly the 
same whether spoken by Hutu or Tutsi (Prunier 2009: 368) and some scholars designate these people, who 
speak Kinyarwanda, Rwandophone. Mamdani (1998) states that although they were historically divided into 
three groups based on territories, the division between Hutu and Tusti was not essential until about 1996. 
79 Jackson (2007: 483 - 484) claims that the borders between the eastern DRC, Burundi and Rwanda are not as 
artificial as many other borders in Africa and “roughly follows what was once one amongst several “African 
frontiers”. However, there was the westward expansion of Rwanda prior to colonial period though being 
partial and tentative. 
80 The colonial administration “was aware it risked upsetting the delicate intercommunity balance” by 
supplying labour from Rwanda and was, at the same time, reducing the demographic pressure in Rwanda 
(Jackson 2007: 484). 
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Vlassenroot 2002).81 With permission from the colonial administration, the early pastoralist 
migrants settled in the high plains, then extended their occupation further in the south of the 
high plateau (Mamdani 2001). The colonial labour migrants however were living in urban 
areas and the refugees in refugee camps (ibid.). Based on their settlements, Banyarwanda 
were identified as the Banyaruchuru and the Banyamasisi in the north Kivu, and the 
Banyamulenge in the south Kivu (Mamdani 1998; 2001).  
The Banyaruchuru and the Banyamasisi were mostly consisted of Hutus whereas the 
Banyamulenge were Tutsi. Furthermore, while the Hutu of Ruchuru were regarded as 
‘indigenous’, therefore had their own Native Authority, the Hutus of Masisi were denied 
the indigenous status. This was also the case for the Tutsi of Mulenge who never had their 
own Native Authority (Mamdani 1998; 2001). Settled in Itombwe, the Banyamulenge were 
described as ‘Pastoralists of Itombwe’ or ‘Tutsi of Itombwe’ or ‘Banyarwanda’ during the 
colonial era (Jackson 2007). Around the 1960s and 1970s, ‘Pastoralists of Itombwe’ 
became ‘Banyamulenge’ – meaning inhabitants of Mulenge hills. Vlassenroot (2002) and 
Jackson (2007) see in this change of appellation a means of claiming indigenous status and 
qualifying for social and political entitlements by distinguishing themselves from Rwanda 
and the latecomers. However, the tactic of changing their identity from ethnicity (Rwandan) 
to the territory (the hill of Mulenge), hence making them natives, rebounded against them 
in their claim for nationality following the restricted citizenship law in 1981, mentioned 
later (Jackson 2007). Suspicions and perceptions rose within the aboriginal communities 
about the Banyamulenge that they tried hiding their true identity with a ‘counterfeit one’, 
making for distrustful nationality in the foreseeable future (Vlassenroot 2002; Jackson 
2007).  
Throughout the eastern DRC, the majority of the population consists of aboriginals, except 
a few territories in the north Kivu, particularly Masisi. Although the Banyarwanda in 
Masisi seemed to be the majority, they were still bound to pay customary tribute to the 
Native Authority, the indigenous local chiefs (Reed 1998). This is what Huggins et al. 
(20005) consider as the cause of the first main rebellion against the indigenous chiefs at 
                                                 
81 According to Jackson’s (2007) claim, it was by the middle of the 19th century. 
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independence, the Guerre des Kinyarwanda [Kinyarwanda war] in the north Kivu, marking 
the beginning of local conflict. From this event, Banyarwanda citizenship became a 
sensitive issue although they were acknowledged as Congolese at independence,82 neither 
was their status defined in the Fundamental Law83 (Mamdani 1998). As explained in the 
following sections, during the Mobutu regime, three essential decrees on citizenship (in 
1972, 1981 and 1991) were passed out. The aftermath of the 1972 Burundi massacres and 
purges of the Hutu middle class, Burundian refugees flooded into Zaïre and responded by 
threatening the existing Banyarwanda minority – composed of Tutsis, to avenge Hutus; 
which created fright amongst the indigenous Congolese (Mamdani 1998; 2001). This 
situation prompted Mobutu to enact a citizenship decree in 1972 to protect the status of the 
Banyarwanda minority.  
Broadly all Banyarwanda population, even those who had come from Rwanda as refugees 
in 1959 and 1960 received the citizenship. Behind this decree, however, was Mobutu’s 
desire to marginalise and weaken traditional authorities in order to strengthen the 
centralised horizontal networks of elites, including Tutsi Banyarwanda as the vulnerable 
minority (Putzel et al. 2008). As stated by Mamdani (1998: 2001): 
“However, the decree was considered to be signed under the influence of 
Bisengimana, a Chef de Cabinet présidentiel [Director of Presidential Office or 
chief of staff], one of the 1959 Rwandan Tutsi refugees. The decision was, 
therefore, perceived as representing a rise in power of the Tutsi Banyarwanda 
minority over the ‘indigenous’ Congolese and the other Banyarwanda population, 
who had arrived earlier than 1959 and were mainly Hutu, and this led to a division 
between Hutu and Tutsi in the Banyarwanda communities in the eastern Zaïre”. 
As mentioned earlier, the 1973 land law commoditised land. The removal of the existing 
customary ownership of land was replaced by individual land ownership as it allowed the 
purchase of any land that was not titled (Huggins et al. 2005). Notwithstanding the fact that 
                                                 
82 The Banyarwanda were permitted to partake in the provincial and municipal elections both as voters and 
candidates in 1960, and this suggests that they were accepted as Congolese at independence (Mamdani 1998). 
83 The Fundamental Law states that “the Congolese people will themselves decide this issue” (Mamdani 1998: 
5). 
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the state owned all the lands, previous customary land rights remained valid on the ground; 
and personal land rights could also be acquired through indigenous customary law though 
the future land tenure was not guaranteed (Meditz and Merrill 1993). Besides, registration 
of personally owned land was partial, which paved the way for land quarrels principally 
from uncertain land tenures (ibid.). To secure their lands against non-indigenous, 
aboriginals registered their plantations. Sosne (1979: 199), for instance, stated: 
“Following the endorsement of this law, ‘indigenous’ ‘peasants hurried to register 
small family plots to secure their tenancy’ through which the Native Authorities 
profited from customary duties”.  
However, having been denied equal access to land by the customary right, the 
Banyarwanda began purchasing land on the market (Mamdani 1998; Reed 1998; Huggins 
et al. 2005). In his analysis based on the effect of the 1973 land law in the eastern DRC, 
Van Acker (2005) is of the view that the application of this modern law annihilated the 
traditional patrimonial system, base of social cohesion and public goods hence destroyed 
the social structure to allow marginalisation and inequality.  
The 1973 land law enabled the Banyarwanda to acquire large parts of former colonial 
estates, hence letting them become prominent in the local economy (Huggins et al. 2005; 
Van Acker 2005; Jackson 2007).84 With Zaïrian citizenship acquired from the 1972 
citizenship decree, they were rewarded with some positions in politics and the Zaïrian 
army, opine Huggins et al. (2005: 2). Although these were advantages, they kept paying 
customary tributes for the land they got to the local chiefs of the groups to which they did 
not belong neither were they entitled to have local chiefs of their own (Mamdani 1998; 
2001; Huggins et al. 2005). The Banyarwanda had acquired vast land. This alienation of 
land gave rise to the resentment of indigenous population against them (Jackson 2007). The 
Banyarwanda were invigorated by their new status and endeavoured to reach representation 
in both local and national politics. The indigenous population became afraid of the 
Banyarwanda minority groups soaring too powerful, and so contested citizenship for them 
                                                 
84 The Benyarwanda acquired in “fertile highland areas of  Masisi and Rutshuru [in North Kivu] more than 90 
per cent of the colonial plantations and some of the biggest ranches”, and this action provoked tensions 
leading to inter-ethnic conflict in Masisi and Rutshuru in 1993 (Van Acker 2005: 88). 
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(Mamdani 1998; 2001; Huggins et al. 2005). With the feeling of being rebutted by the 
indigenous, the Banyarwanda, particularly the Banyamulenge, linked with international 
human rights NGOs in the attempt of improving their status. However, for the indigenous 
population the Banyarwanda had expansionist ambitions, seeking to access the state 
institutions, especially in the security sector (Huggins et al. 2005; Vlassenroot 2002).  
Owing to the rising prominence of the Banyarwanda, the indigenous majority Congolese 
became afraid of the Banyarwanda minority winning the 1977 legislative elections 
therefore gaining political power (Mamdani 1998; 2001). This period coincided with two 
major events in the country; firstly it was the time when state’s economy had drastically 
collapsed. Secondly, it was the time when Mobutu switched his strategy from horizontal 
networks of elites to vertical networks of power, based on his divide-and-rule strategy 
(Putzel et al. 2008). In this shifting political environment, the 1977 elected parliament 
passed out a new exclusive citizenship law in 1981 (Mamdani 1998; 2001).  
According to the 1981 citizenship law, individuals who would be able to prove the 
existence of their ancestors in Zaïre prior to the colonial division in 1885 would be entitled 
to be citizens of Zaïre. For all the Banyarwanda communities, the 1981 citizenship law was 
crucial. First, this decree considered the Banyarwanda as a single group regardless of the 
different time periods and circumstances of their arrival into Zaïre, partially due to the 
difficulty of finding proof of their heritage (Reed 1998). In reality, this law was 
promulgated to remove from the Banyarwanda the rights to vote and to purchase land 
(Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). The Banyarwanda were entitled to vote during the 
provincial assembly elections in 1985, but could not run for office because of their 
confusing status (Mamdani 1998; 2001). Due to physical boycott of the Banyarwanda 
populations, particularly Tutsi, assemblies in the north and south Kivus were not elected 
(ibid.).  
On the grounds of the 1981 citizenship law, an identification mission for Zaïrians living in 
the Kivus, authorised by Mobutu in 1989, was expedited. Following this mission, many of 
the Tutsi Banyarwanda populations’ citizenship status were removed (Mamdani 1998; 
2001; Vlassenroot 2002). These Banyamulenge have been reproached of having 
counterfeited their identity as members of the aboriginal population without proving so 
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(Jackson 2007). Having felt it as an affront, many young Tutsi Banyarwanda joined the 
Rwandan Patriotic Front – RPF, the Tutsi-dominated rebel group based in Uganda, when 
the RPF launched its attack against the Hutu-governed Rwanda during the Rwandan civil 
war in October 1990.85 During the CNS in 1991, nationality had already been a 
tremendously controversial issue (Mamdani 1998). The Banyarwanda, nevertheless, were 
not permitted to attend the CNS and were experiencing probable further marginalisation as 
they were on the verge of losing their citizenship status. The Hutu Banyarwanda 
populations reacted to this conflict by creating organisations to counter marginalisation, for 
example, the Farmers and Livestock Raisers Cooperative of Virunga – Magrivi (Reed 
1998). Magrivi reacted against their exclusion from the 1991 CNS by suspending to pay 
customary tributes to local chiefs. However, the CNS responded to the requests of the north 
and south Kivus delegates by reconsidering the citizenship issue through adopting a 
resolution which approved the 1981 citizenship law (Mamdani 1998).  
The CNS resolution brought a significant polarisation between the indigenous majority and 
the non-indigenous Banyarwanda minority (ibid.). Nearly half of the north Kivu population 
of about 3.5 million were assumed to be the Banyarwanda in 1993, with the Hutu and Tutsi 
being 80 percent and 20 percent respectively (Lemarchand 2003). The growing number of 
non-indigenous Banyarwanda minority through successive flows of refugees became a 
source of threat for the indigenous majority. Similarly, the non-indigenous Banyarwanda 
became aware of their marginalisation by the indigenous majority (Mamdani 1998). In 
Mamdani’s (ibid: 8) words: 
“The Tutsi Banyarwanda were increasingly regarded as one particular group amid 
the non-indigenous Banyarwanda minority, and the name ‘Banyamulenge’ was used 
as ‘a generic one for all Congolese Tutsi’; which made the Tutsi Banyarwanda 
population aware of the similar situation for all Tutsi despite their different 
backdrops”. 
                                                 
85 The Rwandan civil war involved the Rwandan government led by a Hutu president, Habyarimana, and the 
rebel group, the RPF. It began on 1 October 1990 when the Rwandan Patriotic Army – RPA, the military arm 
of the RPF, invaded Rwanda, and officially ended on 4 August 1993 when the Arusha Accords were signed. 
More details are provided by Prunier (1995) and Clark (2008). 
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Following Mobutu’s shifting strategy, the Banyarwanda were first favoured and 
empowered, then marginalised through the manipulation of citizenship and 
commodification of land thereafter. This strategy characterised land issues in this extremely 
inhabited and land-scarce region – Rwanda, Burundi and the eastern DRC (Mamdani 
1998). Under the 1973 land law regime, individuals had two options to become land tenant; 
“through a market deal [for individuals who could purchase] and through declaring one’s 
customary rights as a member of a Native Authority” (ibid: 14). The latter was political but 
entitled the poor to have land. Mobutu’s strategy triggered socio-political conflicts 
particularly in Masisi and Walikale, the north Kivu, in 1993. Initially the conflict was over 
land access between poor Hutu and rich Hutu, and then became an inter-ethnic war in the 
above mentioned territories. The conflict opposed those who were entitled to land through a 
customary authority – the indigenous Bahunde and Banyanga, to the non-indigenous 
Banyarwanda (Lemarchand 1997; 2003; Mamdani 1998; 2001; Reed 1998).86 As a result, 
about 10,000 people were killed and some 250,000 fled within six months (Lemarchand 
1997).87 Mobutu’s troops intervened to stop the violence (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Reed 
1998).  
It is within this context that in late 1993 flows of nearly 50,000 Burundian refugees flooded 
in the south Kivu during the aftermath of the Burundian Civil War and almost one million 
Hutu refugees arrived at the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. Following the 1994 
Rwandan genocide, the entrance of the Hutu refugees into the eastern DRC and the creation 
of the armed refugee camps in this zone considerably changed the nature of ethnic conflict 
in the eastern DRC. The arrival of the new waves of armed refugees divided Hutu and Tutsi 
amongst the Banyarwanda and fuelled the inter-ethnic conflict between the Banyarwanda 
and the indigenous population (Reed 1998). The following section underlines this 
development by analysing the impact of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. 
                                                 
86 As the Native Authorities were at the heart of the sale of land, they seem to have changed the focus of the 
conflict to ethnic discourse, in order to avoid blame for selling land to ‘non-indigenous’ population (Huggins 
et al. 2005). 
87 The estimates vary depending on the source. For example, Reed (1998) estimates between 14,000 and 
40,000 deaths and the displacement of 350,000 in 1993 alone. 
Chapter Four: State failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC   
Coventry University 145 
 
4.2.6  Impact of the Rwandan Genocide in the DRC Crisis 
The Rwandan genocide in 1994 was the significant moment in the history of the region 
during the 1990s (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 216). It was a logical upshot of a socio-political 
ideology based on exclusion. The holocaust drew its root from earlier large-scale massacres 
and the flight of Rwandans with Tutsi origins into exile, and was anchored in the history of 
ethnic identity construction and mobilisation under colonial rule (Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2002).88 Having become useless after the Cold War and barely gripping to power, Mobutu 
used this opportunity to show his backers the strategic importance of Zaïre, especially 
France, where Mobutu had personal relationship with the Mitterrand family and which 
continued supporting him (McNulty 1999; ISS c2008). Subsequently, during the Rwandan 
civil war, French and Zaïrian troops were of a significant role in supporting the former 
Rwandan government led by Habyarimana, the Hutu president, to fight the RPF and to 
reinstate themselves in the eastern Zaïre through two interventions. The first intervention 
happened in 1990, when Mobutu sent the Force Armée Zaïroise [Zaïrian Armed Forces; 
FAZ] for the French-led intervention in Rwanda, Opération Noroît [Noroît Operation], in 
order to defend the Hutu-led government from the RPF attacks. However, the then 
Rwandan president Habyarimana requested the departure of Mobutu’s troops because they 
were looting and raping Rwandan civilians rather than protecting them (Reed 1998; 
McNulty 1999).  
France also provided troops to Rwanda, allegedly to train the Rwandan army, Forces 
Armées Rwandaises [Rwandan Armed Forces; FAR], and defend foreign nationals. 
Evidence on the ground however proved their direct involvement in the fighting as they 
were supporting the FAR (Reed 1998). During the 1994 ‘Opération Turquoise’ [Turquoise 
Operation], French military intervention occurred in the almost completed genocide in 
Rwanda via the eastern Zaïre. Supported by the FAZ, French troops ostensibly intended to 
end the genocide, defend refugees and hand them over to the UN, following agreement with 
the French-drafted UN mandate (McNulty 1999). Notwithstanding the 1993 Arusha 
                                                 
88 Some scholars, such as Lemarchand (1997) give a similar interpretation.  
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agreements89 and a full arms embargo,90 France kept equipping the FAR and the former 
Rwandan government (Reed 1998). The objective of France in this intervention was to 
prevent the RPF victory and force them to share power with the former Rwandan 
government; yet, France did not achieve its objective (McNulty 1999). As an alternative, 
France created a safe humanitarian zone and facilitated the displacement of the defeated 
FAR and Interahamwe,91 known as the Génocidaires,92 as well as portions of the Rwandese 
population into the protected area before helping them move into exile in the eastern Zaïre 
(Prunier 1995; McNutly 1999). Reed (1998) reported that through Zaïre, France 
purportedly also continued to help the exiled Rwandan government to preserve their well-
equipped troops and key command structure through re-arming them in refugee camps if 
they had been disarmed. From this operation France lost trustworthiness for its 
interventions (McNulty 1999).  
Following the 1994 Rwanda genocide, estimates of the number of Rwandans who moved 
into exile in the eastern Zaïre and settled ranged from 800,000 to 1.7 million (Reuters 
AlertNet n.d.; Prunier 1998). These figures vary depending on the source, partially because 
of the highly political nature of their presence (Lemarchand 1997). Over 500,000 refugees 
fled into Tanzania. Due to less influence of the former Rwandan government vis-à-vis 
Tanzania, Tanzanian authorities had more effective control of the camps (Reed 1998). It is 
arguably believed that the Rwandan refugees moved from Rwanda with nearly everything 
when they fled; the military capacity, skilled and educated human resources and even state-
owned resources that were located both domestically and abroad (ibid.). The refugee camps 
in the eastern Zaïre were located along the border with Rwanda and Burundi and were well 
                                                 
89 The Arusha Peace Agreement was meant to bring an end to the Rwandan civil war. It was signed in Arusha, 
Tanzania, on 4 August 1993 by the Rwandan government, led by President Habyarimana, and the RPF, as a 
result of talks between 12 July 1992 and 24 June 1993, with the support of the USA, France and the 
Organization of African Unity. It included a set of five protocols. See UN Peacemaker (1993). 
90 UN Security Council Resolution 918 (1994) was applied to both the Rwandan government and the RPF. 
See UNSC (1994). 
91 The Rwandan government, led by president Habyarimana, described the youth movement of his single 
party, Interahamwe, as “[t]hose who work together” (Prunier 1995: 367-368). Interahamwe was “the first 
civilian militia, officially created for tasks of social interest”, and was “later the main perpetrators of the 
genocide” (ibid.). 
92 The French word, génocidaires, was initially merely descriptive to mean “[t]hose who committed the 
genocide”, but has attained political connotation to suggest “people who had not taken part in the genocide 
but who were considered hostile to the new regime” (Prunier 2009: xxi). 
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controlled by the former Rwandan authorities (Prunier 1998; Reed 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2002).  
Within refugee camps, former Rwandan authorities continued to promote the Génocidaires 
ideology and planned cross-border attacks on Rwanda, with hope of re-conquering Rwanda 
and ensure continuity of the genocide (ibid; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Apart from the full 
state treasury and the full military power taken from Rwanda, they oversaw the movement 
of goods and services in the camps. They also had the complete control of information and 
humanitarian assistance. Under the command of political leaders, they recognised a military 
structure of about 50,000 elements by early 1995 (Reed 1998).  
Aware of having lost his Cold War importance, the establishment of a small state of the 
former Rwandan government within the eastern Zaïre became a vital strategy for Mobutu 
(Reed 1998). Mobutu became indispensable for the international community in its attempts 
to speak for regional instability caused by the former Rwandan government in the eastern 
Zaïre. Anxious to stifle a strong opposition to the Zaïrian state and economic autonomy 
which rose from the eastern part of the country, Mobutu reinforced his influence through 
the long-established relationship with the government of Rwanda in exile. Zaïre came back 
to the forefront map through helping the defeated Rwandan authorities in its land, ensuring 
their safe movement inside and outside its territory, assuring their residence and permitting 
the settlement of military training camps (ibid.). Also, it reportedly helped the former 
Rwandan government with arms supply (Evans 1997; Reed 1998). Unpaid Zaïrian soldiers 
were fending for their own survival through arms trafficking, whereas Zaïre was accused of 
facilitating extensive arms traffics via an international network of traders from Britain, 
China and South Africa.  
Zaïrian assistance allowed the defeated Rwandan authorities to pursue a plan of rebellion in 
Rwanda (Reed 1998). In October 1994, the armed Rwandan refugees launched their first 
cross-border attacks from their camps in the eastern Zaïre. These incursions escalated to 
several attacks inside Rwandan territory, including the capital, Kigali and the second largest 
city, Butare. The intention of the defeated Rwandan government to continue a full-scale 
assault of Rwanda was unveiled. From this point, the new Rwandan regime decided to 
combat against the armed Rwandan refugees in the eastern Zaïre (Evans 1997; Reed 1998). 
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After they realised that it was difficult to destabilise the newly formed Rwandan 
government, they shifted their strategy and secured their long-term presence in the eastern 
Zaïre, by connecting with other rebellions in the region93 (Reed 1998). More essentially for 
the north Kivu, they also decided to capitalise the aforesaid 1993 existing local ethnic 
conflict between the indigenous Congolese population and the Banyarwanda. In association 
with the Hutu Banyarwanda, they started assaulting the Tutsi Banyarwanda instead of 
fighting the indigenous Congolese (ibid.). The violence also provoked a growing tension 
between the Tutsi Banyarwanda and other groups, who feared the armed Rwandan 
refugees’ attacks (Reed 1998).  
In the face of escalating tension, the Kivus’ Native Authority began creating its own local 
militia, called Mai-Mai94 (Mamdani 1998). By 1995, Attacks upon the Tutsi Banyarwanda 
exacerbated due to those local militias involving in violence and by the underpaid FAZ 
troops who colluded with the well-resourced former Rwandan authorities (Lemarchand 
1997; Reed 1998; Lanotte 2010; ibid.). The armed Rwandan refugees eventually extended 
their raids into the south Kivu where they massacred the Banyamulenge; at the same time, 
local authorities appropriated land acquired by the Banyamulenge in the valley (Reed 1998; 
Mamdani 2001). Furthermore, the Parliament of Transition decided to expel the 
Banyamulenge and Hutu Banyarwanda as they were recent refugees (Mamdani 2001).  
Following the aforesaid parliament decision, the tension reached its zenith between March 
and May 1996. The remaining Banyamulenge from Masisi and Ruchuru were identified 
and taken into refugee camps in Gisenyi, the border town in Rwanda (Mamdani 1998). 
Anti-Tutsi hatred grew progressively serious by the summer of 1996 when the FAZ, the 
Interahamwe, ex-FAR and local Hutu militia groups intensified attacks against 
Banyamulenge, provoking the movement of between 100,000 and 250,000 people inside 
                                                 
93 For example, the Hutu militia in Burundi, Milton Obote and the northern rebel movements in Uganda, and 
the Sudanese government (Reed 1998). 
94 The name comes from the word “Maji – pronounced Mai or Mayi in the Kivus”, and means water in 
Kiswahili, referring to “the powers claimed for ritually blessed water to render all those on whom it is 
sprinkled immune to the life-destroying effect of bullets”(Mamdani 2001: 340). The Mai Mai militia was 
considered to be based in Masisi and Walikale, consisting of the Bahunde and the Batembo, however, they 
became a generic term for all militias in the Kivus provinces linked to “indigenous Native Authorities” (ibid: 
258). 
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Zaïre (Prunier 2009; Reed 1998). Many of these individuals moved back to Rwanda with 
more Banyamulenge joining the RPF, which supported the indigenous population’s views 
that they were Rwandans (Mamdani 1998). Subsequently, by September 1996, the all Tutsi 
population had been evacuated from the north Kivu (Reed 1998). Similarly, the 
Banyamulenge were militarised and increasingly perpetrated retaliatory offensives (Prunier 
2009).  
Given that Zaïre was a collapsed state by that time, the international community, especially 
France and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees – UNHCR, was 
responsible for disarming the Rwandan refugee camps in the Kivus and isolate the 
génocidaires from civilians (Mamdani 1998). The international community, however, did 
not have such policies neither did they have political willingness in this regard (Reed 
1998).95 The Tutsi population in the DRC were particularly disgruntled with France as the 
latter facilitated the settlement of the armed Rwandan Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC 
(Sawada 1997). Subsequently, Zaïrian and Rwandan authorities agreed upon closing the 
refugee camps in the eastern Zaïre and unconditionally repatriate all Rwandan refugees to 
Rwanda (Reed 1998). In the face of the failure of the international community to act, the 
Rwandan transitional authorities however came to the point where they felt they had to deal 
or align themselves with the Hutu armed refugee camps in the eastern DRC (Prunier 2009). 
This decisive action eventually led to the attack of the refugee camps in October 1996, with 
the rising of Laurent Kabila as the spearhead of the first Congo War, as detailed in the 
upcoming section (Lemarchand 1997).  
4.3  The Rise of Laurent Kabila and the AFDL: The 1996-1997 War of Liberation 
In the socio-political context illustrated above, the War of Liberation led by Laurent Kabila 
in 1996 toppled Mobutu from power within six months. It should be stressed at this point 
that Zaïre was a collapsed state with declining legitimacy which emerged from 
unsuccessful democratic transition as well as the loss of international support and economic 
ruin (Raeymaekers 2007; Vlassenroot 2008). However, it is also vital to acknowledge that 
                                                 
95 The international community’s assistance to the armed Hutu refugee camps on humanitarian grounds was 
against the peace building policies (Shinoda 2006). 
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the persistence of the political system was the result of private supports from informal 
privatisation.  If “the political system had persisted, it was filled by various non-state actors 
as state sovereignty had been undergoing a gradual process of informal privatisation since 
the 1980s, whereby a fend for yourself attitude served as social pact between state and 
society”, said Vlassenroot (2008: 2-3) and where de-bureaucratised patrimonialism resulted 
in growing self-sufficiency of local strongmen (Reno 1998). Depending on the state’s 
capacity to strengthen its system of control and distribution, those informal social and 
economic networks gradually governed the state (Vlassenroot 2008). This was the case 
particularly in the periphery including the Kivus, where the control of local resources and 
trade was in the hands of various actors who in turn could challenge the state (ibid.). The 
economic and institutional collapse had devastating impact on the population. The 
population suffering reached the peak level of poverty, particularly at the eastern borders 
where people’s survival largely depended on an informal economy in which they played 
shifting roles (Raeymaekers 2009a).  
Although there was paucity of data on the livelihood of the population during that time,96 
fieldwork in the eastern DRC highlighted the negative effect of the state’s failure on the 
population (Sawada 1997). Findings from the fieldwork, for instance, suggest: 
“In the face of the economic meltdown and the hyperinflation, educators at schools 
faced non-payment but were supplied with small amounts of money and crops from 
the parents; medical care was only provided by some churches; and roads 
maintenance stopped in 1993 and many routes became accessible only by 
bicycles”.97  
For Prunier (2009), however, this situation exacerbated when poverty tied in with insecurity 
caused by the heightened tensions and violence from the citizenship and land issues since 
1993. This was further worsened by the quick militarisation of the area with the presence of 
the armed Rwandan refugee camps in the eastern Zaïre in 1994, and the international 
community’s inability to react. Besides, the 1996 Banyamulenge crisis and the Burundian 
                                                 
96 Funao’s (2006) research on the Pygmy in 1998 provides accounts on the life of the population in the eastern 
DRC. 
97 Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament from Kivu, Kinshasa, July 2013 
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factor in line with the killing of many Tutsi during the Burundi Civil War ignited tensions 
between Tutsi and Hutu in the region.98 
4.3.1  Laurent Désiré Kabila and the AFDL 
In September 1996, the south Kivu was attacked in response to the 1996 Banyamulenge 
crisis. Following these assaults, on 7 October 1996, South Kivu governor summoned all 
Tutsi to quit Zaïre within a week (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). On 13 October 1996, 
South Kivu fell under a full-scale attack. This was the beginning of the first Congo War led 
by the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo [Alliance of 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo; AFDL] (Reed 1998; Lemarchand 2003).  
Created on 18 October 1996 in Lemera in the south Kivu, the AFDL was an amalgamate of 
some opportunist groups, including the Banyamulenge, the Alliance Démocratique des 
Peuples [Democratic Alliance of Peoples; ADP],99 a coalition between Kabila and other 
opposition groups, the Mouvement Populaire pour la Libération du Zaïre [Popular 
Movement for the Liberation of Zaïre] and a Lumumbist rebel group in the eastern Zaïre, 
the Conseil National de Résistance pour la Démocratie [National Association of 
Resistance] (McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). The Lumumbist-Marxist Laurent-
Désiré Kabila from Shaba province – current Katanga, spearheaded the alliance (Reed 
1998; McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Prior to the AFDL creation, Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila was smuggling minerals in Tanzania as his previous movement the Marxist People’s 
Revolutionary Party became dormant after several unsuccessful attacks against Mobutu’s 
regime (Reed 1998). Laurent-Désiré Kabila reportedly funded the war effort through gold 
from the eastern Zaïre and signed mining contacts with mining and resource corporations 
especially De Beers and American Mineral Fields (AMF) (Nest 2006b; Reed 1998; Onana 
2012).  
                                                 
98 The Burundi Civil War was triggered by the assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu president, 
Melchoir Ndadaye, on 22 October 1993. The war prompted violence between Tutsi and Hutu, and continued 
until 2005. 
99 This group, created by some Banyamulenge who had returned to Rwanda after 1994, together with Tutsi 
from the North Kivu in Kigali, was headed by Déogratias Bugera and closely linked to the RPF (Vlassenroot 
2002: 509). 
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Owing to the economic capacity of the mining contracts signed with the junior companies 
above, the rebellion should have been seen under the lens of a regional dynamism rather 
than the USA or France interventions (Takeuchi 1997; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Based on 
these contracts with commercial corporations, Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) is of the view that 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila acquired a label of a typical African warlord rather than a 
revolutionary guerrilla leader. Rapidly and violently, his movement dismantled the refugee 
camps, home to Hutu armed refugee. The AFDL attack enabled more than half a million 
refugees to return to Rwanda, whereas those who were considered as génocidaires or 
interahamwe fled further inside Zaïre (Reed 1998; McNulty 1999; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). 
A quick collapse of the opportunist coalition between unpaid and unmanageable FAZ 
troops, the ex-FAR and the Interahamwe happened as the outcome of the dismantling of the 
refugee camps (McNulty 1999). The AFDL succeeded in improving the security conditions 
as looting perpetrated by the FAZ significantly declined in the eastern Zaïre. Thus the 
majority of the population welcomed and supported Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s movement 
(Sawada 1997). On 17 May 1997, after having suddenly moved westwards, the AFDL 
entered Kinshasa without great resistance (Nest 2006b). Mobutu had fled just before to 
Gbwadolite before exiling in Morocco where he died in September (ibid.). Laurent Désiré-
Kabila, the self-installed head of state renamed Zaïre as the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC).  
Much of the population welcomed the AFDL to overthrow the dictator Mobutu because 
Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s armed group described cleverly itself as a Congolese-led rebellion 
(Reed 1998; McNulty 1999; Mwanasali 2000), even if it was militarily and politically 
trained and supervised essentially by Rwanda (Reed 1998; McNulty 1999; Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002; Lemarchand 2003). The AFDL is the expression of Rwandan motivation to 
address the security menace engendered by the Hutu armed refugee camps. For Rwandan 
transitional authorities, their actions were reliable only with the Congolese patriotism and 
the regional common need to get rid of Mobutu (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Based on 
regional security imperatives and shared needs, the AFDL was supported by other countries 
(McNulty 1999). Uganda was the first to join the RPF and quickly sent its army; the 
Uganda People’s Defence Force – UPDF, into Zaïre. Possible understanding of this is that 
Museveni was keen to finish with Mobutu as the latter endorsed Ugandan rebels’ attacks on 
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the UPDF from Zaïrian territory. Some geopolitics and security analysts are in agreement 
with a few historians of the Great Lakes Region that Museveni wanted also to help his close 
allies, senior Rwandan leaders, who served in the UPDF while being in exile from Rwanda 
(Nest 2006b).  
Secondly, the Angolan authorities had long been a foe of Mobutu, as the latter had been 
permitting the Angolan rebel group, Uniao Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola 
[National Union for Total Liberation of Angola; UNITA], which was fighting against the 
ruling party in Angola, Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola - Partido do Trabalho 
[Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola; MPLA], to have operations bases in 
Zaïre (Nest 2006b). Kamina base in Katanga, for instance, functioned as a channel for 
weapons and diamonds and enabled the UNITA to sustain its battle against the Angolan 
government. The AFDL therefore was permitted to use Angolan territories to enter Zaïre 
and Angolan government sent its troops to support the AFDL (Reed 1998). Contrariwise, 
the UNITA ostensibly reinforced Mobutu in order to keep their bases and supply roads in 
Zaïre from the AFDL (McNulty 1999). In addition to the two countries above, Burundi sent 
its troops to secure its borders and avoid attacks from Zaïre (Reed 1998). While Zambia 
permitted the AFDL to enter Zaïre from its territories, Zimbabwe however provided 
military goods (ibid.).  
The AFDL eventually got rid of the Mobutu regime that ruined the country (McNulty 
1999). The Mobutu ethnical strategy based on ‘divide and rule’ backfired, as his 
scapegoats, the Banyamulenge, were militarily supported by neighbouring countries, 
particularly Rwanda and Uganda (ibid.). Nevertheless, this foreign support, particularly the 
Rwandan, got a pivotal long-term impact, for two strategic motives. According to Mamdani 
(1998: 17): 
“Although the FDL was encouraged and considered as leading the War of 
Liberation to an extent, the Rwandan army turned into a force of occupation in the 
eyes of the Congolese population as Rwandan commanders filled senior positions in 
the Congolese national army”.  
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Secondly, Rwandan soldiers began intruding in Congolese matters regarding notably the 
Banyamulenge issue (Mamdani 1998).100 Some could argue that in the eyes of the 
Congolese population, this reflected Rwandan hegemony and expansionism (McNulty 
1999). The overwhelming presence of Rwandans in the Congolese territories and the 
exterminations of Hutu committed by the AFDL troops in the refugee camps in Zaïre 
reinforced the perception of the dependence on Rwanda (Reed 1998). However, it bears 
underlining that the Tutsi-led post-genocide Rwandan government had two objectives; the 
protection of all Tutsi and Tutsi power as a precondition for the Tutsi survival (Mamdani 
2002).  
The Banyamulenge accomplished their concerns regarding their citizenship entitlement and 
the protection of their community as they acquired strong military and political positions 
with the support of the RPF, though most of their elders were opposed to the enrolment of 
their young ones into the RPF (Vlassenroot 2002). However, further considerable 
repercussions and dilemmas related to the coalition between Banyamulenge and the FPR 
rose (ibid.). Possible explanations of this loath stance could include the following Catch-22; 
theoretically the citizenship recovering was based on Laurent-D Kabila’s verbal promise 
during his visit to Bukavu in February 1998. Practically however, they needed to delink 
from the RPF to gain confidence amongst other Congolese for them to be recognised as full 
Congolese. But this was a dilemma for them due to the reliance on the RPF support for 
their security. Moreover, fundamental divergences on the objectives emerged between the 
Banyamulenge and the RPF. The latter had endeavoured to influence the former and all the 
Tutsis living in the DRC to return to Rwanda,101 an idea rejected by the Banyamulenge. 
Concomitantly, the Banyamulenge were facing an increasing rejection and resentment from 
the rest of the population. This is to say that owing to their ties with the AFDL, the Tutsi 
were perceived as having expansionist ambitions as they had gained advantaged positions 
and the AFDL rebellion massacred Hutu, whereas indigenes that resisted them were 
                                                 
100 The Banyamulenge, for example, had a separate Native Authority in South Kivu, and a Tutsi replaced the 
Hutu Native Authority in Ruchuru, in North Kivu (Mamdani 1998). 
101 The motivation behind this idea of migration is unclear, although, some explanations have been offered 
(Vlassenroot 2002): the idea possessed by the Tutsi refugees who had grown up in Uganda that Tutsi 
diasporas should return their homeland; ensuring security of the Tutsi by increasing their number in Rwanda; 
and increasing Rwandan control of the Kivus by sending the returned Banyamulenge back to the Kivus. 
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tortured or killed (Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). The resentment 
between the Tutsi and indigenes reformed the configuration of coalitions on the ground. 
Although the Mai-Mai allied with the AFDL in the first rebellion, their opinions however 
diverged when it came to power, as it became a Rwandese occupation (Mamdani 2001; 
Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). The rift between the Banyamulenge and the rest of 
the population increased and led to further deterioration of ethnic situation in the Kivus.  
4.4  The AFDL Collapse and the Breakout of the 1998 Congo War 
The Laurent- D. Kabila regime inherited from the Mobutu era deteriorated socio-economic 
situation. These conditions got worse prior to the second Congo War, with drastic declines 
in GDP as a result of collapses in all sectors except mining (Nest 2006b; Putzel et al. 2008; 
Prunier 2009). Economic transactions were informal, concentrated around the borders and 
held totally by the regional strongmen, with the size of the informal economy appraised to 
be three times the value of the official GDP by the 1990s (Nest 2006b; Putzel et al. 2008).  
After rising into power, Laurent-D Kabila’s objectives were to reform political, social and 
economic configurations through the use of mining concessions as means to increase state 
revenues and rebuild its capacity. He did not succeed at all to consolidate his authority and 
increase his legitimacy over the territory as in the sight of many observers and Western 
media Laurent-D. Kabila was portrayed as another dictator, not much different from 
Mobutu (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Putzel et al. 2008; Prunier 2009). Owing to the 
fact that Laurent-D Kabila came into power mostly with military support of the RPF, on 
which was laid the burden of the massacres of numerous Rwandan refugees and civilians in 
the eastern Zaïre, his regime was experiencing legitimacy dilemmas (Prunier 2009).102 As 
Laurent-D Kabila had to clean himself from the accusations of crimes against humanity, he 
declared that his leadership did not include the military campaign, exposing his legitimacy. 
In the face of his illegitimacy growing higher, Laurent-D Kabila stopped carrying out the 
                                                 
102 The UN investigation over the alleged human rights abuses, including massacres, during and after the first 
Congo War – ECOSOC 1999, was hampered by the DRC and Rwanda, and the international aid for the DRC 
was blocked (Prunier 2009). Takeuchi (1997) predicted such a measure would have made the country’s 
economic recovery significantly difficult, as the economic sanctions following the massacre of students at the 
University of Lubumbashi in 1990 had led to the complete economic collapse for Mobutu’s regime. 
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Rwandan agenda in arresting and disarming the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR, though they 
continued to attack Rwanda. Their crackdown by RPF resulted in clash with the indigenous 
populations hosting the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR and a development of Mayi-Mayi 
militias (Prunier 2009). Having progressively become autonomous, Laurent D. Kabila 
disobeyed Rwandan requirements with regards to security provision at the borders, 
something which greatly disillusioned his supporter, Rwanda (McNulty 1999; Nest 
2006b).103 Based on internal dissensions resulting from domestic opposition in Kinshasa 
against the overpowering presence of the Banyamulenge and the Tutsi in strategic positions 
within the military and political spheres of his regime, Laurent-D Kabila had to detach 
himself from Rwanda (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Putzel et al. 2008; Prunier 2009).  
In the Kivus, the aversion towards the Tutsi presence became even more compelling due to 
the Banyamulenge having been offered a separate Native Authority in the south Kivu and 
some indigenous authorities being substituted with Tutsi (Mamdani 1998). Additionally, 
several Tutsi pastoralists had also migrated into the Masisi-Walikale zone with their cattle 
(Prunier 2009). These Tutsi expansions provoked an escalation of vehement attacks on the 
Banyamulenge and a series of revolts against each other (ibid.). Isolated by his allies and 
confronted with both domestic and regional discontent, Laurent-D Kabila opted for a 
strategy based on gaining support within the country by manipulating and fuelling anti-
Tutsi feelings (McNulty 1999; Lemarchand 2003; Reuters AlertNet n.d.). On 27 July 1998, 
Laurent-D Kabila asked Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda to withdraw their troops. On 28 
July, the Rwandan troops left. This decision ultimately stimulated Laurent-D Kabila’s 
former allies to aggress the DRC in order to oust Laurent-D Kabila from power 
(Vlassenroot 2002). Afraid of these attacks, the Banyamulenge sought security from the 
RPF although their frustration and dissatisfaction over the ascendancy of the RPF. On 2 
August 1998, the RFP attempted a military incursion in Kinshasa, but the military operation 
was brutally crushed by people and the Congolese army abetted by Angolan and 
Zimbabwean troops. Confrontations between Tutsi and non-Tutsi in some neighbourhoods 
of Kinshasa and those of other cities of the DRC prompted a second armed conflict which 
spread from the eastern DRC across the country (Nest 2006b; ICG 1998). Quickly anti-
                                                 
103 He also enraged Uganda by accusing Ugandan officials of profit seeking in their intervention in the DRC 
(McNulty 1999). 
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government forces invaded towns in the East. Evidence from Vlassenroot (2002: 511) 
revealed that although the second war was displayed as the “second Banyamulenge revolt, 
its impetus came from Kigali”. In retaliation, hundreds of Tutsi living in Kinshasa either 
fled or were murdered (Lemarchand 2003). On 16 August 1998, a pro-Rwandan armed 
movement Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie [Rally for Congolese 
Democracy; RCD] was officially created and proclaimed its uprising. 
The RCD consisted mainly of Banyamulenge leaders and combatants. However, there was 
no consensus on the leadership amongst the Banyamulenge within their community and on 
the predicaments between achieving autonomy and receiving protection and support from 
the RPF (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). Given a strong sense of mistrust rising 
between the Banyamulenge and Rwandans, some Banyamulenge refused being 
manipulated by Rwanda and turned back to Rwandan expansionism (Vlassenroot 2002; 
Lemarchand 2003). In their search of support, including Burundi, they linked with other 
militias to create a movement, Forces Républicaines Féderalistes [Federalist Republican 
Forces; FRF]104 (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). The Banyamulenge fragmentation 
resulted in some armed oppositions between the RCD and the RPA and illustrates the 
increasingly intricate nature of their politics (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). Several 
towns were under rebel control in a short time. Conversely, the RCD advancement to 
Kinshasa on 26 August 1998 was repelled fiercely by the government supported by the 
Zimbabwe Defence Force – ZDF, and the Angolan army (Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009).  
Laurent-D Kabila had a weak control over the army given that its army largely consisted of 
troops from his previous supporters. To overcome this situation, he formed a coalition with 
other ethno-regional groups including the Mai-Mai and the Interahamwe, and called upon 
foreign backers including Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (Putzel et al. 2008; Prunier 
2009). In late August 1998, the RPF and UPDF re-launched their offensive against the 
DRC government from the East and tried to progress towards the capital. In this way, the 
1998 Congo War implicated numerous countries and several armed movements, some of 
                                                 
104 The FRF was created in Uvira in January 2000, in reaction to the double threat faced by the Congolese 
Tutsi (Lemarchand 2003). They feared persecution by the government and instrumentalisation by Rwanda, 
and aspired to negotiate a peace agreement between the Congolese Tutsi and their neighbours (ibid.). 
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which were supported by their foreign allies. Fights were long-drawn-out and attained a 
military stalemate which obliged Laurent-D Kabila to finally agree to the signing of the 
Lusaka Peace Agreements in August 1999 (Grignon 2006; Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009). The 
protracted armed conflicts roughly split the country into two territories by the fissured 
frontline; the south-west was under the pro-government forces control and the north-east 
controlled by the anti-government forces (Grignon 2006).  
The main support for the pro-government was composed of the countries backing the 
Forces Armées Congolaises [Congolese Armed Forces; FAC – formed by Laurent-D 
Kabila] which included Angola and Zimbabwe. It is of note that Angolan support to 
Laurent-D. Kabila was meant to demolish the UNITA’s rear base in the DRC, particularly 
when it was allegedly revealed that the UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi and UNITA vice 
president Antonio Dembo met in Kigali and Kampala with regard to the establishment of a 
new military supply networks (Lemarchand 2003; Nest et al. 2006). The Rwandan attempt 
to overthrow Laurent-D Kabila by airlifting troops across the DRC in Angola’s backyard105 
provides another dimension that prompted Angola to ally with Laurent-D Kabila. It worth 
noting that Rwandan military operation was conducted without prior consultations with the 
Angolan government (Nest et al. 2006). Rapprochement between Angola and the DRC was 
strategic due to the ease with which Luanda thought it could influence Laurent-D Kabila as 
the president of the DRC (Prunier 2009). Angola also allied with Zimbabwe in order to 
curb South Africa’s supremacy in Southern Africa (Nest et al. 2006). Zimbabwe in turn 
was keen to impede South African supremacy with Angola and Namibia for the same 
strategic reason, but publicly sent its troops in the DRC in the context of a collective 
security Chapter of the Southern African Development Community – SADC (Lemarchand 
2003; Nest et al. 2006; Prunier 2009). There was no Zimbabwean security or economic 
stakes in the DRC. Their intervention however sought to recover their loans to the DRC 
government by keeping Laurent-D Kabila as the Head of state (Lemarchand 2003). 
Namibia seemed to have linked with Angola in hampering the UNITA infiltration in its 
territory, on top of other collective strategic objectives (Nest 2006c; Prunier 2009). Sudan 
never acknowledged their presence in the DRC, though they fought beside the DRC on the 
                                                 
105 Rwanda airlifted its troops to the military base of Kitona in Bas-Congo to attack Kinshasa. 
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basis of their confrontation with Uganda (Prunier 2009). Chad and Libya also allied with 
Laurent-D Kabila for a short period even if Libya never admitted its intervention in the 
DRC (ibid.).  
Apart from those countries, numerous indigenous and non-indigenous militias, including 
the domestic Mayi-Mayi militias,106 a Hutu rebel force from Burundi, the Forces pour la 
Défense de la Démocratie [Forces for the Defence of Democracy; FDD]107 and the 
Interahamwe as well as ex-FAR thus; many of whom gathered into a rebel force named the 
Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda [Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda; FDLR] in 2000,108 allied with the FAC against the RPA and RCD. In 1999, 
Laurent-D Kabila decided to dissolve the AFDL (Lemarchand 2003).  Lemarchand (2003: 
31) provided for instance: “the only glue holding together this disparate group of 
counterinsurgents was their common hatred of the Rwandan occupying forces and their 
local allies”. The indigenous population detested the RPA and RCD because of their 
tremendously brutal violence against civilians maybe due to stronger resistance these rebel 
movements encountered (Prunier 2009). The anti-government movement mainly 
incorporated three forces, with strong support from Rwanda.109 The RCD was initially 
backed by Uganda and Rwanda. Rwanda also deployed its own troops on Congolese 
territory because of its allegedly imperative concern for Tutsi power survival (Nest 2006c).  
                                                 
106 Various community-based, self-styled civil defence units became known as Mai-Mai collectively (IRIN 
2007b). They initially aimed at protecting villages from the Rwandan invasion and became prominent during 
the second Congo War (ibid.). However, once they had gained a certain level of political and economic 
power, they became a threat rather than a source of protection to the local population (Vlassenroot 2008). 
Those individuals within the militias were also faced with poverty, unemployment and social exclusion (Nest 
2006c). 
107 Burundi never admitted the presence of the FDD in the DRC (Prunier 2009). 
108 There are different accounts on the formation of the FDLR (see details in Prunier (2009) and ICG (2003)). 
It is, nonetheless, considered that a militant group of the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR in the eastern DRC, 
the Armée de Libération du Rwanda [the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda; ALIR], also known by its 
political wing, the Peuple Armépour la Libération du Rwanda [the Party for the Liberation of Rwanda; 
PALIR] merged with the Hutu resistance movement in Kinshasa to form the FDLR in September 2000. 
109 In addition to these major parties, there were also indirect connections with some other countries that did 
not clearly take sides (Prunier 2009). For example, some individuals in Zambia were supporting the UNITA, 
refugees and rebels in Tanzania, Burundi, the Republic of Congo and Central African Republic were recruited 
to fight in the DRC, and leading politicians from the former Rwandan government, who were accommodated 
in Kenya, influenced the Kenyan government’s position (Prunier 2009). 
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Probable explanation of this concern could be that the Rwandan Tutsi-led government was 
concerned with thwarting the late 1997 ethnic-based killing’s escalations and the 
infiltrations of the Interahamwe and ex-FAR from the DRC (Prunier 2009; Nest 2006c). In 
May 1999, the RCD split into two groups as the result of disagreement between Rwanda 
and Uganda on the movement leadership (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009). The 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma [Rally for Congolese Democracy-
Goma; RCD-Goma] was pro-Rwandans and based in Goma.110 The Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie – Mouvement de Libération [Rally for Congolese 
Democracy – Liberation Movement; RCD-ML] allied with Ugandans and was initially 
located in Kisangani and later moved into Bunia. A third armed movement, the Mouvement 
de Libération du Congo [Congolese Liberation Movement; MLC] arose from the north-
eastern DRC. The MLC was formed and spearheaded by a rich powerful businessman from 
the north, Jean-Pierre Bemba, in order to oppose government oppression, and allied with 
the UPDF. Some analysts concur with the view that Uganda was motivated to send its 
troops in the DRC not only based on its close relationships with the RPF, but to anticipate 
the possible disastrous effects resulting from the defeat of the RPA and the RCD on its 
borders (Nest 2006c). The focal motive, though, was its national security, since there was 
already a previous security conflict between Kampala and Khartoum. Hence, during the 
1996 Congo War, Uganda was threatened by the presence of several Ugandan militant 
groups allied with Khartoum and operating in Sudan and the north-eastern DRC (Clark 
2001).111 Although Burundi never acknowledged openly its presence in the DRC, its 
national army joined the RPA and the UPDF. Prunier (2009: 198) suggests that Burundi 
moved into the Congo in a view that “it needed to mind its back door” preventing the Hutu 
rebel group, the FDD, to enter its territory.  
Lessons learned from the fragmenting and shifting coalitions and alliances amongst militant 
movements and their backers in the DRC indicate the emergence of three principal 
revolutionary coalitions during the 1998 Congo War, which mainly controlled three border 
                                                 
110 The UN Panel of Experts (UNSC 2001b: 23) states that the RCD-Goma was “the creation of the Rwandan 
State”, and that it depended “financially, politically and militarily on Kigali”. 
111 Sudan was supporting several Ugandan militant groups, including the Allied Democratic Forces – ADF, 
and Lord’s Resistance Army – LRA, possibly to destabilise the region to spreadIslamic fundamentalism, 
using the territories in Sudan as well as in north-eastern DRC (Clark 2001). 
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zones (Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009). The MLC with Ugandan support administered the north 
and north-western DRC, the RCD-ML with Ugandan support ruled over the north-western 
DRC and the RCD-Goma with Rwandan backing ran the central-eastern DRC. Keen to 
overthrow Laurent-D. Kabila, their common objectives shifted eventually to occupy 
strategic positions in the government as they encountered the strong military resistance of 
Laurent-D Kabila backers, something which resulted in a military deadlock (Nest 2006b). 
The consolidation of the belligerent blocks happened not only from the stalemate of the 
war, but also from the peace talks initiated during the development of the war, as discussed 
below.  
4.4.1  Attempts to the Peace Settlement 
After lengthy and hard discussions between belligerent groups, Laurent-D Kabila, the RCD 
and the MLC signed the Lusaka Peace Agreements in Zambia in 1999.112 Overall this peace 
accord was signed in July 1999 and included the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Zimbabwe, 
Rwanda and Uganda.113 The MLC signed on 1 August 1999 and the RCD on 31 August 
1999. The progress of negotiations leading to the aforementioned agreement was slow due 
to Laurent-D Kabila’s strong reluctance for democratic transition (Prunier 2009). Also, the 
international community was divided between those who supported the view that the 
rebellion aimed to oust Laurent-D. Kabila and those who rather believed it was an invasion 
by Rwanda and Uganda (ibid.). Peace process however moved forward because of the 
military stalemate (Grignon 2006; Prunier 2009).  
Considered as a ceasefire agreement at the beginning, the Lusaka Peace Agreements 
became the groundwork of the peace process in the DRC. It agreed on the removal of 
foreign troops, the disbandment of negative forces, including the FDLR, ADF and FDD, 
and the establishment of a new political system resulting from an Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
– ICD. The UN committed to monitor the ceasefire and deployed the UN peacekeeping 
force, Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo 
[United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; MONUC] 
                                                 
112 See ICG (1999) for details on the negotiations leading to the Lusaka Peace Agreement. 
113 Burundi attended as an observer since it was not recognised as a belligerent party. 
Chapter Four: State failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC   
Coventry University 162 
 
by February 2000. Following the peace agreement, hostilities went on between government 
forces and rebel movements as well as between Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Uganda and 
Rwanda even had heavy fighting over diamond and gold in Kisangani in August 1999, and 
May and June 2000. The MONUC could not stop the fighting between the two foreign 
armies and belligerents due to its mere 5,537 troops and limited mandate (Reuters AlertNet 
n.d.).  
Although the Lusaka Peace Agreements did not succeed in ending the war, it however, 
“immobilised the military frontline and permitted Laurent-D. Kabila to reorganise his army 
in front of the RPA menacing advance” (Grignon 2006: 71).114 The signing of the Lusaka 
Peace Agreements was a victory for Laurent-D. Kabila, as it brought the much needed time 
to consolidate his military position. In contrast, Laurent-D Kabila saw these accords as a 
serious political defeat, for it compelled him to share political power with rebels, including 
the two RCD factions, MLC, non-armed opposition political parties and civil society 
representatives (Grignon 2006). Laurent-D Kabila was also required to accept that half of 
the territory of the country was out of his control (ICG 1999). In essence, the 1999 accords 
split the DR Congo into three micro-states. In the words of Grignon (2006: 71):  
“The 1999 Peace Agreement legalised the partition of the country into three distinct 
zones and enabled the rebels to legitimately claim that they both officially 
represented their part of the country and had the authority to administer and exploit 
their zone”.  
After the splitting of the RCD into two groups over a leadership struggle and before the 
Lusaka Agreements were signed, the tension between Rwanda and Uganda clearly surfaced 
(ICG 1999). This led to a breaking point in early August 1999 with the UPDF and the RPA 
fighting in Kisangani (ibid.) as noted above. Both parties accused each other of violating 
the ceasefire (Lemarchand 2003). The peace process was on hold when Rwanda and 
Uganda declined to partake unless it considered the Interahamwe and the ex-FAR concern. 
As a response, Angola and Zimbabwe refused to withdraw their troops from the DRC up 
                                                 
114 The RPA launched a large offensive and advanced on Mbuji-Mayi, the diamond town, located between 
Lubumbashi in Katanga and Kinshasa (Grignon 2006). 
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until the Rwandans and Ugandans left. It followed more intense clashes, with an estimated 
death toll of 3.8 million people by 2004 as a repercussion of the conflict.  
Given adverse political repercussions of the Lusaka Peace Agreements, Laurent-D Kabila 
changed his strategy into thwarting genuine power-sharing and any war bonus related to the 
economic dimensions of the conflict (ICG 2000; Lemarchand 2003; Grignon 2006). He 
refused sharing power with other protagonists through the ICD (Lemarchand 2003). 
Laurent-D Kabila opposed a major obstacle to the democratic transition and impeded the 
implementation of the Lusaka Peace Agreements, which only progressed after his murder in 
January 2001115 (ICG 2000; Lemarchand 2003; Grignon 2006). Laurent-D Kabila’s son, 
Joseph Kabila, succeeded his father as Head of state with less internal objections. 
Notwithstanding early scepticism about his capacity to spearhead the country in a 
challenging transition, he achieved significant progress (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b). 
He resumed the country’s relations with international financial institutions and donor 
governments, enabled the application of the Lusaka Peace Agreements (Nest 2006b), and 
strategically stepped away from his father’s old allies (Lemarchand 2003). Consequently, 
Uganda and Rwanda started removing their troops from the front line in February, and the 
organisation of the ICD culminated in the formation of a Government of National Unity, 
with the interstate fighting coming to its end.  
Between February and April 2002, the former Botswanan president, Sir Ketumile Masire, 
facilitated the ICD which created a new political dispensation for the DRC in Sun City, 
South Africa. After the ICD organisation, the signing of the Sun City Agreement occurred 
on 19 April 2002 despite wrangling over the composition of the ICD delegations.116 It set a 
unified multi-party government framework and a chronology for democratic elections. The 
agreement also confirmed Joseph Kabila as Head of state for the transitional period. He 
would share power with a Prime Minister from armed oppositions and three vice-
presidents; one from the two main armed opposition movements, one from the former 
government and one from the unarmed political opposition. The Sun City agreement did 
                                                 
115 Laurent D. Kabila was allegedly shot by his bodyguard Rashidi Kasereka, who was killed on the spot, on 
16 January 2001. The exact reason for the assassination is unknown. 
116 See details in ICG (2002). 
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not include issues related to the unification of the army, something that adversely impacted 
on the future ex-combatants reintegration process and security sector reform. Furthermore, 
it was not signed by the RCD-Goma and some other unarmed political opposition parties. 
This refusal associated with divergences on the appointment of Vice-presidents and the 
Prime Minister, as well as on the composition of the government prompted the collapse of 
the agreement (Grignon 2006).  
Rwanda and the DRC signed a security protocol called the Pretoria accord on 30 July 2002 
in South Africa. This protocol provided a framework in regards to the withdrawal of 20,000 
Rwandan soldiers from the DRC and the rounding up of the ex-FAR and dismantling of the 
Interahamwe. Uganda and the DRC also signed the Luanda Agreement on 6 September 
2002. This formal deal focused on the removal of Ugandan soldiers from Bunia and the 
improvement of relations between both countries. Consequently, Rwandan and Ugandan 
soldiers started leaving in late 2002 (ICG n.d.).  
On 17 December 2002, the members of the ICD signed the Global and All-Inclusive Peace 
Agreement on the transition in the DRC in Pretoria.117 It was a power-sharing arrangement 
for the period of political transition. The country was run by Joseph Kabila as interim 
President and four Vice-presidents who represented the government; two from the MLC 
and the RCD, one from unarmed inner opposition and one from Joseph Kabila’s party. The 
agreement laid down a two-year transitional period framework, including legislative and 
presidential elections. Even if the 2002 agreement marked the end of the war, it however 
overlooked the problematic political legitimacy of the former rebels who perpetrated grave 
offenses against the population and the ethnic and regional balance (Prunier 2009). This has 
been believed to be a snare against the sustainable peace in the DRC as it seemed to be 
purposely and meticulously concocted in order to delay the future demobilisation, 
disarmament and reintegration – DDR, of combatants and the reform of the DRC’s security 
system.   
                                                 
117 This Congolese process rejected external interference ‘in the management of the transition and in the 
implementation of the agreement’ (Grignon 2006). 
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As a sideline to this, several foreign soldiers had infiltrated into the FARDC, the country 
security and intelligence system was controlled by the RPF agents, combatants were 
blended with the FARDC instead of going through the formal DDR process and eventually 
‘combatants without borders’118 emerged as process of perpetuating rebellions.119 As a 
component of the ICD, a transitional constitution and a protocol on security sector reform 
were approved and endorsed in Sun City on 2 April 2003. The formation of a Government 
of National Unity and Transition – known as the transitional government, on 30 June 2003 
marked an official end to hostilities and the commencement of the transitional period.  
4.4.2  The Eastern DRC and the Ongoing Armed Movements 
Following the power-sharing and the installation of the transitional government, the state 
made some democratic changes despite continued political struggles and sporadic conflicts. 
On 12 November 2004, transitional authorities adopted a new law on citizenship seen as a 
fundamental stride towards holding general elections (Jackson 2007). The new citizenship 
law appeared compulsory for excluding the Banyarwanda from the nationality was illegal 
under both international law and conventions. For instance, in the words of Jackson 
(2007:489):  
“The new citizenship law was regarded as necessary also on the normative grounds 
that the exclusion of the Banyarwanda from the citizenship was unlawful under both 
international customary law and the international conventions and on security 
grounds given that the Banyarwanda nationality question has acted as a prime 
incendiary igniting successive regional conflicts, including the outbreak of the 
second Congo War”.  
Clark’s (2008: 6) view concurs with Jackson’s. For Clark, the 2004 citizenship law bestows 
citizenship by origin or by acquirement to “all people and their descendants who were 
resident in the DRC on or before independence on 30 June 1960”; however it does not 
allow dual nationality.  
                                                 
118 See Chapter 5 for detailed information on combatants without borders. 
119 Interview conducted with an academic specialist of the Kivu’s issues, Kinshasa, October 2013 
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Notwithstanding the Banyarwanda officially acquired nationality through this law, in the 
sight of indigenous Congolese however their status of non-indigenous did not change; 
neither were the tensions between them reduced (Clark 2008). More importantly, the 2004 
citizenship law raised three key difficulties that Jackson (2007: 481) elaborates as follows; 
it was not clear on many ambiguities related to the national status of the Banyarwanda, its 
enforcement was not effective and it did not improve the political relationship between the 
individual and the state for the Banyamulenge. For Jackson, the nature of the political 
relationship, necessary in offering the sense of enjoying a full citizenship, covers “local 
rights and obligations between the individual and customary authority, it therefore  implies 
land distribution and other vital rights; and the ethnically vital, lived sense of belonging and 
existential security for the individual within society as a whole” (ibid.). The Banyamulenge 
however seemed to be denied these advantages and the new law was not likely to change 
this situation (Jackson 2007). Following the endorsement of a new constitution by the 
parliament in May 2005, a semi-presidential regime120 – with a two-term presidential 
limit,121 was introduced. On 18th February 2006, the constitution was promulgated 
following the referendum of December 2005.  
On 30 July 2006, Congolese people went to polls for the presidential and legislative 
elections through continued political struggle and with more than 17 million registered 
voters. None of the candidates won the majority in the first round vote. Joseph Kabila got 
44.81 percent while his main foe and contender, Vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba, 
received around 20 percent. After allying with some of first round losers, Joseph Kabila 
won vote on 29 October 2006. His coalition also received a majority in national and 
provincial assemblies, making him to be the first democratically elected President of the 
DRC in forty years. Bemba contested the result and appealed to the Supreme Court to settle 
the litigations. The Supreme Court upheld Joseph Kabila. Following Joseph Kabila’s 
swearing in as Head of state in December 2006, a new government was formed in February 
2007. The RCD-Goma and the Congolese Tutsi communities could not secure sufficient 
political representation as their results of the elections were calamitous.  
                                                 
120 Semi-presidential regime refers to power-sharing between the President and Prime Minister. 
121 For details of the elements of the constitution, see UNSC (2005a). 
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Evidence from the Human Rights Watch (2007) noted that some political leaders triggered 
anti-Tutsi feeling during electoral campaign. The anti-Tutsi feeling had a significant impact 
on the Tutsi presidential candidate, Azarias Ruberwa, leader of the RCD-Goma and one of 
the four Vice-presidents during the transitional period, who secured only 2 percent of the 
vote (Prunier 2009). His ex-rebel group won only 15 seats – 3 percent, in the legislative 
elections (ibid.). This was a penalty score for the Banyamulenge perceived as Rwandans 
and therefore disliked (Prunier 2009). These results determined the RCD-Goma political 
insignificance in the democratically elected government, regardless of the fact that its 
precursor the RCD was one of the four influential political forces in the transitional 
government (Human Rights Watch 2007). This marked the RCD-Goma political liquidation 
(ICG 2007b). Additionally, Minembwe is the largely Banyamulenge-inhabited territory 
which is not still recognised by the government. Consequently, the Banyamulenge were 
denied from having territorial administrative control, representatives in the Provincial and 
National Assemblies (Human Rights Watch 2007). The Banyamulenge perceived this 
decision as the government deliberate strategy to marginalise and alarm them (ibid.).  
Although some achievements were attained during the transitional period, growing 
criticism both at national and international levels was laid on the Joseph Kabila’s 
government (ICG n.d.). The new Congolese army, Forces Armées de la République 
Démocratique du Congo [Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo; FARDC], 
created in July 2003, was relentlessly being indicted of perpetrating human rights abuses 
and being undisciplined.122 Criticism also was on the dearth of transparency in resource 
management, corruption and paucity of infrastructure and basic services. Furthermore, there 
was an increasing level of political intolerance,123 particularly against Bemba’s followers 
and in the east and west regions. Despite the international community concerns regarding 
                                                 
122 MONUC warned the government that it would withdraw from the joint operations in the East unless the 
FARDC ended human rights violations (Reuters AlertNet n.d.). 
123 The nature of the human rights abuses include unlawful killings in the Kivu provinces, violence against 
women, child soldiers, torture, persecution of human rights activists, political violence between Kabila and 
Bemba supporters as well as other factions and limited access to proper justice (Amnesty International 2006). 
MONUC (2006) also published a special report on the human rights situation. A brutal military crackdown on 
political-cultural movement Bundu dia Kongo – BDK, in Bas-Congo, which aimed at reviving the pre-
colonial Kongo kingdom, was also reported in January 2007 (Reuters AlertNet n.d.). Human Rights Watch 
(2008) provides an analysis of the political violence between Kabila and Bemba supporters and against the 
BDK. 
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the weakness of the regime in the management of these problems, “brutal repression was 
increasingly used as a government method” (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009: 477). By 
trying to control strategic natural resources in the Kivus through privatised and brutal forms 
of governance, the government enabled ‘a disparate and fragmented control’ over the 
territories (ibid.). In 2007, the tension between Joseph Kabila and Bemba followers led the 
latter to exile into Portugal after seeking refuge in the South African Embassy in Kinshasa.  
During the transitional period, the disbandment of armed forces and their integration into 
the army, as part of the Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement of 2002, was 
unsuccessful (Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2007b). The process of integration of the 
former government soldiers – about 330,000, with the former rebel combatants into the 
FARDC and the disbandment of combatants not essential for the FARDC were 
considerably deferred to the point that the elections were held before the end of the process 
(Amnesty International 2007; Human Rights Watch 2007; Turner 2007). The 
aforementioned integration of the former troops into the national army was in fact a 
‘intermingling’ and ‘mixing’ processes, which “required soldiers to be trained for 45 days 
and then to be deployed in a region other than the one in which they had previously fought” 
(Human Rights Watch 2007: 10). Combatants also had an alternative to be disbanded to 
join civilian life during the process (ibid.). This option was met with strong resistance by 
various armed forces, most notably from Banyarwanda officers as they feared for their 
security and the loss of their power base, but also from the Mai-Mai militias and the FDLR 
rebels caused by the fears of the militarisation of the Banyarwanda (Turner 2007; ICG 
2007b). In reality, this resistance was the strategy of Tutsi-led Rwandan government to 
have an alibi which would justify the RPF future incursions in the East DRC.124 
                                                 
124 See the section on contextualising the mining-combatant- recruitment cycle in the DRC and Chapter Five 
for more detailed. 
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4.5  DRC’s Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Process 
In the DRC, the DDR process in reality was what is referred to as the ‘combatants’ 
intermingling’125 and ‘mixing’126 processes. These processes, contends an ex-combatant 
interviewed in Brussels,127 were not transparent, in terms of combatants’ identification and 
neither did they establish human rights standards nor any eligibility criterion (Turner 2007). 
According to the 2003 agreement and the national programme for Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration – DDR, 130,000 combatants (the army and rebel 
elements altogether) were expected to be integrated into the FARDC and around 200,000 
soldiers were intended to be demobilised (Marriage 2007). A set of papers on the 
implementation of the DDR in the DRC suggest that the process was not viable. It lacked 
security and development plans and was not planned to help the ex-combatants to speak to 
their grievances; neither was it meant to help returnees to build their livelihood without 
using violence (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008).  
Combatants who had opted for military career into the FARDC were largely disgruntled 
with the wages of USD10 a month – if they were paid at all, and those who had opted for 
civilian life were also disenchanted by the paucity of reintegration process which would 
help them to join their new life, while local economic and social grievances never changed 
(Baaz and Stern 2008). The failure128 of the DDR process partially was conceptual and 
structural. Conceptually, the mobilisation aspect was considered as a mere technical process 
without any budget for the implementation responsibilities. Structurally, the DDR 
implementation reflected the increasingly informal and predatory nature of political and 
economic life, institutionalisation of a methodical use of violence to attain and preserve 
power, and ongoing inter-related conflicts on the ground (Marriage 2007).   
Dealing with the DDR in the DRC implies an understanding of the correlation of various 
aspects that entail all-inclusive responses to address them. There is a claim that the DDR 
                                                 
125 After the 2003 agreement rebels were mixed and intermingled with the FARDC soldiers instead of the 
DDR process.  
126 The 2006 agreement had mixed the CNDP combatants into the FARDC instead of the DDR process.  
127 Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Brussels, December 2013. 
128 Scholars have been using failure, unfolded, endless to assess the achievement of the ex-combatants’ DDR 
programme in the DRC. This research will use these words interchangeably.   
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has its appointed time for being carried out and requires certain particular conditions 
particularly of political nature to ensure that it does not flop (Marriage 2007; Wake 2008). 
The 2003 Pretoria agreement set that all armed groups ought to partake in the DDR process 
in order to address the needs of former combatants and reform the security sector. The 
signing of this agreement however failed to involve all armed groups (Wake 2008). The 
unfolded nature of the DRC’s DDR has possibly been one of the most intricate programmes 
ever implemented in Africa. The DDR programme in the DRC consisted of, among other 
elements, a national programme which included specific DDR programme for Ituri, 
processes to disarm and repatriate non-national combatants and their dependants, those for 
special needy groups such as women, disabled ex-combatants and children and projects in 
line with the DDR of militia groups’ members (World Bank 2010) 
The process was mainly facilitated by the World Bank and the United Nations – UN, 
predominantly via the Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme 
(MDRP) along with the DRC government (Lamb et al. 2012). It has been claimed that 
besides its multifaceted planning, two other supplementary developments complicated the 
process. Firstly Security Sector Reform – SSR, which was a requirement brought about by 
peace accords has never been a concern to various antagonists. On the grounds of the 2003 
Pretoria agreement, SSR aimed to pave the way for the creation of a new national army 
whereby all combatants from most of the significant rebel groups would be integrated into 
the FARDC. SSR was also intended to diminish and possibly eradicate extreme accretion of 
small arms and light weapons from the hands of both combatants and civilians. Secondly, 
stabilisation initiatives, mainly those concerned with mining-armed groups relationship, as 
it has been established that several armed movements access mineral resources (Nzekani 
Zena 2013). Broadly, the DDR programme involves peace and reconciliation processes 
including the military and security reform. The broad idea behind this linkage is to address 
not only former combatants’ needs but also the war-affected community. This links directly 
to the prospects towards reforming or transforming security sector following the conflict, 
and culminates, in the longer term, in human security or development (Marriage 2007; 
Wake 2008). However, it bears stressing that neither of the DDR process or security sector 
reform has come to an end up to date.   
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4.5.1  DDR Institutional and Financial Considerations 
The MDRP started in 2002 and was financed by various contributor governments and 
agencies. The programme geographically focused on the Great Lakes Region of Central 
Africa, with the targeted countries being: Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, the 
DRC, the Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda (Lamb 2011; Lamb et al. 2012). 
According to Nzekani Zena (2013), the MDRP demobilised, disarmed and reintegrated 
close to 300,000 ex-combatants in the above mentioned seven countries, and the processes 
came to its end in June 2009.  
It has been claimed that 50 percent of the entire budget of the MDRP were spent for DDR-
related projects in the DRC, which made this country the most noteworthy component of 
the MDRP (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013). Eriksson and Verweijen’s view supports 
that of the MDRP. The MDRP’s report on the DDR programme unveiled that the fund used 
for only the DRC section accounted for 36 percent of all demobilised beneficiaries; 41 
percent and 22 percent of reinsertion and reintegration beneficiaries respectively, with four 
out of the five special projects for child soldiers being implemented in the DRC (Lamb et 
al. 2012). However, in 2003 the DRC’s government created some institutions – such as the 
interdepartmental committee in charge of planning and co-ordination of DDR – CI-DDR, to 
supervise the National Programme of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration – 
PNDDR; while the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion – 
CONADER, was dealing with the implementation of the PNDDR (Lamb 2011; Lamb et al. 
2012). The PNDDR and CONADER established regrouping Centres to implement the 
disarmament targets, while Integration and Training Centres were created for reintegration 
purposes (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).  
In response to issues associated with the implementation of the national DDR programme, 
an emergency initiative known as Community Disarmament and Reinsertion – DCR, was 
created. Lamb et al. (2012) and Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen (2013), for instance, suggest 
that the DCR aimed to disarm and pacify those armed groups that were not part of ceasefire 
or peace agreements but were believed to be substantial factors of insecurity or 
destabilising forces. The DCR’s implementation focused on Ituri territory due to the 
complexity of armed groups’ actions in this area. Although the DCR demobilised 15,811 
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combatants – with 4,525 children, its component regarding reintegration support however 
has been ‘chaotic’, ‘half-hearted’ and ‘problematic’ because of lengthy implementation 
postponements (Kölln 2011; Lamb et al. 2012; Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).   
The focus of the DDR programme in the DRC was to reincorporate ex-combatants into 
civilian life through ‘safety transition allowances’ and reintegration support (Lamb 2011). 
Kölln (2011), for example, advises that various contributor governments catered for 
significant funding and technical support, with a total of US$ 272 million being offered for 
DDR processes through the MDRP. Ex-combatants who went through demobilisation 
process received an initial imbursement of US$ 110 – for transport, food and other 
expenses, and then a monthly stipend of US$ 25 for a year (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 
2013). Along similar lines, some non-governmental organisations – NGOs, international 
organisations and the UN agencies including International Labour Office – ILO, the Food 
and Agricultural Organisation – FAO, and Caritas offered a range of socio-economic 
support to ex-combatants (Lamb et al. 2012). This support included targeted programmes 
for female ex-combatants and child soldiers, with ex-combatants’ reintegration training 
being available in different fields, comprising, but not limited to, agriculture, fishing, 
sewing/tailoring, woodwork, bricklaying, driving, and metal work (Nzekani Zena 2013; 
Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).  
4.5.2  DDR Outcomes 
Following the end of the MDRP activities in the Great Lakes Region of Africa in 2009, at 
least 102,014 ex-combatants returned home and got both demobilisation and reinsertion 
support in the DRC, with 52,172 having received reintegration support (Lamb 2011). The 
World Bank implemented the Transitional Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme – 
TDRP, which was funded by the African Development Bank, a variety of contributor 
governments and whose aim was providing follow-up DDR assistance.  
The 1925 UN Security Council Resolution of July 2010 extended the UN mandate in the 
DRC, changing MONUC label to the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC – MONUSCO. 
This resolution also endorsed the UN objective of DDR in regards to armed groups 
operating in the DRC and the DDRRR of non-national armed groups, mainly the FDLR, 
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Allied Democratic Forces/National Army for the Liberation of Uganda – ADF-NALU, the 
Lord’s Resistance Army – LRA, and the National Forces of Liberation – FNL 
(Nzekanizena 2013). The MONUSCO, in collaboration with the FARDC, had successfully 
implemented its DDRRR processes within about 18 months despite the difficulties and 
remarkable likelihoods that challenged the programme, including poor governance, 
continuing violence and activities of armed groups in the eastern Provinces (ibid.). It is, 
however, of note that various reports and assessments had castigated the way the ex-
combatants’ DDR programme had been implemented. For example, Lamb (2012) argued 
that domestic political dynamics stymied further attainments. The most recent and notable 
evidence of this criticism however is that in December 2010 the UN Peacebuilding Fund 
funded the DDR of some 4,000 armed groups’ members; yet this programme was put off by 
the DRC government and never occurred (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).  
Overall, many reasons could justify the failure of the DDR programme. Three factors seem 
to be the most crucial (Lamb 2011); the first is the question of ownership. Various authors 
having assessed the ex-combatants’ DDR in the DRC concurred that most of armed groups 
such as the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi – which are key armed movements targeted by the 
DDRRR process, were not parts of peace process and agreement signing, and these rebel 
groups continued to spoil the process. The second factor is that the DDR process had been 
preoccupied mainly with ending violence without addressing the crisis underlining such 
violence. In my research in Brussels, Kinshasa, London and Paris, it can be concluded that 
not only did the programme lack future capability, was poorly defined and was unable to 
communicate vision for the post-conflict community, but also public participation was 
overlooked.129 It can be noted that the purported lack of capacity by both the MONUSCO 
and the government to uproot the fuelling-factors of the re/recruitment cycle of combatants 
culminated in the DDR programme being unfolded; therefore releasing more criminals into 
society than preventing security and social instability. This is what this research further 
refers to as ‘top-down analysis’ of the conflict which goes hand-in-hand with ‘top-down 
solutions’ to the conflict. The third factor relates to the institutions duplication and 
mismanagement of the DDR funding. When I interviewed a member of civil society in 
                                                 
129 Fieldwork conducted by the author from July to December 2013 in the DRC, England, Belgium and 
France. 
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Kinshasa, it can be noted that the institutions duplication and mismanagement of the DDR 
funding had resulted in using the DDR’s funds for other end such as the payment of 
national and international so-called experts than socially and economically reintegrating ex-
combatants.130 However, what lessons could be drawn from the failure of the DDR 
programme in the DRC? How can this feed the cycle of combatants’ (re-) recruitment and 
the phenomenon of resources appropriation?  The following lines will shed light on these 
questions.  
4.5.3  The Kivus Unending Violence 
Despite the expectations that the DDR programmes and consequential political 
engagements would stop the violence affecting civilians, several combatants did not 
surrender but have instead strengthened their influence and amplified armed conflict and 
violent assaults on civilians (Human Rights Watch 2007). Insecurity plagues the Kivu 
provinces since 2003. Following the 2006 presidential, parliamentary and provincial 
elections, the north Kivu’s insecurity conditions degenerated into large-scale violence. 
Having lost political significance (ibid.), the Banyamulenge felt side-lined and endangered. 
Moreover, in terms of political positions, other indigenous groups in the community had 
acquired the economic privileges that the Banyamulenge had during the previous years 
(ICG 2007b).  
Contrary to the government’s belief that the combatants’ intermingling and mixing 
processes – based on shuffling of commanders – Senior Officers, and of units, would pacify 
the East by incorporating all armed movements into the FARDC, it has rather had an 
unfavourable impact on the security situations in the Kivus (IRIN 2007; ICG 2007b). The 
combatants’ intermingling process begrimed the state security system by integrating war 
criminals into the national army. According to intermingling process, a senior member from 
the Force Armée Congolaise [Congolese Armed Force; FAC or Kabila’s troops] had to 
swap with the serving RCD commander, while the RCD maintained the north Kivu (ICG 
2007b). In response, a great number of the RCD Tutsi officers, including Laurent Nkunda, 
refused to obey the government authority and to go through intermingling process, fearing 
                                                 
130 Interview conducted with a member of civil society, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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ethnic maltreatment and retaliation for their acts during the wars, and so created a network 
(Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 2007b; Prunier 2009; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 
2009). Evidence from Human Rights Watch (2007) indicates that some Tutsi soldiers were 
imprisoned, tortured even killed between 2004 and 2006. Nkunda also blamed the 
government of not doing its best to eliminate the FDLR (IRIN 2007).  
In June 2004, a full-blown battle – emanating from an argument between commanders, has 
eventually culminated in a rebellious faction led by Colonel Jules Mutebutsi, backed by 
Laurent Nkunda. This uprising took control of Bukavu in the south Kivu for a while and 
was set down by the government after one week. In December 2005, some RCD-Goma’s 
dissident soldiers fought off the FARDC in Kanyabayonga and seized numerous towns in 
the north Kivu. This action created tensions in the relationship between other leaders of the 
transitional government and the RCD-Goma leadership (Grignon 2006). In July 2006, 
during electoral period, Nkunda created a politico-military organisation, the Congrès 
National pour la Défense du Peuple [National Congress for the Defence of the People; 
CNDP], predominantly made of Congolese Tutsi from the RCD-Goma. Nkunda also lured 
a few leaders of ethnic communities and opponents that were not satisfied of 
democratisation process (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). According to Human Rights 
Watch (2007: 64): 
“Nkunda created the CNDP for the purpose of preventing the exclusion of Tutsi 
from national political life, assuring the security of Tutsi soldiers in the national 
army, eliminating the presence of the FDLR in the DRC and assuring the return of 
Congolese refugees now in Rwanda”.  
The CNDP repeatedly collided with the FARDC, protected their unrelenting autonomy and 
had never accepted its integration into the national army (Human Rights Watch 2007). By 
late November 2006, the CNDP rebelled again and assailed Goma, presumably to seize it 
and make their position advantageous in any future discussions with the government. This 
attitude, in the eyes of Kinshasa, constituted a serious threat to the government (Prunier 
2009; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). In order to thwart additional fights, Joseph 
Kabila and Kagame talked with Nkunda in December 2006 to integrate the CNDP soldiers 
into the FARDC through a ‘mixing process’ (Human Right Watch 2007; ICG 2007b; 
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Prunier 2009). In the process of ‘combatants’ mixing’ and /or ‘combatants’ intermingling’, 
several combatants serve in the same units without the initial units being disbanded and, 
allowing for concerns about security, soldiers were unwilling to any shift outside their 
province (Prunier 2009; ICG 2007b). During the talks, Nkunda required solutions to several 
political grievances, namely the homecoming of 45,000 Banyarwanda refugees from 
Rwanda, the release of political prisoners and military actions to dismantle the FDLR (ICG 
2007a).  
Following the negotiations, the CNDP’s troops started integrating the FARDC through 
mixing process in February 2007. The mixing process profited Nkunda, as it augmented   
the number of troops under his order (Human Rights Watch 2007; Turner 2007; Prunier 
2009). Having become stronger both politically and militarily, Nkunda deployed his units 
to crackdown on the FDLR in the north Kivu and also began enlisting widely from 
unemployed ex-combatants and idle Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi amongst others (Human 
Rights Watch 2007; Prunier 2009). After a while, the FARDC launched unsuccessful 
military operations against the FDLR causing the exodus of more of the civilian population. 
In reaction to these operations, the Mayi-Mayi created a movement called the Patriotes 
Résistants Congolais [Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance by the Mai-Mai; 
PARECO]131 (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). The military objectives of the 
APARECO were to dismantle Nkunda’s rebellion and reinstate peace in the East. Similar to 
the Mai-Mai, which defies any authority and versatile in changing allies, APARECO’s 
political objectives were vague (Prunier 2009; IRIN 2007). 
The mixing process had consolidated the CNDP authority, which led to ethnic tensions in 
the Kivus, as it had “kick-started the FDLR back into life and reopened all the scores of the 
East” (Prunier 2009: 324). In order to demonstrate their importance to the government, a 
group of the FDLR, called ‘Rastas’, maximised the tensions through carrying out massacres 
in the south Kivu in May 2007 (ICG 2007b). In the words of Prunier (2009: 324): “the 
whole region experienced a sudden return to a state of tension previously forgotten” as a 
result. The situation had exacerbated as several uncontrolled militias, such as the Mai-Mai, 
                                                 
131 PARECO also includes some Hutu CNDP deserters (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). 
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warlords and the FDLR (Prunier 2009), and some armed movements, apparently allied with 
the government, including the CNDP and the FARDC, were all responsible for crimes that 
were not being investigated (Human Rights Watch 2007). In May 2007, some hardliners in 
both the FARDC and CNDP diverged on many views regarding military actions, which 
eventually led to the failure of the mixing process (Human Rights Watch 2007; ICG 
2007b).  
Following the failure of the mixing deal, the government launched an attack against the 
CNDP. The crack-down involved heavy fighting between the CNDP and the FARDC in 
August 2007132 but the government could not defeat the CNDP because of the weakness of 
the national army (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). In November 2007, the Congolese 
and Rwandan governments reached the Nairobi Agreement to repatriate the FDLR. In 
January 2008, Goma hosted a meeting on Peace, Security and Development in the Kivus, 
also known as the ‘Amani’133 process. This conference resulted in an all-inclusive peace 
agreement or commitment procedure for a ceasefire and the signing of protocol on 
voluntary demobilisation and integration in the East on 23 January 2008.  
Goma conference gathered members of the different Congolese armed groups;134 
government representatives, civil society leaders and international observers. The Amani 
process was welcomed as it was believed to tackle core issues (Prunier 2009). Its focus on a 
ceasefire and voluntary demobilisation however was in contradiction with the 2007 Nairobi 
Agreement which suggested forceful demobilisation of the FDLR (Boshoff 2008). After the 
Amani process, the security situation did not move forward as expected (Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers 2009). In August 2008, the FARDC allied with the FDLR and APARECO 
and resumed fighting against the CNDP. Owing to its military power, the CNDP conquered 
large zones of the north Kivu in October. Its advancement to inside a few kilometres of 
Goma – the provincial capital, put the FARDC in disarray. Consequently, the national army 
                                                 
132 This was supposedly triggered by a failed negotiation for brassage [mixing] (Human Rights Watch 2007). 
The fighting also involved the FDLR and the Mai-Mai and displaced more than 170,000 people, in addition to 
200,000 people internally displaced since the end of 2006 and 322,000 refugees hosted in neighbouring 
countries (Amnesty International 2008). 
133‘Amani’ literally means ‘peace’ in the Swahili language (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). 
134 Twenty-two Congolese Kivu-based armed groups, including those who had ceased operations, were 
invited in order to ensure equal treatment (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009). 
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went on sprees of killing, raping and pillaging, leaving the FDLR and PARECO to fight 
with the CNDP. The new FARDC debacle spoiled the relationship between the DRC and 
Rwanda, with both laying blame on each other of backing insurgent forces; the FDLR and 
CNDP respectively.135 The contradiction on the FDLR repatriation and the integration of 
the armed groups into the FARDC brought by the 2007 Nairobi and 2008 Goma 
agreements involved some international diplomatic efforts in an attempt to settle the 
conflict. Yet, the situation remained unstable and hostility continued.  
4.5.4  DRC’s Peacebuilding Failures 
Two broad theories have been elaborated to explain the consecutive failures of the different 
peace agreements and the endless crisis in the eastern DRC. In essence, these peace accords 
were based on inclusive power-sharing agreements. They emerged from the ‘consociational 
model’136 according to which combatants’ mixing and intermingling would be the key to 
conflict resolution, based on the belief that exclusion – as opposed to greed alone, has been 
the key fuelling factor of most African conflicts. The first theory portends that belligerents 
could have been dissatisfied of these inclusive power-sharing arrangements and could use 
their dissatisfaction as negative incentives to fuel mutinies in order to be included in the 
arrangements (Tull and Mehler 2005). Lemarchand (2006: 4) reiterates that the power-
sharing agreements seem to be “co-option, directed by expediency” by the Western donors 
(Tull and Mehler 2005). This view is supported by Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers’ (2005: 
476) for whom “a regular model of peace deal in the DRC involves the proliferation and 
fragmentation of armed groups as warlords are entitled to a portion of existing power 
arrangements”. The proliferation of armed groups observed following the 2008 Amani 
process sheds light on this point (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009: 480). In light of this 
theory it might be argued that the Amani process had instituted the principle of violence 
into the peace process and acknowledged negative incentives to be armed in order to access 
resources.  
                                                 
135 These allegations were largely verified by the investigation by the UN Group of Experts (UNSC 2008a) 
that Rwanda discreetly supported the CNDP and FARDC officers extensively collaborated with the FDLR. 
136 The consociational model was formulated by Lijphart in 1970s and has been a predominant theory in 
thinking of democratic governance. See Lemarchand (2006: 1-2). 
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The second theory explains the failures of the peace agreements by a selective mechanism 
which does not involve some potential spoilers in the power-sharing agreements because of 
their economic and security interests (Grignon 2006). In the context of the DRC where the 
fluid nature of the fighters is not negligible, the non-implication of regional actors in the 
peace agreements might gain from continuing fighting (ibid.). According to Grignon (2006: 
76): 
“The 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Peace arrangement illustrates the outcome of 
neglecting to add in potential spoilers as the ICD [based on the 1999 Lusaka Peace 
Agreements] was frozen in a system of power relations hat has changed 
considerably over the course of the conflict”.  
This arrangement was selective by only including powerful domestic actors operating in the 
eastern DRC; the RCD-Goma and RCD-ML whereas the FDLR and Mayi-Mayi were 
disregarded in the transitional government. Only the formal international aspects of the 
crisis were tackled in both the 1999 Lusaka Peace Agreements and the 2002 Global and 
All-Inclusive Peace Agreement, but other aspects of the war remained unaddressed 
(Grignon 2006).  
A close look at self-seeking incentives and peace spoilers as mentioned above shows that 
these two aspects are only concerned with the outcomes rather than the root-causes and 
circumstances that produce this behaviour. Based on his empirical studies on trajectories of 
power sharing in Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC, Lemarchand (2006) argues that the 
outcomes of power-sharing arrangements depend on the socio-political context. The 
backdrop behind the disintegration of the rebel movements, especially the RCD, in terms of 
both intra- and inter-ethnic conflict, backs this view (ibid.). From this perspective, inclusive 
power-sharing agreements might have offered negative inducements to the warring groups 
that could otherwise secure significant political representation through peaceful means 
within the existing socio-political system. Lemarchand’s standpoint on the nature of the 
DRC’s socio-political system, in this case, is noteworthy. 
On the grounds of the view above, it can be argued that inclusive power-sharing 
arrangements might be source of negative incentives to the antagonist movements that 
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could otherwise attain meaningful political representation through non-violent means 
within the existing socio-political system. This conclusion thus sheds light on the nature of 
the socio-political system in the DRC. Arguably, it could be postulated that behind failure 
state and protracted armed conflict in the DRC, while splitting a number of times 
(comprising the rise of the RCD, CNDP then the M23), is hidden the Banyarwanda weak 
position to accomplish political representation. This situation is further compounded by the 
fact that they are ethnic minority group challenged by the political manipulation of their 
citizenship and who largely sought Rwandan support than Congolese. Banyarwanda efforts 
to exhibit the symbols of the state, trademarks and their attachment to the Congolese 
government framework (Tull 2003), as well as to secure social control over local resources 
(Vlassenroot and Romkema 2002), has also been regarded as an attempt by them  to 
increase political integrity and their presence.  
The same socio-political system has been thought to be triggering some protagonists to 
‘spoil’ the agreement since they were either overlooked or their agendas were not taken into 
account in the negotiated peace. Two protagonists that were not members of those peace 
agreements are the Mayi-Mayi and the FDLR. Following Mai-Mai militias fragmentation, 
it proved very difficult to understand their objectives. Having fought against the 
government and other rebellions (Prunier 2009), their attendance at peace agreements 
proved to be a genuine political issue (Grignon 2006). As for the FDLR, all the peace 
arrangements intend to neutralise and repatriate them to Rwanda. Yet, the FDLR are keen 
to return to power in Rwanda through a political dialogue with the Tutsi-led Rwandan 
government rather than fighting (Fessy and Doyle 2009). The FDLR leadership claims on 
its website that their objective is to “reinstate a regime based on universal principles, 
promote moral values, end wars and establish peace in Rwanda and in the region” 
(Chatham House 2009: 6). The refusal of the current Tutsi-led Rwandan regime to engage 
political talks with the FDLR and the assimilation of the FDLR members into communities 
after more than a decade of residence in the DRC would complicate their disbandment and 
repatriation (ibid. 2009).  
Despite a few peace agreements regarding the FDLR demilitarisation and repatriation, they 
have succeeded to reassert their position in the Kivus as the government has been unable to 
dismantle them (ICG 2005; 2010). In this way, the government become a spoiler of the 
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negotiated peace (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009), partially due to a paucity of 
capacity. The growth of Rwandan influence in the Kivus has been thought to be a reaction 
to this unfulfilled accord (Grignon 2006). Rwanda has not only allied with rebellions to 
control the zone effectively, it also sent its troops through the eastern DRC (Grignon 2006: 
79). Additionally, Hutu Banyarwanda leaders have been offered senior positions in the 
provincial administration by Rwanda to decrease their persuasion to adhere the FDLR 
(ibid.). Moreover, Rwandan actions reflect its economic interests to revive livestock 
ranching in the eastern DRC, whereas Rwandan economic agendas have never been part of 
those peace agreements (Grignon 2006). For instance, during the ICD, the concern of 
illegal exploitation of natural resources ascertained by the UN Panel of Experts 
investigations137 was raised by civil society representatives, but the ICD did not sufficiently 
look into the political economy of the conflict and eluded to name any responsibility for the 
illicit exploitation of natural resources (Ballentine 2004; Grignon 2006).  
It is proved that belligerents mined the mineral resources from the land they occupied and 
several disputes over control of the main mineral producing and trading towns erupted138 
(Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Prunier 2009). Rwanda and Uganda strongly refuted their 
economic incentives and implication in the illegal exploitation of Congolese natural 
resources (Prunier 2009). Rwandan and Ugandan security imperatives as a justification to 
invade the DRC have been questionable as some analysts still believe that their presence 
has been motivated by their “long-standing interest in plundering the Congo’s riches” in the 
power vacuum (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 215). Others however have advised that there was 
a shift in focus after these countries secured considerable profits from the pillage of natural 
resources during the 1996 Congo War (UNSC 2001a; Lemarchand 2003).  
While the aforementioned economic agendas have been mostly regarded as patterns of 
greed, analysis of the political economy of armed groups proposes that economic interests 
have been a function of war. They aim to capitalise limited means and yield a necessary 
cash flow for their military campaigns, whereas others began to be aware of the economic 
opportunities accessible and pursued individual economic profit (Nest 2006c; Prunier 2009; 
                                                 
137 See UNSC (2001a; 2001b; 2002a; 2002b). 
138 For example, the UPDF and the RPA clashed for control of Kisangani in August 1999 and May 2000. 
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Nest 2006c). Rebel movements hunted swift returns and minimum investment as a 
consequence of the economic collapse,139 ruin of infrastructure, evident decline in 
agricultural outputs, variations in mining outputs, high costs of business operation, rising 
poverty and growth of informal economy in the DRC (Nest 2006c). They, for example, 
took control of points of access to collect levy on trade, reached favoured trade agreements 
with local merchants and secured local businesses (Nest 2006c; Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers 2005; Vlassenroot 2008). The economic agendas emerged crucial in mid-
1999 when the different protagonists experienced the military stalemate (Nest 2006c) and, 
thus, the low-intensity conflict (Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2005). The function of war 
became vital for all the protagonists involved in the war (Nest 2006c: 38). Aside from the 
declining economy, the DRC government was amputated half of its territory together with 
commerce within it as well as one of the main and historically reliable sources of money for 
the state, foreign aid.140 The Rwandan military campaign was reasonably self-funding as it 
was endeavouring to recoup from the entire damage left by the early 1990s civil war and 
genocide. Uganda also desired to subsidise the military campaigns as the donors 
pressurised on its outsized budget (Prunier 2009). Furthermore, the collapse of the DDR 
programme, which drastically mired progress towards the peace agreement, could be 
imputed partially to the socio-economic conditions in the DRC.  
The paucity of achievable livelihoods as well as the poor DDR programme141 implied that 
combatants could not be convinced to surrender. Possible explanations of this include the 
fact that the integrated fighters were earning insufficient and irregular salaries and 
frequently had to live from looting and plundering. Also, external actors have been 
manipulating the peace processes in pursuit of their economic survival, even if this has not 
been meticulously explored (Grignon 2006). Grignon, for instance, noticed that the 
economic interests of the official peacemakers, explicitly South Africa, menaced other 
countries in the region and thereby led them to jeopardise the engagements concluded. 
                                                 
139 Per capita income decreased to 25 percent of 1970 levels by 2000 (Nest 2006c). 
140 The foreign aid for the DRC reached its lowest point in 1998 since Laurent Kabila appear to have created 
antagonism with the major donors by being “resentful at pressure to pay debts accumulated under Mobutu and 
increasingly bellicose in its diplomacy” (Nest 2006c: 38). 
141 The lack of financial means and agreement between the government and the armed groups is discussed by 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2009). 
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Other external actors were marginalised during the progress of the peace accords because of 
the strong pressure of Belgium, France and the USA that have a close relationship with the 
Congolese government; which might spoil the process (ibid.). Explanations for the 
prolongation of conflict in the DRC, therefore, need to consider the local contexts. While 
both negative inducements and peace spoilers may be real and encumber the peace process, 
analyses on the socio-political context elucidate a range of economic and security 
imperatives for the belligerent groups and their supporters that have been kept blurred or 
addressed in the peace arrangements.  
4.6  Understanding Current Conflict-Mining-Recruitment in Light of Conflict’s 
Multi-layered Factors 
After the end of the Cold War and the capitalism-socialism ideological conflict, the struggle 
for natural resource appropriation has set a new geopolitical landscape of the world; which 
established strong existing correlation between natural resources and armed groups (Blanco 
and Razzaque 2011; 2012; de Konong 2012). The background to the conflict-mining-
recruitment cycle in the DRC draws its origin from 1996 civil war however many scholars 
recognised openly this conflict as a resource-based conflict and/or conflict-based resource 
in 1998 when the CNDP rebellion broke out (Dean Pavlakis 2010; Global Witness 2011). 
Currently, at least 45 internal and external unauthorised armed groups are operating only in 
the eastern DRC (De Koning 2013). Two schools of thought have attempted to explain the 
phenomenon of rebellion’s cycles in the Kivus, and combatant’s pull and push factors for 
joining these militias. The argument of the incapacity of the state to secure these regions, 
and the fear of being dispossessed of land by non-national tribes supported by neighbouring 
countries, on the one side; and on the other, easy access to mineral resources by local and 
regional armed groups on the other (Mazalto 2009; IA 2010; Spittaels 2010) are seen as 
explanative root-causes of violence and insecurity cycles in the eastern DRC. Also, both 
schools acknowledge poverty, insecurity and the rights of defending one’s communities and 
protecting one’s identity and lands against invaders as conflict fuelling-factors (Burnley 
2011; Lemarchand 2011). In summary, rebel and combatant recruitment in the DRC, as 
explained in Chapters Two and Three involves greed and grievance theories. This approach 
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focuses less on the 1884 Berlin General Act, also known as charter creating the DRC. 
According to this charter, the DRC is and should remain a protected space for great powers’ 
interests and wherein any affirmation of sovereignty needs to be deterred by the menace of 
Balkanisation (Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M’bokolo 2005). This is 
what this thesis coins as ‘terra nullius [common property] theory’, which, in fact, according 
to a few scholars (Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M’bokolo 2005; Mbeko 
and Ngbanda 2014), is the main origin of the ‘top-down approach’ or the pre-eminence of 
international and regional views over local approaches in solving the conflicts in the DRC. 
This view was fully supported by my fieldwork’s findings.142 Understanding ‘terra nullius 
theory’ and ‘top-down approach’, however, would require us to review briefly some 
historical facts of the colonial period in the DRC. 
4.6.1 Unveiling some Historical Facts of the Colonial Era in the DRC 
From the International Association of the Congo (17 November 1879), through the Congo 
Free State (1885) and Belgian Colony (1908) to the current DRC (30 June 1960), the 
DRC’s history suggests that the sovereignty of the state has always been in collision with 
the interests of Western powers. It has been postulated by a few historians and political 
scientists (Ndaywel1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M’bokolo 2005; Mbeko and 
Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014) that when the King of Belgium, Léopold II, started 
the conquest of the Congo Basin in the 1870s, he had encountered stiff resistance from the 
then European powers; France, Germany, Spain and Portugal. To these countries, the 
territory of the International Association of the Congo was brimming with abundant natural 
resources. So, they were unfavourable to see Léopold II administrate the rich basin of the 
Congo all alone (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014). According to Mbeko and Ngbanda (2014) 
and Van Reybrouck (2014), on 23 April 1884, the then European powers, including 
Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Holland, Italy, Norway, Span, Sweden and Russia as 
well as the United States of America signed the Berlin General Act, changing the status of 
                                                 
142
General trend rising from the fieldwork’s findings, Belgium, DRC, England and France July-December 
2013. 
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the International Association of the Congo143 – created by Léopold II, to the Congo Free 
State. Here is the importance of recalling that these signatory powers like the current 
international community consider the 1884 Berlin General Act as the DRC’s constitutional 
Act or Charter creating the Congo.144 According to this Act, King Léopold II was 
acknowledged to be the owner of the Congo Free State (Van Reybrouck 2014), but this 
recognition was subject to a conditionality; the territory of the Congo Free State had to be 
and remain a ‘terra nullius’, with free access to all (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014).145 By 
implication, the territory covering the Congo-Zaïre belongs to nobody and all the signatory 
powers of the Berlin General Act had the right to enter and exercise their trade freely. 
Consequently, the DRC has been officially set as ‘a colony of the international community’ 
and ‘a common property’ of the signatory states of the Berlin General Act (Ndaywel 1998; 
Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M’bokolo 2005). This stance also concurs with the general 
trend deriving from my fieldwork’s findings.146 
In 1908, the Congo Free State switched to the Belgian Colony following the atrocities of 
King Léopold II over indigenous populations. However, how can a Free State shift from 
autonomy status to a colony? To date, this question seems to be pending and unanswered. 
Neither the former colonial master nor the signatory powers of the General Berlin Act tried 
to address it. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that under terms of the General Act of the 
Berlin, guarantees related to free trade within the colony, scientific enterprises and no 
import duties for twenty years were the most advantages that the signatory states of the 
General Act of the Berlin were interested in (Ergo 2008). Contrary to his pledge regarding 
the protection of the advantages above, early in the mid-1880s Léopold II issued a range of 
decrees that finally violated the advantages of his partners (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van 
Reybrouck 2014). On the other side, it has been ascertained that after acknowledging the 
                                                 
143 Ndaywel (1998), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) and Elikia M’bokolo (2005) give detailed explanations on the 
historical process of state-building in the DRC. 
144 Ewans (2002) puts forward that in 1885 Leopold’s efforts to establish Belgian influence in the Congo 
Basin were awarded with the État Indépendant du Congo [Congo Free State; EIC or CFS]. On the other side, 
by a resolution passed in the Belgian parliament, Leopold became Roi-Souverain [sovereign King] of the 
newly formed CFS, over which he enjoyed nearly absolute control. 
145 Ndaywel (1998), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) and Elikia M’bokolo (2005) offer further details on the 
internationalisation of the process of state-building in the DRC and various consequences thereof. 
146 General trend rising from the fieldwork’s findings, Belgium, DRC, England and France July-December 
2013. 
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state’s rights of proprietorship over all ‘terres vacantes’ [vacant lands] throughout the 
Congo territory (Ewans 2002; Jones Adam 2006; Ergos 2008), Léopold II further lessened  
the rights of the autochthons – Congolese, in their land to native villages and farms, 
essentially making nearly all of the Congo Free State the ‘terres domaniales’ [crown lands 
or federal lands] (Jones Adam 2006), in which merchants limited their commercial 
activities in rubber to bartering with the natives (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van 
Reybrouck 2014).  Moreover, in 1892, after having divided the terres vacantes into a 
domanial system or federal system, he privatised extraction rights over rubber for the state 
in some private domains, allowing him to grant lucrative concessions to multinational 
corporations (Ewans 2002). As a sideline to this, the domanial system destroyed the 
traditional economy of the Congo basin and enforced a labour tax on Léopold’s Congolese 
subjects, requiring local chiefs to supply men to collect rubber and other resources. Natives 
were essentially constrained to supply these products without payment (Jones Adam 2006). 
Arguably, at the face of great powers, King Léopold II and the Belgian government were 
considered as mere managers of an international property. As discussed above, Belgian 
administration and its official attitude towards indigenes were ‘paternalism’ (Ewans 2002; 
Jones Adam 2006). Based on this approach, Congolese had to be cared for and educated as 
if they were children. Moreover, indigenous people did not have any role in legislation, but 
customary rulers were applied as agents to levy taxes and enlist labour force; uncooperative 
rulers were deposed (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014). This ‘parent-child 
relationship’ between Europeans – represented by Léopold II or the Belgian government, 
and Congolese (Van Reybrouck 2014) still lasts until to date (Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014). 
This policy, as claimed by a group of respondents, consisted of alienating indigenous 
culture and breaking the soul of a people. As a result, Congolese indigenes were kept out of 
management of their own lands and resources – this is ‘resources appropriation’ theory, 
also coined as ‘globalisation’ mentioned earlier in Chapters Two and Three. By 
implication, any conflicts arising from the management of the Congo had to request the 
great powers’ advisory opinion before the settlement (Ewans 2002; Jones Adam 2006; 
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Mbeko and Ngbanda 2014), a view supported by my fieldwork’s findings.147 This is the 
‘top-down theory’ referred to above, which is further discussed in Chapter Five. 
‘Resources appropriation’ and ‘top-down theory’ have been the bedrock of ‘terra nullius 
theory’ mentioned earlier in this section. This view prevailed before colonial epoch like 
during colonial period (1908-1960), in the aftermath of the country’s independence in 1960 
this still continued till today. Equally, this could partially justify why Belgium did not 
prepare Congolese elites to take over after the colonial period (Davidson 1984). 
Concomitantly, evidence from the political history of the DRC (Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M’bokolo 2005) shows that all Congolese nationalist leaders who 
dared to oppose the Berlin General Act by claiming the real sovereignty of the Congo were 
murdered – Simon Kimbangu, Lumumba, Laurent-D Kabila etc., or were curbed from 
accessing into power in order to prevent the country to be governed contrary to the Berlin 
General Act. This stance concurs with the view of Former Senior Civil Servant from the 
intelligence service of Zaïre and with the one from a Civil Servant from the intelligence 
service of the Congo that I interviewed respectively in Paris and Kinshasa.148 In the same 
vein – as disclosed by a focus group’s participant, some days before his assassination on 16 
January 2001, Laurent-D. Kabila, the then DRC’s President, said: 
“I am aware of an assassination plot, organised and conducted by the Westerners, 
against me. A few individuals recruited from inside and outside the country are 
ready to murder me. Yes, I will die! Not because they have made you think and 
understand I am a despot, but because I am not a carrier of Western agendas and 
interests. They will kill me because I decided to lead the battle of intelligence 
against brute force, because I am the people’s soldier and mostly because I want to 
use our resources to change our people’s livelihood”.149 
                                                 
147General trend rising from the fieldwork’s findings, Belgium, DRC, England and France July-December 
2013. 
148 Interview conducted with Former Senior Civil Servant from the intelligence service of Zaïre, Paris, 
December 2013. 
Interview conducted with a Civil Servant from the intelligence service of the DRC, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
149 The last speech of the late Laurent D. Kabila, President of the DRC (1997-2001), reproduced during a 
focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
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This might be the reason why a few days following the independence the country sunk into 
civil war and was once more set under the international protectorate of the UN, namely the 
Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo [United Nations organisation in the Congo; 
ONUC] from July 1960 to June 1964, the first ever UN Missions in the world (Mbeko and 
Ngbanda 2014; Van Reybrouck 2014). 
At the aftermath of the independence in1960, the Berlin General Act has been used through 
theories of ‘chaos and lies’. These approaches gave rise to the emergence of strong men 
from inside and outside of the DRC, and dubious and corrupted elites and leaders from 
within the country. To this effect, reflecting the work of Beswick and Jackson (2011:20), it 
argues: 
“During Cold War, ruling elites in states considered by the superpowers to be of 
strategic value received military support, training and aid to build up forces to 
maintain their position, often against ideologically defined insurgent movements”.  
Based on the work of historians (Hochschild 1998; Ndaywel 1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; 
Elikia M’bokolo 2005; Ergo 2008; Van Reybrouck 2014), political scientists (Ewans 2002; 
Jones Adam 2006) and drawing on findings from my fieldwork (2013),150 it might be 
suggested that in the 1960s, the country went through different coups d’état, secessions and 
rebellions. From the 1970s to the 1990s, as indicated by a focus group discussion, there was 
a rising of puppet leaders all over the region (Habyarimana, Museveni, Kagame, etc.), with 
Mobutu being the main actor in carrying through the Berlin General Act vision.151 In 
whole, it is evident that the chronology of the different protracted armed conflicts and 
various recourse to the international community in solving local and national problems 
(top-down approach) are nothing else than a denial of the Congo’s independence (Ndaywel 
1998; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Elikia M’bokolo 2005). According to a focus group 
discussion I conducted in Kinshasa, participants were of the view that the organised and 
planned looting of natural resources of the DRC falls under the theory of ‘terra nullius’ as 
                                                 
150 See appendix two for more details on different conflicts in the DRC. 
151 Focus groups, Kinshasa August, September and October 2013. 
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it is part of a well-organised programme emanating from the ‘1884 Berlin General Act’, 
endorsed by the ‘1885 Berlin Conference’. To these individuals: 
“The protracted armed conflicts and fragile institutions that have rooted in the DRC 
are part of the well-considered strategy to weaken the structures of the Congolese 
state and to facilitate the looting of the state’s resources. This may be the reason 
why chaos and looting are perpetrated with impunity in the DRC in the eyes of 
20,000 UN indifferent peacekeepers”.152 
The terra nullius theory has been at the forefront of the ambiguity of the colonial dual land 
tenure system which had been corrected by the Bakajika law153 in 1966. However, this does 
not negate the Lemera154 Agreement, neither does it deny Article 9 of the current Congolese 
Constitution, as both reproduced the terra nullius principle in essence and still bear the 
scars of conflict, or litigation between multinational corporations and the Congolese state. 
In trying to understand the essence of Article 9 of the current Congolese constitution, it is 
worth underlining that the Article is nothing more than the reproduction of the 1884 Berlin 
General Act. This section therefore will succinctly endeavour to examine the Congolese 
Land Law, the Lemera Agreement and Article 9 of the 2006 Congolese Constitution in 
order to shed light on the existing correlation between mining and the cycle of combatant’s 
re-recruitment and reintegration in the DRC. The current course of armed conflicts in the 
mineral-rich territory covering Goma and Kisangani helps understand the ideas behind the 
Lemera Agreement, and the principle of permanent sovereignty as stated in the 1884 Berlin 
General Act, reproduced by the Article 9 of the 2006 Constitution. Figure 4.1 shows the 
crown of wealth of the DRC concentrated in rebellions’ stronghold.  
                                                 
152Focus groups, Kinshasa August, September and October 2013. 
153 Bakajiga Law was passed on May 27th 1966 and promulgated as ordinance-law on June 7th 1966. It is used 
to regulate the legal regime of land ownership as the constitution of 1 August 1964 in article 43, Paragraph 4. 
154 Lemera Hotel in South Kivu in the DRC where was signed the agreement creating the AFDL. 
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The link between armed conflicts – including combatants’ recruitment, and the exploitation 
of natural resources in the DRC draws its origin from the military support that Burundi, 
Rwanda and Uganda brought to the AFDL in 1996-1997 (Gebrewold 2009). The AFDL was 
created by the ‘Lemera Agreement’ in 1996. The 2nd Article of the ‘Lemera agreement’ 
declares Congolese soil, whether customarily-held or not, exclusive and inalienable property 
of the AFDL. Concomitantly, the 4th Article states that preaching Pan-Africanism, the 
Alliance agrees to transfer 300 kilometres of the Congolese border, inside the country, to 
secure its neighbours; Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi against the rebel uprising (Nashi 2010; 
2013; Onana 2013).  
It follows from the articles above that the AFDL had the exclusive sovereignty over the 
Congolese lands; therefore, it had rights to alienate the soil, subsoil and the borders of the 
Congo. To this end, it seems crucial to underline that the land management system in the 
DRC is regulated by the 1966 Land Law, also known as the ‘Bakajika Law’. This law 
declares Congolese soil, customarily-held or not, as exclusive and inalienable property of the 
state (Beck 2012). This means that the DRC has absolute sovereignty over its lands. The 
Bakajika law acknowledges an exclusive sovereignty of the state over its lands; forest 
including other natural resources. Concurrently, the 2nd Article of Lemera Agreement 
invested the same state power to the AFDL which was known as a rebel movement before 17 
May 1997.  
On the grounds of the Lemera Agreement, it could be argued that the AFDL was assigned the 
full sovereignty over the Congolese territory, effectively becoming the new lands’ owner. 
This Agreement further established grounds from which the DRC’s neighbours draw their 
legitimacy to overtly or covertly support rebellions inside the Congolese territory covering 
the space required in Lemera Agreement. However, the most important point that should be 
raised is that the AFDL – a rebel group, has created a no man land in the eastern DRC, and 
has allotted to itself the full power to lease mining contracts with countries and multinational 
corporations (Nzekanizena 2013). Question: how and why could a political movement – not 
yet in power, take ownership of the land of a sovereign state, and to some extent, modify the 
national border for neighbours’ profit? This query prompts the importance of understanding 
the motivations that led to the creation of the AFDL and the assigned task in leading the 1996 
armed conflict in the DRC. 
Legend 
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4.6.2 AFDL: Foreign Interest in the DRC 
Although the AFDL was a Congolese political movement under the Laurent-D Kabila 
leadership, basically it was a Rwandan initiative. The AFDL was in control of Rwanda, and it 
can be contended that Rwandans created this movement not necessarily because they needed 
to solve the issue of Hutu refugees in the eastern DRC, but because they had a sufficient and 
clear idea of controlling natural resources in the DRC (Gebrewold 2009; Onana 2013). “It 
was necessary that we respond and we had already identified Congolese who would fight 
Mobutu for us, with our support”, said Rwandan President Paul Kagame (Jeune Afrique 
2013). Onana (2012), for instance, reveals that Tutsi businessmen and elites who were exiled 
in the Congo in 1959 and came back home in 1994 have never hidden their yearning to 
control the resource-rich zones of the Kivus. Evidence from a few scholars further shows that 
when the AFDL occupied the city of Bukavu in 1996, Rwandan businessmen moved Kigali 
to Bukavu with an important quantity of money. They have physically slaughtered local 
inhabitants who attempted to thwart their business plans (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Gebrewold 
2009). From Nzongola-Ntalaja and Gebrewold’s stance, it might be postulated that the AFDL 
arrival in Bukavu had a clear economic and business agenda which has been materialised 
later with the creation of different business structures all over the zones under its 
administrative control. 
The works of Gebrewold (2009), UN (2009; 2010; 2012; 2013), André-Dumont (2011) and 
Onana (2012) provide a useful interpretation of the ways in which the AFDL carried foreign 
interests in the DRC and how the security issue was an alibi which has hidden the main 
objective of the invasion of the DRC – illegal exploitation of mineral resources, by 
neighbouring countries. Beyond the business and economic agenda, some reports and 
evidence have ascertained that from Lubumbashi to Kinshasa, and across the country, the 
RPF had established a business bank for the reconstruction (UN 2009, Onana 2012). 
However, there is still concern as to the relevance of that bank, as it has never funded any 
reconstruction programme in the DRC since its creation. Gebrewold (2009), for example, 
attested that at the same time the AFDL was conquering Congolese territory under Mobutu 
control, some parts of Congolese industrial infrastructure were transplanted from Bukavu to 
Rwanda. The report of the 2012 UN Security Council on external support to the M23 also 
revealed that Rwanda and Uganda still support external and internal armed groups for 
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minerals exchange. Arguably, it could be put forward that Rwanda has essentially invaded 
the eastern DRC in order to secure its future in terms of mineral resources supply (UN 2009). 
A set of papers (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Gebrewold 2009; Onana 2012) indicated that when 
the AFDL started its initial battle to overthrow Mobutu from power, concomitantly Tutsi-led 
Rwandan government was establishing mining structures in the conquered territory under the 
AFDL administration. Based on his research regarding European censorship on crimes in the 
DRC, Onana (2012) clearly acknowledges that the conflict in the DRC is fundamentally 
economics’, and Rwanda – with multinational corporations’ approval, brought the AFDL in 
power not first for security issues but economics’. 
Likewise, in my research in Kinshasa with former Adviser to the Presidency and in Paris with 
a free-lance journalist, it was noted that the first bilateral agreement between the DRC and 
Uganda was a commercial one. This agreement is normally quite specific and set the ‘clause 
of the most favoured nation’ on the side of Uganda.155 This opinion also concurs with 
Gebrewold’s (2009) for whom all agreements signed between Laurent-D and his allies 
carried seeds of future conflicts. From Koen (2008) and Onana’s (2012) researches on the 
DRC’s conflict, it is indicated that in September 1998, the then Rwandan President 
Bizimungu came to Kinshasa with an economical accord between Rwanda and the DRC, 
while Ugandan President Museveni was carrying a commercial one. According to former 
Adviser to the Presidency, the commercial agreement brought by the Ugandan President was 
written in English from Kampala that Congolese counterpart translated into French. The third 
article of the so-called agreement set the ‘clause of the most favoured nation’; while the 
fourth article outlined the application of the third article, and stated that ‘the clause of the 
most favoured nation’ will apply to all business partners.156 
On the grounds of multilateral agreements, the clause of the most favoured nation would 
mean that if a third party joins the agreement and is given any advantage – which was not 
initially included in the contract, automatically the advantage should apply the same to the 
main partner – the one who was the first to partake of the agreement (Battle and Moats 2013). 
                                                 
155 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
Interview conducted with a free-lance Journalist, Paris, December 2013. 
156 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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The same article further highlights that if Uganda would give such an advantage to a third 
party, this advantage should not apply the same to the DRC – which is the Uganda’s main 
partner in the contract. Virtually, possible interpretation of this includes that the ‘clause of the 
most favoured nation’ would only work for the DRC’s case and not its partners. Because they 
– all DRC’s partners, knew that the DRC has lots of partners, and would be offering lots of 
favours to all its partners alike on a grand scale, claimed a group of individuals.157 As the 
focus group discussion indicates, visibly, Rwanda and Uganda were aware of this weakness 
and wanted to fully grab this opportunity to secure their future in mineral resource supply 
(Gebrewold 2009).  
In my research in Kinshasa, when I interviewed former Head of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, he said: 
“In Kinshasa during the same visit of presidents Bizimungu and Museveni, 
Congolese, Rwandan and Ugandan delegations met in the Red Lounge of Congolese 
Foreign Department. The gathering focused on the reconstruction programme of the 
DRC, and Rwandan partners showed their willingness to partake in the reconstruction 
of the DRC. What might sound interesting in the context of this study is that during 
these encounters, Rwandan partners have been interested in building roads connecting 
Gyseni, Goma and Walikale. What would be the interest of neighbouring Rwanda in 
building roads inside the DRC – because it is already beyond their borders, he said? 
For him, connecting Giseni to Goma, for example, would be comprehensible because 
both cities are located on either side of the border. But what could the reasons and 
interests be behind the project of connecting Giseni to Walikale? This concern might 
find the answer in the idea behind Rwandan project of building a railway connecting 
Kigali-Giseni-Goma-Walikale-Kisangani”.158 
Drawing on focus group discussions, most of the respondents adduced that the idea behind 
Rwandan reconstruction project could be gradually grasped by the presence of different 
armed groups in the eastern DRC’s territory along the above-mentioned cities. One review of 
                                                 
157 Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
158Interview conducted with former Head of the Department of Congolese Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
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UN experts on the DRC (UN Experts 2014) indicated that until a recent past – 5 November 
2013, the territory covering Goma-Walikale-Kisangani159 was a rebellions stronghold where 
Rwanda and Uganda ignite and support the recruitment of militias among different local and 
external ethnic groups. This view is supported by several participants in focus groups’ 
discussions, for whom Rwanda’s economic survival relies on fuelling and supporting armed 
movements in the Kivus, something that it uses as a security alibi to invade the eastern 
DRC’s resource-rich territories.160 According to the UN (2012) and de Koning and Enough 
Projects (2013), these militias have been held responsible of illegal mining of mineral 
resources, and were militarily supplied by the above mentioned countries. From 1996 up to 
2013, the AFDL metamorphosed under at least 3 official different rebel movements, the 
RCD, CNDP and M23. All these rebellions, in control of Rwandan background, have 
established their stranglehold within a space covering at least 300 Km inside the Congo – 
from Goma and Kisangani. It might be argued that, believed a Congolese academic, the 
AFDL has been shedding its nature and was an apparatus made and used to monitor and fulfil 
the plans of its initiators and mentors as they are set in the articles 2 and 4 of the Lemera 
Agreement.161 
Although the M23 is defeated, the territory is still unsecured with about 45 armed groups 
controlling mining pits. This part of the country has the largest world reservoir of columbite 
tantalite – coltan, tin and tungsten, also called rare earths – as shown in the DRC’s geological 
map coveted by multinational corporations. It is also rebellions and militias’ throttlehold (IA 
2010; GW 2011; Enough Projects 2013). All armed groups do operate in this space and are 
strongly installed in Walikale. It bears stressing that Walikale is also called ‘safe-deposit box 
of the DRC’, because this area abounds different resources that cause trouble in the East, and 
it is the area where the plundering of natural resources of the Congo is materialised (IA 2010; 
GW 2011). Walikale territory, according to a few participants in a focus group discussion, is 
one of the most mineral-rich areas in the eastern DR. Congo. However, there is no regulation 
in Walikale, neither is there any administrative structure.162 It is a place where looting is 
                                                 
159 See Figure 1.3 for more details. 
160 Focus groups, Kinshasa, July, August and September 2013. 
161 Interview conducted with a Congolese Academic, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
162 Focus group, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
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prolific, a territory where militiamen, soldiers, Rwandan and everyone collaborate in looting 
(IA 2010; GW 2011; Enough Projects 2013). 
With the proliferation of rebellions as well as politico-military and economic-military elites 
increasingly involved in mining deals, it has been suggested by Onana (2013) that Rwanda 
was planning to remove the eastern DRC from the influence of Kinshasa. A Congolese 
academic I interviewed in Paris is of the view that Rwanda could have done so militarily but 
it wanted to achieve the Kivus’ Balkanisation process more socially by creating a railway 
from Kigali to Kisangani.163 This could be interpreted that this part of the DRC’s territory 
was being annexed to Rwanda. Writings from de Koning and Enough Project (2013) 
indicated that under Rwandan and Ugandan leadership, business was developed in this part of 
the DRC. To them, from the 1990s to date Goma’s agricultural and farming products are cut 
off from Kinshasa’s control. The advantage that Rwanda could not get through agreements, 
contend Mbeko and Ngbanda (2014), it is getting so through supporting armed groups. 
Evidence from the fieldwork suggests that when the RCD, CNDP, M23 and other rebellions, 
for example, had started their movements, they have occupied the territory between 
Kisangani and Goma. According to a few focus groups’ participants, in 1998, the RCD for 
instance extended its administration from Goma to Kisangani. From this point, as claimed by 
a few analysts, it seems to be clear that Rwanda has a plan of annexing the eastern DR Congo 
to its territory.164 It attempted to implement this project through agreement with the Laurent-
D. Kabila’s government, but the project failed (Nashi 2007).  
One comprehensive and highly critical report (ibid.) suggested that to keep its plan up-to-
date, Rwanda has created rebellions throughout the natural resource-rich zones in the eastern 
DR Congo by manipulating some ethnic groups and chiefs in that area. As a ramification, to 
date, all rebel movements in the eastern DRC obey one dynamic, that is “each ethnic group 
defends its territorial identity against the other”, contended a Congolese ethnologist.165 At this 
point, “the struggle for identity and lands comes in and tries to hide resource interest”, said 
                                                 
163 Interview conducted with a Congolese academic, Paris, November 2013. 
164 Focus group, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
165 Interview conducted with an academic and ethnologist, Kinshasa, August 2013.  
This dynamic is used as recruitment technique by different ethnic groups in eastern DRC. See Chapter 6 for 
more details. 
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the north Kivu’s governor.166 Summarily, it might be put forward that to Congolese 
politicians Rwanda has therefore fuelled and played the identity game hiding the struggle for 
economic interests. However, in the long run, poverty and misery becoming chronic, given 
that all these armed groups are created not primarily for identity needs but resources’, so they 
have to control resources and territories to survive. Therefore, there comes in a perfect and 
clear understanding relationship between the artisanal mining of mineral resources and the 
phenomenon of strife, war and crises recurrence with all their side-effects; combatants’ (re-) 
recruitment and the endless DDR programme. All these factors combined have resulted in the 
‘Somalisation’167 of the eastern DR Congo.  
In fact, Onana (2012; 2013) is of the view that Rwanda has been destroying the structure of 
the state in the DR Congo. Nothing can prevent all Rwandan actions towards creating and 
supporting armed groups that are responsible of illegal exploitation of mineral resources. 
Moreover, it seems to be that the project of neighbouring countries to keep the DRC in a state 
of failure and protracted armed conflict is run more comfortably in a stateless situation in this 
part of the DRC. Onana’s view is supported by former Head of Department of Foreign 
Affairs. For him, Rwanda’s external geopolitics is based on manipulating the eastern DR 
Congo’s ethnic groups, while at the same time it is putting forward its own agents in the 
Congo in order to control mining zones and secure its future in resource supply.168 From 1996 
to date, Rwandan patriotic army, he said, is still financed from mining structures created 
during the period of the AFDL war. This seems to be the real purpose that led to the creation 
of the reconstruction bank alluded to above. So all Rwandan projects are made possible with 
multinational corporations’ support (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Onana 2012). This is ‘terra 
nullius theory’ said above. 
4.6.3 The Geopolitical Stakes of the Multinational Corporations in the DRC 
The AFDL is by far not the only source of conflict in the DRC. Different rebellions and the 
two Congo Wars (1990s and 2000s) were determined not only by Rwanda and Uganda, but 
                                                 
166 Interview conducted with former Governor of the south Kivu, Kishasa, July 2013. 
167 The concept ‘Somalisation’ has been coined for the purpose of this study to highlight an anarchic and chaotic 
situation which is out of state’s control.  
168 Interview conducted with former Head of Department of Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
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also by globalisation agendas and dynamics. On the basis of ‘terra nullius theory’, the DRC 
ought to remain unstable and weak or even balkanised state. This implies that the DRC has to 
be an international settlement of exploitation, which is made possible through an alienation of 
some national, regional and international elites from within and without which allows super 
powers and multinational interests to feast on the DRC to the detriment of the indigenes. The 
examples of the proliferation of armed groups and rebellions in mineral-rich provinces of the 
Kivus, Katanga and oriental, and the failure of DDR and security sector reform are telling in 
this context. To this effect, it is worth noting that although a fairly stable core surrounds the 
western part of the country, large mineral-rich territories of the eastern Congo are out of 
control of the central government (Beswick and Jackson 2011:32), with armed conflicts being 
fundamentally and strongly driven by multinational corporations and regional powers whose 
major concerns and the interests remain strongly and increasingly on the strategic resources 
of the Congo. 
With regards to multinational corporations’ involvement, a body of researches established 
that from Lubumbashi, before the AFDL troops took over Kinshasa, new Congolese 
authorities have mistakenly signed lots of one-sided or unfair mining contracts with 
multinational corporations. With billions of American dollars, American Mineral Fields 
Incorporated – AMFI,169 Anglo-American First Quantum Company, Lundin, Emaxon, Anvil 
and Kinross170 financially supported the AFDL to reach Kinshasa without taking control of 
Mbunjimay171 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Caplan 2012; Onana 2012; 2013). So, why the AFDL 
took over Kinshasa – 2,000 miles away from Lubumbashi, and overlooked Mbujimayi just 
nearby – 500 miles? Herein lies the importance of noting that Mbujimayi is the World capital 
of diamonds, therefore Multinational Corporations’ fear was that if the AFDL takes control of 
Mbujimayi’s diamonds, it would not negotiate mining contracts in a weak position; therefore, 
they would not have any means to fulfil their project of Balkanisation, said a diplomat.172 In 
contrast, on 2 August 1998, when the second rebellion erupted, Rwanda, Uganda and 
                                                 
169 AFMI is at the lead of multinational corporations which are fuelling mineral conflict in the DRC since 1998. 
170 Anglo-American, Canadians, Australian and South African multinational corporations signed lots of one-
sided mining contracts with AFDL from Lubumbashi a few days before Laurent D. Kabila took over Kinshasa 
in May 1997.  
171 Mbujimai is the Provincial capital of Kasai Oriental in the DRC. It is renowned as the World capital of 
diamonds and is home to Congolese diamonds extractive company MIBA. 
172 Interview conducted with a diplomat, Brussels, November 2013. 
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Burundi’s troops under cover the RCD attacked Mbunjimayi to preclude Laurent-D Kabila 
from any access to diamonds.  
In April 1997, Laurent-D Kabila and the AMFI agreed on a contract aimed to sell the 
Générale des Carrièrs et des Mines [Metals and Mineral Trading Company; Gécamines] to 
the AMFI. This agreement to sell the giant of the Congolese economy allowed the AMFI to 
rush the implementation of one of its objectives; ‘the dismemberment and partition of ex- 
Zaïre into antagonist micro states, destitute of funds and economic infrastructure – kind of 
Balkanization (Onana 2012). Having not any reliable security system and army, these states 
plagued by insecurity, therefore would be put under the total dependence of the AMFI, which 
in turn shall take over their strategic sectors of the economy’ (Caplan 2012; Onana 2012). 
The AMFI’s plan was not carried out in accordance with its objectives explained above. 
According to Onana (2012), Laurent-D Kabila first violated agreements signed in September-
October 1996, with his former allies Museveni, Kagame and Buyoya. These agreements 
obliged the DR Congo to pay for military assistance in the Liberation War, and the problem 
of security at the borders for four countries. This pact stated that the review of the delineation 
of borders in favour of Rwanda and Uganda should simultaneously satisfy these two 
countries, but also the geopolitical ambitions of the AMFI.  
On the other side, Onana (2012) discloses that while Laurent-D. Kabila had turned down the 
AMFI’s agreement; he was at the same time requesting the renegotiation of one-sided mining 
contracts signed with Anglo-American First Quantum Company which there was not deal. 
Unhappy of Laurent-D Kabila not respecting contract’s terms, according to skype interviews 
conducted in Masisi and Uvira with a few mining experts and a member of Congolese civil 
society, Anglo-American First Quantum Company seized the UN and promised fight if its 
contract is renegotiated.173 This view was supported by a diplomat I interviewed in Brussels. 
In his words:  
                                                 
173 Skype interview conducted with members of the Kivus’ civil society, Masisi and Uvira, August 2013. 
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“The request for the renegotiation of $ 2 billion one-sided mining contract signed with 
Anglo-American First Quantum Company, and that of AMFI was the ‘Casus Belli’174 
between multinational corporations and the DRC”.175  
Therefore, resource war has been openly declared against the DRC, and was exacerbated by 
the bursting of the crisis when Laurent-D. Kabila abruptly decides to return Rwandan and 
Ugandan military contingent back home in July 1998 (Nashi 2013; Onana 2013).   
The spark that set fire to the powder between multinational corporations whose proxies are 
Rwandans, Ugandans and to some extent Burundians and Kabila was the sale of one-sided 
contracts signed with the American-Canadian consortium – AMFI, to the ACC – a South 
African multinational corporation (Yomba Ngue 2013). According to a few scholars (Kourra 
Owona 2012; Nashi 2013; Onana 2013), another element which thwarted the AMFI’s 
ambitious plan with regard to the dismantle of the DRC is the denunciation of the contract 
regarding the privatisation of the Gécamines that the AMFI had negotiated in April 1997 with 
the AFDL, while Anglo-American First Quantum Company excluded any attempt towards 
the revision of its mining contract (Hilgert 2013). The AMFI, allegedly, supported rebellion 
in terms of financial, logistic and military supports (Kourra Owona 2012; Nashi 2013; Onana 
2013). However, it was still looking for a great turnover to develop mining business in the 
DR Congo, and therefore had to lead new Congolese authorities of the AFDL to sign one-
sided mining contracts (Hilgert 2013); which held them hostages of ambiguous interests of 
multinational corporations, argue Onana (2012), Hilgert (2013) and Nashi (2013).  
Baracyetse quoted by Onana (2012:92), for example, states:  
“Analysts doubt that the AMFI has the capabilities to exploit the mining concessions 
that it was granted. They believe that the AMFI could contract with larger and more 
specialised companies in order to get paid the risks already incurred”.  
                                                 
174 ‘Casus belli’ is a Latin concept which means cause of war or cause of the conflict. It applies the same to this 
research.  
175 Interview conducted with a diplomat, Brussels, November 2013. 
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On 10 May 1997 – a week before Laurent-D Kabila took over Kinshasa, the AMFI invited 
American and Canadian financial groups to visit its new acquired facilities in Congo. This 
has been seen as a way of marketing business opportunities in the Congo-Zaïre, at the same 
time showing how the AFDL leaders or new Congolese authorities are opened to foreign 
investors. In regards to this point, it is important however to bear in mind that the 
redistribution of concessions and different mining sites to American, Canadian and South 
African companies aimed to help Laurent-D Kabila to raise money in order to pay his bills 
and daily expenses of his political-administrative apparatus (Onana 2012; Bagalwa Mapatano 
2013). And Laurent-D Kabila was signing all these agreements based on Articles 2 and 4 of 
the Lemera Agreement. 
In 1995, the AMFI was officially created, and yet all plans for the ‘Balkanization’ of the 
Zaïre were ready. Nowadays, history is repeating itself as there is a reoccurrence of rebellions 
and armed groups in the eastern DRC. According to Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002) and Onana 
(2012), Museveni and Kagame are fully aware of the true intentions of the AFMI over the 
DR Congo. They are aware of the intentions, the interests and aspirations of what the AFMI 
represents and the benefits of their respective countries and much of these have been 
attributed to Laurent-D Kabila to be fulfilled. There are convergent objectives between all 
multinational companies – MNCs, involved in the DRC’s conflict. Onana (2012) suggests 
that the MNCs are in alliance with the governments of Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda to 
secure their resources’ interest, something which is different from the interest of Congolese 
indigenes.  
It is believed that the AMFI and the MNCs brought a decisive financial, military and 
logistical support to the AFDL. Currently, it has been proved that arms, ammunition, 
sophisticated military equipment that allowed the AFDL to defeat the Zaïrian armed forces in 
1997, continue to be made available for rebellions and armed groups in the eastern DRC via 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda by the same company AMFI (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). So far, 
a set of writings on the DRC’s armed conflicts depict that the geopolitical stakes of 
Multinational Corporations and the involvement of regional countries in the illegal 
exploitation of minerals, coupled with the government mismanagement in the DRC are the 
core matter explaining the cycle of armed groups and the unfolded nature of the combatants’ 
DDR programme in this country (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013).  
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A fairly cursory knowledge of the 1960s Marxist rebellions in the east of the DRC shows that 
Laurent Désiré Kabila was not a charismatic leader who could spearhead a popular 
insurrection (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). From skype interviews I conducted in Bukavu with 
some local notables, a retired general who fought with Laurent Désiré Kabila against Mobutu 
in the 1960s rebellion noted that on 24 April 1965, Ernesto Che Guevara and Cuban 
mercenaries arrived in Baraka Fizi to support Marxist rebellion led by Laurent Désiré Kabila. 
They were sent by Fidèle Castro, the then President of Cuba. After seven months spent in the 
bush, Che Guevara and his revolutionary companions came to understand that Kabila’s 
rebellion could not defeat Mobutu, therefore they decided to go back to Cuba via Tanzania. 
In the words of this veteran: “Che saw in Kabila a disorganised rebel leader; a womaniser 
who enjoyed alcohol”.176 This view was supported by Museveni and Kagame for whom 
Kabila was not able to lead a revolution but they needed an individual of Congolese origin to 
head the movement in order to convince the international community that the AFDL was a 
Congolese rebellion.177 On the grounds of the views above, one can argue that neighbouring 
military and political support to the AFDL, on the basis of regional insecurity imperatives, 
and Laurent-D Kabila’s choice to spearhead the AFDL had nothing to do with Kabila’s 
quality of Marxist-Lumumbist as mentioned earlier. Within the AFDL, there were several 
Congolese Nationalists, such as Kisase Ngandu, Kipulu Walulu, to name a few, who were 
much better than Kabila in terms of nationalism and leadership. Kabila’s choice to spearhead 
the AFDL however, laid in his quality of ‘gold dealer’, something that will later prompt the 
signing of unfair mining contracts before the AFDL deposed Mobutu. This supports the 
Onana’s (2012) view that all countries that allied with the AFDL have been partaking in the 
exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC during both wars and after the war. This 
epitomises the “terra nullius” theory said above. 
On the contrary, reflecting on the level of societies and cultures, it could be argued that 
humanity is dynamic or changes in time. At the level of organisations however, individuals 
could be static or frozen in time even over period of years (Block 2009). With reference to 
Block’s view, it reflects that Che Guevara, Museveni and Kagame’s opinions on Laurent 
Désiré Kabila were based on the principle of circumstantial alliance – which involves static 
                                                 
176 Skype interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Bukavu, August 2013. 
177 See Rwandan President’s interview conducted with Jeune Afrique, www.jeuneafrique.com. 
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behaviour of individuals, and they neglected the dynamics of cultures and societies – 
something which is inherent to humanity. Similarly, by describing Laurent-D Kabila as a 
bungling leader, Museveni and Kagame indirectly challenge not only the capacity of the 
Congolese people to manage their country, but also they defy a lowliest and inept leadership 
incapable to get the country played the central role in the current shift of geopolitical and 
geo-economical configuration of the Great Lakes Region of Africa. Therefore, the use of this 
‘principle of double reference178 by Rwandan and Ugandan leaders at this particular point 
speaks of leaders and people being unable to rule their country and to protect foreigner 
interests without the interference of external leaderships. Although Laurent Désiré Kabila 
was considered as a gold dealer and as somebody who was not able to lead a revolutionary 
movement, in the sight of the Congolese people however he is seen as a nationalist or martyr 
or hero; somebody who sacrificed his life for the total independence of his country. It follows 
from the foregoing that the evolution of societies and cultures goes hand in glove with the 
debate on the versatility of human behaviour, and to some extent leaves room to debating on 
what nationalism, martyrdom and heroism is, and how Africans, particularly Congolese 
people understand these concepts. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the developments and nature of the conflict in the DRC between 
1996 and 2012. It focused on the geopolitical relationship of the DRC with neighbouring 
countries and multinational corporations. The protracted armed conflict in the DRC, from the 
1996-1997 War, through the 1998-2003 war, to the unfolded crisis, has been portrayed as a 
‘multipart hybrid conflict’ (Carayannis 2003) or a ‘many-sided’ conflict (Prunier 2009). It 
was an amalgamation of conflicts that arose at several levels with different actors, roughly at 
local, national and regional levels (Cramer 2006a; Grignon 2006; Wake 2008), and that were 
exacerbated and obscured by their interconnections. It emerged from the analysis that the 
developments of the conflicts occurred in the context of a considerable economic collapse, a 
visible institutional slump and a waning of political legitimacy. The analysis has also 
                                                 
178 In the context of the research being studied, the ‘principle of double reference’ refers to a metaphoric 
language whereby Kabila’s picture presented by Kagame and Museveni is one of confusion until Kabila is 
recognised; then Kabila is properly focused and appears in his true perspective. 
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underlined the significance of the local context, previous to the occurrence of the conflicts, in 
which historical, social, economic, political and cultural nexuses in the region are entrenched. 
Seen under the local level, the roots of the conflicts derive from a long historical standing. 
The flooding of Rwandan immigrants and refugees into the densely inhabited the eastern 
DRC has been subject to political manoeuvring (Mamdani 1998; 2001; Lemarchand 2003; 
Prunier 2009). Being ethnically non-indigenes, the Banyarwanda were largely deprived of 
customary rights and could not have access to land based on the traditional authority 
(Mamdani 1998; 2001). However, through Mobutu’s strategy regarding horizontal elite 
networks, they were favoured and become prominent to govern the country (Putzel et al. 
2008). Through the 1972 citizenship decree, they received Congolese nationality and 
obtained massive land following the 1973 land law (Huggins et al. 2005; Van Acker 2005; 
Jackson 2007). Following the acute economic downturn after 1974, Mobutu’s patronage 
strategy based on the distribution of economic assets for political support was immobilised. 
The resentment of the Banyarwanda grew higher and they got withdrawn citizenship by the 
1981 Citizenship Law. New vertical networks were created with indigenous actors being 
advantaged and taking over the preceding patronage system (Putzel et al. 2008) and 
becoming increasingly independent (Nest 2006b) through informal privatisation of the state 
(Vlassenroot 2008). The 1990s democratic transition overlooked the issue of citizenship for 
Banyarwanda and excluded them from the process, thus aggravating the tensions and 
militarising the Banyamulenge (Lemarchand 2003; Prunier 2009).  
The alteration of the customary patrimonial system (Tull 2003: 437; Van Acker 2005) and of 
the 1973 land law with regard to the commodification portended that the change of land from 
a social resource into a capital asset enhanced a growing socio-economic exclusion of large 
fragments of the population (Tull 2003: 437). The partial land restructuring had also enabled 
a parallel arrangement of land ownerships (Meditz and Merrill 1993) through traditional 
rights and the market (Mamdani 1998). All this had weighed on the Kivus, a densely 
populated region wherein land is the most critical local resource but scarce (Sosne 1979; 
Mamdani 1998; Van Acker 2005; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2005; Turner 2007). Finally 
an ethnic conflict over the land erupted in 1993. After the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the 
situation was worsened by the arrival of the Hutu refugees (Reed 1998) and the subsequent 
1996 AFDL War. While the local conflict was believed to be an ethnic fight over land, it was 
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about ‘ethnicity and citizenship’ – something which determines the access to land (Mamdani 
2002), and political exclusion (Lemarchand 1997).  
During the 1996 AFDL War, Rwanda succeeded to reposition the Banyamulenge in the 
DRC’s socio-political system. However, the coalition between the Banyamulenge community 
and Rwanda brought out dilemmas for the latter, as the fissure between the Banyamulenge 
and the indigenous communities had amplified, and their independence had been assimilated 
in return to the protection granted by Rwanda (Vlassenroot 2002). Suspicion and antipathy 
against the Banyarwanda and Rwandans had grown based on the belief that the latter had 
used the former to aggress the DRC (Vlassenroot 2002; Lemarchand 2003). Owing to their 
coalition with Rwanda, the Banyamulenge were on the frontline of the second Congo War. 
Although they rose into power after the power-sharing transitional government in 2003, there 
were not much changes for the Banyamulenge in terms of marginalisation and treatment. This 
situation worsened with the loss of their political importance following defeat in the 2006 
votes (Prunier 2009). Challenged by a majority-driven political system (Mamdani 2002), 
which disregarded the ethnic minorities, the Banyamulenge created the CNDP to defend their 
political representation, which culminated in intensifying crisis in the Kivus (Autesserre 
2010).  
Nationally, the conflict is seen as a fight against Mobutu’s despotism and for democratic 
transition. While the AFDL war was allegedly led for regional security interests and 
succeeded to depose Mobutu, it had failed to democratise the DRC’s socio-political system, 
partially because of internal divergences and the dearth of legitimacy of the new authorities 
due to their reliance on and alliance with Rwanda (Lemarchand 2003; Nest 2006b; Putzel et 
al. 2008; Prunier 2009), which turned to be an occupying force and had militarised, 
repositioned and strengthened the Banyamulenge community. Their attempt to get legitimacy 
by delinking from Rwanda had significantly changed the local and national aspects of the 
conflict to the regional dimension. Rwanda had grabbed an argument to return to deal with 
the FDLR elements – Rwanda’s security imperative, and to get rid of Laurent-D Kabila 
(Vlassenroot 2002), and it refuelled the Banyamulenge resentment (McNulty 1999; 
Lemarchand 2003; Reuters AlertNet n.d.). When it finally prompted the 1998 Congo War, 
the fight involved various regional actors owing to their own regional security concerns.  
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Although the signing of the Lusaka Peace Agreements in 1999, Laurent-D Kabila remained 
reluctant to open a democratic space. The democratic transition was only moved forward by 
Joseph Kabila following the murder of Laurent-D Kabila in 2001. Following the 1999 Lusaka 
Peace Agreements and the 2002 Global and All-Inclusive Peace Agreement, with the 
principle of power-sharing, the country remained fragmented and the local aspects of the 
conflicts in the eastern DRC unsolved. The 2003-2006 transition and the democratic elections 
instead deepened the conflict in the eastern DRC and cumulated in political repression by 
Joseph Kabila (Amnesty International 2006; MONUC 2006; Human Rights Watch 2008; 
Reuters AlertNet n.d.). The role of regional actors was significant in the DRC’s crisis due to 
both civil wars involving external interferences. Regional security concerns were critical in 
the DRC as the latter became sanctuary for numerous foreign insurgent movements (Salehyan 
2008) and several ‘vectors of violence’ camouflaged under refugees (Lemarchand 1997) from 
neighbouring countries.179 This has been the case of Rwanda whose intervention in the DRC 
was to eradicate the menace from the FDLR, comprising the 1994 génocidaires and the 
militarised Hutu refugees in the Kivus, and to solve the political exclusion of Banyamulenge 
community in the eastern DRC, provoking a ‘Kin country syndrome’ (Lemarchand 1997).180 
Rwandan interferences seriously deteriorated the local conflicts in the eastern DRC as they 
raised the Tutsi resentments.  
The aforementioned analysis of the complex nature of the conflict in the DRC has discovered 
the backdrop and fundamental root-causes of the protracted crisis in the eastern DRC. Firstly, 
the decline of political legitimacy of Mobutu’s regime, institutional meltdown and economic 
downfall ended up to the informal privatisation in the 1980s. This informal governance based 
on socio-economic networks was anchored particularly in the Kivus and has been 
underpinned by armed conflicts and power-sharing agreement following the peace process. 
Secondly, the local environment in the Kivus was significantly shaped by ethnicity, 
citizenship and land concerns as fundamental causes fuelling the conflict, given these 
questions were rigged for political exclusion. Defining access to land was a solution for the 
                                                 
179 Local settlement, as the preferred policy for refugees by the international community until the 1980s, did not 
bring about a desirable impact as some of those refugees had turned into armed rebels (Takeuchi 2006). 
180 According to Lemarchand (1997), where ethnic fault-line cut across national boundaries, conflict tends to 
spill-over from one area to the next, transforming kin solidarities into a powerful vector of transnational 
violence. 
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ethnic crisis in the Kivus, but the state legislation remains poor in governing land ownerships 
due to the existing customary authority and rebel influence in the zone (Mamdani 2002). 
Thirdly, the way the international community handled the waves of the 1994 Rwandan 
refugees following genocide considerably changed the episode and development of the 
conflict in the DRC. The French and Zaïrian decision to create refugee camps for 
génocidaires and armed Rwandan Hutus has thus militarised the eastern DRC and set an 
urgent security risk for Rwanda to take action. More importantly, the peace process has dealt 
with the symptoms of the conflict instead of root-causes. With regard to the analysis of the 
peace process in this chapter, the state-centric or inclusive power-sharing approach failed to 
solve the local socio-political environment wherein diverse economic and security concerns 
remain, and showed its limitations to speak to negative incentives and peace spoilers. So, 
informal socio-economic networks still govern the eastern DRC. They control the local assets 
and trade outside the state authority and linger militarised. 
Within the context of the power-sharing arrangement, some actors like the FDLR were kept 
out of the process. The only option they are offered is to disband and repatriate. Owing to 
their economic and security interests, the FDLR resist firmly and require political talks with 
the Rwandan government. Likewise, the local community opposed a strong antagonism 
against the members of the RDC-Goma due to their close ties with Rwanda which continues 
arming them. Also, the peace rebuilding process during the transitional period was challenged 
by some of the weaknesses of the post-conflict reconstruction tools reviewed in Chapters 
Three and Four. The 2006 Constitution established the majority-driven political system which 
considerably marginalised the RCD-Goma as an ethnic minority and maintained the gap 
between the local community and the Tutsi. The Banyamulenge struggle against political 
exclusion culminated in the creation of the CNDP and reversion of the armed conflict 
(Hesselbein et al. 2006). Another key element is the mingling and mixing of rebels with the 
FARDC elements and the failure to demilitarise the conflict zone. As reviewed earlier, the 
DDR programme was poorly approached, disregarded, divergent and complex structures 
entrenched in the local environment and could not cater suitable support for ex-combatants, 
and neither could it secure both ex-combatants and integrated ones. This chapter has advised 
that the aforesaid unsettled issues should be considered as they are fundamental to end and 
prevent further conflict in the eastern DRC. The Chapter further indicates some limitations of 
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the analysis of civil wars using the absurdity of abundance theory in particular. The conflict 
in the DRC, for instance, epitomises a multi-layered and hybrid nature of conflict which does 
not fall under civil war and inter-state war category. In this case, the “terra nullius” theory 
categorically needs to reinforce the absurdity of abundance theory as it explains the root-
causes of, and the top-down approach to, the conflict in the DRC. It also brings about the 
existence of a compelling convergence and nexus between the new geography of resources or 
resource appropriation, ethnic identity, land access and armed conflict in the DRC, as 
opposed to the only plenty in non-renewable natural resources being a sole factor, since 
defining access to land, resource appropriation and the role of multinational corporations 
seemed to be essential in understanding the local-level conflicts in the eastern DRC. 
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Chapter Five: Nexus between Artisanal Mining and the (Re-) Recruitment of 
Combatants 
 
 (Dunnebacke 2014). 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter presents and analyses data obtained from the field research undertaken between 
July and December 2013. The findings presented and analysed below represent 80 per cent of 
interviewees’ responses, and were collected to illustrate the problems posed in Chapter One. 
In total, 40 interviews were conducted in four different interview clusters as well as 3 focus 
groups.181 Two fundamental goals drove the collection of the findings; the first objective was 
to identify the relationship between artisanal mining and the cycle of the combatants’ 
recruitment, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration in the Kivus. The second 
objective was to explore possible ways of curtailing this destructive relationship. The 
findings presented in this chapter respond to the first objective and demonstrate the potential 
for merging theory and practice. Therefore, findings are presented in six sections that 
examine the results of the state-building and security sector reform processes in the DRC, the 
political economy of the DRC’s mining, the nexus between mining and armed groups, the 
cycle of combatants’ recruitment,  the DDR programmes and the combatants’ re-recruitment. 
5.2  Autopsy of Stuttering Security Sector Reform and Fainting State-Building 
Processes 
This research falls within the post-conflict settings which is complex in nature. 
Understanding the contextualisation of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage in 
the war-torn-zone will require a better knowledge of the processes of state-building and SSR 
in the DRC, since these two elements often determine the success or failure of the post-
conflict society. As alluded to in Chapter One, from the pre-colonial through colonial, to 
post-colonial time, the history of the natural resources exploitation and combatants’ (re-) 
                                                 
181See Chapter One and Appendix Three for further details on different clusters interviewed, the number of 
interviews allocated to each focus groups. 
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis 
can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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recruitment in the DRC has been repeating itself all over the time, taking different shapes for 
different purposes. These changes are a result of the metamorphosis of the state’s institutions 
throughout these periods. In the face of a long history of break-up and conflict, characterised 
by state’s incapacity and inability to project its authority, a highly disadvantageous political 
geography, enormous natural resource wealth and profoundly fragmented society, the nexus 
between artisanal mining and the (re-) recruitment of combatants, seen as an endogenous 
process enhanced by exogenous support of certain powers in pursuit of securing the future of 
their natural resources yonder their official boundaries, needs both macro and micro-analysis. 
Seen under macro-analysis lens, the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment bond has a direct 
implication on capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the DRC driven by state-society 
relations. In light of my fieldwork’s findings however, it might be argued that process to 
analysing the resource-based conflict in the DRC would involve the understanding of 
reciprocal relations between the DR Congo as a weak state and social and political groups 
who constructively engage with the country. Possible interpretation of this includes that a 
better understanding of the link above necessarily requires a good knowledge of the process 
of state-building, peacebuilding and security sector reform – SSR, since the structure of the 
DRC as a state is the result of an underlying political arrangement; the forging of a common 
understanding between colonial master and the then international community on the one 
hand, and the Congolese elites and the current international actors whose interests or beliefs 
are served by a particular way of organising political power, on the other.182  
Based on the findings from my fieldwork, one could note that as a dynamic process, the 
features of peacebuilding, SSR and state-building in the DR Congo and the dynamics of how 
the development of these processes spread out and interconnect rely to a great extent on 
economic, political and social development of the country. This would be construed that the 
perceptions of what is priority in the DRC, for instance, has been an issue of diverse 
interpretations based on the geopolitical or geo-economical even geo-strategic role of the 
country in the region and the actors concerned.183 As a sideline to the above, concurred a few 
respondents and participants, understanding the DRC’s SSR and state-building processes 
                                                 
182 Findings from fieldwork conducted in Belgium, France, DRC and London, July-December 2013.   
183 Interviews conducted with security and military senior officers, France and DRC, September-November 
2013. 
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therefore helps ponder on the conflict essence and existence beyond the link between 
artisanal mining and the (re-) recruitment of combatants, and will guide the research in terms 
of making decisions on how to best prioritise and sequence support to country-level 
peacebuilding and state-building efforts, particularly when it comes to addressing the issue of 
delinking combatants from artisanal mining, restructuring security services and rethinking the 
new combatants’ DDR. It will also shed light in identifying the critical risks of instability and 
the most likely drivers of peace that may be explored as a useful way to addressing the 
security and development challenges in which the state has been trapped since a very long 
period.184 
After the Sun City Agreements, reforming security services and restoring the state’s authority 
have been regarded as an avoidable route to rebuilding the post-conflict DRC. Viewed purely 
under the DRC’s post-conflict perspective, SSR and post-conflict reconstruction seem to be 
so bound up with the broader process of state-building, to the extent that the reforming of the 
Congolese security services emerges as armed wing of the DRC’s state-building. As implied 
below, there exists a close nexus of a global project between restructuring security system 
and state-building process in the post-conflict DRC. This link could be both in peace time and 
in post-conflict environments, since both are also linked strongly with the idea of the ‘liberal 
peace’ (Jackson 2010). State-building and SSR, argues this section, could be exogenous – an 
activity undertaken by external actors, which often occurs during a post-conflict 
reconstruction context. It can also be an endogenous process – a national process driven by 
state-society relations, which frequently happens during peace time. Understood as an 
exogenous process, as is the case with the research settings being studied, sustained attention 
on supporting state-building has tended to be concerned with states repeatedly characterised 
by brutalised civilian populations, devastated economies, institutions, infrastructure and 
environments, widely accessible small arms, large numbers of disgruntled combatants to be 
demobilised and reintegrated and ethnically or religiously divided peoples. From an 
                                                 
184 Interviews conducted with security and military Senior Officers, France and DRC, September-November 
2013. 
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endogenous perspective however, according to Whaites (2008), state-building is nothing 
other than an indigenous and national process driven by state-society relations. This 
developmental view also tends to contend that state-building is primarily a political process 
rather than just a problem of technical capacity improvements and sees state-building as 
involving a threefold dynamic; political deals – usually elite, the prioritisation of core 
government functions and the willingness to respond to public expectations (World Bank 
2011). This, in my findings, constitutes the dichotomy between endogenous and exogenous 
view over the ongoing debate regarding state-building and SSR. However, be it endogenous 
or exogenous, building a state and reforming security services are time hungry, always 
involved different ideologies both from within and without, lengthy discussions and quarrels 
among different partners. Positive state-building development that involves reciprocal 
relations between a state – which delivers services for its people, and social and political 
groups – who constructively engage with their state, will largely depend on the improvement 
of the state-building process from within. This could be said otherwise that the more state-
building process relies on an exogenous aid and ideology –as is the case with the research 
settings being studied, the less it delivers positive service to its citizens who less buy in to it. 
In a very Hobbesian way (Jackson 2012), security is defined as the ability of the state to 
deliver a service to its citizens. From this perspective, a strong nexus between SSR, security 
sector governance and state-building emerges as a global project. Some will argue that state-
building is the practical face of the security-development link. This is the alluded nexus 
above. Brydenet al. (2005), for instance, underline four core areas to keep in mind when 
assessing the moment for suitable intervention of SSR; environment – politics and socio-
economic position of the population, political will and commitment of international actors, 
local authorship and ownership and tension with external interventions, as well as integrated 
and coherent sequencing. However, the particularity of each post-conflict environment would 
mean that state-building and SSR interventions will also be context-specific. It is likely that 
there are various methodologies or timings and these four will change with each intervention. 
Possible explanation of this includes that any international intervention should essentially be 
political in terms of deciding on the suitable moment to intervene, intervening in a delicate 
and diplomatic way and factoring into domestic political sensitivities within a heightened 
political condition. On the ground however, noted Albrecht and Jackson (2005), it has tended 
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to occur that most of the interventions have been essentially technically emphasised rather 
than politically responsive. There has also been a tendency to implement the ‘easier’ 
technical tasks of training police and military while the more problematic governance aspects 
are neglected. It arises from this perspective that overlooking the political environment in 
which the intervention takes place is too easy, something which could be a serious obstacle to 
SSR progressing effectively. In a post-conflict environment, as is the case with the DRC, 
SSR should always take into account the legacy of the past, which often involves a lengthy 
dictatorial regime. In such cases both the governance structure and the institutional 
framework have to be restructured. Moreover, political considerations come into play 
because of the involvement of different actors in post-conflict restructuring and governance 
processes. These actors may be international agencies, international militaries, private sectors 
and non-statutory security actors, comprising parties such as insurgent groups, religious 
transnational actors and warlords, as well as civil society and government itself. 
Seen through the lens of my findings, it may be suggested that following the Sun City 
Agreements, the process of state-building and SSR in the DRC caught the attention of much 
international assistance, in practice however different tries at achieving their objectives have 
been in a bind. The fundamental reason for this is the hidden agendas of different 
protagonists and their supporters, as well as the approach of state-building and SSR adopted 
both by the international community and former belligerents.185 As argued in this Chapter, 
the DRC, in its current configuration, has been subject to contemporary state-building 
approaches and is the result of interventions that focus very much on technical issues, 
particularly effectiveness and functionality of the state, rather than on the idea of what the 
Congo as a state actually is and should deliver to the Congolese. Be it theoretically or 
practically, argue some scholars, there is a clear cut difference between constructing a state 
apparatus and building a state that delivers rights to its citizens, including the right to live free 
from harm, not least in separating the technical process of what a state does from the political 
processes involved in what state actually is (Jackson 2012). Purely from a perspective of the 
                                                 
185 Interviews conducted with the UN and EU representatives, Brussels and Kinshasa, August-November 2013. 
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sociology of conflict, it argues that after each post-conflict period in the DRC, the 
international community always endeavours to build in the Congo what Jackson (ibid: 256) 
coins as “a Western-style state armed with an entire range of neoliberal theories that view the 
institutions of the state as being technocratic and separate from politics”. As a sideline to this 
thinking, the international community has dismantled the Congolese original – traditional, or 
existing state and began all over again, constructing a new set of ahistorical institutions alien 
to the indigenous communities; a process, in state-building and SSR’s readings, labelled as a 
‘McDonaldisation approach’ to state-building and SSR by Fischer and Schmelzle (2009), or 
the ‘top-down approach’ to conflict-analysis and conflict-resolution discussed in Chapter 
Four and cited in Chapter Six. Similarly, the ‘top-down approach’ used by the international 
community to the conflict in the DRC raises the issue in line with the limitations of an 
externally led UN approach that incorporated foreigner technocrats and local elites but side-
lined local communities. This effectively resulted in creating an ahistorical state which exists 
legally and is managed by a dubious elite, but is still hollow because it is severed from local 
political processes or representation, hence lacks legitimacy yonder the ruling elite and the 
United Nations (Lemay-Hebert 2011). The picture above illustrates that externally led, top-
down approach or technocratic solutions do not automatically end to a successful state-
building (Woodward 2009). 
According to Skype interviews I have conducted in Bukavu and Goma, participants have 
been of the view that following the 2003 Sun City Agreements, state-building process was 
dominated by the development of exit strategies for different belligerents and other internal 
intervening parties, including civil society and non-armed opposition. To them, these 
Agreements also designated a transitional period and ‘democratic elections’ as the end 
point.186 However, the experience has shown that after the 2006 and 2011 general elections, 
the DRC did not yet reach a successful conclusion of state development, even though some 
technocrats (Jackson 2012) could contend that elections are the possible way to making and 
enhancing democracies. It might be concurred with the view above that to date, the post-
                                                 
186 Interviews conducted with civil society representatives, Bukavu and Goma, August-September 2013. 
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conflict political landscape in the country is shaped by a multiparty democracy, but there is 
still a fundamental lack of understanding of what the development of state and that of a state-
building actually means in practice. The dearth of a good understanding of the project of state 
and state-building by state’s leaders has important implications for security governance, 
because security institutions are an essential component of the state and are frequently seen 
by underprivileged individuals as a major menace to their security. In the current shift of 
global geopolitics and geo-economics, characterised by the hunger of natural resources by 
states, building security institutions that are representative is therefore critical to the stability 
and the survival of the DRC’s sovereignty and the human security of its population. 
Much has been written on state-building (Fukuyama 2004; Hippler2005; Berger 2007; 
Beswick and Jackson 2011; Jackson 2010; 2012), but it appears useful to review 
representative illustrations of some main approaches. Fukuyama’s (2004) approach on 
completely ahistorical and technocratic states, for instance, points out the lack of institutional 
memory about state-building within policy bodies such as the United Nations. Fukuyama’s 
stance corroborates with the view that state-building is time consuming – constructing a state 
is a long-term commitment and involves sustained investment in time and resources (Jackson 
2012). Other analysts add to the ideas above, but many of their views remain generic or 
generalised comments and do not actually offer an all-inclusive theoretical framework for 
state-building. Hippler (2005), for example, highlights a plan based on three points including 
improving living conditions, structural reform of ministries and integration of the political 
system. It is worth specifying at this point that Hippler’s three-point plan looks like a 
depoliticised account of reality that drives the politics off state-building. Furthermore, such 
interventions are often put through by bureaucrats, or in the case of security governance by 
military officers from the international community who are primarily concerned with 
technical rather than political issues (Jackson 2012). Pragmatically, what does this actually 
stand for? Into which framework is the political system being integrated? If the political 
system is being integrated into the international order, as is usually the case, then how do 
grassroots partake in this process? Who authors and owns it? Are local people benefitting the 
process, or does it profit stakeholders – international states, depending on the state system on 
the ground? A substantial silence in Hippler’s analysis is that the role of a functioning 
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security sector, capable for maintaining a safe environment in which state-building can 
actually flourish, has been neglected. 
Although many of the analysts of the conflict in the DRC virtually accept that there are 
problems with the nation-state in the way that the country has been failing (Prunier 2009; 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009), however they still tend to support the scenario of the 
technocratic structures of state-building as laid out by Fukuyama. This displays the DRC as 
the norm in international relations, disregarding the expansion and extending of security at 
international and sub-national levels, mostly the intra-state nature of conflict, international 
conflict actors as well as the role of the DRC itself as an actor in non-state conflict. “If we 
can develop the right mixture of policies, then we can create a healthy nation-state that can 
exist in the international order”, says an assumption, quoted by Jackson (2012:258). 
Reconstructing the post-conflict DRC on the Agreements does not mean that the state exists 
on the ground. Like all states, the DRC needs to rely on people to make it work. This means 
that the country needs to hinge around political structures and institutional bodies. This 
further implies that people need to buy in to the state at some level.  
Viewed under the lens of legitimacy, the state as an institution needs some level of support 
that epitomises something its populace recognise as a state. This is what is referred to as 
multiparty democracy in a liberal sense, but in practice this model of democratic structure has 
failed to provide representation in the DRC post-conflict environment, partially due to 
nascent democratic institutions need sufficient time to bed down (Jackson 2012). The DRC is 
the archetypal fragile or weak state which pieces together the state’s history and the problem 
of contemporary international relations, particularly the universalisation of one model of the 
nation-state (Wolfgang Heinrich and Manfred Kulessa 2005). Based on Skype and email 
interviews conducted with a few representatives of some international organisations in Beni, 
Bukavu, Butembo and Goma, it could be interpreted that UN-sponsored external state-
building following the Sun City Agreements is another core element of a failure to embed 
legitimacy within a hybrid government beyond local elites.187 From another point of view, 
but closer to the former, different stances of a few senior security and military officers I have 
                                                 
187 Skype and email interviews conducted with a few representatives of international organisations, Beni, 
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interviewed converge to the assumption that the current DRC, seen as the emanation of the 
2003 Sun City Agreements, tells that the sharing of power between leaders who are alien to 
their populace but still have ties with external powers can have dire consequences for the 
population more generally.188 This view is closest to those of Jackson (2011) and Lemay-
Hebert’s (2011) in that it raises the second point in connexion with the construction of a new 
DRC, something which requires a significant cultural change in the sense that how people are 
close to the new state and how they conduct their everyday business, corroborated a group of 
Congolese historians and anthropologists.189  
Some political analysts acquainted with the political history of the DRC argued: 
“Attempts by King Léopold II to build a Western state in the Congo, and Mobutu’s 
initial emphasis on deconstructing post-colonial state and political parties, effectively 
superimposed an artificial state over sub-national political systems”. 
 To these analysts, if the Congo-Belgian as a state existed as an extension of Belgium, Zaïre 
as a state however existed solely because of external support to Mobutu, and not because 
there was an underlying belief in Zairian society. They further supported the view that the 
current DRC exists because of resistance of a people who believe in the unity, who are 
against foreign or neighbouring interference in the development of their state and who are 
opposed against all attempts to the Balkanisation of their territory.190 On the grounds of this 
view, the risk now is that following the decolonisation and after the departure of Mobutu the 
new Congolese state has effectively become another faction rather than an oversight 
mechanism for controlling warring factions at sub-national level.  
Thirdly, state-building is extremely ‘time consuming and capacity hungry’. From interviews 
and focus groups I have conducted in Kinshasa, it has been disclosed that following the 2003 
Agreements, the DRC received a lot of technical support for the security institutions from 
international community. However this support focused on the protection of transitional 
                                                 
188 Interviews conducted with security and military Senior Officers, France and DRC, September-November 
2013. 
189 Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
190 Interviews conducted with academics, Kinshasa University September 2013. 
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institutions leaders, the security of the elections and did not allocate resources to building the 
corresponding political support for the DRC post-transitional period – mainly because it has 
been believed to be difficult to secure. The technical support offered resulted in many EU and 
UN officials taking decisions because those from the 1+4 transitional government lacked the 
capacity to do so.191 Since the days of the Sun City Agreements – more than a decade now, 
SSR in the DRC is still a piecemeal. This, in my findings, constituted a hobbling management 
system of the state security, as experience from my fieldwork shows that the process still 
struggles to create both a developed security force and an effective intelligence. This leaves 
room to security analysts to make a point arguing that the DRC’s security system is still 
without the culture of civil oversight to control it and the civil power is still unable to 
oversight the military power.192  
Fourthly, reconstructing modern state in the DRC is so resource intensive and the process 
relies on the funds from external donors. Evidence from my fieldwork depicts that due to the 
external degree of financial investment on a political level, the process has become externally 
dependent and driven. Herein lays significant problems regarding funding and funding 
priorities, particularly when it has to do with ‘bottom-up approach’ – also referred to as 
grassroots-up approach or local authorship and ownership in the context of research being 
studied, or dearth of it and, most recently, the more limited availability of funds from external 
donors, trapped by the current credit crunch.193 A view closest to that of a Senior Security 
Officer for whom the unavailability of funds from main external donors still raises serious 
issues regarding the long-term sustainability of reforming security sector in the DRC, and 
also the relative balance between different activities; for example, should external partners 
fund the military more than development activities? This is still a fundamental predicament 
of international involvement.194 The shifting meanings of insecurity over time within the 
DRC, cited in Chapter Four, illustrates that the balance of donor intervention also needs to 
switch over time to factor in changes in the security situation, however embedded interests 
                                                 
191 Interviews conducted with civil society representative, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
     Focus groups, Kinshasa, August-September 2013. 
192 Focus groups, Kinshasa, July-August 2013. 
193 Ibid, September 2013. 
194 Interview conducted with a Congolese Senior Security Officer, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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and the inflexibility of donor planning systems have effectively locked up the state into set 
trajectories for some time (Albrecht and Jackson 2009).  
Fifthly, in the Congo-Zaïre the formation of effective state institutions has been very uneven. 
Findings from my fieldwork have shown that even where state has had a functioning core 
institution before, during or after conflict, this core hardly reaches the rural zones,195 
something which supports Jackson’s view (2007) in terms of inadequacy and maladjustment 
of security system in most of states emerging from Post-Cold War period. Consequently, the 
DRC remains alien to the Congolese citizens simply because the state is incapable to deliver 
services directly to many people. In the area of justice provision, particularly in remote 
territories and mineral-rich areas, most of the people receive justice from customary 
authorities such as chiefs or village headmen.196 These local leaders are legitimised because 
they control land and local security by using the local police, they are also controlling militias 
or ‘vigilantes’ (Baker 2008), since the general tendency of each ethnic group in the eastern 
DRC is to have its self-defence force.197 At best this has created an effective governance 
system in which local communities have both a say and a choice in terms of accessing 
services, including security. As a repercussion of such hybrid systems depending on both 
traditional approaches and modern systems of governance, local elites and leaders have 
become strongmen, they use their position to reinforce their authorities and to shore up the 
kleptocratic tendencies of neo-patrimonial rule to the detriment of powerless communities,198 
which view concurs with Jackson’s (2003) on the consequence of the mixture of traditional 
and modern systems of governance in a weak state. Lastly, yawning discrepancies are in the 
DRC between state-building, security and development.  
Readings from Jackson (2012:260) state: 
“Human security can be best served by creating a functioning state that will, it is 
theorised, provide security as a public good. Then, it is conjectured, development will 
provide benefits to the general population”.  
                                                 
195 Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
196 Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
197 Findings from fieldwork conducted in Belgium, France, DRC and London, July-December 2013.  
198 Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
Chapter Five: Nexus between Artisanal Mining and the (Re-) Recruitment of Combatants   
Coventry University 220 
 
However, how do exactly diverse individuals fit into this picture? A close look to the history 
of institutional development within the DRC shows that the country has still had wounds and 
scars for Congolese people in terms of guaranteeing their security. From remote interviews I 
conducted in Beni, Butembo and Kalele, some local leaders were of the view that access to 
security has a sad tendency to remain uneven between state, groups and individuals.199 This 
concurs with Jackson’s (2012: 260) view that “human security, or ‘freedom from fear’, which 
involves an entitlement to protection by the state in which they are citizens”, is still elusive 
for many Congolese. In view of this, states’ – and by extension the international 
community’s, responsibility to protect citizens remains a text-book principle, or something 
yet to be realised all over the country. This sets up a vicious cycle that legitimises the 
MONUSCO’s presence in the country, even where there has not been conflict. 
5.2.1  State-building, SSR and Security Governance in the DRC: A “One-Size-Fits-All” 
Approach? 
The development of SSR in the DRC is closely intertwined with the evolution of state-
building as a set of activities that coalesced. Drawing on the results of my fieldwork, it could 
be contended that from the 2003-2006 transitional period to date, building the capacity of 
civil servants to provide oversight of defence departments has been more entwined with the 
growth of civil service reform programmes as a whole, whereas security in general remains at 
the heart of the entire state-building approach from the point of view of both individual 
citizens and the international community, however that may be defined. It goes the same that 
considering the fact that SSR is viewed as a fundamental part of the international 
community’s approach to conflict management, rebuilding and reforming security institutions 
following conflict have become central components of international intervention.200 This 
view is bolstered by the view that “relatively cheap investments in civilian security through 
police, judicial and rule of law reform etc. can greatly benefit long-term peacebuilding” 
(Jackson 2012: 260). Reforming security sector involves improving the performance and 
                                                 
199 Skype and phone interviews conducted with a few community’s leaders, Beni, Butembo and Kalele, August 
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accountability of police, military and intelligence organisations, with the aim of upgrading 
the basic components of security for people.  
As a process, contends Jackson (ibid: 260-261):  
“SSR should ideally move far beyond narrow technical definitions of setting up 
functioning security institutions and follow a more ambitious agenda of reconstructing 
or strengthening a state’s ability to govern the security sector in a way that serves the 
population as a whole rather than the narrow political elite”.  
Possible interpretation of Jackson’s stand implies a radical transformation of values and 
cultures within habitually secretive and insular institutions that are not accessible to particular 
sub-groups within the population, particularly women and youth. Jackson’s opinion further 
concurs with my findings due to focus groups’ participants uttering that within the DRC, the 
general population are mistrustful of security services and hostile to the intelligence service 
which is regarded as a wing of the ruling party, hence direct threat to their individual security 
as well as to the democracy.201 It is worth emphasising that reforming such a security system 
would require including an ambitious set of approaches that will contribute to restoring trust 
between the state and the people, or the social contract. Despite obvious difficulties resulting 
from the political nature of these interventions, many international actors however are 
currently involved in SSR programmes in the DRC, including the Angola, Belgium, France, 
South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, United Nations and European Union. 
According to the information gleaned from focus groups in Kinshasa, the programmes they 
deliver are based on the use of an array of approaches and involve a complex mixture of 
international organisations, governments, non-state actors and private companies. To these 
participants, although there are significant differences in carrying out SSR as the result of 
different approaches employed by the actors above, there is however a family resemblance in 
terms of the general approaches adopted; ‘one-size-fits-all approach’.202 
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There has been much written about SSR, even though this has been subject to what Peake et 
al. (2007) refer to as ‘benign analytical neglect’. This negligence has arisen nonetheless from 
the concept having been thrived partially from an academic pre-history of civil-military 
relations (Jackson 2012). However, much of what has been written on SSR casts more light 
on practical policy-related analysis rather than being entrenched in conceptual or theoretical 
approaches (Fukuyama 2004; Hippler 2005; Berger 2007). Particular activities caught more 
attention rather than analysing wider interventions as an expression of and in relation to 
broader social and economic reform (Bryden and Hänggi 2005), therefore making the process 
of SSR to be seen as gateway into discussions surrounding security without really thinking of 
broader implications, as is the case in the DRC. 
5.2.2  Governance, Development and Security: A Blank Slate in the DRC? 
Drawing on Hettne’s (2010) work on the macro-history of the security-development nexus, 
three possible futures of state-building are postulated, including neo-Westphalian, neo-
medieval and post-national. According to the neo-Westphalian model, the current system 
would effectively continue to function through a state-based structure – with gaps, greatly 
enhanced by stronger multinational organisations with greater and more securitised powers. 
Such a structure could be multipolar, and might involve the inputs of the BRICS nations – 
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, as active security hegemons in their respective 
regions. Such a system may be violent, and create revolution and reaction within non-core 
areas of the global economy. In a Neo-medievalism scenario, state represents a less violent 
option in terms of scale, but offers no solution for those areas that are outside organised 
nation-states. With neo-medievalism there is a loosening of the state to allow smaller units 
based on primitive accumulation or warlord economics in the short term, leaving those who 
live in localised pockets of violence to suffer that violence. Lastly, Hettne puts forward the 
idea of a post-national future based on global development, which in turn is built on the inter-
regional approach proposed by the European Union, among others.  
Hettne’s pattern singles out regional governments as wagons or pipelines that promote human 
rights, democracy and conflict prevention, and such provisions are – at least in theory, 
cooperative and voluntary. However, none of these posits a pragmatic solution to the creation 
of a security-development nexus that guarantees freedom from fear. Visibly the first two 
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scenarios are connected, with the first being both more aggressive and possibly evasive to 
keep people from violence. In the first scenario individuals could be subject to international 
violence, and in the second to localised ‘low-scale’ violence – of course, it is not low scale to 
those suffering the violence. The third scenario involves innovation by providing some way 
forward, but there is a real concern with an EU-inspired solution, namely that EU decisions 
are made on the basis of arrangements between effective states that share a great deal of 
common ground, including the collective experience of a European war that no one wishes to 
repeat. This does not apply to the countries of Africa of Great Lakes, for instance, where the 
regional organisations still carry woeful experience, partly because the states that are part of 
regional agreements have repeatedly been the first to disregard them.  
Prospects for the development of comprehensive regional actors remain bleak specifically in 
regions with high recurrence of conflict (Hentz 2009). Regional approaches have proved to 
be useful in terms of renegotiating the colonial frontiers that have led to conflict – in the Horn 
of Africa, clearly in Sudan and currently between DRC and Rwanda, but the fundamental 
issue in this precise case remains the nature of the state and the close bonds between the state, 
the regime and the individual at the head of the regime (Trutz von Trotha 2009), which 
regional approaches struggle to address. This consideration actually depicts the 
characteristics of state in the DRC. State failure and drown-out-conflict in the DRC includes 
varied political orders, with some being more legitimate than others. State in the DRC 
typically lacks a monopoly of force and is powerless to extend its authority across its entire 
sovereign territory. The government also suffers from a paucity of legitimacy, is fragmented 
by alternative sources of power and faces continual threats to its authority. Since “Mobutu’s 
divide and reign strategy”, cited in Chapter Four, ‘traditional’ and state functions coexist, but 
created avenues that gave leeway to political power which the existing regime is concerned 
about.203  
More than fifty years on, the DRC has experienced different regimes that have a tendency to 
creeping authoritarianism, with them trying to construct alternative sources of security – 
paramilitaries rather than militaries, and using the security services to protect regimes rather 
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than protecting the state or the population. The scenarios alluded above lend diverse sets of 
challenges and lay out unfavourable environment for SSR approaches if they are to address 
development and security issues in a post-conflict DRC. In this context, if SSR has to work, it 
should arise from the political structures and history of the Congolese nation. Donor 
documentation often acknowledged this but not carried out on the ground. In order words, I 
argue that failure to understand the root-causes of the conflict in a ‘bottom-up’ or ‘grassroots-
up’ perspective, or engaging directly with the population – as opposed to receptive elites or 
‘top-down’ approach, has resulted in a non-representative state in the DRC and has provided 
security for the elite/regime and marginalisation for the population. This view supports 
Lemay-Hebert’s (2011) on the disparity of security system in weak state. As a ramification, 
the long-standing existence of the state is at least partially reliant on the international 
community. It follows from the problems set above that at least in the short term, the state in 
the DRC has become the simple building block of any international approach to security and 
development; hence the international community has become the main means of delivering 
both security and development to national populations. As implied above, I argue that a 
development approach – more nuanced, patient and flexible, to building state in the DRC 
should be therefore envisioned. As outlined below and this in light of Luckham’s (2009) 
view, it needs to involve: 
Firstly, a proper recognition of security as a political entitlement of citizens, hence as part of 
a social contract with the state. It is a must for the DRC’s government to provide security for 
its citizens, not to protect individuals in power (personal regimes). To this end, it should be 
acknowledged that the state’s security services as well as individual security actors who are 
acting as trouble makers and who have become agents of insecurity themselves will require 
substantial change. 
Secondly, processes and interventions of SSR and state-building should be engrained in the 
specific cultural-historical-political situation of the DRC as a nation, and not just emerged 
from the external experience of donors or non-governmental organisations. The process of 
state-building and SSR in the DRC has become problematic partly because the process is a 
top-down result of the conflict analysis and resolution which has not considered the specific 
settings of its application. Rather, it emphasised more on national and multiparty elections as 
an indicator of the legitimacy of state and as an exit point for donors; a mistake which has 
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become dangerous, since it spoiled peace, worsened civil conflict and ingrained it for long. 
This concurs with Savon and Tirone’s (2011). 
Thirdly, local communities’ voice needs to be taken into account since they are all the time 
subject to violence. At the same time, support access to justice for victims of the state and 
other forms of violence needs to be provided. It is worth noting that although the DRC 
brimmed with natural resources, poverty has however locked up most individuals in 
situations of extreme vulnerability, as do the social and economic roles allotted to idle 
individuals. Development, understood as functioning delivery of justice, would make sense 
only if it is associated with access to income-generating opportunities, since they both pave 
the way for emancipation for those locked up in vulnerable situations. There is a rift between 
the state’s security services and the people.  
Fourthly, security should be grounded from the bottom or grassroots as an evidence rather 
than idealism or ideology. This means that the ‘off-the-shelf’ interventions of some 
development agents and the highly romanticised view of some grassroots organisations have 
to be pieced together. In the eastern DRC, particularly in the mining conflict-affected areas, 
warlords have been providing a degree of governance, but only so far as it benefits them and 
only to the limits of state power. In other remote national territories, traditional authorities 
and chiefdom systems are cheap and easily understood and accessible by the people, but 
these systems usually discriminate against some loser groups at a local level. At the local 
level not everything is positive or enjoys universal support. This supports Jackson’s (2007) 
reflexion on the importance of decentralised administration in terms of rapprochement 
between governors and the people. Congolese government makes people more insecure, 
through employing security services or militias to repress people directly, using violent 
organisations to impose political power and patronage, or through links between criminal 
gangs and state security organisations such as the youth of the ruling party.  
In short, it should be envisaged ‘smarter’ and more targeted interventions, above all, a far 
deeper knowledge of the political economy of intervention over and above the technical 
expertise required to plan an SSR intervention. More generally, security is essential part of 
governance, and the provision of security falls within legitimacy attribute. The majority of 
Congolese people are subject to poverty and identify security as a key need. In essence, the 
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line drawn between development and security by the academic debate does not matter: what 
matters is how to have beneficiaries of development at the lowliest levels – local 
communities, and how to recognise security as a core need for any human development. 
However, to what extent state-building and SSR processes could have side-effects on the 
development of political economy of the mining sector in the country? The following section 
seems to cast more insight on this issue. 
5.3  Political Economy of the DRC’s Mining Sector 
The section above has helped us understand state-building and SSR in the context of the 
DRC. A look at the organisation of the mining sector however would be crucial in the 
appreciation of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus in the context of weak state 
and protracted armed conflict, since some scholars arguably believe that the nexus above 
would be the upshot of the decay of the Congolese state and its inability to reform the 
security system. Since the decline of the DRC’s economy in the 1980s, foreign investments 
have become reluctant to invest in the DRC’s mining sector although they have been critical 
to the sector’s growth. Issues such as political instability, the cost of doing business and the 
fiscal regime have been the main stumbling-blocks that still deter investors to buy into this 
sector (De Koning 2009). The political economy of the mining sector in the DRC should be 
seen under the lens of ‘strong investment potential in theory’. Theoretically, changing the 
DRC’s potential into wealth and development that profit people would require political 
willingness and visionary leadership underpinned by the rule of law. The Oxford Policy 
Management (2013:4) puts forward: “80% of investors would invest in mining in the DRC if 
the country followed international best practice in terms of its regulatory environment, 
taxation and other factors”. To date, however, the monopoly of investments in the mining 
sector is held by few multinational corporations that accept high levels of risk will, thereby 
restraining the competition between investors for the country’s mineral resources. According 
to Fraser Institute (2013), the Congolese National Episcopal Conference – CENCO, and the 
Congolese civil society,204 the DRC’s mining code is disincentive to investing in the 
country’s mining sector. Due to political instability and security concerns, the DRC has 
                                                 
204 See CENCO and Congolese Civil Society’s recommendations on the revision of the mining code. 
Chapter Five: Nexus between Artisanal Mining and the (Re-) Recruitment of Combatants   
Coventry University 227 
 
become an unappealing investment environment regardless of its attractive natural resources, 
and it ranks 5th from bottom in the World Bank’s Doing Business (The Oxford Policy 
Management 2013). Overall, it can be argued that the decline and dysfunction of the mining 
sector result from the fact that this sector has always been the prerogative of a certain elite in 
power.  
According to former adviser at the Presidency, a Congolese academic and a member of the 
Congolese civil society I interviewed in Kinshasa: 
“From Mobutu to Joseph Kabila, the mining sector in the Congo-Zaïre has been 
governed by one rule; that is controlled by the Presidency and to some extent the 
ruling party. This rule is drawn from the colonial model of mining exploitation based 
on the principle that every mining production should profit the colonial master. This 
pattern was reproduced by the AFDL administration which was mainly composed of 
the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian elites and military during the arrival of 
Laurent-D Kabila into power in 1997. These non-Congolese military and civil 
personnel were representing the interests of their respective countries. They were fully 
aware of the geo-economy of the mining sector in the DR Congo and the kind of 
security that such a sector required during time of peace or disturbance”.205 
5.3.1  Security Provisions of Mining Sector 
The concept of ‘security’ has undergone an era of theoretical turmoil with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the limitation of strategic arms and the reduction of threat of major power war. 
Seen under the lens of conflict dynamics, security concept derives from the supposed ‘peace 
dividend’ drawn from peacebuilding and peacekeeping that unleashed a broader debate over 
whether to widen the security concept farther (Mathews 1989; Sorenson 1990; Brezinski 
1992; Clare 1992). As alluded to above, it might be provided that the perspective of 
individual nations and the idea of common security need to be enlarged to a global perception 
of security whereby every socio-economic aspect should be accounted for a potential hazard 
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(Dixon 1991, Chen 1995). More recently, researchers’ efforts have shifted to the mining 
security, with focus on the mining-cantered aspect (Dixon 1991; Chen 1995; De Koning 
2009). In the security literature, the argument of mining security involves that the attention of 
security studies should switch from the state to the mining sites, with military and non-
military threats going hand in glove (Clare 1992; Chen 1995). 
The development of security is the result of the acknowledgement of unexpected patterns of 
change in different apparatuses of development, technological and political changes brought 
by globalisation. Possible repercussion has been the rise of the concept of mining security. As 
indicated by De Koning (2009), this term ordinarily entails ‘protection of zones endowed 
with natural resources or mining sites’. In parallel to the debate over human security, a range 
of scholars (Mathews 1989; Sorenson 1990; Brezinski 1992; Clare 1992) have been debating 
on the significance of the ‘mining security.’ In modern and sovereign states, the traditional 
meaning of security has been the application of the military force to protect the territorial 
integrity (Clare 1992; Chen 1995). However, security studies and the security systems have 
long been emphasised on defence policy or mechanisms – be it local, national or 
international, towards deterring, avoiding, preventing, and to some extent, winning inter-
state/intra-state armed conflicts (Baldwin 1995; Chen 1995; Del Rosso 1995). The idea 
behind the concept of security includes two basic elements; an orientation to forthcoming 
risks and an attention on risks of falling beneath some critical threshold of deficiency (Clare 
1992; Baldwin 1995; Chen 1995; Del Rosso 1995). In mining sector, however, security is not 
synonymous with the average level of upcoming welfare; it means the risks of being severely 
disadvantaged (Baldwin 1995; Del Rosso 1995; De Koning 2009). The security of the mining 
sector in a country today, for instance, is not only a function of its well-being today, but it is 
also projections for its future resource protection in terms of avoiding states of great 
resources deprivation. 
Following wartime, the DRC’s security system has been subject to various multilateral and 
bilateral reform programmes, including peacekeeping and peace enforcement by the 
MONUC, security sector reform programme of assistance and bilateral training programmes 
of the national army and police (De Koning 2009). Despite these multilateral and bilateral 
assistances, the dynamic of the privatisation of security in the country increased and is still an 
issue out of the state’s control. In the DRC, the national army and police are widely involved 
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in insuring private interests. This situation results from the appalling conditions of security 
forces, corruption and maladministration (Stearnset al. 2013). State security forces are no 
longer public security provider, rather insecurity and threat supplier.  
In pursuit of a decent income and in search of filling their pockets, the police and army 
elements are more involved in a series of privatised uses of state assets, ranging from the 
defence of the commercial interests of the political elite, the participation of police and army 
in trafficking to the use of police as guards at residences, shops or companies (De Koning 
2009; Stearnset al. 2013). This suggests that in a context whereby the national security 
system is run as privatised rather than public forces, there is risk of creating a rift between 
people and security forces due to the latter predating on the former. Autresserre (2012: 19) 
however, is of the following view: 
 “Extending the authority of a predatory state merely results in replacing one group of 
perpetrators with another – state authorities and state security forces, furthermore it 
sometimes actually worsens living conditions for the population”.  
The history and sociology of the DRC’s security system from the independence to date 
suggests that there is a lack of trust between the security system and the people (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 2002) to the extent that the people cannot rely on the state’s security system – Army 
and Police, due to its unprofessionalism and the lack of protection capacity. This situation 
unfortunately led the people to turn to private security. Similarly, it has been proved that the 
DRC’s state of failure and the lack of service delivery have commoditised security in the 
country (Zeilig 2009; Lanotte 2010). As a result, security has become accessible only to those 
who can afford it, whereas those who cannot are often on prey of the public security 
elements. It is in this environment that the private mining security could be situated in the 
DRC. 
In the mining sector’s jargon, the concept of security encompasses several understandings 
depending on different scales of mining activities, mining environment and different policies 
applied to the mining activities. In my research in Kinshasa, when I interviewed a mining 
lawyer, she particularised that mining security can stand for the way in which mineral 
activities are carried out in accordance to the required rules and conditions in order to avoid 
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accidents and landslides. It also refers to some protected areas where mining activities are 
prohibited. These zones include sites of uranium or other sensitive minerals in general. 
Mining security further indicates the security of some mining areas that are still under state 
control, and not yet open to the public for mining activities. These two latter zones are 
secured by the state mining police.206 
The police allocated to mining are an organised institution which only deals with the security 
of mining areas that are not yet granted to third parties. According to Congolese law and 
mining policy (Mining Code 2011), no mining activities can be carried out except with prior 
authorisation by the government. Hence, any potential mining operator needs a required 
authorisation. According to a mining expert interviewed in Kinshasa, the mining code 
provides three types of permits towards mining activities:207 
• Research permit that bestows an authorisation to carry out research on the kind of 
minerals. 
• Operating permit which is lent on the basis of knowledge of an existing mineral 
substance in a given mining area – the kind of mining substance is already known and 
well located then needs to be exploited.  
• A mining operator who already holds the operating license but cannot meet required 
conditions related to mining operations can contract with a third party either to exploit 
or to search. If they agree on the exploitation, then the agreement is called option 
contract. However, if the agreement is on research activities, then it is a lease contract.  
These three contracts outline the mining activities in general.  
Apart from these three contracts, there is what the state has created and that the mining code 
calls artisanal mining zones. These areas are declared by the state to be opened to artisanal 
mining activities. Artisanal miners are therefore listed in order to run artisanal mining under 
the supervision of cooperative groups (Proposition d’Amendements sur le Code Minier 
2012). Beyond these contexts, any other mining-led activities are unlawful (Congolese 
Mining Code 2011). On the grounds of the abovementioned principle, no mining activities 
                                                 
206 Interview conducted with a lawyer of an Anglo-American mining corporation – Tenkefungurume, Kinshasa, 
August 2013. 
207 Interview conducted with a member of private mining sector representatives, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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can be carried out without prior authorisation because mineral resources are part of the state’s 
sovereignty, contended some respondents.208 
From the other point of view, it is said that the state, through the mining police, needs to 
ensure that no mining activities are conducted in the mining-prohibited zones. Herein lays the 
role of the police of mining which is to ensure that the mining of minerals and the traffic 
thereof have respected the principle established in the mining code.209 Therefore, it is up to 
the police of mining to secure the mining sites which are prohibited for any mining activities 
due to sensitive minerals and those which are not yet given to third parties (Congolese 
Mining Code 2011). This leaves room to a private sector’s mining expert to claim that all 
mining operators holding either of the aforementioned permits are expected to ensure the 
security of their mining concession.210 However, it is important to bear in mind that mining 
activities draw from the general principle that the soil and the subsoil belongs to the state – 
Bakajika Law. It means that the DRC which is the owner of the land (Congolese Mining 
Code 2011), said an expert on mining, declares illegal any exploitation carried out in the area 
that is not temporarily conceded to third parties for mining activities.211 
So far, the system of security provisions in the mining sector involves National Police, the 
Mining Police, the National Intelligence Agency and the Directorate-General for Migration 
(De Koning 2009; 2011, Autesserre 2012). Additionally to these services, private and 
semiprivate security companies protect mining concessions on behalf of mining companies, 
while in remote mining areas where the state and companies cannot provide security, 
customary authorities could set control systems involving lightly armed recruits (De Koning 
2009). As discussed in Chapter One, the issue of artisanal mining security is diverse and 
typically involves state and non-state security players.  
                                                 
208 Interviews conducted with a member of political representatives, policymakers and a journalist, Kinshasa, 
July-August 2013. 
209 Interview conducted with a member of the Department of Mining, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
210 Interview conducted with a member of private mining sector representatives, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
211 Interview conducted with an academic and mining lawyer, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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5.3.2  The DRC’s Land Rights: Bakajika Law 
The Bakajika law212 is the state’s land rights and therefore regulates mining activities in the 
DRC. According to this law and the DRC constitution (2006), suggest a few mining experts, 
the state is the owner of the soil and subsoil.213 This stands true for the natural resources, and 
implies that natural resources belong to the state. Hence, it is up to the state to release, for a 
period of time, the authorisation to carry mining activities in a given site. However, this 
permit only gives the right to use the land, but does not grant ownership (DRC Mining Code 
2011). This view is supported by a mining lawyer and expert who said that the land 
ownership is only possible for the right to use the fruits of the land – minerals, but the 
transfer of the land ownership can never be made to a third party. This is a peculiarity of the 
Congolese law and policy in line with properties. In general all minerals and other resources 
across the country are and remain the property of the state.214 
The Bakajika law draws the line between the extracted minerals that belong to the licensee 
and the land that is and remains the state’s property (DRC Mining Code 2011; Proposition to 
the mining code amendments 2012). In practice, this statement could be interpreted as 
followed; when a mining company mines diamonds, it owns diamonds in terms of the right of 
exploitation. This view is supported by a number of lawyers in the DRC and oversees due to 
them saying that the Bakajika Law is the dissociation between the property right – which 
belongs to the state and the usufruct – Usus fructus abusus [full ownership] – which belongs 
to the license holder. For these scholars, through this law the Congolese state distinguishes 
the acquisition of fruit and its usage – belonging to the companies, from the land ownership 
which is its full right – belonging to it. In my interviews conducted in Brussels, Kinshasa and 
Paris, respondents further claimed that the Bakajika law is the right of disposal – for the state, 
and the right of the use of fruit – for mining companies. This means that if a mining company 
                                                 
212 Chapter 4 provides more details on Land Rights and Bakajika Law and its implication in the conflict in the 
Kivus. 
213 Interviews conducted with a member of political representatives, policymakers and a journalist, Kinshasa, 
August 2013. 
214 Interview conducted with a mining lawyer working for Tenkefungurume, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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sells its operating license, in reality it sells the right of usage and not the land ownership; 
however, when it sells minerals, it sells its ownership right on these minerals.215 
From the above, it is clear that the DRC’s natural resources cannot be expropriated because 
they belong to the state. Any mining operator, be it state or company, is just a user and not 
owner. The state which exercises full sovereignty over its land may require its lands back 
from any leaser at any time, if it wants to dispose it otherwise (DRC constitution 2006). On 
the back of the aforementioned statement, a few Congolese scholars and journalists are of the 
view that Mobutu was deposed because he did not amend the Bakajika law, which in fact has 
hindered the globalisation of the DRC’s natural resources, to date however this law is 
believed to be weakened by article 9 of the 2006 Constitution; which is the backbone of the 
Congolese mining code.216 This means that Article 9 has switched the state’s power from an 
absolute sovereignty to the permanent’s, with the result being the setback of the state to the 
colonial era.217 
5.3.3  Mining Code 
The current mining code in the DRC is a hybrid legislation which emanates from two 
different legal systems – Romano-Germanic and Anglo-Saxon. It brings together a structured 
legislation, with issues clearly defined. However, it bears some stumbling blocks related to 
some concepts copied from Anglo-Saxon law that are not clearly defined (Oxford Policy 
Management 2013). This problem results from different origins. According to the 
Tenkefungurume’s mining lawyer and a few mining policy-makers, problems and difficulties 
encountered in the Mining Code result both from World Bank’s initiatives and Anglo-Saxon 
law as well as its interpretation. To these experts, the mining code is a copy of Anglo-Saxon 
law of which ramifications have been translated into French verbatim, whilst in practice its 
                                                 
215 Interviews conducted with a number of mining lawyers and a member of private mining sector 
representatives, Brussels, Kinshasa and Paris, October, November, December 2013. 
216 Focus groups, Kinshasa, July-August-September 2013. 
    Interview conducted with the Jeune Afrique editor, Paris, December 2013. 
217 Interview conducted with a member of academic representatives and a Journalist, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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implementation brings several problems. It is, in reality, two different legal systems 
superposed.218 
The mining code, for instance, states that a research permit holder cannot develop the mining 
concession, but may contract with a third party to fund research works. Once the research is 
completed and the exploitation license issued, the third party who funded the research 
becomes a partner – also known as option agreement (Mining Code 2011). According to the 
telephone interview conducted in Goma with a member of civil society, it was claimed that 
this option contract or unilateral promise of sale is made between the permit holder and a 
third party. For these experts, it seems to be that the state which is the land owner is not 
involved, therefore loses its due taxes.219 Based on the view of a few academics and mining 
law experts, the weakness of the mining code includes the fact that it draws from an Anglo-
Saxon system while the state uses the Romano-Germanic legal system. For them, the mining 
code struggles not only to interpret the law but also to apply it. It enables different permits to 
be exchanged from one third party to another without clearly defining the transfer of the taxes 
due to the state.220 Furthermore, some mining activities are only accessible to Congolese and 
not foreigners (De Koning 2009). For example, according to the law, to be an artisanal miner 
one must be Congolese. Also, operating licenses for small-scale mining is grantable to 
Congolese or to a group of investors predominantly Congolese (De Koning 2009; Mining 
Code 2011). Nevertheless, due to lack of infrastructure, most of the mining activities are 
semi-industrial, led by foreign companies that supersede Congolese.221 With regards to the 
taxes and tax regime, the mining code sets a cumbersome tax regime not clearly explained. 
Foreign mining companies only pay the deposit but the mining code is silent on any direct or 
indirect transfer of the operating license (Oxford Policy Management 2013). Additionally, 
investors are less informed about the presence of a variety of tax charges that the 
administration applies beyond the mining code (Bokondu 2012).  
                                                 
218 Interviews conducted with the Tenkefungurume mining lawyer and policy makers, Kinshasa, September-
October 2013. 
219 Telephone interview conducted with a member of the north Kivu’s civil society, Goma, August 2013.  
220 Interview conducted with a panel of Academic experts in mining law, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
221 Interview conducted with an academic in Paris, November 2013. 
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The Oxford Policy Management Institute’s research on the impact of mining in the DRC 
(2013) found that the mining code’s weaknesses lie in both the non-application of its general 
principles and the presence of an administration that strikes instead of accompanying 
investors. Either the Mining Code or the Code of investment, it should be noted that there are 
several businesses in the Congo that Congolese individuals cannot fulfil. For the Oxford 
Policy Management Institute, the Mining Code weaknesses are both due to its 
implementation and its rigour. The Code has an attractive shape but its application poses 
problem (ibid). Furthermore, it is crucial to mention that there is also a structural problem 
based on the law juxtaposition – importation of Anglo-Saxon laws, which is beyond the 
Congolese legal system; which need precision (Oxford Policy Management 2013). In 
addition, mining activities are more artisanal (De Koning 2009), nevertheless there are no 
control mechanisms on artisanal mining, and neither are there sanctions.222 Artisanal mining 
in general is still a big issue to be addressed in the mining code. The dearth of control 
mechanisms in this sector paves the way for unlawful exploitation, which in turn leads to 
mineral-based conflicts (De Koning 2009; Bokondu 2011).  
5.3.4  Organisation of Mining Sector 
The mining code has undergone changes and these changes are directly connected to the 
context in which different mining contracts have been agreed. The first mining contracts, 
under the current mining code, have been signed during the transitional period of 2003-2006 
led by a President assisted by four Deputy Presidents – also known as 1+4 government (IPIS 
2012; Stearns et al. 2013). During that period, the state was characterised by a severe paucity 
of money. Therefore, it could not negotiate effectively. As it was claimed by former adviser 
of the Prime Minister, the state was in a position of weakness – lack of resources and 
expertise, and was undermined by the issue of upstream and downstream institutionalised 
corruption – upstream corruption with multinational corporations being aware of the DRC’s 
weaknesses in terms of lack of control mechanisms that presented a lot of challenges for the 
country.223 
                                                 
222 Interview conducted with an academic in Paris, November 2013. 
223 Interview conducted with former Premier Minister Adviser in Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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As a result, all mining contracts draw from unfair agreements and the DRC has found itself in 
a situation totally out of its control; lack of expertise worsened by the corruption of political 
elite (Verbruggen et al. 2011). Verbruggen’s (2011) view concurs with Bokungu’s (2012) for 
whom the development of the post-conflict mining sector in the DRC unveils that a lot of 
mining contracts have been signed on the sly without profiting the country. A number of 
analysts of the DRC’s mining sector make a point to concurring with this view, due to them 
saying that mining activities neither create employment nor facilitate development. For these 
individuals, mining companies are not required to process minerals in the country; neither are 
they required to transfer technology; nor do they have a duty to fulfil ecologic planning.224 
Congolese economy is based, and relies on the mining sector while the contribution of the 
latter to the state’s income has been insignificant (Oxford Policy Management 2013). In the 
previous researches, De Koning (2009); Bokungu (2011) and Verbruggen (2013) concurred 
that in the early 1960s and 1970s the DRC’s mining sector was made of less than ten mining 
industries, but it was the leading provider sector in terms of national income. During my 
fieldwork however interviewees did not agree with the opinion above on the basis that, to 
date despite hundreds of mining companies the mining sector is still not the state’s leading 
provider sector in terms of state income.225 
From the fieldwork findings, it has been further indicated that the state has not integrated 
mining contracts into general planning for global development and particularly agricultural 
development. As an upshot, mining contracts have created a state of reliance on mining on 
the one hand; and on the other there is not a long-term policy of a diversified economy, 
neither is there any plan on the local content or corporate social responsibility. Along similar 
lines, Congolese people are concerned with the issue of transparency (ITIE 2012) in mining 
contracts. However, a number of individuals are of the view that transparency is required by 
foreign institutions rather than the Congolese elite.226 Alternatively, one of the interviewees 
posited that there are several mining contracts but each of them has been agreed on a different 
mining policy.227 Furthermore, previous researches on the DRC’s mining sector depict that 
                                                 
224 Focus groups, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
225 Focus groups, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
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227 Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
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the policy with regard to the signing of mining contracts in the DRC – Zaïre, was a standard 
rule regulated by the Presidency and the Department of Mining (De Koning 2009; 2010; 
Bokungu 2012). But during the fieldwork people were of a different view due to the rivalry 
issue existing between multinational corporations, and the problem of money laundering. 
According to a telephone interview conducted in Bukavu with a Member of the Provincial 
Parliament, it was unveiled that some mining agreements have been signed but not yet 
developed; while their value on the stock exchange is appraised 20 times higher than the 
initial cost.228 This provides an opportunity to supporting the view that natural resources have 
a preponderant role in the DRC’s instability.   
5.4  Mineral-based Conflict: The Cycle of Combatants’ Recruitment and DDR 
Before establishing any link between mining and combatants’ enlistment, the chapter will 
attempt to put into context how the phenomenon is developing, and to first identify the link, if 
any, between armed groups and the mining of natural resources because without armed 
organisations it is absurd to make reference to combatants. Figure 4.2 summarises the nexus 
between artisanal mining and (ex-) combatants. 
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Figure 5.2: Nexus between artisanal mining and (ex-) combatants (Own composition) 
5.4.1  Nexus between Mining and Armed Movements 
A set of researchers interested in the issue of civil wars are of the consensus that valuable 
minerals have been among the main causes fuelling armed conflicts (Collier 2000a; Collier 
2000b; De Soysa 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2002; Keen 2005; McCue and Haahr 2008; Reno 
2009). So far, regardless of the large body of literature speaking for this topic, the 
confirmation is still varied (Blattman and Miguel 2010; Van der Ploeg 2011). Based on the 
most popular Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) political economy theory of post-Cold Wars, it 
has been indicated that countries relying on larger shares of primary product exports are more 
likely exposed to civil wars. However, a few shortcomings of Collier and Hoeffler’s theory 
have been underlined. First, primary commodities – such as agricultural produce, are not 
identical all the time. Specialists of the field advise to draw the line between diffuse resources 
– such as agricultural production, and point resources – as is the case for mineral resources, 
with the latter being thought to be more conflictive and incentive for armed groups (Maystadt 
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et al. 2013). On theoretical grounds, point resources – as opposed to diffuse resources, 
inveigle war entrepreneurs for whom the objective of fighting remains the control of the rents 
(Blattman and Miguel 2010; Van der Ploeg 2011). Identifying the particularities of mineral 
resources that push individuals to become combatants and join armed groups is crucial as this 
would be of a positive role in delinking armed groups and combatants from mineral 
resources.  
From a series of papers seeking to recognise the explicit effect of mineral resources on the 
recruitment of combatants and conflicts entrepreneurs (Besley and Persson 2010; Van der 
Ploeg 2011), the initial result based on cross-country analyses showed the unquestionable 
role played by mineral resources in both fuelling and sustaining armed conflicts (McCue and 
Haahr 2008; Reno 2009; Lujala 2010; Maystadt et al. 2013). Second, the link between 
mineral resources and combatants’ enlistment and/or conflict remains potentially 
endogenous. Maystadt’s (2013) study on artisanal mining and conflicts in the Kivus, for 
example, found that the state reliance on mineral resource is a direct result of current or to 
some point, expected armed conflict. In the same way, it has been established that the 
confusing role of institutions, coupled with the role of oil revenues in weakening state 
capacity, is another source of endogeneity (De Soysa 2000; Keen 2005; GW 2013). Besley 
and Persson’s (2010) research on mineral-based conflicts elaborate this argument by 
theorising a pattern of endogenous state capacity configuration. This model indicates that 
natural resource-rich countries that under-invest in state capacity building would be more 
prone to the incidence of armed conflicts. Third, the cross-country nature of the above 
contributions to this discussion overlooks the impacts of within-country unfair sharing of 
resources. Likewise, this level of aggregation could disregard unobserved heterogeneity. In 
Maystadt’s (2013:2) words: “more recent studies adopted a micro-founded approach by 
exploiting within country variations”. Working with sub-national units of analysis helps 
establish more precise underlying implication. In the same line of thinking, a range of writers 
(Buhaug and Rod 2006; Angrist and Kugler 2008; Dube and Vargas 2008) find a positive 
nexus between natural resources and the occurrence of civil wars, whereas Buhaug and Rod 
(2006) find the likelihood of civil war due to the effect of oil and diamonds presence by 
utilising geo-referenced data used at the 100 square kilometre grid. Following the above 
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contributions to the artisanal mining in the Kivus, DRC, the fieldwork’s experience seems to 
be somehow different due to specialists on the grounds expressing fairly different opinions.  
According to the fieldwork, few conflict analysts indicated that the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources in the DRC started in 1996 with the AFDL’s war against Mobutu. For these 
individuals, the AFDL’s leader, Laurent-D Kabila, came into power with a large support of 
Anglo-Saxon mining companies. These mining companies signed unfair agreements on most 
of the DRC’s mining concessions while Laurent-D Kabila was still a rebel, whilst others were 
concluded when he was President. According to them, in 1998, after the beginning of the 
anti-Kabila war, the objective of rebel groups including the RCD-Goma, MLC and RCD- 
KML aimed to retake power. However, rebel groups could not survive long without the 
economic support needed to hire and sustain combatants. Therefore, minerals were mined in 
exchange for external military support. From this point, the first nexus between artisanal 
mining and armed groups was established.229  This stance was supported by a similar opinion 
from an email interview I conducted in Bukavu with a mining operator. In his words: 
“Illegal mining of natural resources in the DRC, particularly in the Kivus should be 
traced back from the 1996 and 1998 armed conflicts. In 1996, the presence of the 
AFDL and its allies in the prosperous mining zones was motivated by the struggle 
toward driving Mobutu off the power. The AFDL signed several mining contracts 
with multinational corporations and its allies. When Laurent-D Kabila rose into 
power, his government, supported by foreigner armies, secured mining zones and 
enabled all his supporters to have access to resources in the state’s mining-rich 
territories. However, following the burst of the 1998 conflict, the RCD and its allies 
overtly occupied several mineral-rich territories in the East in order to fund their war, 
not with the intention to overthrow Laurent-D Kabila from the power but to preclude 
the mineral-rich territories of the East from his government. From this point onwards, 
                                                 
229 Interview conducted with a former Adviser of the Department of Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, August 2013.  
Interview conducted with a member of Congolese civil society, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
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the recurrence of armed groups and (ex-) combatants’ recruitment – mostly with roots 
in neighbouring countries, in mining zones has become a real fact”.230 
This view differs from Besley and Persson (2010) and Van der Ploeg’s (2011) ones. For 
them, the conflict’s initial cause is not mineral resources; rather it is security concerns and the 
need for getting rid of dictator regime even if the signing of mining contracts seems to step in 
the course of events. However, it bears stressing that following the AFDL rebellion the issue 
of mineral resources had proved to be real and played unquestionable role (Lujala 2010; 
Maystadt et al. 2013); first with the signing of unfair mining contracts between the AFDL 
leader and multinational corporations; second with the illegal exploitation and trade of 
minerals in the 1998 war. 
The Enough Project (2013) and a more recent report of the UN Experts on the DRC (2014) 
raised the issue of illegal exploitation and trade of mineral resources by armed groups in the 
eastern DRC. This evidence is supported by the field research findings based on the 
confirmation of people expressing that the issue of illegal exploitation of minerals arose 
mainly with the appearance of several rebel groups in the eastern DRC between 1998 and 
2003. According to the findings, armed movements could not survive without any economic 
support from the exchange between minerals and arms. However, the fact which established a 
clear link between minerals and armed groups is the use of violence by these armed groups to 
either extract minerals or to impound minerals from artisanal miners. This violence resulted 
in sexual assault, human rights abuses and forced displacement of people.231  Summarily, two 
arguments emerge from the nexus between armed groups and mining of natural resources. 
The first argument suggests that conflict in the DRC is not primarily about resources but 
identity between ethnic groups – namely Banyamulenge, Hutu, Hema and Lendu, even if the 
1998 war was mainly a mineral-based conflict. This view concurs with the theory of land 
access and ethnic identity substantiated in Chapter Four and helps understand the recurrence 
of armed conflict in the Kivus.  
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The second argument, however, supports the idea that the protracted armed conflict and the 
cycle of combatants’ recruitment in the eastern DRC are due to the presence of minerals in 
the eastern part of the country. The origin of the conflict may be alien to the presence of 
mineral resources in this part of the country, but the recurrence of conflicts directly links to 
the easy access to mineral resources by belligerents.232  This view supports the Collier and 
Hoeffler’s theory (2004) but goes beyond their shortcomings by suggesting an analysis of 
conflicts in the Kivus in its totality and comprehensiveness. Herein lays the necessity to point 
out that in social sciences, facts are not only all-inclusive, but also context specific, and the 
aetiological analysis cannot be done from a single factor. Therefore, Collier and Hoeffler’s 
theory does not apply fully and is not sufficient to explain the case of the Kivus given that all 
multi-layered factors playing the role in the DRC’s conflict need to be accounted for. 
Minerals are one of the causes but not necessarily the main one. 
In their papers on the new geography of conflict, Klare (2001) and Reyntjens (2009) 
predicted the shift of contemporary armed conflicts to regions with high concentration of 
vital resources. Like Collier and Hoeffler (2004), Klare and Reyntjens understand the post-
Cold War’s increased competitions over access to vital resources as a reconfigured 
geography, or a new cartography of conflict, in which resource flows rather than political and 
ideological divisions. Drawn from Klare (2001), Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Reyntjens’ 
(2009) ideas, it bears arguing that the concentration of rare minerals including coltan, 
cassiterite, gold in the Kivus is a target for multinational corporations and neighbouring 
countries that provide military support to armed groups for minerals exchange. The 
geography and history of the DRC has demonstrated that in zones with copper and diamonds 
endowment there is not conflict but mineral fraud and corruption. Nevertheless, armed 
conflicts have become the norm in areas where coltan, cassiterite, gold and tin abound. In a 
similar way, looking closely at the sociology of conflict in the DRC, they further argued that 
90 per cent of Congolese rebellions occur in the eastern part of the country. For them, all 
armed conflicts that arise from Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda expand in the eastern DRC, 
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while those occurring from Zambia, Sudan, Angola and the Congo-Brazzaville do not cross 
Congolese border.233 
Likewise, an ex-combatant and a few local leaders interviewed by remote in Butembo, Beni 
and Masisi claimed that close examination of mining activities and mining traceability reveal 
that mining activities in the eastern regions involve rebel groups, the national army and their 
allies. For him, the mining business in this part of the country is run without any state 
supervision. This situation is artificially created by both armed groups and the Congolese 
administration because military officers as well as armed groups seniors in this territory are 
involved in mining activities.234 The new map of conflict in the DRC depicts that illegal 
exploitation of mineral resources has become a business which involves a set of different 
actors, including multinational corporations (Onana 2012), neighbouring countries, armed 
groups (UN Experts 2014), the national army officers and political elites (Stearnset al. 2013). 
This finding is supported by the fieldwork’s results. Following an interview with two Hutu 
individuals from Maiko village in the north Kivu, it has been revealed that the FDLR rebels 
has set a credit system for individual members to borrow money from the group’s central 
treasury in order to invest in all kinds of economic activity.235 This view was supported by 
one expert, due to her saying that in remote forest region of Maiko National Park in the 
province of the north Kivu, the FDLR members have largely funded activities in newly 
discovered artisanal cassiterite and coltan mines.236 
Evidence from a Kivus’ Mwami suggests that the Congolese army – FARDC, and foreign 
armies like those from Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have been using the mines either to 
fund themselves or to buy arms that allow them to continue fighting. In light of suggestion 
above, it should be stressed that armed groups fight to control minerals they mine or for 
                                                 
233 Interviews conducted with a member of academic representatives in Kinshasa, July 2013. 
    Interview conducted with a member of the National Episcopal Conference of the DRC, Kinshasa, August 
2013. 
234 Skype and telephone interviews conducted with communities’ leaders, Beni, Butembo and Masisi, August 
2013. 
    Interview conducted with a member of Congolese civil society, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
235 Telephone interviews conducted with two members of Hutu community – also known as Benyarwanda, 
Maiko, August 2013.  
236 Interview conducted with a member of Global Witness working in artisanal mining areas in the Kivus, 
London, November 2013.  
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mineral trading groups. In this way, there are two key issues at the moment; the fight over the 
control of assets if one likes to generate the money and the other one is to perpetuate the 
existence of armed groups. In the Kivus, although things are changing, but it has been noticed 
however that the presence of Rwandan troops in the mining areas and the significant 
influence of Rwanda by personnes interposées [proxies or intermediaries] are still a major 
concern. Some years ago, it was easy to see Rwandan troops but now they have 
intermediaries.237 This is the above mentioned shift.  
The view above is supported by an expert on artisanal mining from Global Witness. For her, 
in March 2013 in the south Kivu, the situation in mining site was very different compared to 
other mining sites in the north Kivu. For example, in Mwenga territory in the south Kivu, the 
site of gold mining is controlled by the FDLR who tax the miners $ 100 every month. The 
FDLR went physically in the mining site while others are sent to the village to collect the 
money. However, as of January 2013, there was a new development. The Raisa Mutomoki 
armed group also tax the miners $ 300 every two weeks and then the FARDC elements sent 
by seniors based in Bukavu will come 3 times a week on a motorbike to collect the money 
from miners. She said: 
“I saw them with my own eyes going to mining area, taxing people and they were 
charging $ 2.50 per person per pit and those miners who use motor-pumps were 
paying $ 5; this tax was levied every Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, I was there 
and saw them”.238 
To this expert, in the situation in the south Kivu, armed groups are not physically present in 
mining sites but they will be controlling the civilian miners. Further down the road to 
Mwenga centre, the local community belongs to Raisa Mutomboki armed group. These 
communities have decided to be to the mine both to earn the money for themselves and to 
protect the mine against the FDLR, because they see the mine as their local asset. In this 
mine, the dynamic is very different as the minerals that go to the Raisa Mutomboki rebel 
group pass through the community. In the north Kivu, however, in Lubaya territory, there are 
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238 Interview conducted with a member of Global Witness working in artisanal mining areas in the Kivus, 
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the members of the Niatura armed group who have been unofficially integrated in the 
national army. This militia was physically in the mining site. For example, they will make the 
local population fix the road between the mining side and the village, and then they could 
take the minerals more easily for themselves. In Walikale, on the right bank of Loso river, 
there is the Simba armed group taking every mines for itself, and on the left bank of the river, 
there is a Belgian guy protected by the army who is making a lot of money through using a 
mechanised system of mining exploitation totally different from what the local people are 
using and he is directly linked to Kinshasa. In the army, there is a mining network which 
facilitates seniors to steal the mines that are stocked at the custom offices. Colonels Chaka 
and Fikiri, for example, stole minerals stocked at the custom office, loaded them into trucks 
and sent them to Goma to be sold.239 
There is also a strange and circumstantial alliance between armed groups and the Congolese 
army in Walikale.240 Walikale is a mineral-rich zone in the eastern DRC. Due to the presence 
of several armed groups along the way, it is inaccessible by road. The only way through is by 
private jets which fly over the Congolese territory without any permission (Autesserre 2012; 
Stearnset al. 2013; UN Experts 2014). In this zone, Congolese soldiers and the FDLR 
combatants work together towards extracting minerals instead of fighting each other (UN 
Experts 2014). Evidence from an ex-combatant revealed that in some mining zones, the 
FDLR, Mayi-Mayi and other local and external non-authorised armed movements operating 
in conflict-torn zones are all involved in illegal mining activities. For this ex-combatant, 
Congolese and non-Congolese elites are also involved in illegal dealing of minerals.241 This 
evidence is backed by a more recent report of the UN Panel of Experts on the DRC (2014) 
which mentions the involvement of the elements of the DRC’s national army – FARDC, and 
armed groups in illegal exploitation of mineral resources. For these experts, the national army 
like rebels have entrenched economic interests in mining.  
De Koning (2013) however drives the point in claiming that mining plunder in the DRC has 
been involving negotiated arrangements whereby the army and armed groups sometimes 
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London, November 2013. 
240 Focus groups, Kinshasa, July; August; September 2013. 
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connive in order to protect particular interests in return for a share of the profits. For him, the 
FARDC and rebels’ involvement in unlawful mining exploitation and trade has been a 
stumbling-block for the process towards demilitarising mining zones. This has been the 
outcome of the presence of several armed movements in the eastern DRC and the result of the 
intermingling and mixing processes of the different armed factions into the national army (De 
Koning 2013; Stearnset al. 2013) since the official end of the conflict in 2003.  
From another similar view, it has been unveiled that in Ituri, for example, civilians, 
militiamen and foreigners mine gold, which they sell in neighbouring countries. This view 
was supported by a member of civil society, due to him uttering that armed groups regularly 
trade minerals via independent brokers and private trading companies. This informs that the 
network between traders and rebels has become closer in the sense that combatants protect 
buyers, while the latter could get ores cross official borders on behalf of combatants. 
Evidence from Kahuzi-Biega National Park supports the view above and depicts that the 
FDLR employ civilian intermediaries to convey ores to Lulingu airstrip to be sold to 
traders.242 
Within the zones they control, combatants as well as the national army elements have also 
established small trading businesses in connection with artisanal mining. Based on the 
evidence gleaned from a military officer, it is noted that the FARDC soldiers forced the local 
population from the Kayebe coltan mining to sell to an unlicensed trading company while 
fending off other traders.243 As alluded to above, like combatants, military also are involved 
in organising and ensuring the transport of minerals in addition to actively associated with 
mining traders (De Koning 2009). Evidence from the United Nations experts illustrates that 
the FARDC requisitioned an aircraft in February 2009 from a private air cargo company to 
transport military goods into the mineral-rich Walikale territory in the north Kivu (De Koning 
2009), and fly back to Goma with cassiterite and coltan.244 
                                                 
242 Interviews conducted with a member of Global Witness, London, November 2013 and with an ex-combatant, 
Brussels, December 2013.  
243 Telephone interview conducted with a Senior Member of the FRDC, Kayebe – Katanga Province, September 
2013. 
244 Interviews conducted with members of the EU Commission, Brussels, December 2013. 
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Alternatively, it has been claimed that fraud and corruption in the copper and diamond sector 
have not fuelled conflicts as it happens in the eastern DRC with coltan, wolframite, gold and 
cassiterite. Hence, all Congolese minerals are not conflict minerals.245 In the pursuit of their 
mining business, a subjective alliance between armed movements and Congolese soldiers has 
been set and has been central in recruiting young people. This leaves room to some recidivist 
ex-combatants to say that young people who join armed movements are enlisted under the 
order of both Congolese Army officers and rebel movement seniors. These individuals are 
used as labourers in mining pits. After peace agreements, most of them are marginalised for 
having colluded with rebels, therefore rejected by their community’s members. As a sideline 
to this, they become the prey of recruiters mostly when they are idle and do not have access 
to livelihoods. They are easily drawn into military or rebel life hoping to gain access to the 
mining resources. This also holds true for the re-recruitment of demobilised fighters.246 
However, what induces individuals to be at the mercy of armed groups? The following 
section looks into the mechanisms that war entrepreneurs use to recruit combatants. 
5.5  Combatants’ Recruitment 
Conflict entrepreneurs recruit combatants through agencies based inside and outside the 
DRC. The complicity between the army and armed groups in the mining zones (De Koning 
2013; UN Experts 2014) suggests that both the national army and armed movements 
supervise the recruitment of combatants for the share of the mineral profits. In this 
perspective, the combatant’s recruitment first becomes a business issue as opposed to the 
self-defence’s one for rebel leaders and conflict entrepreneurs. Secondly, joining armed 
group for young people is perceived as an opportunity to access resources within an 
environment with scarcity of jobs.  
Rebel leaders are based in the city, while combatants are recruited in the bush. What links 
combatants to their leaders is the means the latter use to convince the former to adhere the 
fighting ideology. However, it is crucial to mention that beyond ideological conviction, war 
entrepreneurs may use agencies and families to persuade individuals to join armed 
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movements. The Kivus are a high recruitment zone, as there are few employment 
opportunities, other than to join the rebels. However, it is also important to mention that all 
armed groups that are operating in the Kivus have their representatives in Kinshasa either in 
the army or in the parliament or in the government (Stearnset al. 2013). According to a 
military officer, all rebel movements, including the FDLR, RCD, CNDP, MLC and M23 had 
forcibly enrolled people, sometimes with the national army assistance to increase the number 
of combatants. In the Kivus, the recruitment of combatants is carried out by abduction or 
force. Apart from ethnic bases and street children, generally co-opted by armed groups, 
voluntary recruitment is very rare (Autesserre 2012). Evidence from a FARDC senior officer 
and an ex-child soldier however suggests that there is a strong tribal lobbying with aim being 
to bribe families in order to convince their children to join military actions.247 In other words, 
there exist recruitment agencies that network with communities to enrol young people into 
armed groups.   
From Özerdem and Podder’s (2011) theory on push and pull factors in recruitment of youth 
into conflict, it might be argued that motivations such as avenging against some grievance, 
the duty of securing community against injustice, exclusion and any other kind of social 
inequality and the feeling of supporting and feeding families may lead individuals to join 
armed groups. However, some others unfortunately may become combatants as volunteers or 
by force or coercion. From the fieldwork’ findings however, it seems to be different due to 
combatant’s recruitment process responding to the ethnic ideology and socio-economic 
interests. Contrary to combatants’ push and pull factors as elaborated by Özerdem and 
Podder’s (2011), things on the ground in the Kivus however seem to be different. The pattern 
of combatants’ mobilisation in this part of the DRC argues against the view above, since it 
goes beyond greed and grievance aspect to fall victim to there being a fight of ‘indigenous 
interest against non-indigenous’. From the workshop on the Kivus’ communities held in 
Kinshasa on 5 July 2013, Julien Paluku – the Governor of the north Kivu, made a point which 
clearly argues against the theory of combatants’ push and pull factors above, and revealed 
two phases towards recruiting rebellion members. The first phase consists of recruiting rebel 
leaders and the second phase relates to enlistment of combatants. For Paluku, leaders are 
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recruited by Rwanda and Uganda on the basis of ethnic ideology. As leaders, they are 
enlisted not as individuals, but as the bearers of the interests of their ethnic groups. Paluku’s 
evidence further underlined that the financial background and the individual links influence 
institution of a leader. This means that participation in politics in order to partake in the 
defence of one ethnic group interests becomes a key motivational factor of the recruitment 
process. Along similar way, once a leader, one is made to recruit combatant to serve the 
interests of the community. It is crucial to mention at this point that these combatants are 
enlisted from the Tutsi ethnic group either from within the Congolese territory or from 
neighbouring countries with the same ideology.248 
Drawing on Paluku’s evidence, the ethnic ideology and socio-economic interests towards 
recruiting combatants gave rise to the phenomenon of ‘combatants without borders’249 in the 
region. These soldiers use issues such as racial domination, ethnic identity, ethnic cleansing, 
security of the neighbouring states and good governance as a recruitment ideology to hide 
economic interests of their countries of origin – Rwanda and Uganda (Autesserre 2012; 
Stearns et al. 2013; UN Experts 2014). As forcibly combatant’s recruitment is the case in 
other armed groups (Mandel 2009; Sageman 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012 Mckay 
2012), so is coercion also used as combatant’s recruitment tactic in the Kivus, due to 
recruiters and armed groups being rejected by local people (Lemarchand 1997; Mamdani 
1998; 2001; Huggins et al. 2005; Autesserre 2012).  
According to the fieldwork, some national and international experts were of the view that the 
FDLR recruits its members among its community made of Hutu Rwandans with the hope of 
returning home. The motivation used to recruit combatants is the possibility of the collapse of 
the RPA, Tutsi ruling party. Mayi-Mayi rebel groups and other local militias recruit 
combatants among their communities to defend their lands against Hutu and Tutsi in which 
they believe to be foreign invaders. These combatants are recruited from their immediate 
                                                 
248 Report on the Kivus’ workshop, Kinshasa, 5July 213.  
     Interview conducted with a member of the Kivus’ notability, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
249 Combatants without borders are combatants recruited from Rwanda and Uganda that the Congolese coin 
soldiers without borders. These combatants have served more than three armies in the region and were mostly 
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environs with the aim of defending their land against foreign invaders. Alain Maykani250 – an 
ex-combatant turned journalist for the CCTV in Kinshasa, contends that in Ituri particularly, 
the Thomas Lubanga’s armed movement called Union des Patriotes Congolais [Union of the 
Congolese Patriots; UPC], was asking each family to send one or two of its members to join 
the tribal militia in order to fight and defend its tribe during the Hema and Lendu conflict. 
This wave of clandestine recruitments, emphasised by Maykani, was carried out under the 
supervision of chief Kawa – the traditional chief of Lendu tribe. As community’s chief, Kawa 
was de facto the chief of the militia. Therefore, all recruiters had to liaise with him on every 
issue concerning combatants’ enlistment.251 The RCD, CNDP, M23 and other armed groups 
however have been forcibly recruiting young people in their local communities in the Kivus. 
Therefore, the local people consider them to be foreign armed groups.252 Following different 
recruitment tactics used by different armed groups, it bears arguing that the recruitment 
modus operandi responds to ethnic ideology for the RCD, CNDP, M23 and Mai-Mai and land 
protection and identity recovery for the Hutus and FDLR. In addition, they all have been 
using friendship as a recruitment technique. Maykani, for instance, asserts: 
“I was abducted and became a soldier while I was coming home from school. A friend 
of mine asked for my help to carry his elder brother’s parcels to the forest. The 
parcels turn out to be weapons and I later realised that my friend’s brother was a rebel 
leader. Since that day I never came back home and I found myself in Mandro at 2 
miles away from Bunia for my military training and initiation”.253  
However, for the RCD, CNDP and M23, the recruitment pattern responds not only to ethnic 
ideology but also and mostly to the socio-economic interests and coercion. Overall, factors 
such as insecurity, poverty, access to land and resources, citizenship recovery, foreign 
interest, etc. motivated individuals to join armed groups. An FDLR member, for example, 
                                                 
250 Alain Maykani is working for CCTV as a journalist in Kinshasa. He is an ex-combatant and was one of the 
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said “I am fed up! My family members have been raped, my field and crops were taken away, 
the government does not do anything to protect us, I am going to join armed group”.254 
The rivalry between different armed groups and militias in the eastern DRC has revealed that 
each ethnic group has its militia and fighting ideology (Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 2002; 
Armstrong and Rubin 2005; Jackson 2007; Clark 2008).255 This stand is supported by 
Mulungulu Elias.256 In the Kivus, each ethnic group has the duty to hinder the triumph of 
another, said this former Governor of the south Kivu.257  Mulungulu’s view is supported by a 
few local leaders. For these notables: 
“As the Tutsi ethnic group becomes powerful, all anti-Tutsi ethnic groups must stop 
the rise of the Tutsi and inhibit the community from becoming stronger than others. In 
that case, when there is a social concern, the government settles it with all ethnic 
groups. However, in the case of Hutu and Tutsi militia, the government exercises 
preferential treatment trying to settle it by ignoring other ethnic groups”, they 
contended.258 
From a different point of view, some individuals acquainted with the conflict in the Kivus 
indicated that the recruiters enlist youth by promising them a future promotion to head 
political and military positions if they come to power. These recruiters use the theory of 
‘disorder as reorganisation project and the quest of a new socio-political order from the 
rebellion’259 as recruiting ideology.260 According to some members of diplomatic 
representatives and academics, this ideology is often used by Congolese politicians in mining 
zones where the evanescence of the state seems to justify the main reason for recruiting 
fighters – as was the case of Mbusa Namwisi with the RCD – Movement for Liberation or 
                                                 
254 Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
255 See Chapter 4 for more details. 
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today as one of the influential leaders of Kivu. 
257 Interview conducted with an ex- governor of Kivu province, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
258 Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
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RCD-KML.261 However, non-national armed groups recruit on the basis of false promises, 
family threat, blackmail abduction etc.262 Overall, it seems to be that the only rebel 
movement that voluntarily enticed young people and children was the AFDL due to a general 
resentment of Mobutu’s dictatorship.263 
From a general observation however, three trends emerge from the recruitment tactics used 
by recruiters. First, children are forcibly recruited while others join rebel groups on the basis 
of ethnicity. Second, some combatants are recruited by the army leaders of neighbouring 
countries. This is the case of ‘combatants without borders’ who have fought for at least three 
different national armies in the region. Third, in the case of economic hardship and political 
instability, recruiters recruit youth by offering them luxuries as done by Tutsi in forming the 
CNDP and M23 armed groups.264 In whole, reasons why youth join such groups can be 
summarised as to avenge the rape of a family member, confiscation of property, lack of 
education, unemployment, national army disorganisation, insecurity and the incapacity of the 
army to defend state (Mandel 2009; Sageman 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2011; 2012; Mckay 
2012). There are also patriotic or sentimental reasons. Political and economic reasons (DDR 
programme in the DRC 2012) are entirely different, but they all converge to socio-economic 
concerns (Özerdem 2012; 2013). There is not one-side-fixed technique to recruit combatants; 
it depends on where the individual is and which kind of armed group is operating in that area. 
Broadly, there is a range of reasons that lead to the recruitment of combatants. 
All armed groups have been reportedly accused of being involved illegally in mining 
activities (UN Experts 2014), though for junior fighters, it seems difficult to establish a clear 
relationship between minerals and the combatants.265 Some ex-combatants and civil society 
members I interviewed in my fieldwork specified that in the structure of a rebel movement, 
combatants are under the commandment of their senior officers. Based on the military 
principle of subordination or loyalty to senior officer, the nexus between mining and 
combatants holds true. In reality, the junior combatant is not directly involved in mining 
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activity. Rather, senior officers are involved in the mining business and junior combatants are 
often assigned the role of protecting mining areas. However, it is important to mention that 
there is always a legacy between different armed groups. For example, it has been observed 
that the RCD, CNDP and M23 have thrived in mining zones with their seniors highly 
involved in mining smuggling. A report from global Witness on Congolese minerals in the 
balance depicts that Bosco Ntaganda, a former CNDP and M23 leader, currently in judgment 
at the International Court of Criminals – ICC, was earning $ 15,000 a year minimum, because 
he was smuggling through Rwanda.  
So far, at this level, we can see three different things; civilians taking arm themselves to 
protect minerals against armed groups, armed groups taxing miners and controlling mines at 
the distance with vulnerable civilians being attacked if they do not pay, and armed groups or 
military stealing the mines and making the money from it.266  Overall, combatants and the 
military can be involved in mining activities in five cases: 
- In the case, whereby they control a mining pit. For example, a senior combatant can 
protect individuals working in mining pits, or combatants themselves can mine 
minerals if they know how to do so or combatants can simply lead a group of 
individuals to execute mining activities whose they are paid for. 
- In the case whereby they ally with some civilians they use as proxies. 
- In the case whereby they confiscate individuals’ minerals. 
- In the case whereby they take minerals taxes from the comptoirs [counters or mineral 
selling point]. 
- In the case whereby they collaborate with multinational counters. 
Basically, combatants control either mining concession or mining counters. They play a 
downstream role through leading all mining activities from the pits. The field research 
findings overall have shown that Mayi-Mayi rebel groups, for example, sustain their 
movement with contributions from their community members. This portends that when they 
control mining pits they extract minerals and sell them. However, who do they sell them to? 
There is a great blurring around this trade. Similarly, some military officers are involved in 
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mining extraction and trade. General Amisi Tango, an ex-senior member of rebel group – 
RCD, integrated into the national army as general officer through the security sector reform 
and DDR process has been accused of illegal mining business. Along similar line, from an 
interview conducted in Brussels with and ex-combatant, it was indicated that some Congolese 
indigenous people have witnessed how minerals were crossing the border to Rwanda from 
the mining zones controlled by rebel groups.267  Therefore, it could be seen that there is a 
clear link between minerals and combatants.  
5.6  Combatants’ DDR in the Kivus: Towards a Problem-solving or a Plight? 
As noted in other African countries, the DDR programme in the DRC encountered a few 
challenges in line with the lack of capacity, inefficiency, mismanagement, institutional 
rivalries and alleged corruption (Lamb et al. 2012; Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013). 
Report from the UN Security Council (2011), for instance, suggests that the MONUC in the 
DRC played a key role in the DDR programme. However this role was barely limited to the 
implementation of the national programme, with a focus almost exclusively on 
demobilisation of combatants. However, Kölln (2011) having assessed the effectiveness of 
the DDR programme in the DRC found that the main focus of the MONUC’s assistance 
towards implementing the DDR programme in the DRC was the dismantlement and 
disarmament of non-national armed groups, mainly the FDLR. In addition, Kölln’s findings 
unveiled that the DDR process was carried out via the UN Disarmament, Demobilisation, 
Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement – DDRRR, programme. This programme 
comprised armed peacekeepers whose the assignment was to protect and secure combatants 
who were willingly seeking to abscond from armed groups, due to they may be aggressively 
assailed or executed by their fellow fighters once their efforts to give up the armed 
movements turned unsuccessful (Kölln 2011). 
Drawn from Nest’s (2006) account on the political economy of the Congo war, it is indicated 
that based on the spirit of the Lusaka Peace Agreements, the MONUC was in charge of 
transforming the DDRRR into joint operational plan. In terms of chapter nine of the above 
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accord, the MONUC was mandated to design the programme. However, it is noted that the 
programme designed by the MONUC contained several flaws, mainly in regards to its task of 
disarming non-national fighters. It is crucial to underline at this point that as a result of the 
Lusaka talks, the MONUC was commissioned to identify, screen, demobilise and repatriate 
fighters, but did not have any responsibility in disarmament. However, lessons learned from 
the post-conflict recovery establish that the implementation of the DDR programme relies on 
combatants’ disarmament (Muggah 2010; Lamb 2012; Lamb and Alusala et al. 2012). As the 
MONUC was not associated to combatants’ disbarment in the eastern DRC, thus the 
implementation of the DDRRR by the MONUC was inconsistent due to it being kept away 
from disarmament process. As a ramification, the MONUC’s activities strengthened local 
power imbalances because some armed groups voluntarily disarmed but others did not. This 
situation is the effect of the Lusaka Agreements that were unable to address the aspect of 
economic interests of warring parties and the MONUC which also failed to address the issues 
of economic interests of the post-conflict community (Nest 2006). Yet these interests 
determine not only the willingness of fighters to disarm, but also have an impact on the post-
conflict recovery in general and particularly on the DDR-related processes such as state-
building, SSR and the transitional justice system. 
In post-conflict situations, two strategies have been used as inducements for warring parties 
to voluntarily disarm; programmes that trade agricultural implements for weapons, and cash 
buy-backs of weapons. The success of these programmes entails the setting of clear time 
limit, followed by relocation and reintegration of ex-combatants by offering them possible 
alternative livelihoods. The latter has to do with the economy of the communities that are 
meant to welcome ex-combatants. The Ethiopian model is informative in this effect. In 1991, 
following the fall of Mengistu regime, ex-fighters who were reintegrated into uplands crop 
farming obtained coffee plants, those reintegrated into lowland wheat cultivation draft 
acquired draft animals and those reintegrated into urban areas obtained apprenticeships, small 
business management and microcredit facilities (Nest 2006; Lamb and Dye 2009; Muggah 
2010; Willemij verkoren et al. 2010). Unfortunately, the MONUC’s DDRRR programmes in 
the eastern DRC have fallen victim to there being no clear timescales, as is the case in the 
Lusaka Agreements. 
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Following surrender to the MONUSCO, non-national ex-combatants were settled into the 
transit centres in Uvira, Bukavu, Beni, Dungu and Goma where they received basic assistance 
before getting repatriated into their countries of origin for reinsertion and reintegration 
support (Nzekani Zena 2013). In 2004, another programme known as the Structure Militaire 
d’Intégration [Military Structure for Integration; SMI] was established and linked to the DDR 
programme through national legislation. The SMI aimed to give to combatants the option of 
either integrating the FARDC or undergoing the DDR process (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 
2013). The initial idea behind the creation of the SMI was to assemble all combatants at the 
FARDC-run centres and integrate them into the new national army. It was also established to 
demobilise ex-combatants who opted to re-join civilian life (Stearnset al. 2013; Verweijen 
2013). 
As alluded to above, since the official end of conflict in the DRC in 2003, the DRC’s 
government created a national DDR programme for the reintegration of the Congolese ex-
combatants (Onana 2013). However, this programme has not been run properly due to a lack 
of a national DDR plan, a poor implementation, the mismanagement and depletion of 
resources allocated to the programme (Onana 2012; De Koning 2013; Stearnset al. 2013). 
This inopportune situation got exacerbated by a temporary suspension of donor funds 
(Stearnset al. 2013). Furthermore, the already ambitious SMI programme has also proved 
slow and difficult to implement (De Koning 2013; Verweijen 2013). Unless these 
programmes have made significant progress, security in the DRC will still depend on a 
national army comprised of businessmen and a mix of badly trained government forces and 
militias, with some of them being kept in their previous units with the same old command 
structures being largely intact. Contrary to the above mentioned government’s efforts, a more 
recent finding from Onana (2012) shows that although a DDR programme has been 
implemented after a long-drawn-out period of armed conflict, this process however is still on-
going up until now and had not yet yielded the hoped for results. This finding is supported by 
De Koning (2013) and Verweijen’s (2013) for whom authorities and local war-affected 
communities have come to the point where the DDR programme is believed to be a process 
that aims to further weaken the already failed state. For them, the DDR process is pointed out 
as a process which releases more criminals into society. It produces new recruiters and 
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combatants for armed groups instead of reintegrating them into their prospective 
communities (De Koning 2013; Verweijen 2013). 
The fieldwork’s findings concur with Onana (2013), De Koning (2013) and Verweijen’s 
(2013) views due to the people believing that to restore the political economy of DDR, would 
involve the reestablishment of state authority, the empowerment of veterans and the 
promotion of human and institutional security, which create a humanitarian system of 
government. For these people, the particularity of the DDR programme in the DRC is that it 
was intended to relocate and to reposition ex-combatants without identifying how 
demobilised individuals could usefully fit into their society. The DDR programme was poorly 
planned and its approach was not holistic, neither was it able to tackle the core issues of the 
post-conflict state.268 Based on a recent exchange with a member of the UNDP in Kinshasa 
on the security sector reform, it has been revealed that the UNDP has just understood the 
problem of DDR in the DRC, and would change their approach. This individual further 
acknowledged that available resources allocated for ex-combatants were derisory and could 
not enable them to have a decent and sustainable life.269 
As disclosed in the document on the assessment of ex-combatants in the Kivus and the report 
on the reintegration and disintegration of ex-combatants in the DRC, between 2002 and mid-
2011, the DDRRR section of the UN mission in the DRC repatriated more than 25,000 non-
national ex-fighters – 58 percent of total repatriated, and their dependants, with 1,435 arms 
and 46,006 rounds of ammunition destroyed. Rwanda was the endpoint of 80 percent of the 
total repatriated ex-rebels. To date, it is believed that strategic success in repatriating non-
national combatants was the facilitation of the demobilisation and repatriation of some 
foreign combatant officers, comprising their liaison officers from the north and south Kivus, 
which allegedly interrupted the recruitment of combatants, logistical support and unlawful 
trading by the armed movements (Eriksson Bazz and Verweijen 2013; Lamb et al. 2013). 
However, over time, the composition of national and non-national armed group members – in 
terms of gender and size, varied. Despite several attempts with regards to the combatants’ 
                                                 
268 Focus groups, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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DDR programme, there is still the need to question why the DDR process has been and 
continues to be a stumbling block in the re-establishment of peace in the DRC. 
A study on the security sector reform in the DRC suggests that the DDR programmes in the 
country have failed to give sustainable inducements to combatants and to address basic 
insecurity because of the lack of understanding of certain processes such as the in-
formalisation of politics and economy, the exercise of power through violence, the multiple 
crises people are facing in the society (Marriage 2007) and of course different perceptions for 
the security sector between donors’ objectives and domestic needs (Boshoff et al. 2010; Roue 
and Willems 2010). DDR failure has been attributed to be a result of a ‘top-down 
understanding’ of, and ‘top-down solutions’ to the Kivu’s conflict, the dearth of strategy 
corporation and delivery mechanisms for change, the marginalisation of local 
communities,270 the lack of follow-up, broken promises of assistance and the incapacity of 
the national security forces to deal with the continuing insecurity (Roue and Willems 2010). 
Although it could be acknowledged some attempts towards demobilising and disarming 
former combatants, it should be noted that the process has been partially implemented and 
ex-combatants have never been fully reintegrated into civilian life in the Kivus (De Koning 
2009). 
Drawing on the Kivus’ experience, it might be argued that DDR did not take into account the 
repatriation of foreign militias; neither did it properly plan the combatant reinsertion phase. In 
the current state of insecurity in the eastern DRC, whereby combatants have become the prey 
of war entrepreneurs, ‘combatants’ intermingling and combatant’s mixing processes’ should 
be banished. These processes need to be revised and replaced by a traditional process of the 
combatant’s reintegration in order to convert veterans into undertaking collective works such 
as agriculture, fishing, farming etc., and to create community development structures that 
would assist ex-combatants to embrace a more stable life. It is to say that ex-combatants 
should be able to work and partake in the development of their new social environment (DDR 
programme in the DRC 2012).  
                                                 
270Fieldwork conducted by the author from July to December 2013 in the DRC, Belgium, England and France. 
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However, it is important to note that apart from the Institut National des Professions 
Pratiques [National Institute for Professional Practices; INPP], a professional centre 
specialised in training young people based in Kinshasa, there are no other professional 
training centres in the countryside, though the DDR programmes are conducted in the 
provinces – countryside. In addition, due to the fact that the market of employment structure 
is not organised in the country, it is hard to estimate the general level of unemployment in the 
DRC. Therefore, it is not possible to employ individuals who have been trained in 
professional jobs. Although the state is of an agricultural vocation, due to having the second 
world largest tropical rain forest potential,271  agricultural activities are still underdeveloped. 
However, some ex-combatants underwent agricultural training and are expected to be 
employed in agricultural sector. Evidence from an ex-fighter, nonetheless, showed that after 
the DDR process, ex-combatants have received social assistance which would help them 
reintegrate either into agricultural life, formal or informal education. However, it is not an 
easy matter to convince young people who were used to handling easy money from artisanal 
mining and illegal actions like theft to join agriculture in a society where peasant life is the 
main form of livelihood, hence rejected in preference to earning easier money.272 Ex-
combatants are aware that with a weapon they can make money, therefore they choose not to 
opt for seek jobs in agriculture that produces nothing in unstable and unsafe zones. In this 
instance, controlling mining pits is quick and lucrative. In addition, there are also 
psychological reasons for maintaining a combatant lifestyle,273  since bearing arms may be 
seen as validating and offers a sense of power (Özerdem and Podder 2011; Özerdem 2012; 
2013). 
A close look at how the DDR process has been handled in the DRC, it might be argued that 
the programme has not achieved its objectives because of the cyclical nature of the process, 
with rebels being reintegrated without fundamental motivation. This situation also happened 
with the reform of the security system. For this latter, it is reported that different elements of 
armed factions, including those from non-national armed groups, were intermingled with the 
                                                 
271 Report from the Congolese Institute of Geography, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
272 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
Interview conducted with an academic, Paris, December 2013. 
273Telephone interviews conducted with members of the CONADER, Beni, Kinshasa and Masisi, July 2013. 
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elements of the FARDC instead of being integrated (De Koning 2009). According to a human 
rights reporter, a demobilised combatant is either reinserted or monitored or jailed due to 
criminal acts. For this activist, most Congolese rebel leaders were junior fighters fighting on 
behalf of Uganda and Rwanda. However, on the basis of a total discretion of Rwanda and 
Uganda, they have become recruiters and senior officers of armed groups in the DRC. They 
are unstable as their life is an ‘in and out rebellion’. Therefore, they have been several times 
reintegrated into national army with different high ranks. As a result, there is an eternal cycle 
of reintegration and desertion.274 A Kivu’s ethnologist explains the recurrence of this attitude 
by the fact that these unstable fighters or ‘combatants without borders’275  cannot join civilian 
life in the Congo because there is no clear rational for why they fight. Therefore, they prefer 
being mingled with the national army in order to secure and keep alive their mentor’s 
objectives. Their integration into the army is to preserve benefits they have had during the 
rebellion time or those they were promised during peace negotiation.276 
The continuation of the DDR programme in the DRC is also linked to the fact that the 
programme was designed and financed from outside, with no consideration for the unique 
and specific needs of the Congo (Muggah 2010). Concomitantly, a set of civil society 
members and the DDR experts in the DRC are of the consensus that the UNDP handled the 
DDR programme before specialised agencies took over. For these people, the DDR 
management was calamitous.277 Flabbergasting evidence from a former adviser at the office 
of the Prime Minister, for instance, depicts that 20 demobilised individuals got to be 
repatriated in the province of Equateur, Katanga and Kasai at 800 miles away from the Kivus. 
The DDR managers rented a forty-seat-plane for $ 125,000 from Caribbean islands to board 
20 individuals, whereas each demobilised combatant received $ 100 for their social 
reintegration. The aircraft’s cost is 62.5 times higher than $ 100 given to ex-combatants as 
the reinsertion social package. There is already the irrationality on the use of the funds 
allocated to the DDR programme. How the DDR managers can rent a forty-seat-plane for 20 
                                                 
274 Interview conducted with a member of the Human Right Watch, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
275 These Tutsi combatants have served at least three national armies in the region and are currently leading   
rebellions in the eastern DRC. Most of them have been integrated into the FARDC as Senior Officers are used 
to going into exile in Rwanda and Uganda – their original countries, in case of rebellion defeat.  
276 Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
277 Focus groups, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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people, while it was possible to give $ 1,000 to each ex-combatant and get them boarded a 
fifty-dollar bus? It would be much less expensive than renting a $ 125,000 aircraft. The audit 
on the mismanagement of $ 360 million allocated for the DDR programme has been initiated, 
yet no one has been found guilty up till to date. It has been reported that money benefited 
both the DDR managers and CONADER’s executive officers, while half of the money was 
used for other thing such as payment of foreign partners and expertise.278 
In their research on how to assess social reintegration of ex-combatants, Bowd and Özerdem 
(2013:3) advise: 
“The way in which the reintegration of ex-combatants is viewed depends to a great 
degree, on the philosophy underpinning the DDR programme and this will, to some 
extent, influence the way in which they are designed as well as the perceived success 
of such programmes”.  
From the perspective of an ex-combatant working for a private security company in 
Kinshasa, it has been said that the endless nature of the DDR programmes is also due to the 
incapacity of the government to offer a socio-economic and politic alternative to returnees on 
the one hand, and on the other because the state reintegrate doubtful individuals or 
combatants without borders into the national army. For this former combatant, the state has 
not provided any economic and social reintegration structure for people who were used to 
accessing resources and had some power,279  whereas the DDR and reintegration programmes 
to date have been commonly appraised according to economic reintegration with focus being 
on levels of employments or registration on training course (Özerdem 2012; Bowd and 
Özerdem 2013). According to former Adviser at the Presidency, however, this seems to not 
be the case as after the DDR programme, ex-combatants were meant to spend their new life 
in an environment where there are neither economic infrastructure nor employment 
opportunities.280 
                                                 
278 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
279 Interview conducted with an ex-combatant, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
280 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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After laying down their arms, ex-combatants received $ 100 for their social reintegration. 
Being confronted with social issues beyond their control, they are unenthusiastic to be 
reintegrated into poverty and unemployment as they still need means to come over the same 
initial problems they have fought for. Indeed, ex-combatants re-join unauthorised armed 
groups not only because they need to access resources in either way, but also because the 
state is becoming less involved.281  Very often, ex-fighters join armed groups because they 
feel to be closer to rebel group’s politics than the government’s one (Porto et al. 2007). In 
this context, as it has been claimed by a few specialists of the DRC’s conflict, there is a 
resignation of the state which in the case under question has favoured the ‘cult of uniform’282  
in the country. As a sideline to this, in the villages, anybody who takes arms is fully 
respected, therefore has access to resources and life’s facilities. Weapon gives individuals 
‘lord’s status’ (Muggah 2009; Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Özerdem and Podder 2011) and 
confers them the right to do anything they want – sexual violence, robbery, assault etc. As 
weapon handlers, these people can either control mining pits or abuse miners in the mining 
areas.283 
The recurrence of the DDR of ex-combatants also has roots in the precariousness of social 
life. Based on his paper on a re-conceptualisation of ex-combatants reintegration, Özerdem 
(2013) suggests a community-centred reintegration approach as a mechanism towards 
speaking for the needs of the wider community in a post-conflict society with deep and wide 
societal divisions. From the fieldwork’s findings, it might be proposed that the lack of 
employment, for example, has led ex-combatants to be tempted by any kind of job. Evidence 
from a former rebel indicated that when ex-combatants are in the bush, they are trained in 
illegal mining trades and once reintegrated into civilian life or national army, they still bear in 
their mind the scars of undue advantages they had in the rebellion such as extortions, access 
to minerals etc. Therefore, doing a job that does not respond to ex-combatants’ aspirations 
would not dissuade them from using force and military skills to survive. For this ex-
combatant, it would be more advantageous for ex-combatants to act as gangsters in a state 
                                                 
281The cult of uniform is the fact that anyone who wears military uniform, no matter his or her social rank, is 
always considered as superior to other citizens that they call ‘basendji’ [less civilized] or civil – less man. These 
people can go out and abuse, yet they are not answerable before the court law. 
282 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
283 Focus groups, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
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where impunity has become a norm and where violence is used to voice one’s concerns.284 In 
whole, from the fieldwork’s results, it might be argued that the DDR programme lacked real 
blueprint of the future capability. The programme was hobbled to define and communicate 
vision, while its organisation failed to change its culture. Additionally, local communities 
were not involved in it implementation and the engagement of stakeholders was very 
limited.285 
The ex-combatant’s reintegration process would be expecting to encounter issues with 
regards to trust and confidence between receiving communities and ex-combatants due to 
atrocities that ex-combatants committed against their communities. The lack of trust and 
confidence from both parties could present challenges that could undermine social 
reintegration (Maclay and Özerdem 2010; Özerdem 2013). From the research findings, it 
appears the DDR programme dealt with people who want to be Congolese but at the same 
time work for their origin country. This leaves room to a military expert to say that the issue 
with the DDR programme is that combatants without borders have never identified 
themselves as Congolese but as Rwandan or Ugandan which they are working for, and the 
DDR programmes have never drawn the difference between local and foreign armed groups. 
For this analyst, the process has rather been integrated into the national army combatants 
without borders and soldiers from foreign armies.286 
From a more recent meeting of the Great Lakes countries Community – CPGL, it has been 
revealed that foreign ministers of CPGL members complained about Rwandans and 
Ugandans supporting the M23 rebel movement although the fact that they are signatories of 
the Addis-Baba Peace Agreement on the eradication of rebel groups in the eastern DRC 
signed in March 2013.287  For the association of the Kivus’ elders and leaders, the DDR 
programmes look like an atypical process which has sustained insecurity for long. Insecurity 
in the eastern DRC is self-financing and the DDR programme will be complicated as long as 
ex-combatants still have opportunity to access minerals that enable them to rearm. For them, 
DDR would be far from solving combatants’ concern unless widespread poverty, military 
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insignificant and irregular salary, chaotic situation, mafia groups and total impunity are 
tackled down. If these issues are not well addressed rebel groups will still be motivated to 
criminalising economy, re-enlisting discontent and idle ex-combatants.288  Therefore, it might 
be argued that as far as the Kivus’ conflict continues to be approached from a top-down 
perspective – which ignores local communities’ view and which results in top-down 
solutions, the DDR programme would still fail to address what it is meant to, and will be 
perceived like a programme which aims to change communities’ culture rather than 
impacting positively on post-conflict communities. 
5.7  Combatants’ Re-recruitment: The Phenomenon of Combatants without Borders 
From a set of previous papers on the roots of armed conflicts in the DRC, the state weakness, 
the interference of the neighbour Rwandan and Ugandan, endogenous conflicts – especially 
access to the land, and the pursuit of natural resources plundering have been underlined as 
theories to explain the causes of armed conflicts in the DRC (Mamdani 2001; Vlassenroot 
2002; Armstrong and Rubin 2005; Jackson 2007; Clark 2008). In a more recent Usalama 
survey on the roots of conflict persistence in the DRC however, Stearns et al. (2013) 
highlight four more conflict-fuelling-factors beyond the early contributions to the DRC’s 
conflict explanation. For him, owing to the present political environment in the DRC, 
violence constitutes an efficient means to access power and control resources.  
The militarised nature of the policy of power which emerges from the current political 
environment is the result of the 2003-2006 transitional period following the second Congo 
war (1998-2003). Peace process was based on the principle of power sharing; former 
belligerents joined the Congolese state institutions and their armed wings were integrated into 
the new national army. The idea behind this approach which was based on granting political 
rights to the insurgents in order to stifle their insurrections still continues today, thus 
encouraging elites to mobilise armed groups. Another cause of military mobilisation lays in 
difficulties associated with military policies. By integrating constantly armed groups into the 
FARDC, the government has not only prompted the launch of a future and new uprising, but 
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also one could even say it has ‘endorsed’ impunity. The abuses of the army have led many 
groups to take up arms and conferred legitimacy to claims of self-defence harboured 
constantly by rebels. In addition, the army sometimes is in an accomplice in mobilising 
combatants for armed groups, with officers offering support to armed groups or getting 
involved in the arms trade. 
With regard to how the ex-combatant’s reintegration has been conducted, it might be 
postulated that the continuation of the DDR programmes in the DRC seems to be the 
ramification of the failure of a proper reinsertion of ex-combatants into economic 
environment, but most importantly is that the DDR process was instrumental and technical, 
and the process was limited on numbers, targets, partners, trauma, protection and 
rehabilitation (Sageman 2004; Mandel 2009). This gives room to former Adviser at the 
Presidency to claim that the paucity of economic component in the DDR planning has paved 
the way for returnees becoming easy prey for re-recruitment by armed groups that operate in 
the mining territories such as Walikale. For him, ex-combatants re-recruitment results from a 
total impunity which characterises the state’s institutions in general and the army in 
particular. Consequently, the army would not be able to subdue rebellions because it 
conspires with rebel groups to mine illegally minerals.289 
Two reasons can justify the involvement of armed groups and combatants in the mining 
activities (De Koning 2009; 2010; UN Experts 2014); first, they have to feed themselves and 
all this requires money. Second, they have to buy weapons. In the same vein, it is important 
to mention that the traffic of small arms and light weapons is a flourishing trade in the eastern 
DRC – from Ituri to the south Kivu via Uganda. As noted by a member of the Southern 
Africa Resource Watch – SARW, from 1998 to 2013 more than 400 or 500 weapons enter the 
eastern DRC per day from neighbouring countries and one gun costs about $ 600 to 700. This 
view supports that of Beswick and Jackson’s (2011) for whom DDR processes that take place 
after a regional conflict culminate in the flows of weapons over borders, since combatants 
tend to keep their bonds with neighbouring countries. Although there is an arms embargo, 
weapons are still trafficked easily in this part of the country because armed groups control the 
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border and customs are corrupted. Preventing the re-recruitment of demobilised people by 
this mafia system, opines the SARW’s member, becomes difficult because of the easy access 
to mining business, weapons traffic, the lack of traceability, the intermingling of different 
elements of armed fractions and the permanent presence of ‘combatants without borders’ in 
the national army.290 Who are these combatants without borders? A portion of the answer can 
be drawn from the profile of Bosco Ntaganda, an ex-combatant who is currently behind the 
ICC bare (Le Palmares 2013).  
Rwandan rebel in 1990s and RPF combatant, Ntaganda entered the Congo as Rwandan 
soldier then became senior officer of the Congolese army and joined RCD/Goma during the 
1998 anti-Kabila war. In June 2000, he fought as a Ugandan soldier against Rwandan army 
during the memorable six-day-war in Kisangani.291 After a while, he became again Congolese 
army’s general officer, and then later joined again the M23 rebellion in 2012 before fleeing 
into exile in Rwanda, where he was officially born from Rwandan parents. At the age of 40, 
he has served three national armies – Rwanda, Uganda and DRC (Le Palmares 2013).  
Herein is the importance to draw the line between mercenaries, also known as soldiers of 
fortune, and combatants without borders. Mercenaries are soldiers or combatants whose 
purpose is to fight in foreign conflicts for financial gain. These soldiers for hire get involved 
in a conflict because they have been paid to do so. Their common feature remains the search 
of other forms of self-enrichment along the way (Beswick and Jackson 2011:102). The focus 
on mercenary activities in Africa dated from national liberation movements during the early 
post-colonial Africa period. One review of peacekeeping, security and development in 
developing countries (ibid.) suggested that as at now, mercenaries are still widespread not 
only in various civil wars, but also in contemporary peacekeeping missions. Their modus 
operandi has changed to the extent that some operate illegally as private security companies, 
even though their activities are banned by the UN and African Union – AU, Conventions 
(Vaux, Seiple et al. 2010). Combatants without borders or eternal reintegrated combatants 
however are soldiers who fight in foreign conflicts for the interest of their country of origin. 
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According to a Western diplomat based in Kinshasa, these individuals identify themselves as 
nationals of foreign countries they are fighting in. They are also characterised by an unstable 
behaviour and are prone to either creating a rebel group or re-joining another with intent to 
return with a higher position during the new reintegration.292  This, in Stearnset al.’s (2013) 
findings, is pointed out as the illustration of the 2003-2006 transition period with the so-
called government 1+4.  
It is of note that after the abovementioned transitional period, rebels became Members of 
Parliament, ministers and some held high positions in public institutions. However, following 
the 2006 elections, those who failed went back to the bush and restarted rebellions. For a 
member of the SARW, the cycle of the (ex-) combatants’ (re-) recruitment is the result of the 
DDR programme which rehabilitated into the national army individuals from various armed 
groups without any selection criteria. This further suggests how the cycle of recruitment and 
reintegration is primarily linked to the weakness of the state and that the DDR has further 
weakened the state due to unexpected reintegration.293 
Overall, from the field research findings, it emerges that all analysts and observers concerned 
with the DDR process are of the consensus that the programme has integrated ex-combatants 
in the army without inventorying who is who but on the basis of neighbouring countries’ so-
called concerns. It can be noted that the issues of work ethics and training were not taken into 
account. Most demobilised people were using minerals to get money, once integrated into the 
army, they do no longer have financial opportunity they had in mining zones controlled by 
rebels, and hence when any rebellion opportunity arises they yield. In the same vein but from 
an academic sociologist’s perspective, these armed movements have struggled to entice local 
young people to join them because their ideology is not about consolidating the idea of 
national cohesion and the unity of the state.294 
In light of Stearns et al.’s (2013) survey on the national army and armed groups in the eastern 
DRC, it has been found that the DRC’s government’s policies towards armed groups have 
been erratic and various political and military mechanisms regarding the reform of national 
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security have been barely used in a coordinated way. Within the FARDC, for example, the 
reintegration of deserter soldiers into the national security system has become a key factor to 
mobilise the army, say Stearns et al (2013). Along similar line, it is proved to be that the 
national army is made of homogeneous units from former rebels integrated into the FARDC 
without adequate training, who refuse to be deployed outside the eastern DRC and who have 
been promoted without any merit (De Koning 2009; Stearns et al. 2013). Stearns et al.’s view 
is supported by a general officer of the FARDC for whom the lack of homogeneity and the 
presence of foreigner soldiers within the national army respond to the strategy of ‘trapped 
solution’, which is based on infiltrating strategic military positions in order to prepare future 
violence.295 Possible interpretation of this view includes that the rising of combatants without 
borders also epitomises the failure of reforming security sector. 
From the contributions above, it emerges that having been recruited from outside of the 
Congo, ‘combatants without borders’ are in reality severed from local beliefs and 
communities. During the DDR programmes, they prefer integrating the Congolese Army than 
civilian life because in fact they are professional recruiters and are meant to fulfil the 
Balkanisation process. In this context, recruitment of combatants should respond to the vision 
of mineral exploitation. This vision should be set as a business interest for their original 
countries. Therefore, the international community should hold Uganda and Rwanda 
responsible for handling the fate of ‘combatants without borders’. The great powers should 
not shirk either because most of these fighters were trained under the military cooperation 
between Washington, London, Kampala and Kigali. Moreover, the wars they conducted in 
the Congo enormously enriched multinationals, including electronic and arms companies (Le 
Palmares 2013). 
5.8 Conclusions 
The relationship between artisanal mining and combatants’ recruitment has fragmented the 
national army and thwarted the original intention of the DDR programmes (De Koning 2009; 
2010). It is important to remember that a great number of ex-combatants prefer getting 
                                                 
295 Interview conducted with a Senior Member of the FARDC, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
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integrated into military life than opting for civilian one. ‘Combatants without borders’, for 
instance, have understood the fact that the Congolese national army is not organised and that 
national territory and national security have always been a challenging issue for the 
government (Stearns et al. 2013) to the extent that state’s authorities prefer external military 
assistance (De Koning 2011), rather than reforming the national security system. Therefore, 
rehabilitation into the army gives opportunity to mutiny and to join a rebel group any time. It 
can be arguing that the involvement of combatants and the army in illegal mineral business 
and the failure of the DDR process are the result of the militarisation of politics and the 
politicisation of the army in order to enable war entrepreneurs to get access to resources and 
keep their position of representatives of different armed groups in national institutions.296  
Overall, it is worth noting that the failure of combatants’ DDR is associated with five factors; 
firstly, the programme did not have real blueprint of the future capability. Secondly, it poorly 
defined and communicated vision. Thirdly, its organisation failed to change its culture. 
Fourthly, local communities did not own it, nor did they author different policies regarding 
the implementation of the programme, with the latter being ‘top-down solutions’ to a ‘top-
down understanding’ of the conflict. And fifthly, the engagement of stakeholders was 
insufficient. 
The nexus between artisanal mining and combatants’ (re-) recruitment has resulted in an 
ongoing insecurity which illicitly enriches certain elites involved both in mining activities 
and arms traffic (Stearns at al. 2013). Insecurity creates jobs as it paves the way for illegal 
trades of minerals, which helps maintain the economy criminalisation while impunity created 
by the state of lawlessness hampers the state to exercise its sovereign powers (De Koning 
2011). In the long-term, as it has been claimed by former Adviser of the Prime Minister, there 
is a moral consequence based on the reliance of the state’s economy on the mining; which in 
turn downgrades every attempt towards anticipating a sustainable development. At the same 
time, there is a creation of the ‘economy of picking’ or the economy of a ‘cash cow’297 which 
results in the underdevelopment, with worse effects on human development and security.298 
                                                 
296 Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
297 Picking economy or cash cow economy and economy of rent are interchangeably used. 
298 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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Basically, there is a fivefold repercussion to the link between artisanal mining and the cycle 
of combatants’ re-recruitment:299 
• First of all, the state is trapped in the cycle of instability, the recruitment of children, 
incessant conflict between ethnic groups and the problem of access to land.300 
• Secondly, armed conflicts in the east give the opportunity to a category of individuals 
– political elites and high ranking officers, to grab some mining concessions for 
individual purposes.  
• Thirdly, some individuals have become richer and stronger than the state i.e. they 
cease being law-abiding citizens.  
• Fourthly, the state weakness is not a direct consequence of this relationship, but it is 
the relationship as a result of the proliferation of armed groups.  
• Fifthly, the state has resigned its duties and charges, therefore has become a ‘text-
book-state’ that does not exist in practice and whose the vacuum profits no-authorised 
movements.  
All these ramifications can be wrapped up into three main issues, including the ‘culture of 
violence301 and the rise of the ‘strong men’,302 the emergence of ‘far west’303 and the 
installation of rentier economy304 in the country. 
In whole, the presentation of data in this chapter was in line with the nexus between artisanal 
mining and the re-recruitment of combatants in the DRC. The chapter has presented the 
findings collected from interviews conducted on the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle in the 
                                                 
299 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
300 Congolese are attached to their land and lands belong to Congo tribes. Mining activities give rise to the land 
appropriation which leads to conflict. 
301 The culture of violence is part of human psychology. It is primarily a psychological theory before being 
social theory. According to this theory every human being has a portion of natural violence that needs to be 
shaped by the mechanism of socialisation.  
302 The concept of the strong men was coined from military coups d’état of the1970s. This theory epitomises 
violence as a way toward voicing concern. The cult of the strong man means that extreme violence cannot be 
justified. As such, anyone can do anything, and violence becomes more credible by the fact that it produces 
money. 
303 The far west in the case of the Congo is explained by the geography and concentration of some wealth in the 
country. Congolese wealth gets enriched some people at the expense of others. Therefore mineral-rich territories 
have become strongholds or no man land for self-enrichment and rebel activities. 
304 A rentier economy is a process through which a state only profits from natural resources and cannot diversify 
and develop other sectors of its economy. 
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DRC. The main argument in this chapter is that continuation of violence and the cycle of 
combatants’ enlistment in the east DRC is a battle over territorial ambitions for neighbouring 
countries and a fight on resource survival for multinational corporations and great powers. 
Furthermore, it presented the results of the political economy of the mining sector in the 
DRC. It gave the picture of the mining security system, the mining code and the organisation 
of the mining sector in the DRC. The chapter also dealt with the cycle of combatants’ re-
recruitment and the DDR programme. It drew the link between the cycle of re-recruitment, 
the continuity of the DDR programmes and the geography of natural resources in the eastern 
DRC. Through these discussions, in this chapter, it has been indicated that one of the major 
causes fuelling war in the DRC, therefore sustaining and underpinning the mining-combatant-
remobilisation nexus seems to be the fact that belligerents have easy access to minerals. 
Overall data showed that the presence of natural resources entices military and rebellion 
presence around mining areas; while insecurity, violence and armed groups are a lucrative 
business for multinational firms, regional governments and national dignitaries. Armed 
groups exchange minerals for the financial and military supports with different actors from 
both inside and outside the country. These are reasons why rebels, national as well as 
foreigner military officers are involved in illegal mining deal, and delay any efforts towards 
ending war. As a result, the country incurs a vicious cycle of endless DDR programmes, the 
security sector reform is low and the economy of rent has crystallised.  
 
The nexus between artisanal mining and combatants’ recruitment and DDR has been 
established and two debates emerged from this relationship. The first posits that the 
fundamental debate on the DRC is based on the issue of governance. That is to say which 
model of governance does the DRC need to avoid resource-based wars and to turn its 
resources into blessing? The second debate however regards the sub-regional cooperation. 
The research departs from the premise that no state can develop without direct synergy with 
its immediate environment. So, all the DRC’s neighbours would have been working in 
synergy to promote endogenous development for the region in order to escape resource curse 
and the cycle of combatants’ (re-) recruitment and DDR. This debate paves the way for the 
forthcoming chapter on the demilitarisation of the mining zones.  
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Chapter Six: Demilitarisation of Mining Zones 
“  
 
 (De Koning 2010:3). 
6.1  Introduction 
The DRC is fully endowed with rare, rich and strategic natural resources that the country has 
not been able to maximise for economic development. In most of the DRC’s mining zones, 
the economic exploitation and trade of mineral resources are made possible from illegal 
exploitation, robbery at gunpoint, illicit fees and levies, coercive business arrangements as 
well as coercive governance. Illegal business has become a plague to the country. Mining 
areas have become a magnet to war entrepreneurs, discontent ex-combatants and unemployed 
people to the point that the linkage between (ex-) combatants and minerals, and how the said 
link could be severed continue to be a real challenge for the state. This chapter explores 
possible approaches towards breaking the recurrence of this relationship via demilitarising 
mining zones.  
The main argument of this chapter is that the mining sector in the DRC should be a 
locomotive of social development and poor communities’ livelihood improvement that gives 
opportunity for communities to build a local and national society which, not only lives up to 
people’s aspirations, but also where mining of natural resources encourages local content and 
keeps individuals from joining armed movements. Contrary to what the mining sector is 
supposed to be and do as set above, the political economy of military forces vis-à-vis mineral 
resources, however, is characterised by the unlawful economic exploitation of mineral 
resources. There is a continual militarisation of mining areas which is impeding the 
combatant’s demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration – DDR programme, with the 
latter including the security sector reform – SSR. It also de-motivates the mining sector from 
contributing to the post-conflict rebuilding efforts. On the overall, it would be difficult to 
envisage the establishment of sustainable peace in the DRC without tackling the challenges 
of militarisation of mining areas in the Kivus.   
This item has been removed due to 3rd Party Copyright. The unabridged version of the 
thesis can be viewed in the Lanchester Library Coventry University.
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In this chapter, the analysis of findings presented in four sections explores the importance of 
breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship, and suggests 
possible solutions with regards to escaping the state failure and protracted armed conflict in 
the DRC. It also presents and analyses, like in Chapter Five, data obtained from the field 
research undertaken between July and December 2013. Likewise, it responds to the second 
objective in connection with exploring possible ways of curtailing the artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment nexus. In whole, it might be put forward that demilitarising mining 
zones will require a conjunction of several efforts and motives at the same time. For instance, 
local ownership of the process of the demilitarisation programme, local authorship of the 
different policy control, a bottom-up understanding of the Kivus’ conflict and bottom-up 
solutions, the reform of security sector and the application of Dodd Frank Law should be 
provided for an effective and efficient demilitarisation process. This research uses the 
concept ‘local ownership’ to refer to the mechanism through which policies are made and 
implemented, while ‘local authorship’ is regarded as the daily harnessing of the local 
involvement in the process of achieving results from set objectives.305 
6.2  Towards Solving the Artisanal Mining-Combatant Nexus 
Different studies on post-Cold War (Dagne 2011; Kitenge N’Gambwa 2011; Jensen and 
Lonergan 2012) suggest established linkages between armed groups, access to national 
resources and prolongation of conflict. However, debates over the impact of ongoing illegal 
exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas and on armed group dynamics need more focus 
in order to understand the artisanal mining-combatant nexus in a comprehensive manner 
(Lundqvist 2010; UN Panel 2014). According to the UN Panel report on the looting of 
resources in the DRC (2014), all military forces or belligerents are involved in the illegal 
exploitation of mineral resources in the eastern DRC. At the same time, some studies on the 
war economy in the DRC (Autesserre 2012; De Koning 2011; de Koning and the Enough 
Team 2013) are of the view that keeping (ex-) combatants and unauthorised soldiers away 
from mining sites would be one of the solutions towards averting and solving the conflict-
                                                 
305 Moore (2013) and Autesserre’s (2014) works have developed detailed definition and understanding on ‘local 
ownership and authorship’. 
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mineral issue. This view is supported by a number of individuals interviewed on the issue of 
severing the artisanal mining-combatant relationship in the DRC. Overall, it could be 
assumed that they have been genuinely optimistic in the belief that severing the artisanal 
mining-combatant relationship would restore sustainable peace, and could pull the country 
out from its protracted unstable nature.306 However, the basic question which might help to 
map out the context is; who has responsibility to demilitarise mining areas, to break down the 
artisanal mining-combatant relationship and how could this be done?    
6.2.1  Severing the Artisanal Mining-Combatant-Recruitment Relationship 
Armed groups and their supporters are aware of the fact that in the DRC, impunity is the 
norm. Strong men and violence or war entrepreneurs have been erected into a social cluster of 
individuals that are not law-abiding citizens, therefore are on top of the law. This is what this 
research coins as the theory of ‘chaos-building’ or ‘disorder-organising’, which, in Beswick 
and Jackson’s (2011:25) findings, constitutes what is coined as ‘state-unbuilding’ or ‘state-
breaking’ by. This approach has been significant in the destabilisation of the DRC since the 
1960s. As indicated by the fieldwork’s findings: 
“From 1960 to date, the ‘chaos-building’ theory, based on violence and crime has 
been a means to access resources and state office in a country where unlawful actions 
of a certain elites and strong men are not punished. Thus, the disorganisation of some 
targeted public institutions, such as justice, security and mining profits a group of 
individuals; politicians, high ranked army officers as well as armed groups and their 
supporters. To this regard, it is therefore important to underline that the theory of 
“chaos-building” goes hand in glove with that of “terra nullius” which is a neo-
colonialist thought with roots in the 1884 Berlin General Act”.307 
A body of literature on the role of mineral resources conflict in the DRC (De Koning 2011; 
UN Experts 2012; 2013; 2014; Stearns et al. 2013) puts forward that efforts to breaking the 
link between mining and conflict in the eastern DRC have been thwarted by illegal 
                                                 
306 Focus group, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
307 Fieldwork, Belgium, DRC, France and England, July-December 2013. 
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involvement of some members of the Congolese army in the trade of minerals, since the 
government is not doing much to deter individuals accountable for unlawful behaviours. As 
the Global Witness’ research on artisanal mining in the Kivus indicates, these soldiers mine 
minerals, tax miners and traders, and facilitate the smuggling of ores – sometimes in the 
official vehicles of the army. Soldiers in the eastern DRC can earn thousands of dollars per 
week through undue mining levies,308 despite the fact that the Mining Code prohibits the 
army to partake of mining activity (Mining Code 2012). One of the major challenges of the 
mining sector in the DRC today remains the mismanagement and lack of transparency in this 
sector, illegal exploitation of certain strategic minerals by belligerents and the easy access to 
resources by a cluster of privileged elites (Stearns et al. 2013). However, one of the major 
causes fuelling war in the DRC and underpinning the artisanal mining-combatant-(re-) 
recruitment nexus has been believed to be the fact that belligerents have easy access to 
minerals (De Koning  2011; UN Experts 2014). The particularity of the political economy of 
armed groups or rather of belligerents vis-à-vis the mining sector in the DRC has been that 
the mining zones give the opportunity to accessing strategic minerals, necessary to high-tech 
multinational corporations, at a cheaper price (De Koning 2010; 2011). Severing this 
relationship and demilitarising mining zones have been envisioned as a problem-solving path.  
Different reports from the UN Panel of Experts on the involvement of armed groups and 
military officials in the unlawful mining of mineral resources in the eastern DRC (UN 
Experts 2012; 2013; 2014) argue that breaking mining-combatant nexus needs subsequent 
efforts towards disengaging armed groups and soldiers from mining zones. This has been 
defined as a key moment in the redefinition of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment 
relationship. However, as a sovereign state, the DRC has the basic and vital right to plan and 
deliver the framework of actions under law in which armed movements and (ex-) fighters, be 
they national or international, should agree to leave mining areas illegally occupied (De 
Koning  2011; UN Experts 2014). This, however, is not exhaustive and leaves room to others 
– Congolese individuals and conflict analysts, to express their opinions on different actions 
towards keeping belligerents – the national army, armed movements and unauthorised army 
elements, from illegal exploitation of mineral resources. 
                                                 
308 Global witness’ statement before the opening of the international conference on conflict minerals, Kinshasa, 
October 2014. 
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A set of literature on the implication of armed groups in mining exploitation in the DRC 
found that unless mining zones are demilitarised and (ex-) combatants kept from accessing 
mineral resources, ending war and promoting peace in the eastern DRC would be a dream or 
a luxury process to achieve (De Koning 2011; Demmers 2012). This view is supported by the 
ongoing debate over the security situation in the Great Lakes Region of Africa; particularly in 
the DRC (De Koning 2011; De Koning and The enough Team 2013). Boshoff et al. (2010) 
and De Koning (2013), for instance, are of the view that disengaging (ex-) combatants from 
exploring minerals would involve a firm political willingness from the Congolese authorities 
and the international community. From another point of view, in my research in Kinshasa 
when I interviewed a Congolese academic, he claimed that severing the artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment relationship within mining zones under armed groups’ occupation 
means that armed movements should be demilitarised or expelled.309 This stance got a great 
support from most interviewees and focus group participants during the fieldwork, and two 
possibilities towards disengaging combatants from exploring minerals are envisioned; either 
dislodging them militarily from mining areas or through dialogue – negotiations.310 
However, the two decades of civil war have portrayed the DRC’s army as inexistent, weak 
and inadequately equipped to eradicate armed group’s phenomenon in the national territory 
(Stearns et al. 2013; UN Experts 2014). This view holds true as it concurs with that of 
Congolese journalists, academics and civil society members who are of the view that over the 
past ten years, it has been clearly proven that the DRC’s army was disintegrated and unable 
to defeat armed groups or to win a war.311 In the light of the recent victories of the FARDC 
backed up by the UN intervention brigade over the M23 rebellion, this argument however is 
still questionable, due to the recent change of the course of events on the ground.  
From a different opinion nonetheless, a Congolese Member of Parliament has claimed that 
the DRC has military potential to defend the national territory as was the case during 
Mobutu’s reign, but the problem is that there is an ongoing conspiracy and betrayal organised 
from the top of the state by national authorities given that instability gives leeway to illegal 
                                                 
309 Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, 2013. 
310 Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
311 Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
Chapter Six: Demilitarisation of Mining Zones   
Coventry University 277 
 
exploitation of minerals that profits them.312 From a general perspective of the fieldwork 
though, many of the participants and respondents have been of the view that military actions 
towards eradicating armed groups operating in the eastern DRC would be one of the strongest 
options,313 even though lessons learned from other African post-conflict situation (De Koning 
2010) privilege political actions instead. However, it is important to bear in mind at this point 
that military actions are always of heavy and disastrous socio-economic consequences, for 
they involve irreparable costs concerned with the loss of human lives and socio-economic 
infrastructure. Thus they would not be advisable, if the ultimate aim is to set a sustainable 
peace within a zone which has experienced almost two decades of armed conflicts. In my 
interview in London with an expert familiar with the Kivus’ conflict, it has been, for instance, 
claimed that it would be preferable if diplomatic option and national consultations could be 
used to dissolve the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship,314 but this view is 
only from a representative of an international non-government organisation. 
In the previous research on the DRC’s resource-based conflict (De Koning 2011; Demmers 
2012; Tschirgi 2013), it has been argued that the task of fragmenting the artisanal mining-
combatant relationship is to unravel the multifaceted dynamics of combined processes of the 
previously mentioned phenomenon so as to explicate and/or to comprehend how and why 
(ex-) combatants resort to (re-) integrate armed groups operating in zones endowed with 
mineral resources. Doing such analysis is part of conducting social research. In essence, the 
artisanal mining combatant-recruitment relationship falls under the lens of the complexity of 
the potential bonds between natural resources, conflict and peacebuilding; which Jensen and 
Lonergan (2012) have coined as ‘comprehensive assessments of the peacebuilding process.’ 
For them, comprehensive assessments of the environment in which mineral-conflict-based 
occurred should start at the outset of peacebuilding, and have to be built around a trilogy 
basis. The first is based on ascertaining the link between natural resources and the 
environment in causing conflict outbreak, financing armed groups, sustaining the risk of 
combatant’s (re-) recruitment reoccurring. The second is to deal with underlining the direct 
and indirect effects of conflicts on natural resources through highlighting any associated risks 
                                                 
312 Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
313 Focus group, Kinshasa, September 20013. 
314 Interview conducted with a representative of the Global Witness, London, November 2013. 
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in regard to human development, livelihood and security. The third however, appraises the 
prospect of re-establishing and utilising natural resources so as to attain peacebuilding and 
sustainable development outcomes while reducing new grievance (Jensen and Lonergan 
2012). 
Muggah’s (2010) explanation on stabilising fragile states and humanitarian space indicates 
that it is crucial to imagine a more complex and demanding set of actions towards stabilising 
zones which have faced conflict-mineral-based such as the DRC. Such actions may culminate 
in good results, but will barely yield enough sustainable solutions. Muggah’s stance is closest 
to those of a few Congolese – interviewed during my field research on the issue of mineral-
based conflict and the cycle of combatants’ (re-) recruitment, in that the stabilisation of the 
DRC would only be possible through national dialogue which would need to take into 
account the paradigmatic change of the perception of the Congolese state management and 
operation.315 As the fieldwork indicates, academics, political scientists and analysts and 
opponents strongly believe in this option, since it gives opportunity to people to be part of 
solutions to the state’s problems. This, in my findings, is referred to as ‘public participation’ 
or ‘community-based approach’316 as discussed below. It is with this in mind that the Congo 
has held several peace conferences, but with no discernible progress. Hence, changing the 
operative paradigm would help avoid falling into the same patterns as in the past. However, 
as pointed out by Tschirgi (2013), the DRC’s inability to police itself or to work with its 
neighbours in order to ensure regional security represents a real stumbling-block to carry on 
an effective process towards fragmenting artisanal mining-combatant relationship. Therefore, 
it seems to be urgent and more than important for the DRC to ensure that it is strong enough 
and well prepared to deal with this issue without other extra-states actors. The figure 6.1 
encapsulates local ownership and authorship of community-based approach to the 
demilitarisation of the mining zones in the Kivus. 
                                                 
315 Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
316 Community-based approach, public participation, bottom-up approach or local ownership and authorship are 
interchangeably used in this research. 
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Figure 6.1: Local ownership and authorship of community-based approach to the 
demilitarisation of the mining zones in the Kivus (source: Own composition) 
Although the recent victory of the FARDC over a few armed groups operating in the mining 
zones, a thorough analysis of various processes of peacebuilding and peacekeeping in the 
Kivus however has revealed the incapability of the DRC’s government to plan and implement 
an effective combatants’ DDR programme and to reform its security sector system (Tschirgi 
2013; Vircoulon 2008), whereas the DDR and the reform of security system pave the way for 
the creation of a new security system, henceforth strengthening state-building process, in a 
post-conflict state. De Koning’s (2011) survey on the demilitarisation of the DRC’s mining 
sector found that there is an imperative condition prior to breaking artisanal mining-
combatant relationship based on the restoration of the state’s authority, the achievement of an 
effective (ex-) combatants’ DDR and the reform of the security system. However, De Koning 
research is limited as to how demilitarised mining zones should be secured after they have 
been cleared of combatants. According to the fieldwork’s findings, it has been claimed by an 
academic that the government should think about the security of mining zones after the 
departure of rebels on the one hand; and on the other, there is the need for using communities 
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as a way towards reinforcing all solutions with regard to severing artisanal mining-combatant 
relationship.317 This leaves room to former Adviser at the Congolese Presidency and a 
consultant at the office of the Congolese Prime Minister to express the opinion that the 
efficiency of this process would be possible only if the state reforms its operating and 
management system by putting in place a state’s proactive intelligence system or an 
anticipative and offensive intelligence system that aims to anticipate events.318 It is, however, 
of note that severing artisanal mining-combatant nexus, as a peace process, would need to go 
along with security and safety of mining areas which implies the imperative process of 
demilitarising mining zones.  
6.2.2  From Demilitarisation of Mining Zones to Militarisation of War-affected Zones 
Administration: Toward a Community-based Approach 
Since the eruption of armed conflicts in 1996 up to 2012, all antagonists or armed forces have 
been abusing with impunity the civilian population in the eastern DRC (UN Experts 2014), 
even though the country is still home to the world largest United Nations peacekeeping 
missions ever deployed these abuses still continue. Supported programmes to disband (ex-) 
combatants and to form a unified national army have been limited only to treaties but not 
implemented to achieve the set objective (De Koning 2011). One of the particularities of 
human abuses in the Kivus is the connection between belligerents and the artisanal mining in 
mining war-torn-zones (UN Experts 2014).  
From the past two decades of civil war in the eastern DRC, for instance, it has been reported 
that the human abuses are often connected to the economic exploitation of artisanal miners 
and other individuals involved in the possibly worthwhile mineral trade at the local level 
(Svensson 2011). As also argued by de Koning and the Enough Team (2013), the exploitation 
of mineral resources in the eastern DRC is regarded as a convoluted combination of formal 
and informal activities, wherein military units, police and other state agencies misuse their 
legal powers for economic advantage. This claim corroborates with the report of the UN 
Experts (2014) on the link between mining and organised armed groups in the eastern DRC; 
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which found an extensive militarisation of the mining sector in the eastern DRC. Although 
the UN report focused on the illegal exploitation of minerals by armed groups, nevertheless, 
it also acknowledged the prominent role played in this by elements of the FARDC.  
In previous research, it appears both from the army and from the armed movements, 
exploitation of mineral resources is tacitly condoned as a way for soldiers and combatants to 
appendage their low and often unpaid salaries (De Koning 2009; UN Experts 2014). This 
concern raises additional problems in regard to combatants or soldiers that have not been 
properly (re-) integrated into the FARDC structure (De Koning 2013). Based on De Koning’s 
(2009) research on the demilitarisation of the mining zones in Katanga and the Kivus, it 
might be argued that the government has been understandably disinclined to keep soldiers 
from mining zones due to some officers further up the chain of command, therefore profiting 
from illegal sources of revenue. In De Koning’s (2011:2) words: 
“The militarisation of mining zones elongates and thrives on the informality of the 
mining sector, therefore impeding industrial mining interests, as well as those of civil 
society and development organisations. This has partially been due to the protraction 
of conflict, but also because of a lack of capacity of the state mining authorities to 
establish noteworthy presence in the often remote and rapidly shifting mining 
locations”.  
However, during the field research, it seems to be different. People have expressed the 
opinion that the Congolese government must learn from other post-conflict states that went 
through the same phenomenon, although not having the same realities.319 According to an 
interview conducted with the Adviser at the Congolese Department of Foreign Affairs, how 
Colombia, for example, handled the situation of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia; FARC] is worth analysing.320 All 
respondents, however, seem to be of the consensus that the main cause of the recurrence of 
violence is the absence of the state’s authority over the western part of the country – the 
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evanescence of the state.321  However, how can the state’s authority be restored in an unstable 
situation? This leaves room to the current Senior Adviser at the Department of Security in 
Kinshasa to envisage the idea of militarising provincial administrations of affected-war 
zones.322  From a contrary view, a few academics and political analysts made a point which 
argued against the one from the Senior Adviser at the Department of Security. To them, 
however, as the army is also involved in the mining activities, it ceases being an independent 
and sovereign institution that defends the state’s interests. For one of these analysts, the army 
like political parties are a group of ambitious individuals and an organisation of businessmen 
disguised as soldiers or policemen and therefore they cannot ensure the collective interest.323 
The militarisation of the administrations of war-affected zones has been supported by some 
individuals who believe that the Congo needs a dissuasive and organised army in order to 
deter any rebellion attempt, be it from inside or outside. A member of the presidential 
majority324 is of the view that one possibility towards demilitarising mining areas is to 
‘militarise war-affected zones administrations’ and then ‘militarised administrations’ will 
‘demilitarise former rebel militarisation’ in mining areas for a ‘new remilitarisation’ whose 
aim is security of mining zones and stability; which can end with the improvement of the 
situation.325  In this way, it bears stressing that fragmentation is very important in this case. 
As previously developed in Chapters Four and Five, each ethnic group in the Kivus has its 
militia based on the principle of ‘ethnic rivalry’ that all communities should be treated the 
same as none can be favoured over the others. Therefore, there is the need for reconditioning 
and recreating the sense of community that involve all communities in the decision-making 
of the whole community. To the above mentioned member of the presidential majority: 
“The process of recreating the sense of community means that all ethnic groups have 
to be at the heart of the decisions that involve their provinces. This process falls under 
the central administration lens, and should involve the national army bearing in mind 
                                                 
321 General trend of the fieldwork’s results conducted in Belgium, DRC, England and France, July-December 
2013. 
322 Interview conducted with the Senior Adviser at the Department of Security and Defence, Kinshasa, 
September 2013. 
323 Interview conducted with an academic and political analyst, Kinshasa, July, 2013. 
324 Presidential Majority is the coalition of the ruling party. 
325 Interview conducted with a member of the Presidential Majority, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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that the process will require to undertake several reforms before it reaches a positive 
outcome. It should eventually go along with local communities, central government 
and international community. It is worth noting that it is all about reconditioning 
people and putting them at the centre of all decisions that involve their communities. 
In this context, the concept of poverty and marginalisation has to be addressed; 
otherwise it would be tough to allow ethnic groups to live together given the 
Balkanisation tendency. International community therefore should assist government 
not only in creating life conditions and in reforming other state’s sectors, but also in 
creating environments whereby solutions to economic, political and social problems 
come from the bottom rather than the top; which is otherwise known as community-
based approach or public participation”.326 
Demilitarising mining zones and breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment 
nexus processes fall under the lens of peace interventions. As such, it should draw on local 
and thematic knowledge to be efficient (Anderson and Olson 2003; Mac Ginty 2008; 
Campbell 2010; CDA 2010b). As elements of peacebuilding process, acquaintance with the 
local environments is critical in demilitarising mining zones and severing the artisanal 
mining-combatant-recruitment link (Autesserre 2014) for some reasons; first, as 
peacebuilding approaches to changing the conditions that uphold and encourage violence, 
they imply thorough understanding of the root-causes of these conditions (Call and Cousens 
2008). This is a vital prerequisite of any successful project initiative. Secondly, viewed from 
a purely perspective of sociology of conflicts, it is ascertainable that the dynamics of mineral-
based conflicts are frequently localised and contextualised, they repeatedly differ 
tremendously from environment to environment (Autesserre 2010; Coyne and Pellillo 2012; 
Leonard 2013). So, of the above follows: 
“A nuanced understanding of the specific conditions in which demilitarising mining 
zones and breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus 
intervention – the motivations of each party, the patterns of alliance and conflict at 
play, the history of antagonisms, is essential for peacebuilders to determine who to 
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approach, which argument to use, and, ultimately, what strategy to adopt” (Autesserre 
2014:70).  
Against Autesserre’s view, it argues that it is only local communities that could be able to 
provide in-depth knowledge of local histories, cultures, traditions, attitudes, and to some 
extent, worldviews that could enable peacekeepers to adjust foreign ideas to on-the-ground 
conditions during project initiation and design (Richmond 2005; Mac Ginty 2008). 
Indigenous expertise remains pivotal in designing projects and throughout project 
implementation, due to conflict and post-conflict environments being tremendously volatile, 
thus plans have to be continually updated (Huang and Harris 2006; Campbell 2010). Finally, 
cultural understanding is noteworthy for an effective demilitarisation of mining zones and the 
breaking down of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus processes, as it 
encourages and enables valuable communication between peacebuilders and target 
populations. Communities in war-torn-zones all over the world thus underline the 
significance of local knowledge – for national and international stakeholders) in planning and 
executing apposite and significant projects, communicating effectively, and as it has been 
discussed in Chapters Four and Five, ensuring that project funds do not divert to other ends 
than those set initially (CDA 2010b). This is a community-based approach, incorporating 
local ownership and authorship, referred to above. It also applies to other sections as 
discussed further in this chapter. 
From the above, it might be adduced that a sustainable solution towards demilitarising mining 
areas and breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus would require a 
full involvement of local community in the process of peace at all levels. It is important in 
this regard to underline that the involvement of combatants in the mines like demilitarisation 
process are not happening in a vacuum; rather within a community where some members 
who believed to be grieved opted for violent means either to voice their concern or to access 
resources. Also, different alliances and networks that have emerged around mines created by 
belligerent have direct or indirect impacts on the local community. In either way, community 
is the victim of the conflict like it would be the beneficiary of peace. Therefore, dealing with 
demilitarisation process without public participation, according to the fieldwork, would be 
like secluding reintegration process from the DDR programme. According the findings from 
my fieldwork, it can be postulated that community-based approach or local perspective may 
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help to draw the line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ militarisation. In the same vein of thinking, 
believe a group of respondents during a focus group in Kinshasa, and skype and phone 
interviewees in Beni, Butembo, Bukavu, Goma and Uvira, the participation of community’s 
members to the community’s issues, such as those in line with peacebuilding and post-
conflict recovery may be a way towards addressing some challenges encountered both by 
stakeholders and the community itself.327 
For instance, the ‘nexus between artisanal mining and the combatants’ recruitment, 
reintegration and re-recruitment cycle approach’ with its focus on demilitarisation of mining 
zones would be a partial and coercive method without the participation of concerned 
communities. Researchers who have explored the conflict in the Kivus have also singled out 
the involvement of the FARDC in the illegal mining exploitation and trading (De Koning 
2009; 2013; Global Witness 2013; UN Panel 2014). In this context, demilitarising mining 
areas could change military balance in favour of national and local authorities who have been 
involved in illegal mining exploitation and trading, therefore victimising and criminalising 
(ex-) combatants by dismissing any political grievances regardless of their legitimacy, 
legitimating and protecting state authorities despite their alliance with armed groups and their 
implication in violence.  
The experience of post-conflict recovery in the eastern DRC suggests that peacebuilding 
approach is regarded as the mundele328 or muzungu’s [foreigners] projects. Evidence from my 
fieldwork indicates that local authorities and populations frequently consider international 
peace initiatives as having been dictated by their foreign partners. Numerous community 
leaders and civil society members in the Kivus, for instance, complained about how the 
whole idea of conflict settlement between Banyarwanda and indigenous communities was 
imposed on them by the international community.329 My research findings are closest to 
                                                 
327 Interviews conducted in Kinshasa, July-October 2013.  
     Skype and phone interviews conducted in Beni, Butembo, Bukavu, Goma and Uvira, July-October 2013. 
328 In Congolese idioms (Kikongo, Lingala and Swahili), Mundele or Muzungu means white person. In the 
context of this research, local communities have used this term to designate a project made of, and managed by, 
white people mainly.  
329 Focus groups, Kinshasa, August, September and October 2013. 
     Interview conducted with an academic and political scientist, Paris, November 2013. 
     Skype interviews conducted with the Kivus’ notables, Goma, Bukavu, Beni, uvira, July, august and 
September 2013. 
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Autesserre’s (2014) work on conflict resolution and the everyday politics of international 
intervention. In trying to understand the failure of the post-conflict recovery process in the 
DRC, she (Autesserre 2014: 97) unveils that “criticisms levied against peacebuilding 
approach in the Kivus show that peacebuilders were arrogant, condescending and 
paternalistic”. To her, local communities were viewing peacebuilders as ‘bossy’ and 
‘preachy’ [“donneurs de leçons”]330 because as soon as they arrive, they immediately tell 
people what to do (ibid: 97). Drawing on local leaders’ perspective, it might be postulated 
that the post-conflict recovery based on a ‘top-down approach’ as is the case in the DRC 
(Autesserre 2014), has proved to have some limitations in understanding and addressing the 
phenomenon of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus in the Kivus, because in 
such a conflict, where artisanal mining seems to be at the heart of the conflict, actors would 
be either below or beyond peace interest; and therefore, if peace occurs, it would be a 
transitory moment between transitional and recurrent phases of combatants’ recruitment.  
It has been demonstrated in Chapters One and Five that belligerents use proxies or 
themselves to convey their minerals to the selling points. These proxies are civil individuals 
and members of different communities affected by the war. This means; within communities, 
there are some people that are in connection with belligerents. These people are like 
jeopardising peace efforts because of conflict’s dividends gleaned through their network with 
belligerents. Only by cooperating with local communities that such individuals could be 
denounced and exposed. In such a context, community-based approach would come up with a 
reconciliation solution which is useful not only to address issues that involve violent 
activities within a segmented society, but also to take actions against belligerents and 
civilians who are guilty, contended a group of respondents.331 
Various scholars who have studied the conflict in the Kivus posit that the war in the eastern 
DRC encapsulates the nature of the state, governance, the state regime and leadership 
(Autesserre 2010; 2014; Dagne 2011; Kitenge N’Gambwa 2011). The trajectory and nature 
                                                                                                                                                        
     Interview conducted with a member of the EU, Brussels, December 2013. 
330 In French language like in Congolese culture the concept ‘donneurs de leçons’ [preachy] carries a ‘pejorative 
meaning’. It means somebody who pretends to be knower even if he/she does not know anything about what 
he/she thinks to know. 
331 Focus groups, Kinshasa, August; September; October 2013. 
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of the conflict in the DRC, as elaborated in Chapter Four, has among other roots ethnic 
identity, land access and citizenship as well as the 1884 Berlin General Charter creating the 
DRC. These factors need to be taken into account if any solutions to the conflict are 
envisioned. A few Congolese academics and analysts are of the consensus that the DDR 
programme, army and police reform and good governance approaches – or simply the DRC’s 
state-building, would need communities’ support, public participation, in order to reinforce 
the mechanism of demilitarising mining zones in the Kivus. To them, community-based 
approach could be envisioned as a sustainable demilitarisation and peace.332 Public 
participation in this context would mean that all Kivus’ communities have to come together 
and discuss on the cycle of crisis and the real problems of their community, they said. Herein 
is the importance to mention that the conflict in the Kivus has involved a ‘top-down 
understanding which has also resulted in top-down solutions’, something which kept local 
people away from decisions concerning their communities (Atesserre 2010; 2014).  
Viewed as an automatic and intuitive approach, a ‘top-down’ analysis and understanding of 
violent conflict, as is the case of the Kivus, consists of peacebuilders locating the causes of 
continual violence in the regional and national realms. As a sideline to such a diagnostic, 
peacebuilders acquire inevitably a perfect sense to centre their efforts at the macro levels 
(Autesserre 2010). According to a ‘top-down’ framework, regional and national crisis or 
violent conflicts gave rise to the most protracted conflicts in the eastern DRC; therefore 
assuaging these conflicts would quench leaders’ warlike appetites and end the persisting 
fighting. Also, due to resentments amid the belligerents being accounted for one of the major 
elements curbing the reunification of the state, the restructuring of security system and the 
enactment of essential legislation, reconciling these belligerents would bring sustainable 
peace. Furthermore, given the residual, grassroots violence was the result of the absence of 
authority, state building would stop it (ibid: 92-93). However, it has been 15 years now since 
peacekeepers – MONUSCO, are in the DRC. Despite the MONUSCO intervention, peace 
diagnostic in the eastern Congo is severe; the central government has never been able to 
exercise its authority all over this part of the country, violence in the Kivus is still a plague 
while the involvement of different conflict’s actors in illegal exploitation of minerals has 
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never come to an end up till to date. Equally, DDR and SSR have never come to happen as it 
was set on the agreements, while communities are more torn than they were before. 
Summarily, the peacebuilders’ “top-down framework” has created more problems than 
solving them.333 
On the contrary, evidence from my fieldwork made a point which argues as follows; applying 
community-based approach would mean that the conflict in the Kivus may need a “bottom-up 
understanding which may result in bottom-up solutions”. In this context local leaders – local 
civil society, traditional authorities, community’s leaders, grassroots, etc., and stakeholders 
might be involved in the design and implementation of peace process.334 Moore (2013:121) 
and Autesserre (2014:102) suggest: 
“Peacebuilding is more effective when it promotes both local ‘authorship’, meaning 
the constant solicitation of ‘local input on how best to proceed with a given set of 
goal’, and local ‘ownership’, which entails ‘control over policy creation’ and 
implantation”.335   
Moore and Autesserre’s view adds to the general trend regarding the demilitarisation of the 
mining areas gleaned from the findings of my fieldwork. Community-based approach, 
according to my fieldwork findings, may be the keystone for peace and a progressive revision 
of governance which is based on local-based communities taking into account certain 
specificities mainly related to the existence of their nations – tribes, as a state.336 This ‘local 
ownership and authorship approach’ could address the issue of the DR Congo being a ‘terra 
nullius’ set by the 1884 Berlin General Act and endorsed during the 1885 Berlin Conference, 
claimed an analyst and civil society activist.337 As a result, multinational corporations and 
powerful states still consider the DRC as a protected turf for their interests”, he said.338 This 
assertion corroborates with the resource appropriation principle – previously mentioned in 
                                                 
333 Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
     Interview conducted with a Diplomat, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
334 Findings from fieldwork conducted in Belgium, DRC, France and UK, July-December 2013 
335 See Moore (2013:121) for detailed definitions. 
336 Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
337 Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
338 Interview conducted with an academic and member of civil society, Paris, December 2013. 
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Chapters Two and Four, according to which war should be imposed to counter against any 
inclination towards affirming absolute sovereignty over natural resource-rich entities such as 
the Congolese territory.  
Based on the background discussed above along with the trajectory and nature of conflict in 
the DRC reviewed in Chapter Four, community-based approach, as postulated by my 
participants, may possibly be a path towards not only escaping illegal militarisation of mining 
areas, but also contributing to peace process in the Kivus. In addition to above mentioned, 
public participation or local ownership and authorship could contribute to the development of 
a responsible leadership which stems from the people, something that lacks the state since its 
independence. It may also contribute to address the economic, political and social 
reintegration aspect which the 2002 and 2006 DDR programmes overlooked.339 Finally, it 
possibly will reconfigure the nature of the state, its governance, political regime, and the state 
leadership through empowering communities; which would enhance the national cohesion 
given that the particularity of the Congo is that lands belong to the ethnic groups,340 which 
manage them on behalf of the state.341 In this case, the demilitarisation of mining zones could 
have a domino effect.342 
Accordingly, a number of Congolese academics, conflict analysts and civil society 
representatives believe that beyond public participation approach, there is the need for the 
principle of militarisation which involves the military protection of the state’s mining sites.343 
To them, the military protection of the state’s mining sites is crucial for the state and its 
sovereignty as this is ‘good militarisation’ for it was part of the colonial administration, said a 
member of the government.344 This view is supported by an expert of the Congolese 
Department of Security who believes that it is not by chance that during colonial period and 
Mobutu’s reign there were important military bases such as Watsha and Kamina in the 
                                                 
339 See the Section on the need of a new DDR programme for more details. 
340 Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
341 See chapter 5 for more details on land issues in the DRC. 
342 In this context, the domino effect stands for that public participation incarnates the power to boost up peace 
ingredients as it involves a frank and fraternal dialogue between members of the same nation. 
343 Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
344 Interview conducted with a member of the government, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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eastern Congo. It happened because this zone covers great mining sites and Belgium was 
militarily protecting this territorial space through military bases.345 To date, the principle 
based on ‘military protection of mining area’ stands true in the  northern DRC where the 
current presence of commando troops trained by American and Belgian instructors 
respectively in Kisangani, Oriental Province and in Kindu, Maniema responds to the same 
reasons, claimed an academic very acquainted with the DRC’s politics and intelligence 
service.346 Although this may sound controversial, the reproduction of colonial patterns at this 
point may be envisaged for the survival of state in terms of the mining protection. 
From the above argument emerges a fundamental prerequisite before demilitarising mining 
areas. This precondition is the imperative of the defence system to go along with the state 
politics, and to become a priority of the Congolese government. This imperative should be on 
the agenda and then switches into practice. In other words, the government of the DRC needs 
to carefully initiate a framework of the national military geopolitics which integrates military, 
social and economic interests. For this to be effective, there will be a need for avoiding the 
instrumental vision of the state based on using the state’s office to have access to national 
resources. However, as long as the state is still fragile, demilitarising and securing mining 
sites will be difficult. Hence, the state must have a security sector reform and military plan 
towards militarily protecting these areas so as to obstruct unauthorised individuals to access 
resources. Unfortunately, said a Congolese academic and conflict analyst, from internal like 
from external, the planning for defence and security, alluded to above, has fallen victim to 
there being no such provisions.347 
Lamb’s (2012) survey on the DDR process in the DRC found that unless the DDR process 
and SSR have been effective in the DRC, security will still rely on the national force or 
national army composed of a blend of poorly trained and underpaid ex-government soldiers, 
ex-rebels and ex-militia. However, as mentioned earlier in this research, militarisation delays 
and enables the informality of the mining sector (De Koning 2011; De Koning and the 
Enough Team 2013). Drawn from De Koning’s findings on the demilitarisation of Katanga 
                                                 
345 Interview conducted with the senior advisor at the Department of Security and Defence, Kinshasa, September 
2013. 
346 Interview conducted with an expert on the DRC’s politics. 
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and Kivu mining regions, it could be noted that DRC’s national soldiers have been 
recurrently impeding legitimate mining authorities from accessing mineral resource such as 
coltan. On the other side, state institutions, both civil and military, tend to abuse their official 
powers to access artisanal mining for individual economic profit. Furthermore, it has been 
indicated that the profits raised from controlling mining zones are a disincentive to consent 
full integration into the new FARDC structures (De Koning 2010). Therefore, following De 
Koning’s view and in light of the UN Experts’ recommendations on the DRC (2014), 
condemning and punishing abuse and rewarding moderation would be one of the main 
components of the demilitarisation package.  
Following the above, one could say that demilitarising mining areas, severing the mining-
combatant relationship and ending the combatants’ recruitment cycle which also leads to the 
unfolded nature of the combatants’ DDR, henceforward culminating in state-breaking or 
state-unbuilding, would require a synergy work with the communities on the basis that 
security is a common heritage, and the DDR process links to integration, post-conflict 
recovery and peacebuilding (Berdal and Ucko 2009; CIDDR 2009; Özerdem 2012); which in 
turn involves economic, political and social rehabilitation both for returnees and community’s 
members (Özerdem 2008; Özerdem and Podder 2012). Thus, populations need to learn that 
everyone must contribute towards security.  
From micro-level analysis, it might be postulated that ‘top-down’ approach failed to address 
the conflict issue in the Kivus, since it has been applying peacebuilders’ view – international 
and regional solutions, to a local problem. Therefore, ‘bottom-up’ solutions based on 
‘community-based’ approach or ‘local community participation’, as I was told by my 
respondents, may be the bedrock for not only breaking the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment nexus and demilitarising the mining zones, but also for other processes – as 
elaborated below, pertaining to development and sustainable peace in the Kivus. But what we 
need to bear in mind is that ‘bottom-up’ approach would not be without challenges or could 
be of little solutions, especially in matter of security where we are dealing with strong men 
and combatants without borders, as well as with the emergence of some regional powers 
whose survival relies on the looting of the DRC’s resources. ‘Bottom-up’ approach may be 
affected by challenges of armed bandits and hoodlums who desire to accomplish their ulterior 
motives in the community. In this case, the concept of policing, trust and collaboration may 
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be envisioned and would need to be effective in order to reach a higher security in 
implementing the ‘bottom-up’ approach for maximum results. Also, police force, such as the 
current national police totally militarised, might need to be banned. There is the need for the 
effective DDR programme and SSR.348 
6.2.3  Need for New (Ex-) Combatants’ DDR Programme: Reconceptualising 
Combatants’ Reintegration in the DRC 
Inactive or unemployed ex-combatants are always at the mercy of rebellion entrepreneurs and 
are well prepared to become fundamentalists. The cycle of (ex-) combatants’ (re-) 
recruitment and the unfolded nature of the DDR programme in the DRC is linked to the 
state’s economy. In other words, the precariousness of life and the lack of employment have 
exposed these individuals to earn their life through easy job such as urban violence and 
crime, illegal exploitation of resources or collusion with enemies against their own land. In 
this context, ending war, mitigating or eradicating armed conflict’s inclinations would be 
difficult, unless a sharing economic prosperity zone with neighbours is created. 
At the start of each DDR programme, it is crucial to raise the question as to whether there are 
parties to work with. (Ex-) combatants could undermine peacebuilding efforts. However, 
what should be avoided is the (ex-) combatants being attracted by terrorism and religious 
extremism due to the failure of their socio-economic reintegration (Özerdem 2012). 
Terrorism and religious fundamentalism have been one of the most dangerous repercussions 
of the unfolded DDR (Özerdem and Podder 2011) and the failure of the reform of security 
system in a post-conflict country (Dirk Salomons 2005; Sendra 2013). A DDR process badly 
planned and monitored ends up rising impervious to the logic of peace incentives in a war-
torn-zone. A successful DDR process should start with a realistic political scenario. This 
scenario needs to rely upon breaking down internal and external supports of different 
belligerents (Kölln 2011), and on the capacity to recognise the significance of individual 
combatants as for what they would have and what would be their contribution to each aspect 
of social reintegration, which should be seen under the lens of their capacities and 
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Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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weaknesses and the way they would connect to the overall objectives of social reintegration 
in a continuum (Özerdem 2012). Kölln (2011), for instance, suggests that when a government 
and a rebel group have reached an agreement, their access to external resources should 
absolutely be cut off through an agreement between different parties in conflicts and their 
funders. In the 1990s when the government of Mozambique and rebel movement Renamo 
reached the peace agreement their access to external resources were cut off through a signed 
agreement between Russia, United States and South Africa (ibid.).  
Drawing on Özerdem’s (2012) theories on a re-conceptualisation of ex-combatant 
reintegration: social reintegration approach, it might be assumed that the new DDR 
programme of the ex-combatants should emphasis both on the community and the 
combatants in order to address comprehensively ex-combatants’ needs and aspirations. From 
this perspective, the successful DDR process of ex-combatants would be the touchstone and 
the time of truth for the process of peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It is 
important to bear in mind however that when combatants surrender, they face a point of no 
return (Lamb 2012). Their only faith seems to be focused on the near future where the 
advantages of peace outweigh those of war (Özerdem 2013). Failure in meeting that future 
vision, ex-combatants and their leaders would not confirm to the choice for peace; therefore 
would become a serious threat that might require complex solutions to solve than those 
ordinarily requested during the DDR programme. 
The DRC government is mobilising external partners for a new DDR programme called 
Global and Unique DDR III. According to the Head of the Department of Defence and 
Security, this programme aims to address challenges in line with SSR. It has been reminded 
that the country has already implemented two DDR programmes respectively in 2002 and 
2006, and the number of demobilised individuals was not left out. However, the Global and 
Unique DDR III apparently eluded to explain why the two previous programmes did not live 
up to the community’s expectations; neither could the Head of the Department of Defence 
and Security tell how the Global and Unique DDR III is different from the previous. There is 
work to be done on this ambitious new combatants’ DDR programme, if previous mistakes 
are to be avoided, otherwise history will repeat itself. Researchers who have looked at this 
subject are of the consensus that the failure of the DDR process in the Kivus suggests that the 
process was not viable, lacked security and development agendas and was not planned to help 
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the ex-combatants to speak to their grievances and build a livelihood without using violence 
(Marriage 2007; Wake 2008). Marriage (2007) is of the view that this failure partially was 
conceptual and structural, while Wake (2008) believes the process was more instrumental and 
technical. Apart from conceptual, structural, instrumental and technical challenges (Marriage 
2007; Wake 2008; Lamb 2012), experience from the field work has shown that the failure of 
DDR is also a result of a ‘top-down understanding’ of the conflict which entailed ‘top-down 
solutions’, with the programme aiming to change local culture instead of influencing 
economic, political and social environment of post-conflict communities.349  As long as local 
communities incur decisions involving their communities rather than being part of it and as 
far as (ex-) combatants and soldiers continue to be acquainted with exploiting mineral 
resources with little difficulty, they will find the DDR process an unattractive option (Lamb 
2012). 
Based on the results from my fieldwork, it has been claimed by a few individuals that the 
DDR programmes as financially supported by bi-multi lateral partners aimed at the 
reintegration of ex-combatants. However, the reintegration component did not happen due to 
general poverty and lack of expertise. As a result, the process ceased mid-way because 
partners stopped funding.350  This leaves room to Congolese academics to express the opinion 
that if the reintegration component were implemented, ex-combatants situation would have 
been sorted out.351  From a similar view, a member of the DRC’s government and a former 
adviser at the office of Prime Minister are of the view that a stable and sustainable 
reintegration process decreases the number of weapons and insecurity, and lures investors to 
buy into the country.352  As a sideline to this, the post-conflict state starts taking off (DDR 
programme in the DRC 2012). Theoretically, possible interpretation of this includes that a 
successful DDR would be a domino effect which will automatically demilitarise all territory 
previously controlled by militias.353 To this end, different partners involved in the new 
                                                 
349 Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
350 General trend emerging from the fieldwork’s results conducted in Belgium, DRC, England and France July-
December 2013. 
351 Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
352 Interview conducted with an official from the Congolese government, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
353 Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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programme would need clear strategy and internal and external communication system that 
are based on trust and empowerment. This will enable them to understand social structure and 
dynamic that could undermine peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict communities. Figure 6.2 
summarises the management and understanding of such a new ex-combatants’ DDR. 
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL ENVIROMENT TO DDR & SSR 
Figure 6.2: Understanding of structure and dynamic in a new DDR and SSR in the DRC 
(Source: Own composition). 
In their research on how to assess social reintegration of ex-combatants, Bowd and Özerdem 
(2013:2) indicate: 
“DDR and reintegration programmes to date have generally been evaluated in terms 
of economic reintegration with output indicators such as levels of employment or 
enrolment on training”.  
CLEAR STRATEGY 
PARTNERSDETAILS
DDR & SSR 
ENVIRONMENT 
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Bowd and Özerdem’s view concurs with the fieldwork’s findings due to individuals saying 
that the new DDR programme should draw from a concrete and accurate planning that 
delineates the general development.354 However, the fundamental equation that should be 
kept in mind is the issue of underdevelopment, misery and poverty. These issues however 
should be defined in terms of disarmament and training of former fighters. They are also 
useful for the nation as well as in terms of Security Sector Reform for ex-combatants 
yearning for military life. It means that ex-combatants need to do work that not only values 
them, but also lets them exercise some responsibilities with regard to the management of their 
new environment (Özerdem 2013). They need to be reintegrated into normal economy 
networks which hold them responsible. This implies that the programme should have a 
proactive policy which cares for ex-combatants and impedes any attempt towards excluding 
them from being developmental actors.355 
 The economic reintegration initiatives are still the principal method and applications 
worldwide accepted by the DDR process, and the process in itself links to the economy 
(Bowd and Özerdem 2013). It stands for that demobilised individuals need to be kept busy 
doing a job. It is not enough to demobilise and disarm combatants, but it is crucial to 
reintegrate them and value them through social responsibilities. For this purpose, as noted by 
the former Adviser at the Presidency, the DDR process should go along with the post-conflict 
economic reorganisation mainly based on the reinforcement or the creation of viable 
economic environment which is capable to eradicate unemployment and mitigate violence. 
During my fieldwork in the DRC, it has been claimed that most young individuals in the 
DRC join armed movements because of unemployment.356 A number of individuals have 
therefore suggested that the new and successful DDR programme would need to rely on a 
sustainable employment policy that aims to employ ex-combatants and other unemployed 
individuals on the basis of their skills.357 
                                                 
354 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Premier Minister office, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
355 Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
356 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
357 Interviews conducted with academics, members of civil society and NGOs, Kinshasa, July-August 2013. 
     Interview conducted with a member of the European Commission, Brussels, December 2013. 
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However, before starting this process, DDR managers need to evaluate and to know how 
demobilised individuals would socially, economically, politically even militarily – for those 
who are willing to return to military life, partake in the socio-economic development of their 
new environment (DDR programme in the DRC 2012; Özerdem 2013), as the understanding 
of the ways in which socio-economic reintegration happens will facilitate a comprehensive 
planning of the programme as a whole (Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Özerdem 2013). Debates 
centres on the issue of DDR suggest that authorities and stakeholders in charge with planning 
and managing the DDR programmes should design a DDR scheme that encompasses skills of 
different ex-combatants (Özerdem 2013) in order to rationally make use of their human 
potentiality or knowhow. Theoretically, this would solve the problem of the right man in the 
right place on the one side, and on the other communities and the new national army will be 
more empowered to assist returnees in their new life journey. Thus, the DDR programme will 
cease being a haphazard programme because the monitoring of the programme will be 
continual.358 
In their research on how to assess social reintegration of ex-combatants, Bowd and Özerdem  
(2013) are of the view that the assessment of the former combatants’ reintegration will 
fundamentally rely to a high degree, on the philosophy behind the DDR process and this will, 
to some extent, impact on the way in which they are planned. With this in mind, it might be 
anticipated that a development plan with ex-combatants as co-responsible (Özerdem 2013), a 
strong civil security system which promotes the free movement of goods and persons, the 
restoration of the state’s authority over the whole territory need also to be provided into the 
overall DDR plan.359 As claimed by an academic, here is the necessity to underline the 
importance of having a policy on the traceability of small arms and light weapons and on the 
stimulation of local leadership to work in synergy with the provincial military and political 
authorities so as to provide a vocational training policy that empowers ex-combatants 
economically.360 
                                                 
358 Interviews conducted with academics – anthropologists, sociologists and historians, at the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Kinshasa, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the office the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
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According to the UN Integrated DDR standards’ operational guide (2010), it is pointed out 
that although the range of activities or services surrounding the DDR programme differs in 
each case, it needs to incorporate at least five broad principles that lead a DDR programme 
influenced by the human security agenda. It would need to be people-centred, flexible, 
accountable and transparent, nationally owned and integrated and well planned. It might be 
drawn from this belief that everything should be done not only to disarm ex-combatants but 
also to create a reintegration process, just in the normal life of the country. As it has been 
claimed by the UN under Secretary in charge of Peacekeeping, the ex-combatants’ DDR will 
not happen straight away but it is a process that should start straight away as it involves the 
whole security sector reform.361 All armed conflicts do not end by victories; diplomatic 
actions could help end war. A diplomatic reorganisation coupled with the reform of security 
system would be a panacea to solving the issue of unfolded DDR and breaking the nexus 
between combatants and artisanal mining. However, it bears stressing that for the new DDR 
of ex-combatants to be different from the 2002 and 2006 ones and in order to avoid the 
recurrence of combatants without borders that seems to thrive in the post-conflict Kivus, 
there is the need to map out a systematic programme which will address the economic, 
political and social aspects of the reintegration process (Özerdem 2012; 2013). In this way, 
the process should speak to:  
• Community and family needs in order to eradicate the major push and pull factors that 
ignite individual recruitment. 
• Be considered and materialised beyond employment and education opportunities. 
• The issue of local economy development in order to allow the post-conflict society to tackle 
with the problem of poverty and unemployment,  which remains a major concern for both 
ex-combatants and other unemployed community members. 
• Help ex-combatants to be economic, political and social actors for the future of their 
community. 
• Structural root-causes of re-recruitment of combatants. It means that there will be the need 
for addressing it from the broad picture of macro-level economics, politics and international 
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Chapter Six: Demilitarisation of Mining Zones   
Coventry University 299 
 
aspects. In doing so, the questions ‘How and why’ would be helpful in addressing the 
problem from the macro-level structural dynamics. 
 
Overall, during the post-conflict recovery process, ex-combatants and community’s members 
should not be regarded as needy people to be assisted, but as active participants whose 
requirements should be met. Failure to do so, they will find violence as alternative solution. 
6.2.4  Restructuring of DRC’s Security Sector  
From 2003 up to 2012, the process of the DDR of (ex-) combatants and SSR has yielded 
much less results than expected. Former combatants who yearned for joining military life 
have never been properly incorporated into new army structures, while those who opted for 
civilian’s one have been left half-way by the DDR programme (De Koning 2011). The 
concept of SSR is used for post-conflict states. On the basis of this principle, a post-conflict 
state is state whose army is made of several militias and/or armed forces that have opposed 
one another during a civil war. SSR is part of post-conflict situation; which emerges from a 
civil war (Sedra 2013). 
Every country without peace and a good security system is doomed to a marginal existence 
due to potential investors being demure to buy into it. Consequently the vicious cycle of 
instability and poverty will tighten its grip. Here is the imperative issue of achieving the 
process of DDR in every post-conflict environment. There are strong debates (Pugh 2013; 
Ryan 2013; Steinberg 2013) over whether DDR should be or not substitute for a 
comprehensive peace process. However, there is a general consensus (Dirk Salomons 2005; 
Muggah 2010; Lamb 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Özerdem 2013) as to the DDR’s 
fruition is linked to the former combatants being effectively reintegrated. Tschirgi (2013) 
believes that nonviolent and non-coercive security system has been the one absolute 
prerequisite to any effective recovery process after the intensity of armed conflict decreases. 
For her without security prospect, communities are hopeless; when communities are 
hopeless, they cannot commit to a common future. Security is a human right. Therefore, 
restructuring security system after a war stalemates has to be the heart of any post-conflict 
development debate.  
Chapter Six: Demilitarisation of Mining Zones   
Coventry University 300 
 
Insecurity in a country emerging from armed conflict can be the result of different sources 
(Özerdem and Podder 2011; Özerdem 2012; Bowd and Özerdem 2013; Tschirgi 2013) 
among which military forces – be they under a central command or disseminated amid ragtag 
units; rebels and organised gangs working for the powerful war entrepreneurs and actors of 
war economies, ideological zealots, religious extremists, rogue police forces or armed non-
combatants acting independently. However, it seems to be like responding to such threats 
requires flexible and broad political, military and economic tools. De Koning (2013), for 
instance, advises that those who seek to bring stability in a post-conflict state do not have 
time. De Koning’s statement portends that security system cannot be created overnight. This 
view is shared by Sedra (2013) for whom reforming a national army – in terms of creating a 
new and disciplined army under state control, is a long-term task which requires years; and 
this would be much longer for the rebuilt of a component police force working in a context of 
law and order.  
SSR consists on creating a professional and effective army which respects the standards of 
the rule of law and human rights. This reform relies on the DDR programme. As it has been 
claimed by a number of ex-combatants in Brussels and Paris, without a successful DDR, it is 
barely possible to undertake the army and police reform.362 This opinion is closest to that of a 
member of the DRC’s Department of Security and Defence, due to him making a stand 
arguing that it is only after a successful DDR programme that the objective criterion in 
connection with the eligibility of demobilised individuals who are longing to join the army 
can be set down. For this analyst and government’s expert, the new army starts with ex-
combatants who have been found worthy to belong to the national army after the eligibility 
criterion.363 It is important to bear in mind that the reform of security system falls under 
governance lens, and it is a political choice to creating a different order from which that 
existed during conflict period.  
The reform starts from different armed groups via a successful DDR (Hazen 2010; Sedra 
2013). Hazen and Sedra’s contribution is closest to that of a Congolese Member of 
Parliament for whom:  
                                                 
362 Interviews conducted with ex-combatants, Brussels and Paris, December 2013. 
363 Interview conducted with a civil servant from Security and defence Department, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
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“If the international community and Congolese authorities want to bring back hope in 
the DRC by supporting or nurturing a peaceable solution, they would have to pay 
exceptional attention to a long-term forecasts of the military and former combatants 
who are about to be deprived of their livelihoods”.364 
Therefore, taking care of demobilised individuals should not be seen as just a technical 
military issue, rather it encompasses a complex operation in line with political, socio-
economic, security, humanitarian and development dimension (Kölln 2011; Özerdem 2012; 
2013; Bowd and Özerdem 2013). This view concurs with that of the UN Under Secretary in 
charge of peacekeeping for whom disregarding one aspect of the pentagram above would 
unravel the entire fragile peace process.365 However, Muggah (2010) and Lamb (2012) warn 
that whereas insecurity might have abated, the root-causes of conflict might last for ages to 
overcome. If support to former combatants does not live up to the efforts required to facilitate 
the entire process of peacebuilding, including communities and former combatants’ recovery 
process, failure is again likely. Thus, the different responses cannot be half-hearted or 
piecemeal as it is usually. 
SSR, through the lens of intelligence service, will improve civil-military rapport and the issue 
of the infiltration of foreign armies’ elements within the state’s security system. Reforming 
the Congolese army and police would be a piecemeal and would not bring peace at all if the 
state service of intelligence is left out. As claimed by an academic and political analyst, since 
2006, the fundamental problem of the DRC is the reform of the security system; army, police, 
intelligence service and justice. The security system, taken as a military constituent of state-
building, needs a reform that would contribute to the economic problems caused by the 
militarisation of mining zones and should respect human rights. The reform of the 
intelligence service however would need to be extended to the national component instead of 
being limited to military issues.366 Based on the fieldwork’s findings, a number of academic 
and civil society members are of the view that country where there is a deep rift between 
civilians and military, a mix intelligence service system that can bring civilians and military 
                                                 
364 Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
365 Interview conducted with the UN Under Secretary in charge of Peacekeeping, February 2014. 
366 Interview conducted with an academic and political activist, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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views closer would be a strong weapon against rebellion’s inclinations. Therefore, the DRC 
needs a strong and powerful civilian-military intelligence service which goes along with 
police and the national army to deter any attempt towards destabilising law and order.367 
However, there is still no consensus as yet over whether military actions are necessarily the 
privileged path towards conflict settlements (Muggah 2010; Lamb 2012, Demmers 2012), so 
a joint diplomatic action among the Great Lakes countries is crucial in order to solve 
problems in synergy. Hence, as soon as war ends, as believed by a member of European 
commission and a former Adviser of the Prime Minister, there is the need for creating 
prosperity and sharing zones with neighbouring countries in order to mitigate the whims of 
mineral-based conflicts.368 
By virtue of my findings from the fieldwork, it bears arguing that post-conflict and fragile 
states are beset by a vast array of security challenges of which the restructuring of the 
security system is perceived as the ultimate solution. Muggah (2010) and Lamb (2012), for 
instance, suggest that international community hyped the reform of the security sector as the 
answer to the exit strategy dilemma encountered in post-conflict communities. In theory, the 
concept of SSR does not matter, in practice however, what matters is the integrated approach 
it brings to police, justice and governance reform and national security planning (Jackson 
2010; Beswick and Jackson 2011; Jackson and Albrecht 2011). One review of the UN 
missions on the DRC and Kosovo (Autesserre 2014) indicated that the security-development 
nexus within SSR means that post-conflict communities need assistance, with the aim of 
overcoming the challenges of insecurity and structural fragility that may have conflict’s root-
causes. In saying so, it is important to figure out the meaning and direction that the concept is 
taking, what lessons could be drawn from other experiences over the last decade and whether 
the concept, as it is currently understood in the DRC’s case, is still relevant and useful. 
Drawn from a scholarly set of papers (Jackson 2010; Sedra 2010; Beswick and Jackson 2011; 
Jackson and Albrecht 2011), SSR could be understood as follows: 
 An armed wing of state-building. 
                                                 
367 Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
368 Interview conducted with former Adviser of the Prime Minister, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
     Interview conducted with a member of European commission, Brussels, December 2013. 
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 Human security approach whereby security and justice are treated as public policy 
issues. 
 An approach towards bringing together security and justice reform in all contexts and 
foremost a political process rather than exclusively a technical activity.   
 A process which aims to re-balance aid to both the efficiency and the liability of 
security and justice services. It bears underlining at this effect that lessons learnt from 
the outcomes of increasing the efficiency of security players without ensuring 
sufficient liability were hard but valuable.   
 A process acknowledging the close bonds between the security and justice sectors, 
aimed at reforming the police, the police force, actors who have policing functions 
and those who handle and supervise policing services. 
Debate centres on the issue of state-building and SSR provide that restructuring police, 
justice, governance and planning for national security have long been at the heart of debates 
on how national governments have functioned. The main argument of the ongoing debate 
argues that SSR is far from being a recent discipline, though its approach to isolated activities 
has been believed to be new, technical, disconnected and without accountability (Downes and 
Muggah 2010; Jackson 2010). Rather than being about bringing together the above principles 
into on-going work, it is believed that SSR is a separate all-encompassing discipline; the 
universal remedy for all the challenges experienced by post-conflict or fragile states (Ebo and 
Powell 2010; Ball 2010; Sedra 2010). However, experience on the ground has shown that as 
an all-encompassing discipline, it is barely easy to find successful SSR models (Autesserre 
2014). Sierra Leone, for instance, is one among rare examples of the successful application of 
SSR principles (Jackson and Albrecht 2011). Nonetheless, it is just not the SSR label; the 
existence of an effectual parliament oversight committee, an inclusive security white paper 
process, greater engagement of the police with civil society groups to identify needs played a 
very important role (Autesserre 2014). Having a model of all-inclusive straightforward 
successful process of SSR is much difficult to find. 
In January 2010, the MONUSCO was established in the DRC. It replaced the MONUC 
created in 1999 of which SSR became part of its mandate from 2008. From then, the security 
system of the DRC was no longer a matter within the exclusive sovereignty of the state, since 
the MONUSCO has also had a security system which was working in parallel with the 
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DRC’s one.  This reveals the uninterrupted interference of external powers in the DRC up to 
2003 and the focus from 2003 to 2007 on planning for and holding elections (Beswick and 
Jackson 2011). This means that the problem of restructuring security system in the DRC gave 
rise to the debate on regional and multilateral organisations approach to SSR. Two questions 
emerged from this debate; could regional or multilateral organisations target their assistance 
at the strategic or programmatic levels in a best way? Is SSR viewed as separate from other 
post-conflict recovery programme or does it play an integrating function? These two 
questions however challenge the way international community plans its approach to these 
issues, how it uses its limited capacity and whether it targets its engagement effectively. 
Amongst other issues that the SSR component is concerned with in the DRC are derelict part 
of national security architecture and strategy. This suggests that the SSR component is a more 
programmatic approach to restructuring a security system in the sense that it seems to endorse 
SSR as a separate discipline, rather than a process which aims at influencing and improving 
the restructuration of the police, justice, corrections, human rights and civil affairs sections.  
Without a more in-depth review, it is barely impossible to indicate which structure is more 
effective.  
Owing to this new orientation which the concept has embarked on, the query to be asked 
would be; has SSR now broken the policy glass ceiling through?  
Based on my fieldwork experience, it would be relevant to acknowledge that as a concept, 
SSR is still encountering some opposition. Confusion on where security sector reform ends 
and rule of law begins seems to be newsworthy in the DRC as it would be in any post-conflict 
recovery field. But all these discourses encapsulate policy debates than they are about 
substance or field realities. I would posit that if SSR as a policy concept has to be erased, 
what would be emerging are issues that the policy advocated for; acknowledging the political 
nature of reform, the necessity to balance effectiveness with governance, the importance of 
certifying the interconnected-nexuses nature of the system, and that individuals have to be at 
the centre of all reforms.  This might be coined as an ‘SSR-based approach to police reform’. 
In a similar way, experience learned from the fieldwork depicts that SSR involves a large 
political elements as it is with anything that has to do with the public sector and even more so 
when it concerns state sanctioned use of force. The process is linked to a plethora of different 
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areas. From that experience, it emerges that the common mistakes made in applying SSR in 
the DRC like other post-conflict countries are concerned with insufficient technical resources 
allocated to the process and usually delusional timelines applied. These flaws frequently arise 
due to plans being designed by political individuals, while they are not sufficiently informed 
on the technical challenges in line with reforming huge organisations. The fieldwork’s 
findings indicate that challenges occur exponentially in fragile states. To this regard, it might 
be postulated that the more fragile a state is, the bigger the multiplication factor. This entails 
a huge difference to be considered when dealing with SSR in Europe or Latin America than 
when doing so in the Middle East or Africa.369 The view that a set of politicians and/or 
diplomats could reach a blurry agreement in a conference room and that peace and respect for 
human rights will be set thereafter have been a common mistake and the root of cyclical 
issues and constant disappointment at the results of peacekeeping and peacebuilding mission. 
From an interview with a field practitioner who has worked in SSR, DDR, human rights and 
political affairs on several different continents, it is noted that if no one can get troops to obey 
orders, then no matter what political processes have been agreed, it is all moot. If troops are 
not disciplined, then they will not obey orders. If soldiers are not paid in an orderly way, then 
disciplining them will be impossible. Paying and supplying troops in an orderly manner need 
a minimum of process and organisation.370 
Challenges in reforming security system in the DRC arise from two sources: firstly, the 
colonial legacy in line with state-building process and secondly, the emergence of new sub-
regional economic powers such as Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi; whose economic survival 
depends on illegal exploitation of the DRC’s natural resources371 and the rivalry of military 
power between Angola and South Africa in the SADC as well as the presence of inside and 
outside peace spoilers.372 
With reference to the colonial legacy or first source, it might be posited that in the theories or 
paradigms of states, more focus is cast upon the legal status and management of the state, 
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370 Interview conducted with an expert on security issues, Brussels, December 2013. 
371 See Chapter Five for more details. 
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while less attention is provided as to what the state is useful for. According to a historian I 
interviewed in Kinshasa: 
“The current Congolese state is the great grandson of the International Association of 
the Congo – IAC; 1879-1884, conceived and created by Léopold II. In 1885, IAC 
became the Free State of Congo – FSC, which in turn gave birth to the Belgian-Congo 
colony in 1908. Almost within 28 years, Léopold II succeeded to build and establish 
at the heart of Africa an operating territory with roots in Belgian Crown. Up till to this 
level, the process of the Congolese state-building is ahistorical and alien to indigenous 
populations, since local people are not part of it. Léopold II almost single-handedly 
built up the Congo into one of the most astonishing operating and economic success 
colonies of the 19th century colonial times. He did so in the face of constant threats of 
his tiny state’s security and indeed existence. In theory, the DRC is a Léopold-owned 
imagination; what he thought and understood about the state, its nature and functions. 
The Belgian-Congo tried to portrait the appearance of a modern state, in terms of 
required international standards; administration and legislation. However, things were 
contrary to what was being displayed to the world. Up till to 1950, the state system 
was streamlined to reproduce the projection and ideas of the 1885-1888 state’s 
system. During this period raw materials were exploited and produced by paid 
workforces – that in reality were slaves of the operating companies, and all the 
colonial state’s profit directed to the colonial master. From the Rounded Table 
Conference in 1960, through 1965 to 1967, we were not able to say whether we were 
a nation; we had a state, government and people – citizens, but in reality the colonial 
state’s system continued to operate. The Union Minières of Katanga [a State-owned 
mining companies in the province of Katanga] was secluded from central government 
by colonial local feudal, while in the east of the country Jean Schramme and Bob 
Denard – mercenaries hired by Mobutu to fight against Marxist-Lumumbist uprising, 
were doing the same as what armed groups do today. Although it did not work at the 
same pace and scale as nowadays, it however looks nearly the same. Furthermore, 
many people have forgotten that following the mercenary adventures in the east of 
Congo, a mining company – OPRAG, with roots in Germany was created. OPRAG 
was granted almost the same rights as the Union Minières of Katanga. It was given a 
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vast mining concession with full rights of exploitation. Actually it was the same 
modus operandi like the one which is still applied today. In view of the above, state-
building and SSR, from the current DRC’s configuration, would be difficult, because 
the state is run on the basis of predation principles; lack of transparency, non-
accountability, politicisation of the security system and militarisation of political life. 
To Congolese people, state-building would mean that Congolese society as a whole 
require a state based on rule of law and on the understanding of what it stands for. The 
current DRC’s shape is not at all in the perspective of building a state based on the 
rule of law principles. In the mind of most Congolese leaders and elites however, the 
state is a tool which enables to be empowered in order to get enriched. To this effect, 
state-building in the Congo will be on hold, since economic, political, social and 
structural conditions are far from being gathered”.373 
In line with the emergence of new sub-regional economic powers or second source, it might 
be postulated that the search of economic survival by new sub-regional economic powers,  
the rising of military hegemony in an unstable mineral-rich region and the consolidation of 
inside and outside violence entrepreneurs have impeded the built of a reliable and strong 
security system. It implies that all these factors have decisive impact on the failure or the 
success of SSR implementation in the DRC. It needs to be reminded that the SSR process in 
the DRC is closely tied to ‘combatants’ mixing and combatants’ intermingling processes’ as 
well as the illegal exploitation of minerals that gave rise to the phenomenon of ‘combatants 
without borders’. Taken from this point, it arises that the DRC’s government and the 
international community should have knowledge of the issue relating to the national interest 
of regional countries and the economic interests of the post-conflict communities before, 
during and after the implementation of the SSR process. This is closest to that of Former 
Senior Civil Servant from the intelligence service of Zaïre. To him, there is still work to be 
done on the security system of the DRC, since the process of mixing and intermingling of 
combatants with the FARDC instead of a proper DDR programme was purposely planned by 
multinational corporations and countries that draw profits from the conflict in the DRC. 
Combatants’ intermingling and mixing processes have led to the infiltration of foreign 
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armies’ elements into the DRC’s National Army, the phenomenon of combatants without 
borders and the rehabilitation of war criminals into the FARDC. For this expert: 
“Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi do not have interest in the DRC having a structured 
security system which would deter and nullify their territorial and economic 
ambitions into the DRC. Angola would like to see the DRC weak militarily in order to 
interfere militarily not only to ensure that Congolese territory would no longer be a 
rear base for the foes of Angolan government, but also to dissuade Congolese 
government in its attempt to claiming back oil dividends that Angola has been taking 
from the DRC’s shelf for decades. A DRC hobbling militarily would be a good 
business for South Africa which would keep its military bases in the DRC to hinder 
Angolan inclinations of being asserted as regional military power. In whole, he said, a 
fragile/weak and inexistent/disorganised security system in the DRC, or rather ‘state-
breaking’ or ‘state-unbuilding’, enables international community to fulfil the ‘1884 
Berlin General Act’374”.375 
Therefore, the success or failure of the SSR process in this case would also be subject to the 
geopolitics of international community and the countries mentioned above. 
The fieldwork experience has also revealed that private security companies, particularly 
South African, Jewish and Lebanese entrepreneurs have mushroomed in the DRC. As alluded 
to above, private security companies are nothing other than mercenaries (Beswick and 
Jackson 2011). These modern-day mercenaries (ibid:102), supported from inside by some 
high ranking political officials and senior military officers, are employing most ex-
combatants who failed their socio-economic reintegration, something which further 
weakened the already fragile state’s security system. In the absence of a reliable state’s 
security system, these companies are selling their security service to those that can afford it, 
as they are not there for charity; neither are they there to protect state or for public security. 
To them, security is first a commodity, hence a source of enrichment. Restructuring the 
security system, to them, would hamper their interests and business. Therefore, believing that 
                                                 
374 See Chapter Four for more details on the Berlin General Act. 
375 Interview conducted with former Senior Civil Servant from the intelligence service of Zaïre, Paris, December 
2013. 
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these companies could contribute to SSR would be a naivety. From an endogenous 
perspective purely, it bears noticing that those who are set to reform security system are 
actually themselves problems. It is worth noting that the failure of SSR is the result of the 
duplicity of Congolese authorities. The management of the DRC’s security system lacks a 
structure which can anticipate events and strongly relies on foreign and mercenary customs. 
Also, Congolese authorities prefer foreign security architecture and plans than national and 
local initiatives, as the former enables them to raise funds that they have been using for self-
enrichment. Herein may lie the importance of a ‘local authorship and ownership’, a ‘bottom-
up understanding’ and ‘bottom-up solutions’, said above, for the issue of SSR in the DRC.  
Summarily, building up processes and organisations is labour intensive. It involves both 
technical skills, changing cultures and mind sets that take time to achieve. Depending on the 
quality and amount of resources, it usually requires at least five years just to lay a foundation 
and further five years to bring things to some kind of stable state.376 Nowadays, defence 
budgets keep shrinking and the habitual powers have less and less hunger to take this kind of 
work on, new patterns and agreements need to be reached. It bears stressing that what is vital 
is not the security sector reform as a concept, even if it is now widely accepted, mostly when 
it comes to engaging the donor community, rather the support and importance that different 
stakeholders provide to security and justice reform as a way that ensures efficient delivery of 
these services within a framework of good governance and accountability and with human 
security being its backbone. These principles are the groundwork of peacebuilding and 
contribute indispensably to development. 
6.3 Arms and Finance Traceability: Avoiding History Repetition 
Although there is not yet an internationally agreed definition of arms and finance traceability, 
it is however of the global view that tracing the origin of arms and finding of armed groups 
would deter combatants from violent actions. The traceability of small arms and light 
weapons as well as that of finance plays a crucial role in preventing and ending violence in a 
post-conflict country. Based on a topical debate on the unending armed conflict in the DRC 
                                                 
376 Interview conducted with an expert on security issues, Brussels, December 2013. 
     Focus group, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
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(Bertrand-Hardy 2011; Brook 2011; Maréchal 2011; Autesserre 2012; Mckay 2012), it has 
been found that easy access to minerals has been one of the causes that fuels war, and that 
consolidates the (re-) recruitment of combatants at the same time delaying the end of the 
DDR process and SSR. In July 2010, American Congress passed into law Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street reform and consumer protection law, also known as ‘Obama’s Law’. According to this 
law, American companies have to publish the origin of their minerals in order to discourage 
the illegal mining and trade of minerals coming from the mining zones controlled by armed 
movements in the Kivu (Bokundu 2012).  
Similarly, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals 
from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas – OECD DDG (OECD 2011a: 52) recommends 
global responsible supply chains of minerals in order for companies to respect human rights 
and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral or metal purchasing decisions and 
practices. This document suggests that any company potentially sourcing minerals or metals 
from conflict-affected and high-risk zones – upstream and downstream, may use the Due 
Diligence Guidance in order to promote transparent, conflict-free supply chains and 
sustainable corporate engagement in the minerals sector. In Paragraph seven of Resolution 
1896 (2009) in its November 2010 final report S/2010/596, the Group of Experts elaborated 
guidelines for the use of due diligence by the importers, processing industries and consumers 
of mineral products regarding the purchase, sourcing, acquisition and processing of mineral 
products from the DRC. Instead of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas being applied in the 
Great Lakes Region and particularly in the DRC, a joint venture of mining mineral resources 
may be one way towards solving conflict-mineral in the DRC. It is with this in mind that the 
representative of the Southern Africa Resource Watch – SARW,377 in Kinshasa claimed:  
“The Dodd-Franck’s principle would then ensure that minerals are not illegally 
exploited, the regional certificate of traceability will have to attest that minerals are 
from green sites, while the due diligence certification will need to assess that the 
                                                 
377 The Southern Africa Resource Watch – SARW, is a program of the Open Society Initiative for Southern 
Africa. Its mission is to ensure that the mining of natural resources partakes in sustainable development in 
Southern African countries. 
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process of minerals’ exploitation and their development from the mining site to the 
processing stage meet the required standards”.378 
Control and commercialisation would ensure that minerals are not from armed groups. The 
opinion of SARW’s representative concurs with that of the African Association for Human 
Right’s chair for whom the traceability of minerals and other natural resources would 
discourage illicit exploitation and trade of minerals in the Region of Africa of Great Lakes, 
particularly in the eastern DRC, and would contribute in fighting against armed groups 
accessing funds from illegal minerals.379 
It is, however, of note that only after three years of their application, Obama’s Law and the 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance seem to not live up to the expected results in the DRC. The 
Congolese civil society is of the view that Obama’s law was adopted without any upstream 
and downstream consultation with the members of the Kivu’s civil society or with Congolese 
experts, and it is not reflecting truth on the ground (Bokundu 2012). As claimed by a member 
of the Kivu’s civil society, Obama’s Law like the OECD Due Diligence Guidance are 
criticised for being focused on minerals of conflict without taking into account Congolese 
perspectives on the issue.380 In Radley’s words (2014:1); “the Kivu’s problems are much 
complex and cannot be narrowed down into the issue of minerals, without political 
implications of crisis being considered as a whole”. It should be however noted that at the 
beginning of the Dodd-Frank Law, for example, there was not any traceability in the DRC. 
As a result, Obama’s Law has unintentionally set an embargo on the Kivu’s minerals. Several 
mineral comptoirs381 have shut down, while at the same time lots of miners in search of 
survival with weapons in hands on the back of civilians, have joined local militia and armed 
groups (Bokundu 2012; Radley 2014).  The view above is supported by a group of mining 
experts for whom, the Dodd-Frank Act has some weaknesses as it has prevented indigenes to 
come up with their own propositions of solution to the mining conflict. The Act has not yet 
brought out significant changes since most mining sites in the eastern DRC remain in the 
                                                 
378 Interview conducted with the representative of the SARW, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
379 Interview conducted with the chair of the African Association for Human rights; Kinshasa, October 2013. 
380 Interview conducted with a member of Kivu’s civil society, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
381 In the DRC, comptoirs is a coined name which means an appropriate location reserved for the mining sale – a 
mineral selling-point. 
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shadows, forced into illegality or decline. It needs to be revised by taking local communities, 
civil society and authorities’ views into account, given the fact that the sole actors consulted 
before its elaboration were Dodd-Frank’s supporters. As a consequence, there still exist 
supplementary tensions, with divergent voices at the local level. Congolese voice, particularly 
local communities’ must be considered, local context and structures of power should be 
factored in the elaboration of principles in connection with minerals from war zones, they 
contended.382 From another divergent view however, a diplomat argued: 
“It is of note that the first objective of the Dodd Frank Law was not to clean up the 
DRC’s mining sector from its malfunction – which is government’s responsibility, 
rather it aimed to reduce the role of minerals in fuelling the proliferation of armed 
groups. If warlords have found alternative which bypasses Dodd Frank Law as a 
means to funding their violent activities, blames are to be laid upon the Government 
which is in charge of following-up of the Law’s effects and not the Law per se”.383 
On the basis of the above experts’ considerations, one could argue that mining audit process, 
as suggested by Dodd Frank Act, is meant to improve the mining sector practices, rather than 
providing a façade solution. Thus, the idea that a control process and a statistical validation 
ensure mineral trade without conflict is not appropriate in the Kivus’ context mired by 
instability and insecurity. Mining and foundries should be monitored regularly and the gap of 
time between inspection and certification should be reduced. New wars have developed 
diverse sources of funding (Duffield 2000; Kaldor 2007), including the levying of taxes in 
territory administrated by rebels, control of borders, drugs, arms trafficking, diasporas  
contribution, neighbouring countries support, to name a few – see Chapter Two. This means 
that armed groups are no longer relying entirely on minerals to survive, though mining, as 
one source among many others, still plays a crucial role in war economies. 
In a post-conflict environment where insecurity and violence come from different sources, 
traceability of minerals alone would not be stronger to deter criminal activities and to stop 
                                                 
382 Declaration of a group of Congolese mining experts in the Workshop on the outcomes of the Dodd-Frank 
Law, Kinshasa, August 2014.  
383 Interview conducted with an EU diplomat, Brussels, November 2013. 
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violence. There is need for minerals’ traceability to be reinforced by weapons’ traceability.384 
In this case, the traceability of weapons is imperative to achieve the peace and reconciliation 
process. It is crucial at this point to mention that from the fieldwork’s result, it is indicated 
that at least two million weapons illegally pass through the eastern DRC, even though the 
country is supposed to be under arms embargo.385 At the same time, it could be drawn from a 
few ex-combatants’ discourse that the national army is accused of being at the centre of arms 
sales.386 This suggests that there is an uncontrolled flow of weapons deliberately rooted in the 
country which, if is not meticulously handled and stopped, will keep causing a chaotic 
environment.   
Findings related to my fieldwork suggest that weapons’ traceability helps to retrace different 
processes related to the manufacture and detention of weapons. It also helps to track different 
chains of weapons traffic and acquisition. Weapons traceability expose those individuals who 
own guns illegally, shows where and how they were purchased and which ways they entered 
the country or region.387 In the context of economic criminalisation, as is the case in the 
DRC, the traceability of weapons is a necessity as it helps set a benchmark of weapons used 
by the army and those that armed groups possess. In this case, as acknowledged by a military 
expert, the state will need a traceability policy which aims to minimize crime rate, given it 
would provide the state some mechanisms to know how weapons enter the region, and what 
their identification number is.388 In one of Congolese army experts’ words: 
“Weapons have DNA which helps to establish their trafficking process from the 
manufacturing industry. Using this method of identification could help decrease the 
rate of importation of small arms and light weapons”.389  
Therefore, there is the need for monitoring regularly state’s borders in order to control the 
flows of economic exchanges between different neighbours, something that in turn would 
                                                 
384 Interview conducted with the former Adviser at the office of the Prime Minister, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
385 Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
386 Interviews conducted with ex-combatants, Brussels and Paris, November-December 2013. 
387 Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
388 Interview conducted with a military expert, Adviser at the Department of National security and Defence, 
Kinshasa, September 2013. 
389 Interview conducted with a Senior Member of the FARDC in Charge of the ex-combatants DDR, Kinshasa, 
August 2013. 
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discourage any leeway to weapons trafficking, drugs and other products that uphold armed 
groups. 
Based on the report on the extractive industries transparency initiative – EITI,390 and the 
governance of natural resources (O’Sullivan 2013), the DRC has lost its EITI membership 
due to mismanagement and lack of transparency in the mining sector. Similarly, Africa 
Progress Panel Report391 (2013) suggests that the DRC loses at least $ 5 billion each year as a 
cost of mismanagement and lack of transparency in state mining companies. Dearth of budget 
transparency and budget mismanagement could dent the public interest. In a few mineral 
producing countries such as Botswana and Namibia (Africa Progress Panel 2013; O’Sullivan 
2013), finance traceability is mandatory, for the state’s authorities are held accountable for 
the management of natural resources that belong to people. The DRC, however, does not 
have any finance traceability system. Like weapons traceability, there is the need for finance 
traceability which falls within transparency and good governance principles. One mining 
expert argued that finance traceability means that any state’s expense should be clearly 
explained to people as to purpose, who the applicant is, how the process has been requested 
and what this money will be used for. For him, in countries where transparency has been set 
as a factor of economic governance, each citizen is able to check the process leading to the 
use of the national budget. It is otherwise called finance traceability or the official process of 
public good procurement.392 
Corruption, fraud and embezzlement of public funds have plagued public administration in 
the DRC without anything being done to avoid the inevitable chaos which has ensued. Yet 
there is a strong debate over the DRC’s management system (Bokundu 2012; Africa Progress 
Panel 2013; O’Sullivan 2013) where it has been believed that the country misses two things 
to underpin sustainable peace; lack of monitoring and the absence of penalty. Indeed, without 
monitoring, it is difficult to determine any performance indicators; neither would it be 
possible to use an appropriate working method and to conduct periodic evaluations 
                                                 
390 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative  – EITI, is a global coalition of governments, companies 
and civil society working together to better openness and accountable management of revenues from natural 
resources. 
391 The Africa Panel Report is an observatory which advocates for more sustainable and equitable development 
in Africa. 
392 Interview conducted with a mining expert, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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(O’Sullivan 2013). As noted by an academic; “it is not enough to plan, to decide and to 
expect results; it is imperative to follow more closely the process implementation in the best 
possible conditions”.393 Monitoring is in fact an enduring and systematic control of the 
works, activities and expected results. It aims mainly to ensure that the work and activities 
taking place have been following previous plotted plans, and to provide periodic reporting on 
how inputs are used.  
According to a member of the UNDP in Kinshasa, the main objective of reporting, which 
would have a strong and positive impact on traceability policy, is to prevent the authorities 
from deviating the initial goals and desired impacts.394 However, when it comes to the most 
common monitoring activity such as the execution of a project, monitoring would be 
understood as a set of activities that aim at assessing whether human resources, finances and 
materials allocated are well defined, managed and wisely used (O’Sullivan 2013). In this 
perspective, punishment has a very important role if the state needs to perform effectively; 
for discipline and punishment are the primary functions assigned to the criminal penalty to 
protect every society.395 
Due to mismanagement and the paucity of transparency undermining the mining sector 
(Bokundu 2012; Africa Progress Panel 2013; O’Sullivan 2013), the traceability of finances in 
the DRC should go along with the signing of mining contracts. It means that the Bakajika 
Law has to be re-established and adapted – in its aspect of reinstating all mining concessions 
that have been unfairly apportioned to multinational corporations to the state. In this case, 
Congolese communities may be able to have a better control over all its mineral resources. 
Therefore, the authorities might not only become accountable to their actions, but also law 
abiding citizens like everyone. However, it is necessary to remember that the Bakajika Law 
does not cover all the aspects of the state sovereignty. According to proposed amendments to 
the revision of the mining code (2012), the act does not take into account the maritime space 
of the DRC, therefore neglecting some maritime resources such as oil, gas, diamonds etc. 
Thus, there is the need for bringing together the Bakajika Law with the Article 9 of the 
                                                 
393 Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
394 Interview conducted with a member of the UNDP, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
395 Interview conducted with a member of the European Commission, Brussels, December 2013. 
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DRC’s constitution. Although the latter decreases the states’ economic prerogatives vis-à-vis 
multinational corporations,396 it however invests the state with the power over all the national 
territory, including soil, subsoil and maritime spaces. This will need a visionary leadership to 
readjust carefully this aspect, since it is one of the state’s internal and external geopolitics 
backbones.  
6.4 Need for an Internal and External Mining-Development Geopolitics 
Mining’s support to social development, ex-combatants’ DDR and sustainable peace in the 
DRC can range from improving poor communities livelihood to enhancing local economies. 
Yet, there is a growing opportunity for communities to partake in the success of the mine in a 
new way; encouraging local content in specifications and operational decisions, capable of 
erasing unemployment and impeding unemployed individuals from joining armed 
movements. This is significant because a big part of success in peace process in the DRC is to 
understand the risks that involve mining and how to manage them effectively.  
According to De Koning (2011), some Congolese mining experts and academics,397 one of 
the biggest risks facing mining sector in the DRC today has nothing to do with the geography 
of resources. Rather, the risk lies in mismanagement and lack of transparency in this sector, 
illegal exploitation of certain strategic minerals by belligerents and the easy access to 
resources of a cluster of privileged elites. To analysts above, Congolese people are unfairly 
and purposely deprived from developing socio-economic conditions that would respond not 
only to their desires, but also that correspond to the wealth of their country. Congolese people 
and communities like other people from the world are entitled to wellbeing in terms of 
resource enjoyment and poverty alleviation. One comprehensive and highly critical report 
(Africa Progress Panel 2013) asserts the right of all people to enjoy security and to live free 
from poverty and despair. This assertion principally speaks for resource-endowed countries 
where poverty and wars have become endemic. People, particularly vulnerable ones, should 
be freed not only from fear and want, but also should have an equal opportunity to enjoy all 
                                                 
396 Interview conducted with an academic, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
397 Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
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their rights over their resources; which would permit them to fully develop their human 
potential. 
Drawn from King and Murray’s (2000) development planning framework, a plan to develop 
internal and external mining-development geopolitics should consider among others:  
• Acceleration of economic growth and ‘Wealth Creation’ and not just poverty reduction. 
• Stabilisation of macro-economic, liberalisation of markets and prices, and private sector 
led-growth. 
• On the external economic side;  
- Acquiring the profits from the irreversible process of globalisation which has to be 
made fair for all. 
- Pursuit of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals. 
- Implementation of the Decent Work Agenda which lays emphasis on Workers’ Rights, 
decent employment for all, social protection for all, and improved social dialogue. 
The projections for success in attaining the development goals above depend on the practice 
of good governance – democracy, respect for human rights, rule of law, transparency and 
accountability, the fight against corruption in government, the private sector and all sectors of 
human effort and society (Daniele 2011; Boshoff et al. 2010). However, it would be 
interesting to underline that behind internal and external mining-development geopolitics lays 
a governance responsibility. Boshoff et al. (2010:1), for instance, suggest: 
“At a time when the world is involved in a race to obtain raw materials, the problem 
of conflict minerals needs political and not technical solutions. No technical solution 
will stop the trade in minerals from promoting conflict. Only governance based on the 
rule of law will make the proposed technical solutions feasible. In the event of failure, 
there is a risk that one of the economic engines of the Great Lakes Region will quite 
simply grind to a halt”. 
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Taking Boshoff et al.’s stance, it might be assumed that the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment nexus, also coined as ‘mining-identity’ relationship398 is first of all a Congolese 
issue. The former Adviser at the Presidency has, for instance, claimed that from a geopolitical 
perspective, it might be posited that Congolese territories endowed with mineral resources are 
not only coveted but are also subject to geopolitical agendas of Balkanisation and borders 
redefinition. In this context, the mining-recruitment nexus has swiftly switched to be 
associated with ‘identity-resource relationship’ and ‘identity-powers inclinations’ – potency 
and cogency, of countries that are keen to invade the DRC.399  In this context, the problem of 
poverty and unemployment in a country that enriches the world turns to become an irrelevant 
debate. From the fieldwork’s results, for example, it broadly arose that if other people from 
the world can get richer from the DRC, so would it also be possible for the Congolese 
government to grab the same wealth and use it rationally to tackle and alleviate poverty.400 
This is what a former Adviser at  the office on the Prime Minister names ‘anticipative 
governance’ – which aims to build human prosperity and state’s security by rebutting 
indignity through making accessible national richness for all.401 
According to de Koning’s (2009) research on the demilitarisation of mining zones in the 
DRC, it reflects that bad governance has been one of the cardinal factors of the protracted 
nature of the DRC and the recurrence of armed conflicts which may result in the 
Balkanisation of the country in the near future. The results from my fieldwork however have 
shown that the Congolese governance has been characterised by the ineffectiveness and 
inability to secure people and their goods and to cover people life’s costs.402 The same 
findings further indicate that state institutions’ leaders are more business men than state 
managers.403 It has also been noted by an academic and a member of civil society that 
growing poverty, generalised insecurity, undeveloped land, the non-exploitation of natural 
resources, weak administration, fragile and corrupted army and police and other state 
institutions are not only symptoms of the state’s weakness, but also actuate neighbouring 
                                                 
398 In the DRC the mining-combatant-recruitment is also called mining-identity nexus due to war entrepreneurs 
using identity issue as means towards recruiting combatants.  
399 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Presidency, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
400 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
401 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the office of the Prime Minister, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
402 Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
403 Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
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countries to conquer the Congo’s spaces.404 Therefore, it may request for developing an 
internal and external geopolitics based on the rational exploitation of mining and the 
development of local people. This may perhaps constitute a strong response to the pervasive 
weakness of the state.  
In the words of a Member of Parliament:  
“The struggle for resources has exposed resources endowed countries to any kind of 
instability. However, building a strong and collective identity based on the 
groundswell of solidarity of people, the leverage of the organisational capacity of 
people and the sense of people’s unity would be a strong arm for victimised people 
against every yoke.”405 
Possible interpretation of the statement above includes that in the context of the DRC’s post-
conflict environment where the historical memory was disoriented by collective and spiritual 
savageries based on a series of resource-based conflicts,406 the building of a strong and 
collective identity grounded on the solidarity and organisational capacity of local-based 
communities could reorient people’s collective destiny lost during violence and insecurity.  
As noted from above background, it might be put forward that the artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment nexus in the DRC is the result of the emergence of new regional 
powers in Africa,407  and the fact that the DRC’s control over its sovereignty’s tools; army, 
police, economy and industry has been lost (De Koning 2010; 2011). Hence, an organic 
dialectic based on bad governance and the DRC’s state of weakness on the one hand; and on 
the other the rising of new powers that can only survive politically and economically by 
destabilising the DRC, have arisen. The Congo’s authorities therefore have to be mindful that 
modern states rely on violence and/or wealth in the pursuit and conduct of their affairs. For it 
to be effective there will be the need for a strong, serious and responsible dynamic leadership 
to lead the state.  
                                                 
404 Interviews conducted with an academic and a member of civil society, Kinshasa, July-August 2013. 
405 Interview conducted with a Member of Parliament, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
406 Interview conducted with a Congolese academic, Paris, December 2013. 
407 Interview conducted with an academic and political analyst, Kinshasa, October 2013 
     Interview conducted with an academic and member of the opposition, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
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6.5 Conclusions 
The analysis of data in this chapter relates to breaking the nexus between artisanal mining 
and combatants. It has actually presented and examined the findings collected from 
interviews conducted on the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle in the DRC. The main 
argument of this chapter is that the political economy of military forces vis-à-vis mineral 
resources is characterised by the unlawful economic exploitation of mineral resources. 
Continued militarisation of mining areas is a hindrance to the combatant’s DDR programme, 
security system reform and thwarts the mining sector from contributing to post-conflict 
rebuilding efforts. Therefore, demilitarising mining areas and breaking the relationship 
between mining and (ex-) combatants will need political will and determination.   
The first section presented the results on some possibilities in line with solving the artisanal 
mining-combatant relationship. It explored different ways towards severing the artisanal 
mining-combatant relationship, demilitarising mining zones, the new (ex-) combatant DDR 
and restructuring the security sector system. The second section dealt with the traceability of 
arms and finance. It elaborated on the capacity of traceability process to strengthen peace 
efforts by tracing back different processes related to the manufacture and detention of 
weapons, to the chain of mineral supply and to the finance. The third section looked at 
internal and external mining-development geopolitics. It showed the rationale of developing a 
national and international politics based on anticipative system of governance that will take 
care for human wellbeing and identity and state’s security through using rationally national 
richness for all.  
Overall, the discussions in this chapter have shown that the particularity of the political 
economy of armed groups or rather of belligerents vis-à-vis mining sector in the DRC has 
been that mining zones, under rebel administration, lend the opportunity to accessing 
strategic minerals at a very cheaper price. Therefore, demilitarising mining zones and 
severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus have been envisioned as a 
problem-solving path. In whole, the findings have established that understanding the 
relationship between artisanal mining and (ex-) combatants would need the involvement of 
local communities in core issue in line with conflict resolution and the post-conflict recovery, 
as this is one of the most critical aspects towards breaking the link between armed groups and 
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minerals in a post-conflict country. However less attention has been devoted to exploring the 
impact of ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas on armed group 
dynamics. The process of demilitarising mining areas and severing the artisanal mining-
combatant nexus needs political solutions rather than technical. This process is meant to 
create urgency and to form a powerful coalition between local communities and all 
stakeholders. In so doing, it creates and communicates a vision for change and removes 
obstacles that impeded the post-conflict reconstruction efforts. It also creates short-term wins 
built on the change and anchors the changes in corporate culture. Only governance based on 
the rule of law may be able to put forward the proposed technical solutions feasible.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations 
7.1  Introduction 
This research was conducted to explore and to establish the nexus between artisanal mining 
and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of combatants, and to investigate 
the likely impact of such a link on the prolongation of the state failure and protracted armed 
conflict in the DRC. It equally focused on the demilitarisation of the mining zones as a way 
of enhancing and promoting sustainable development, peace and security in the Kivus, DRC. 
To achieve these aims, the research used a case study approach, supported by qualitative data 
to analyse the following; the background to the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle in the 
DRC, the likely impact of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage in sustaining 
and driving insecurity and instability in the post-conflict DRC as well as approaches towards 
severing such a relationship. Drawing on this aspect and using the data gleaned from primary 
and secondary sources, this thesis contributes to extend our understanding of the nexus 
between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants 
in the Kivus, DRC. The overarching research question that this thesis has addressed is; how 
and in what ways could demilitarisation of mining zones consolidate peace in the Kivus? 
The research has addressed the following specific research questions: 
1. To what extent can natural resources be characterising the trajectory of the unfolded 
nature of the combatants’ DDR process in the Kivus, the state failure and protracted armed 
conflicts in the DRC? 
2. How does the nexus between artisanal mining and the cycle of combatants’ 
recruitment and the reintegration impede the achievements of the DDR process and feed the 
cycle of the (ex-) combatants’ (re-) recruitment in the Kivus? 
3. How can the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage be broken down? What 
would the relevance of the new DDR process be to the demilitarisation process and the 
security of the demilitarised mining zones?  
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4. How can the process of severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link be 
strengthened in order to prevent and stop violence in the Kivus? What are the opportunities 
and challenges of breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus? 
This chapter encapsulates the key findings of this research and assesses the attainment of the 
research to wind up its discussions and analyses.  
7.2  Main Research Findings 
The research started with a review of the ‘absurdity of abundance theory’ – otherwise known 
as the paradox of plenty, resource curse or adverse effect of resource abundance theory, and 
‘the combatants push and pull’ factors, respectively in Chapters Two and Three, to shed light 
on how resource-based conflict and the cycle of (ex-) combatants’ (re-) recruitment and 
reintegration are linked and feed on each other. The review of resource curse theory in 
Chapter Two suggested that the economic motivations and opportunity created by abundance 
of natural resources and weak governance fuel armed conflict, while dismissing grievance as 
an incentive of armed conflict. The exploration of the ‘combatants pull and push factors’ 
theory in Chapter Three however found that combatants’ recruitment and/or re-recruitment 
are motivated by the same root-causes understood under the lens of greed and grievance. 
Nonetheless, the mere difference between combatant’s recruitment and re-recruitment is that 
the latter deals with an ‘ex-combatant’ who possesses military skills and is a valuable 
instigator of violence; thereby becoming valuable commodities for conflict entrepreneurs and 
agencies. Overall, the recruitment-reintegration-re/recruitment relationship remains a 
cumulative interaction that requires considering both the motivations behind re-recruitment. 
It is generally regarded as the failure of reintegration programmes and how it can worsen and 
fuel the existing root-causes that triggered recruitment in a particular society. When the 
outcomes of failure of reintegration tie in with the combatants’ existing push and pull factors, 
the likelihood of the combatants’ re-recruitment cycle is higher. However, this seems to be 
more complex in the case of the Kivus, where the phenomenon of ‘combatants without 
borders’ had emerged neither from the failure of the DDR process or pull and push factors, 
but from the rising of some new regional powers whose survival relies in the insecurity and 
illegal exploitation of minerals in the DRC.    
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The analysis of the background to the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship in 
the Kivus’ conflict in Chapter Four established the significance of the domestic environment 
in which state failure and protracted armed conflict occurred. This situation led to the 
militarisation of the region, particularly the mining zones which motivated regional 
insecurity. The conflict-mining-combatant’s recruitment cycle and the unfolded nature of the 
DDR process have been a corollary of the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the 
DRC. It extended to the domestic environment characterised by a significant economic 
downturn, an involvement of multinational corporations in signing unfair mining contracts,  
implication of belligerents in the illegal mining of mineral resources, perceptible institutional 
crumble and the loss of customary authority which were provoked by the application of the 
Bakajika Law – land rights of 1966, the end of the Cold War superpowers support in the early 
1990s and the new geography of resources – which implies the principles of resource 
globalisation or resource appropriation. The effects of all these together were substantial; the 
population was living at survival level as the country’s economy and infrastructure collapsed, 
the informal sector lengthened significantly by prevailing over the formal economy – which 
ended up giving easy access to mineral resources, therefore giving rise to the cycle of 
combatants recruitment and the failure of the DDR and SSR processes. At the same time, 
insecurity and violence became the ultimate route to accessing resources. As a result, the state 
capacity was further shrunk. These domestic conditions occurred in an environment of poor 
leadership in the country and the interference by the international community.   
The other conflict context which is not of short is that the conflict-mining-recruitment cycle 
has been instigated from the eastern DRC. For decades, this mineral-rich part of the country 
has been home to migrants including Hutu génocidaires having fled political hostility in 
neighbouring countries; Rwanda and Burundi. These migrants have arrived all the way 
through history, politicising ethnic identity by the manipulation of nationality and land 
access, therefore fuelling marginalisation, inequality, insecurity and violence. Within this 
context, the Bakajika Law of 1966 or the laws governing land tenure, and citizenship law 
became the key tools. The Bakajika law brought back the full authority of the state over the 
lands. In 1973, land – which is the most vital domestic asset in the densely populated and 
sparse land region, was commoditised. The Bakajika Law impelled the purchase of land by 
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the Banyarwanda who have no right to accessing land through customary rights for they were 
regarded as foreigners.  
The commodification of land altered the social configuration thoroughly and paved the way 
for marginalisation, discrimination and violence. Likewise, the introduction of the 
consecutive citizenship laws in 1972, 1981 and 1991 was politically manoeuvred by the Zaïre 
government in order to be in command of the Banyarwanda ethnic minority. The insecurity 
and violence resulted from marginalisation and discrimination above had led to an ethnic 
crisis in the eastern DRC before the arrival of the refugees into the Kivu provinces as a 
repercussion of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The creation of armed Hutu refugee camps 
under the supervision of Zaïre and France in the zone increased the militarisation of the area 
including mining zones and worsened the ethnic anxieties in the area. This has been the 
evidence which Tutsi Banyarwanda and the governments supporting them – Rwanda, Uganda 
and Burundi, have used as security threats alibi to trigger finally the 1996 Congo War. 
Although ethnic concerns and security threats were used by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and 
the Multinational Corporations as the reasons for interfering with the DRC’s sovereignty, it 
had hidden ambitions of territorial expansion and easy access to the DRC’s rich natural 
resources. The pseudo anti-Tutsi feelings manoeuvred by these countries in fact was a 
discontent over the non-application of mining agreements signed during the 1996 war 
between Laurent-D Kabila and his former allies; which led to the 1998 Congo war. In these 
armed conflicts, peace agreements have been carrying some predicaments and traps which 
have led to the recurrence of armed groups. This situation purposely created by neighbouring 
governments enabled a favourable environment for foreign armies’ elements to infiltrate the 
DRC’s security system, something which enabled (ex-) combatants (re-) recruitment cycle, 
the development of the phenomenon of combatants without borders, the illegal exploitation 
of mining, the unfolded nature of the DDR process and the failure of SSR in the aftermath of 
conflicts. These conflict impacts have resulted in a militarisation of the region and mining 
zones.  
Given the multi-layered nature of armed conflicts at local, national and regional levels, 
marginalisation, inequality, insecurity and poverty emerged as conflict-fuelling factors. 
Concomitantly, the issue of natural resources – seen as the main cause of armed conflict and 
the cycle of combatants’ recruitment, was neglected. Therefore, the root-causes of conflicts 
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could not be addressed during the peace settlements through a mere mechanism of power-
sharing at a national level or by the DDR and SSR process or the democratic elections. 
Hence, the (re-) recruitment of (ex-) combatants and the long-drawn-out conflict in the 
mining area largely involve the RCD or CNDP or M23 against the FDLR and local militia 
against non-local ones.  
The M23 is a metamorphosis of the CNDP, which itself derives from the RCD. The RCD 
stemmed from the 1998 non-respect of unfair mining contracts between Laurent-D Kabila 
and his Allies. The CNDP emerged from alleged criticism over poor conditions in the army 
and the government’s unwillingness to implement the 23 March 2009 peace deal formulated 
against the DRC’s government. It occurred when the Banyamulenge alleged to defend their 
ethnic minority after failing drastically in the local and national legislative elections in 2006. 
For the CNDP or M23 and their supporters, Banyamulenge are politically excluded from a 
majority-vote representative democratic system. Besides, there is still a great rift between 
Banyamulenge and the rest of indigenous people aggravated by the wars. The FDLR – who 
consist largely of the Hutu refugees – génocidaires, require political dialogue with the anti-
democratic Rwandan government supported by the international community. Although they 
are only left the option of surrendering, demobilising and being repatriated as they are singled 
out as a negative force, the FDLR are often colluding with the local Mai-Mai militia and the 
national army – FARDC, to fight against the RCD, CNDP or M23. 
In Chapter Five, the analysis of the nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment of 
(ex-) combatants indicated that the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkages emanate 
from the control of resources and resource-zones by combatants, whether by monitoring the 
mining pits or by confiscation of ores from miners or by taxing mining dealers and miners 
operating in the mining zones under their control. On the other hand, artisanal mining 
bestows combatants with the right to partake in decision-making and benefit-sharing in 
mining zones under the armed group’s administration. Combatants therefore have developed 
the mechanisms to secure mining assets and personnel in mining zones under their control. 
As a repercussion, combatants became responsible for social and environment impacts 
created by the mining of natural resources during the period covering their administration. 
Armed groups like the national army exploited different natural resources not only to sustain 
their various military campaigns, but also for self-enrichment of rebel, military officers and 
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political leaders. The artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus signified that mineral 
exploitation is a lucrative business which generates financial supports for combatants who 
became suppliers to the neighbouring countries and the multinational corporations that buy 
illegally from them. The current scholarly knowledge of conflict literature and analyses focus 
on the relationship between armed groups and natural resources with very limited analysis on 
motivations behind the ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas on 
armed group dynamics. However, the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus should 
be seen under the lens of the broader informal economy, which draws its roots from the 
1980s economic meltdown mentioned earlier and the current resource globalisation which 
originated from the 1884 Berlin General Act, approved and substantiated by the 1885 Berlin 
Conference. The 1980s economic crisis like the current resource globalisation still leave great 
socio-economic scars and a negative legacy on the DRC mining sector; the shutdown of 
industrial mining gave rise to artisanal mining in the 1980s and 1990s, with the state being 
unable to regulate mining activities within the informal sector. At the same time, resource 
globalisation paves the way for multinational to have free exploitation of the DRC’s 
resources. 
Informal mining and cross-border trade have served as a means of survival for a great number 
of local communities living amid poverty, lacking livelihoods alternatives, despaired by the 
ruin of the infrastructures, and incurring insecurity caused by the conflicts. Concomitantly, 
the state of informality also resourced the conflicts by creating confusions and squabbles over 
mining ownerships. The quarrels over mining ownerships originated from a number of 
problems; the inconsistency of the mining code and the juxtaposition of two different legal 
systems in its provisions and enforcement, the blurring created by the legislations governing 
land and mining rights, the acknowledgement of a parallel authorities ruling land access and 
ownership by the national land law and customary law, the duplicated authorities of the 
central government and the control of a portion of the land by armed groups. As the state is 
unable to provide an efficient legal system option to settle litigations and quarrels over 
mining ownerships, violent approach appeared to be an important mechanism of conflict 
resolution within an environment where the DDR process did not address properly the socio-
economic reintegration of ex-combatants. Therefore, within the widespread system of the 
informal sector, drawing the line between the war economy and the existing informal sector 
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has become incredibly difficult due to ex-combatants being released in the environment 
without employment, but where intra-borders illegal guns traffic set in as a flourishing and 
easy commercial activity. Moreover, the mining code failed to regulate the huge vested 
interest within the artisanal mining, therefore hampering reforms and decreasing the state 
controlling capacity.  
However, it is too simplistic to attribute the failure of the combatants’ socio-economic 
reintegration aspect only to unemployment without a thorough analysis of the impact of the 
ongoing illegal exploitation of minerals in demilitarised areas on armed group dynamics. The 
analysis in Chapter Five underscores the fact that natural resource wealth also exposed the 
DRC to conflict, although it has been established that the geographical concentration of 
resources and unequal sharing of richness provide inducements for rebellions. The struggle 
for the control over mineral resources by domestic and foreign armed groups also ignited the 
risk of war in the 1990s and 2000s. There are significant factors that should formally be 
accounted for in the existing models of resource plundering or globalisation that are very 
critical in explaining the nexus between artisanal mining and the cycle of combatants’ (re-) 
recruitment as well as the risk of war in the Congo. On the contrary, based on the difficulty of 
determining with accuracy the physical presence of combatants within the mining zones, it is 
challenging to assess exactly to what extent mineral resources exploitation encourages 
combatants’ recruitment in the eastern DRC. Therefore, how and whether curtailing the 
artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment relationship needs a clear understanding of other 
factors driving the state failure and protracted armed conflict in the DRC. Without having 
established understanding of these nexuses, demilitarising the mining sector and severing the 
said relationship cannot be predicted.         
The perspectives expressed by different experts in Chapter Six support the above interaction 
of these complex factors. These individuals have been of the view that the particularity of the 
political economy of armed groups – including all belligerents, vis-à-vis mining sector, 
particularly artisanal mining, in the DRC has been that mining zones give the opportunity to 
access minerals at a cheaper price. Therefore, demilitarising mining zones and severing the 
artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus have been envisioned as a problem-solving 
path. In addition, the local perspectives have demonstrated that understanding the relationship 
between artisanal mining and (ex-) combatants is one of the aspects towards breaking down 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations   
Coventry University 329 
 
the link between armed groups and minerals in a post-conflict country. The process of 
demilitarising mining areas and severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus 
needs political solutions rather than technical ones. Only governance based on the rule of law 
may be able to make the proposed political solutions feasible. In the protracted armed conflict 
in the Kivus, all protagonists therefore continue to draw lucrative dividends from mineral 
exploitation and from their varied sources of endowment. Although there seems to be a 
consensus on the fact that minerals financially sustain the armed movements operating in the 
eastern DRC, the analysis of the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment linkage has 
established that the empirical analysis of what constitutes the link between combatant and 
minerals and how it could be severed continues to be a challenge for both academics and 
practitioners. Hence, the analysis on the motivation behind the ongoing illegal exploitation of 
minerals in demilitarised areas on armed group and combatants’ recruitment dynamics is 
extremely limited. Despite this limited analysis, some researchers who have looked at this 
subject are of the view that mineral resources are the fuelling-factor for the cycle of 
recruitment and the unfolded nature of the combatants DDR process. Other scholars believe 
that mineral resources are the major incentives for the armed conflict, while few others are in 
agreement with mineral resources upholding the conflict or the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment link being the result of insecurity and governance mismanagement or failure in 
the DRC.  
With reference to the scholarly knowledge of the absurdity of abundance and the combatants’ 
push and pull factors reviewed respectively in Chapters Two and Three, the political 
economy of armed movements vis-à-vis the mining sector appears to be limited if regarded as 
the prime cause behind most armed conflicts, even if it is difficult to draw clearly the line 
between economic reasons from other factors such as ethnic identity, partially given that 
conflict dynamics vary over time. Without any consensus on a set of conflict motivations, 
opportunities lent by the easy access to abundant natural resources and the effect of 
mismanagement are largely regarded as triggering armed conflicts, both by the rebel greed 
hypothesis and the political economy of armed groups vis-à-vis mining sector. The 
aforementioned stance has been prominent and determined the responses, leading to the 
mineral-based conflict approach in particular. The responses then focus on the mechanism 
concerned with keeping rebel groups from financial resources with the aim of stopping and 
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preventing violent conflict. There are also concerned with the issue of governance 
improvement as the paradox of plenty hypothesis indicates that weak governance is a critical 
variable in triggering war in countries endowed with natural resources. At the same time, the 
economic, political and social reintegration of ex-combatants has been considered to be the 
most important aspect of the DDR process as it aims to rebuild trust between ex-offenders 
and victim communities. Failing to do so, victim could rebut ex-offenders, which in turn may 
resolve in radicalising themselves. 
On top of the overarching research question, my main conclusions for sub-questions are: 
1. The DRC’s economy is highly reliable on natural resources. It is more susceptible to 
violent conflict since it is less likely to be diversified and thus offers fewer 
opportunities to accumulate wealth and evenly distribute incomes, or to achieve 
equitable and inclusive development. In the same vein of thoughts, this research 
argued that the DRC’s low-levels of development links to weak governance capacity 
to exercise authority over its territory. Likewise, the lack of infrastructure and 
effective security system restricts the government’s capabilities to control and manage 
natural resources in the East; neither has it been capable to share proceeds from 
natural resources in an equitable manner. Hence, insurgents and armed groups are 
more likely to happen. This becomes a particular security concern, essentially in the 
Kivus where economically valuable natural resources are opened to individuals 
without any restriction; easily accessible and lootable by anyone. Subsequently, these 
resources and their supply chains are fairly captured and utilised to uphold belligerent 
activities by armed movements. Concomitantly, non-lootable natural resources are 
either scrambled for or informally taxed along the value chain; this, in my findings, 
constitutes a source of revenue for armed groups. As a repercussion, despite a few 
DDR initiatives having been implemented in the Kivus due to the continuous 
resurgence of violence in recent past and a lack of a comprehensive peace agreement 
solution, it is clear that natural resources – especially artisanal mining, play a crucial 
role in delaying peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, particularly in 
the failure of the ex-combatants’ DDR. This means that the (ex-) combatants’ 
acquaintance with the mineral wealth of the eastern DRC, coupled with the 
evanescence of the state in this territorial part of the state play a key role in 
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livelihoods and community recovery overall, such as the overall context in which 
DDR processes have been implemented. In view of that, the governance of the mining 
sector and the implementation of mineral supply chain certification schemes back up 
the outspread nature of the combatants’ DDR process in the Kivus, the state 
evanescence and long-drawn-out armed conflicts in the DRC. 
 
2. The reintegration component of DDR programmes is highly influenced by the 
surrounding context, including the absorption capacity of communities, social 
relations and the economic climate of the area. On the other side, this research has 
proved that the nexus between combatant-recruitment and artisanal mining-armed 
groups is feeding each other. With respect to artisanal mining, this study has pointed 
out three areas that are of interest to DDR practitioners; issues of land rights, 
engagement of private sector actors and sustainable value chain development working 
in the mining sector. In view of these three elements, it is arguable that the 
management of mining sector lends different entry points for sustaining temporary 
income generation activities and sustainable employment creation during reintegration 
and recovery process. However, in the case of the Kivus, the easy access to mineral 
resources by combatants have delayed and impeded the stabilisation of income 
generation, emergency employment, local economic recovery and sustainable 
employment creation. In clear, the (ex-) combatants’ reintegration process 
implemented in the Kivus was neither ‘ex-combatant-centred’ nor ‘community-
centred’ approach. It was a process – which aimed to get rid of a post-conflict 
requirement considered as a recommendation from the international community, 
rather than a peacebuilding process whose purpose is to tackle down issues that have 
led to grievance, hence to militancy of a few individuals. In the Kivus, easy access to 
minerals promotes violence through enabling the formation of insurgent armed groups 
in short-term, while at the same time provides opportunities to access public 
institutions – army, police, government etc., in long-term. This often accommodates 
the capacities of conflict entrepreneurs to spoil peace efforts.  
 
3. Reintegration processes are often linked to natural resource sectors, such as 
agriculture, fisheries, forestry and protected area management. However it is to be 
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ensured that artisanal mining is sustainably used to support peacebuilding and 
development. This could significantly strengthen the outcomes of DDR and could 
have positive multiplier effects on wider recovery efforts. Reinsertion activities fall 
within the short-term stabilisation activities of emergency employment. Nevertheless, 
the reintegration activities could start as the reinsertion activities above, but are a 
stronger focus of employment opportunities. This leads to long-term employment 
generation efforts that occur during reintegration and beyond. The artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment linkage would be broken down, if all the activities above start 
as early as possible in a peacebuilding phase, even if they will have different 
intensities over time. The particularity of the political economy of armed groups and 
belligerents vis-à-vis mining sector in the DRC is that mining zones offers the 
opportunity to accessing strategic minerals at a very cheaper price. Henceforth, 
delinking (ex-) combatants from artisanal mining would need the restoration of the 
state’s authority, the achievement of an effective (ex-) combatants’ DDR and the 
reform of the security system. In this context, conceptualising a new DDR framework, 
which hinges around individual-centred and community-centred reintegration, seems 
to be the bedrock of the demilitarisation process and the security of the demilitarised 
mining zones. This, therefore, would not only address returnees’ concerns, but also 
the community’s. 
 
4. The analysis of the recurrence of combatants’ (re-) recruitment and reintegration in 
the mining zones in the Kivus shows that the failure of the peacebuilding efforts in the 
Kivus is one of the results of the deficiency of reliable security system by the state. 
This involves the state’s incapability to extend legitimate violence over its mining-
endow territories under the squatters control and its inability to use its attributes of 
sovereignty. Therefore, reinforcing the process of severing the artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment link, and preventing and breaking violence in the Kivus would 
require a ‘militarisation of war-affected zones administrations’. Then ‘militarised 
administrations’ will ‘demilitarise former rebel militarisation’ in mining areas for a 
‘new remilitarisation’, whose aim is security of mining zones and stability. This 
process can end up with the improvement of security stabilisation. This implies that 
all belligerents must be kept away from mining zones, while mining activities that aim 
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at feeding violence in the Kivus should be banned. In this context, economic, political 
and social rehabilitation of ex-combatants and their home community should go hand 
in glove during the post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding efforts. This also 
includes the creation of natural resources management system which will factor into 
local, national and regional interests, if the processes of demilitarisation and severing 
the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment link are envisioned to be strengthened. 
Conversely, given that reconditioning fragmented communities – that have developed 
mistrusted relationship based on ethnic tensions, with each of them maintaining ethnic 
military wing, is part of peacebuilding processes, local community participation in 
this context may be envisaged as a path to reinforcing all solutions with regard to 
severing artisanal mining-combatant relationship. The efficiency of these processes 
would be possible only if the state is able to reform the management of its security 
system based on a state’s proactive intelligence system or an anticipative and 
offensive intelligence system capable to forestall events.  
On the basis of the above, the thesis analysed how demilitarising mining zones can contribute 
to ending the cycle of the combatants’ (re-) recruitment, the unfolded nature of the 
combatants’ DDR process, illegal exploitation and trade of mineral resources, and enhance 
peace and security in the Kivus, DRC. While breaking the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment nexus, as a new form of demilitarising mining zones, is seen to be a path towards 
curtailing and preventing armed movements and war entrepreneurs from resources, the 
research has found that there is the need for the local communities to participate in the 
processes of the demilitarisation of mining zones as their contribution may form the 
cornerstone of the process. As discussed in Chapters Four and Five, each every ethnic group 
in the Kivus has created its tribal militia and all tribes require being treated as equal when it 
comes to addressing economic, political and social issues concerning their communities. In 
this regard, the reliance on the top-down understanding of, and top-down solutions to the 
conflict that have overlooked local perspectives and favoured some ethnic groups over others 
– as is the case with Tutsi and Hutu, the ex-combatants’ DDR processes and SSR, have been 
largely driven by the agendas of external stakeholders like the specialised agencies of United 
Nations. This situation has led to the infiltration of foreign armies’ elements – particularly 
Rwandan and Ugandan even Burundian soldiers into the FARDC and the DRC’s security 
Chapter Seven: Conclusions and Recommendations   
Coventry University 334 
 
system, to the phenomenon of ‘combatants without borders’ and to the conflict resolution 
based on the ‘blend of belligerents’, ‘intermingling and mixing of combatants’ rather than a 
‘proper DDR process’ approach.   
In social sciences, facts are all-inclusive, with their perspective being contextualised and 
specific, to the extent that the analysis of their aetiology cannot be approached in an isolated 
manner. The ‘nexus between artisanal mining and the combatant’s recruitment, reintegration 
and re-recruitment cycle’ approach has been able to bring into light the ‘artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment nexus’ although it was barely possible to physically locate the 
presence of combatants within the mining sites since they use proxies or intermediaries to 
hide their trading activities. The recruitment of combatants like the war economy is deeply 
networked and well integrated to the point that it has changed the existing widespread 
informal economy. This can be detected in the nuanced perspectives of the local stakeholders. 
Demilitarising mining zones therefore would not significantly improve security issues 
without understanding the informal sector in the DRC. Neither would it contribute to end or 
prevent the conflicts unless communities are reconditioned and their opinions included. 
Based on the conflict aetiology, it has been established that the causes of the conflicts in the 
Kivus include many factors among others; militarisation of mining zones, access of 
belligerents to natural resources, mismanagement of the mining sector and poor quality state 
leadership as well as the 1884 Charter creating the DRC. In addition to this, the emergence of 
other new regional powers within an environment characterised by an unbalanced geography 
of resources, has all played roles in creating marginalisation, inequality and insecurity that 
have allowed gunmen, strongmen and a group of elites from within and outside of the country 
to have access to resources. The situation ignited grievance and conflict as resources were not 
distributed fairly. There is no concrete evidence and assurance as to what would thwart (ex-) 
combatants from accessing revenues from illegal exploitation of mineral resources after they 
have gone through the DDR process. Furthermore, the ‘nexus between artisanal mining and 
the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants approach’, which focuses on 
the ‘demilitarisation of mining zones’, is partial and coercive method for the following main 
reason; demilitarising mining areas may switch military balance in favour of the government 
therefore victimising and criminalising (ex-) combatants by dismissing any political 
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grievances regardless of their legitimacy, legitimating and protecting state authorities despite 
their implication in violence, and getting rid of prospects for diplomatic negotiation.    
In addressing the research question, overall we can conclude that this research has 
endeavoured to shed light on the issue regarding how and why ending and preventing the 
nexus between artisanal mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment cycle of 
combatants in the eastern DRC. ‘Demilitarisation of mining zones’ has been used as the 
theoretical concept. For the purpose of this research, demilitarising mining zones is 
conceptualised as a social condition that emerges when change and transformation occur at 
local and community levels. This study has examined local level changes, particularly from a 
‘severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus’ perspective which involves the 
participation of the whole community to the process and how could local ownership and 
authorship influence not only a new conflict understanding and new solutions, but also create 
a new social identity through communities recondition. In precise, these are my main 
findings; the community-based approach or local communities’ participation, which is a 
major short-coming of the ‘demilitarisation of the mining zones’ approach examined in this 
research, highlights the challenges in breaking the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment 
nexus by only including a wide range of military operations, due to the nature of the conflict 
in question. In this regard, the research has suggested that military actions against illegal 
exploitation of mining may be ineffective owing to the army which is supposed to lead 
military actions is itself involved in the illegal exploitation and the minerals trade. Due to this 
conflict of interest, this is the challenge for the army which normally should not be involved 
in the demilitarisation of mining zones. However, it is important to bear in mind that the army 
as a whole but just portion of officers and soldiers that are in acquaintance with illegal mining 
exploitation and trading. There still is a way to demilitarise mining zones with the army and 
with the support of the Kivus’ communities.  
Considered at the heart of the demilitarisation process, community-based approach may shift 
the analysis and comprehension of the conflict in the Kivus from the ‘top-down 
understanding’ to the ‘bottom-up understanding’. As a repercussion, solutions to the conflict 
would switch from ‘top-down solutions’ to ‘bottom-up solutions’. This is what this thesis has 
called ‘local ownership and authorship’, which could form the groundwork for sustainable 
peace in the Kivus. Local ownership and authorship can enable communities’ recondition 
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which is indispensable for a new DDR process following the demilitarisation of mining 
zones. However, due to armed groups in the Kivus being supplied from various sources – 
including neighbouring countries, and due to insecurity dividends gleaned by strong men, 
combatants without borders and other peace spoilers – such as armed bandits, hoodlums etc. 
who want to achieve their ulterior motives in the community through insecurity and resource 
pillage, community-based approach might yield less hope than expected. Therefore, the 
traceability of minerals, weapons and finance needs to go along not only with the control of 
the borders, but also with the development of internal and external mining-development 
geopolitics that hinge on both local and regional economic interests. This divergence is all 
within an environment characterised by bad governance and poor leadership leading the state 
on one hand, and on the other by armed conflicts and an army made of businessmen involved 
in illegal mining exploitation. The concept of community-based approach requires 
reconsideration in terms of necessary economic, political and social change to make it more 
practical in order to elucidate the extent to which military actions and the participation of 
local communities is sought. In addition, the arguments presented in this thesis have 
contributed to ongoing academic debates on conflict analyses, the absurdity of abundance 
hypothesis, the political economy of armed groups vis-à-vis mining sector, and the 
combatants’ socio-economic insertion in particular. This is the point in which the thesis 
contributes to knowledge by shedding light on the theoretical contention of applying the 
demilitarisation of mining zones as a means of breaking down the artisanal mining-
combatant-recruitment nexus. 
As a social fact, the analysis of economic motivations cannot be isolated from other factors 
for they can be regarded as a symptom of underlying insecurity and grievance. The thesis 
investigated the challenges of country-based reductionist approaches and their over-emphasis 
on the economic dimensions of armed movements throughout my analysis with regard to the 
conflicts in the Kivus. Such analyses are limited as to the multi-layered complex nature of the 
conflicts. The research came up with ‘demilitarisation of artisanal mining zones’ as one of the 
solutions towards breaking down the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus. 
According to the demilitarisation theory administrations of war-torn zones need to be 
militarised – good militarisation, in order to demilitarise mining zones – bad militarisation. 
Such a process will require a strong and visionary leadership which drives the understanding 
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of the course of events in which the country was, is and could be involved. This further will 
contribute to the development of a viable national framework for resource management, with 
a focus on mineral and finance traceability and to the initiation of a new combatants DDR 
process that takes into account  both Security Sector Reform and economic, political and 
social reintegration aspects. It will eventually consider creating a mechanism of dialogue 
between different ethnic groups in the Kivus, whereby communities would be given 
opportunity to voice their concern and contribute to their development instead of using 
violence as a means towards attaining their objectives. This is the point in which the thesis 
contributes to practice. 
This research was significant because it has achieved the research objectives set at the 
introduction by offering empirical analysis and data on the combatants’ recruitment and the 
DDR process and the artisanal mining sector with regard to the state failure and protracted 
armed conflict in the DRC. It has demonstrated how combatants contribute to offering the 
opportunity to access mineral resources at a cheaper price, which context requires a solution 
such as the involvement of the above mentioned elements as a backbone of the 
demilitarisation of the mining zones and the severing of the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment nexus. Although it is difficult to ascertain the physical presence of combatants in 
mining sites, the nexus between combatant-recruitment and artisanal mining-armed groups is 
feeding each other. Curbing financial resources accrued from small arms and light weapons 
derived from mineral resources for the combatants would end and prevent violence. 
However, the distinctly different perspectives amongst local communities could be 
incorporated into the military activities towards demilitarising mining zones, as it provided an 
insight into how and why the local communities may be needed concretely to partake fully in 
ending and preventing the armed conflicts in the eastern DRC.   
It should be highlighted that a recent claim from a group of mining experts in the DRC 
indicates that Dodd-Frank Law did not live up to the local communities’ expectations. This 
law has not only been a blow to the local communities – who depend on artisanal mining, but 
did not completely help close criminal networks that have crystallised around illegal 
exploitation of minerals. They further claim that neither local communities nor civil society’s 
view has been taken into account in drafting this legislation. This claim is closest to that of 
the main finding of my research in that bottom-up understanding and bottom-up solutions 
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that factor in communities recondition, local ownership and authorship, a new DDR process, 
finance and mineral traceability, the need of internal and external mining-development 
geopolitics may be included in the process of demilitarising mining zones and severing the 
artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment nexus. Having concluded, the following section 
presents a set of recommendations.  
7.3 Key Recommendations 
Since the end of the Cold War, a general belief and optimism based on peace and 
development thrived from the developing world, also known as the reservoir of natural 
resources and conflicts. Contrary to the above, however, the hope of the developing world 
has given rise to an increase of local conflicts based on the problem of geography of 
resources, which has become rooted within resource-rich countries such as the DRC. These 
conflicts result from identity, land access, governance, insecurity issues to name a few, which 
in turn have become the conflict ‘push factors’ once tied in with economic concerns. Owing 
to the total comprehensiveness and the specific contextualisation of social facts in their 
analysis, military actions to be taken against unauthorised armed groups occupying illegally 
mining zones would be effective, if they are associated with tackling with issues and needs 
concerned with the local communities.  
The local community-based approach would not only be a path towards escaping illegal 
militarisation of mining areas, but also may reconfigure the nature of the state, its 
governance, political regime, and the state leadership through empowering communities. In 
this case, the demilitarisation of mining zones could have a domino effect, thus resource 
curse could turn into resource blessing. For this to be effective, there is the need for collecting 
ideas about how to address these issues and needs, and what has been obstructing the 
progress of the situations on ground. Such approach could contribute to developing policies 
and decisions for conflict resolutions that could encourage the establishment and the 
consolidation of a national civil structure capable of controlling the main mining activities, 
and managing equitably the extraction and trade of natural resources in the eastern DRC. This 
will enhance sustainable peace and security by incorporating these issues and the views of 
critical local communities whose concerns and perspectives have not been factored in.  
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As for the government, the first thing to bear in mind is that mineral-based conflict in the 
DRC is limited within a territorial area bordering countries that are harbouring territorial 
ambitions and hegemony to secure their future in natural resources and in land access. The 
economic survival of these countries relies on the pillage of the DRC’s natural resources. For 
these countries – Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, the rich provinces of the Kivu is their 
hinterland and needs to be kept under perpetual insecurity in order to control their resources. 
It is up to the DRC’s government to stop these neighbouring inclinations, either through 
military actions or by developing a common policy of natural resources management. This 
means that, the DRC’s government may need to account for the interest of the neighbours in 
the analysis of the exploitation of the DRC’s mineral resources.  
As the country is entering the third phase of DDR, the government and all stakeholders 
should be aware that the access of armed groups to minerals is one major reason which fuels 
and sustains war in the eastern DRC. Severing the artisanal mining-combatant-recruitment 
nexus and preventing rebels from financial sources could require DDR and SSR that align 
corporate strategy, delivery mechanisms for change and business-as-usual environment. All 
this might be possible only if the programme has real picture of the future capability, if there 
is a clearly defined or communicated vision, if the organisation is able to change its culture 
and if there is a sufficient engagement of stakeholders.  
The multi-layered and hybrid nature of the conflict in the Kivus involves local, national and 
regional levels of analysis since it encompasses several players. This is where lies in the 
importance of responsible and visionary leadership capable to handle local, national and 
regional interests through privileging the state’s security independence. In politics, leadership 
is about being able to work collectively and co-operatively in order to achieve community’s 
desire, and yield effective and satisfactory – popular, results. Leadership always goes along 
with history remembrance and anticipated actions and results. It has been more than 50 years 
since the DRC’s independence; however, the country is still lacking a resource of good state 
managers and a responsible and effective leadership (Kitenge N’Gambwa 2011).  
Debate centres on the issue of the resource-based conflicts and rebellions in the DRC (Dagne 
2011; Kitenge N’Gambwa 2011) depict that since 1960 up to date the country’s leadership 
has been missing out three attributes to obtain the utmost for the country’s welfare. These 
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attributes can be summarised as the lack of a real vision for the DRC’s future, skills and 
capacity to achieve the vision, and the desirable character to safeguard the realisation of the 
vision with sound judgment, integrity and equity (Kitenge N’Gambwa 2011). To date, the 
DRC’s Diaspora lays blames on the DRC’s government of managing the state under the 
influence of Rwandan leadership,408 to the extent that it is believed that the Congolese 
institutions are infiltrated at all levels by Rwandans.409 This view is closest to that of a 
member of the north Kivu’s civil society for whom, this type of Rwandan leadership is 
territorially circumscribed and only pretends to control the DRC’s territories-rich in natural 
resources but not the whole state.410 Breaking from the DRC’s past shapes of poor 
governance, it is arguable that the government needs a clear and practical vision for the 
country’s future; which has to be articulated and applied. This vision will however require 
determined effort from a new leadership (Dagne 2011). This type of leadership should come 
from the Congolese people both living in the country and those who are part of its far-flung 
Diaspora. Opportunities and avenues for reform include revamping democratic governance 
and electoral reform, promoting economic growth by moving beyond aid and creating a 
favourable environment for investment, reforming the mining sector, improving the health 
and education systems, and strengthening the DRC’s judiciary. A well-organised and 
invigorated Congolese Diaspora can join with Congolese living in the DRC to work towards 
the reforms. The upcoming elections in December 2016 offer a chance to step up these 
organisational and advocacy efforts. There is still work to be done on this issue. 
Nowadays there is a survival problem, in terms of demography and geography of resources, 
in Rwanda and Uganda which triggers insecurity and violence in the Region of Great Lakes 
(Burnley 2011; Nabishaka 2011). This situation would linger for a while if not addressed 
properly. It happens to be important to initiate a regional and common policy framework on 
mining activities; which guarantees regional and common interests. This needs not only a 
political willingness but also a strong leadership to remember history and to anticipate 
events.411 Yet, taking a look at the first and second World Wars, it looks to be like the 
                                                 
408 Focus group, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
409 Interview conducted with former Governor of the Kivu province, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
410 Interview conducted with a member of the north Kivu’s civil society, Kinshasa, September 2013. 
411 Focus group, Kinshasa, August 2013. 
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Congolese crisis is not worse than the one Europe went through. With its valuable human and 
natural resources, associated with the geostrategic and geo-economical position of the 
country at the heart of Africa, the DRC is capable to build a strong, stable and prosperous 
state which could serve as a kick-off point for the development of other countries in Africa. 
This leaves room to former Adviser at the office of the Prime Minister to acknowledge that 
issues relating to governance, strong leadership and regional cooperation need to be looked 
into.412 
Precisely seeing through an endogenous lens, the artisanal mining-combatants-recruitment 
cycle can be explained with a simple reason; the emergence of the mining sector from rentier 
economy. Mining has created a temporary wealth and is the backbone of a rentier economy in 
the Congo, only accessible to a category of elites (De Koning 2010; 2011). Severing this 
relationship requires surpassing it by using mineral income to create other important sectors 
of prosperity such as agriculture, new technology, etc. in order to reduce poverty and the 
likelihood of social conflict.413 Poverty has been proved to be the catalytic element of 
violence and conflict in all human societies (Tschirgi 2013). It leads to violence and becomes 
the roots of violence (Özerdem and Podder 2011) in all states that rely on rentier economy 
and where poverty is severe.  
As my fieldwork’s findings indicate, when a country shifts from rentier economy to an 
integrated economy – based on intra and extra-border exchanges, people become less poor 
and less aggressive. An integrated economy alleviates violence and conflict. However, any 
society facing economic hardship, conflict becomes endemic. Countries that have solved the 
problem of geography of resources encounter less conflict. Resource blessing will occur only 
if resources are rationally used as a starting point to accumulate investment capital in order to 
get rid of rentier economy. Mining is the hub of the economy and part of national 
sovereignty; therefore actions towards demilitarising mining sites occupied illegally are 
needed.414 
                                                 
412 Interview conducted with former Adviser at the office of the Premier Minister, Kinshasa, October 2013. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Interviews conducted with a number of academics, Kinshasa, July 2013. 
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7.4 Future Research 
There are a number of thematic clusters that merit further research. Firstly, army 
“intermingling and mixing” was a central agenda element with respect to the management of 
ex-combatants. Yet, in order to keep the research focused on the artisanal mining-combatant-
recruitment nexus; this issue is barely included in this study. This issue is worthy of a 
separate research project, mostly from a security sector reform and state-building perspective.  
Secondly, the nature of public participation was briefly discussed in Chapter Six. As the 
country is entering the third phase of DDR, a further study focusing on public participation, 
but concurrently taking into account potential effects and applications of the social, political 
and economic reintegration of ex-combatants, could be more helpful in understanding 
peacebuilding in the eastern DRC. Another set of researches on the local content or corporate 
social responsibility in line with how best local communities’ suggestions can be conveyed 
on to the authorities and stakeholders is needed. The future research should consider how and 
why the community-based approach can reinforce the perceptions of good militarisation 
based on the military protection of strategic mining zones. For this research, an applied 
research study, facilitating dialogue with wider national and international actors as well as 
local communities in particular would be desirable. 
Thirdly, there was no scope to concentrate on how the emergence of new regional powers 
impacts on the unfolded nature of the DDR and on the (re-) recruitment of (ex-) combatants 
in the mining zones. There is a need to explore the link between new regional powers and the 
ongoing instability in the eastern DRC focusing on the unfolding nature of the DDR and the 
cycle of combatants’ recruitment emerging in the Kivus should be turned into sustainable 
peace and development process. 
Fourthly, as an aftermath of the ongoing conflict in the DRC, combatants are constantly 
involved in various forms of violence and unlawful exploitation of mining, since the DDR 
processes have been piecemeal. The involvement of combatants in violent conflicts in mining 
zones in the eastern DRC suggests forcibly recruited and voluntary combatants from different 
armed groups take part in the perpetration of violence. A multivariate analysis of variance 
revealed that voluntary combatants are likely to perpetrate more violent acts and are inclined 
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to higher appetitive aggression. Forcibly recruited combatants however commit less violence, 
but are much more exposed to the PTSD. Further studies might consider assessing the 
combatant’s perception of committing violent acts as a means towards accessing resources. 
Fifth, artisanal mining has a significant impact on economic development and poverty 
reduction in certain mining producer-countries. However, in the DRC, it is prone to conflict 
and generates benefits for armed groups and their supporters instead of producing profits for 
both local communities – artisanal miners, and government. In the DRC’s artisanal mining 
zones, particularly in the Kivus, the key issue is that most mining concessions are declared 
artisanal mining zones, opened to artisanal miners. Yet artisanal activities operate outside the 
regulatory framework of the state. Hence, there is the need for researching on how to 
formalise the artisanal mining sector and on how to embody this informal sector into a 
standardised legal framework which is registered in and governed by a central state system. 
This research may further explore the current artisanal mining top-down formalisation policy 
and the bureaucratic and technical measure that compound but do not address different 
problems associated with this sector; in particular conflict, informality, poverty, illegality, 
state control.  
Sixth, the state-building process in the DRC needs the understanding of political process and 
the challenges associated with the colonial legacy. This is key to understanding the 
achievements, or lack thereof, of SSR. Different trajectories of the Congo’s power struggle 
went through three phases; foreign occupation and stalled SSR efforts; transition period 
where former enemy forces were merged under a single umbrella; and a post-electoral phase 
where competing strategic agendas were settled. All of these have severely constrained 
available options in terms of SSR. It also paved the way for the Congolese army to be 
composed of a hodgepodge of experienced soldiers, former self-defence units, more or less 
efficient armed groups and ex-religious zealots. This issue is worthy of a separate research 
project, mostly from the exploration of the interdependence between the political process and 
the de-politicisation of security apparatus in a post-conflict state. 
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Mineral-based Conflicts 
Name & Date of 
Creation 
Prominent Leader Recruitment Ideology 
& Political Objectives 
Ethnic Base Size & Area 
Controlled 
Financing Sources                  Foreign Support 
Support to Rebels Support to Gov. 




Unpaid soldiers in the 
east;  
Ethnic representation in 
government 





- Large part of the 
eastern region 
- Army base: 
11,000 troops in 2002 







MLC, 1998 Jean-Pierre Bemba - Anti Kabila 
- Ugandan and 
Rwandan  security  
- Strategic interests 







- Equateur Province; 
- Army base: 
5,000-10,000 in 2002 
-Diamonds, gold, 
timber 







RCD-Kisangani, 1999 E.W.D Wamba - Anti Kabila 
-Ugandan and 
Rwandan  security  
- Strategic interests 
Multiple groups - Kisangani, Central-
eastern Province 









Appendix   
Coventry University 416 
 
RCD-Goma, 1999 Emile Ilunga; Déo 
Bugera; Adolphe 
Onusumba 
- Anti Kabila 
- Ugandan and 
Rwandan  security  
- Strategic interests 
Multiple groups - North and South 
Kivus, 
parts of the North 
Katanga 











L. Nkundabatware -Ugandan and 
Rwandan  security  
- Strategic interests 









M23, 2012 B. Bisimwa, JM 
Runiga,  Makenga 
-Ugandan and 
Rwandan  security  
- Strategic interests 
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Appendix Three: Fieldwork schedule and the categories of participants 
Interviewees  
Name Gender  Organization Location Date Background 
 
M Private sector   Kinshasa 15.08.2013 










M Civil Society  Kinshasa  25.07.2013 
M Civil Society Kinshasa  08.08.2013 
M Civil Society Kinshasa  06.09.2013 
M  Brussels  26.11.2013 
M Civil society Paris  07.12.2013 
M Mining Sector  Kinshasa  25.07.2013 
















interview   
 
18.09.2013 




























M  Paris  09.12.2013 





M Civil Society Kinshasa  22.08.2013 
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Data Protection. 
The unabridged 
version of the 
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This item has been removed 
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University.
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interview  
F Private Sector Kinshasa  07.08.2013 










M  Kinshasa  11.09.2013 
M Political  Kinshasa  25.07.2013 









M Political  Kinshasa  17.09.2013 
M  Kinshasa  28.09.2013 
M Private Sector Paris  11.12.2013 







F  Brussels  22.11.2013 
M Political Brussels  18.11.2013 
F Mining Sector  London  10.11.2013 
F Mining Sector  Coventry  06.11.2013 





























This item has 
been removed due 
to Data Protection. 
The unabridged 
version of the 
thesis can be 




This item has been removed 
due to Data Protection. The 
unabridged version of the 
thesis can be viewed in the 
Lanchester Library Coventry 
University.
Appendix   
Coventry University 419 
 
Focus Group Discussions 
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Appendix Four: Interview semi-structured questions 
Interview Questions 
Theme I:  
The relationship between Mining and the Recruitment of Combatants 
1. As the Global Witness has just published some high rank military officials of both Congo and 
neighbouring countries are involved in mining exploitation in the DRC. Can you comment on this?  
2. Could you tell me a bit about what happened in the mining zones controlled by armed group as far as 
the recruitment of combatants are concerned? 
- Which areas are particularly affected by this phenomenon? 
- Which armed groups target such zones? 
- What particular tactics they use in their recruitment? 
- How do they mine mineral resources in the zones they control? 
- What do they do with these mined minerals? 
3. Can you explain how and why this relationship is recurrent after ex-combatants have been demobilised, 
disarmed and reintegrated? 
4. What are the consequences of this relationship? 
5. As we know the close relationship between mining and recruitment of combatants is a huge challenge 
for the DRC, therefore could you tell me how can such a relationship be broken down? 
Theme II: 
Demilitarisation of the Mining Zones 
1. Can you tell me what state security provision there are in mining zones, and who is in charge of it?  
2. As we understand some mining zones are controlled by armed groups. Could you tell me how can they 
be demilitarised? 
3. How can the mining areas be safe and secured after being demilitarised? 
4. What can the impact of reintegration be on demilitarising the mining areas? 
5. What needs to be done so that they (reintegration outcomes) can be effective to prevent the re-
recruitment of combatants in mining zones? 
Theme III: 
Political Economy of the Congolese Mining Sector 
1. Based on the extant code of mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo, how is the mining sector 
regulated and organised? 
2. Based on doing business and EITI, the DRC is performing badly, while the Kimberley control is 
regarding diamond control is failing to reach the target. Can you comment on this? 
3. What are strengths and weaknesses of the existing code of mining, and that of mining investment?  
4. Can you explain whether these weaknesses are linked to the inadequacy of existing laws or to their 
application? 
5. How do armed groups profit from this situation? 
6. What roles mining companies and traders play in strengthening the existing rebel groups?  
7. What roles are there do you think for mining companies in promoting good governance in the mining 
sector?   
8. How can mining sector contribute to good governance and social peace?  
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Appendix Five: Ethics Approval Authorisation 
REGISTRY RESEARCH UNIT 
ETHICS REVIEW FEEDBACK FORM 
 
(Review feedback should be completed within 10 working days) 
Name of applicant: Magha Gimba……………………  
Faculty/School/Department: [Business, Environment and Society] BES International Studies and Social 
Science……………………………… 
Research project title: The Nexus between Artisanal Mining and the Recruitment, Reintegration and Re-
recruitment of Combatants in the Kivus, Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
Comments by the reviewer 
 
Evaluation of the ethics of the proposal: 
 
Dear Charles 
This application is almost complete, but you still have to deal with a couple of things. 
In particular, you still need to include some information on the consent form (see my previous comments) - you still have not 
included a sentence to give permission for interviews to be recorded. If you are taping participants you must have this on the 
consent form. 
 
Evaluation of the participant information sheet and consent form: 
 
1) can you include Alp's contact details on the participant information sheet (his name and email are enough) 
 
2) The consent form could also do with a little more detail. If you look at the examples of consent forms on the CU 
Ethics system under the documentation tab you will see what I mean. In particular you need to get your interview 
candidates to consent to being tape recorded. 
Recommendation: 
(Please indicate as appropriate and advise on any conditions.  If there any conditions, the applicant will be required to resubmit 
his/her application and this will be sent to the same reviewer). 
X Approved - no conditions attached 
 Approved with minor conditions (no need to re-submit) 
 Conditional upon the following – please use additional sheets if necessary (please re-submit application) 
  
 Rejected for the following reason(s) – please use other side if necessary 
  
 Not required 
 
Name of reviewer:  Anonymous  
 
Date:  24/01/2013  
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Appendix Six: Interview briefing sheet 
 
Study title: 
The Nexus between Artisanal Mining and Recruitment, Reintegration and Re-recruitment Cycle of Combatants in the DR Congo. 
What is the purpose of the study? 
The aim of this study is to develop reflexions from peacebuilders within international and local non-governmental Organisations in the DR 
Congo and theorise about their experiences so as to get a greater grasping of how best to build sustainable peace in a post-conflict country 
with natural resources endowment from the political economy of mining in the DRC and other similar settings. 
Why have I been chosen? 
For the purpose of this study I need to interview a large number of those individuals who have been most involved in peacebuilding and 
mining sector in the DRC through their work in local and international NGOs. 
Do I have to take part? 
No. Participation is entirely voluntary. Even having completed the interview you may request for your comments to be excluded from the 
study. You can withdraw by contacting me by email and providing me with your participant information number.  If you decide to withdraw 
all your data will be destroyed and will not be used in the study.  There are no consequences to deciding that you no longer wish to 
participate in the study. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
I will carry out a short interview (30 minutes – 1 hour) which I will record on a digital audio devise. After the interview I may contact you 
again by email or phone to clarify certain points or to invite you to take part in a second interview. 
What are the possible disadvantages of taking part? 
I will aim to keep the interview as short as possible. If however you feel that you have a lot to share I may invite you to spend more time 
discussing this with me, which would involve you dedicating a longer period of time to the study. 
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
Your insights could make a significant contribution to deepening our understanding of the role of natural resources in conflicts recurrence in 
the east of the DRC and peacebuilding work that has taken place in there. It is only through studies such as this that those of us working 
within this field have the opportunity to share our knowledge with a wider audience and to learn from each other’s’ experiences for the 
future. 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
Yes. The information you share will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous. I will not name you or the organisation you belong to in 
the final publication. The interview data will be kept private and will be destroyed on completion of the study. I will not discuss the 
comments you make during the interview with any third person. 
What will happen to the results of the research study? 
The information collected will be written up and included in my final PhD thesis. There is the possibility that all or extracts of this thesis 
will be published (for example, in peer reviewed academic journals) or presented at conferences. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
The research is organised by Charles Gimba Magha and is a PhD research project based at the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies 
(CPRS) at Coventry University. 
Who has reviewed the study? 
This study has been through the University Peer Review process and been approved by the Chair of UARC/RDS-C. 
If you have any questions or queries Charles Gimba Magha will be happy to answer them via e-mail: gimbam@uni.coventry.ac.uk. If I 
cannot help you, you can speak to Professor Alpaslan Ozerdem, the Director of studies. 
Phone: +44 (24) 659069 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a participant or feel you have been placed at risk you can contact the Director of the studies, 
Prof Alpalan Ozerdem via e-mail: aa8681@coventry.ac.uk. 
Contact for Further Information. 
Charles Gimba Magha-A-Ngimba 
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My name is Charles Gimba Magha and I am currently undertaking research for my PhD studies at Coventry 
University. This interview is to help create an understanding of the nexus between mining and the recruitment, 
reintegration and re-recruitment of combatant cycle in the DRC. 
 
The interview aims to collect data and information towards the completion of this research. The research aim is 
to inquire and fill the gap in previous research as to what is the role of natural resources in the armed conflicts’ 
recurrence in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The main purpose of the research is to establish and examine 
the nexus between mining and the recruitment, reintegration and re-recruitment of combatants, and investigate 
the likely impact of such a link on the prolongation of the armed conflict in the DRC. 
 
The information gathered is for academic purposes which would help to increase knowledge and highlight ways 
of improvement for peacemakers, policymakers and other organisations, with your permission, I may digitally 
record your interview, and then it will be written out so that I have a record of what was said in the interview. 
Your views will be treated in-strictest confidence. 
 




 The participant signature must be witnessed by the researcher 




The consent Statement 
 
 
Participant Reference Code: _________ 
 
I have read and understand the attached participant information sheet and by signing below I consent to 
participate in this study.   
 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study without giving a reason at any time during the 
study itself.   
 
I understand that I also have the right to change my mind about participating in the study for two weeks after my 
participation in the study.  
 
Signed: ____________________________________________________ 
Print Name: _________________________________________________ 
 
Witnessed by: _______________________________________________ 
Print Name: _________________________________________________ 
 
Researcher’s Signature: Charles Gimba Magha 
Date_______________________________________________________ 
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